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I can have little doubt that the Prince Royal of Bavaria left you in good humour—and well he might; for, whatever appearance he might wear, his end was answered, and the incessant object of his Court, that of increasing their possessions by every means, gratified as far as it could be by proceedings at Milan, notwithstanding all the coquetry and affected coyness which MM. de Montgelas and Rechberg have since assumed at Munich, in declining to be charged with powers to carry the arrangement into effect; the true object of which is to throw all the odium of exacting sacrifices upon Austria. They well know that their acquisitions are abundantly excessive for any cession they are called upon to make, inclusive of that of contiguity. It is not necessary now to enter into the three modes of settling this matter which you state in your letter, as one of them has been finally chosen ; but convinced am I that, if this business had not been extremely mismanaged, (possibly through the state of parties at the Austrian Court) you would have had Bavaria upon her knees, seeking those very exchanges proposed by the Protocol, which have now been obtained by what appears to me a very profuse misemployment of the interests of third parties.
The whole case seems now to have taken an entirely new aspect. As far as relates to the engagements of the Allies, they are upon the eve of being fully satisfied by the completion of those very exchanges which by the Protocol of the 3rd November they undertook to support, and which they conceived comprised indemnities not only sufficient to counterbalance the territories required from Bavaria, but to satisfy her for the sacrifice of contiguity also. Had they thought otherwisethat so large a portion of territory as that of the circle of Main and Tauber was requisite for this purpose, and that so great a sacrifice could be justifiably exacted from Baden, surely they would have said so.
The question, then, to me appears a new one, and the Allies quite at liberty to take whatever line they may deem it expedient upon it; and I believe it will be found, however the others may act, that it will not become quite a facile matter to gain over the appui of a great Northern Power to this new demand.
I agree, nevertheless, with you that, if the four Allied Courts can press measures upon Bavaria, they may (though not à fortiori) urge certain cessions from Baden. This, to a certain degree, was already done by the Protocol, and to the extent of even endeavouring to obtain some further modification of territory, bounded by the moderate scale noticed in Lord Castlereagh's despatch to you of the 29th ultimo; some of them, we know, will not be indisposed to use ulterior efforts ; but really, when the demand is for one entire circle out of the nine of which the territories of Baden are composed, I should much doubt whether our Court will desire to become a party to such an exaction.
It may be true that all Powers have been, or may be, called upon to make sacrifices for the general peace: I should, however, like to know where, under the proposed arrangement, is the sacrifice of Bavaria. But surely, if the position is a true one, Baden will have the right to ask why she is to be called upon to make the sole and so great a sacrifice in the present instance, and this for the purpose of increasing the Bavarian territories. She may, and doubtless will, if urged upon this point, additionally ask why Wirtemberg is to be left untouched, and claim proportionate indemnity from this last Power as the price of her accession to the terms required ; and hence will arise all that unsettlement of territory which it was the object of the Allies to prevent, that complication of negociation which Lord Castlereagh so much and so justly deprecates, and that interminable scene of irritated discussion, which I cannot but apprehend as the result of such a procedure.
Till I shall receive a full and ample communication of the views of our Government upon this new situation of affairs, my march will be guided by Lord Castlereagh's despatch to you of the 29th January, and so as not to prevent my Court from going, if they shall so please, the full length of lopping off the ninth part of Baden without indemnity, for the future aggrandizement of Bavaria. Previously to the receipt of your letter, i.e., on the 20th instant, I sent home the whole of Wacquant's instructions, with their ten annexes, Wessenberg's Memoir only excepted. By accounts received yesterday from Munich, we do not expect to be set agoing here in less than a week, by which time, or very soon after, I should hope, full instructions from Lord Castlereagh will reach me. Should you go to England, I trust you will make this your road. You might afterwards go home by Brussels, where you will find James and Lady Emily. We have not a word here worth conveying: all is at a stand, and must continue to be so, till these recirements territoriauw shall have been settled. CLANCARTY.
Lord Clancarty to Lord Stewart.
Frankfort sur Maine, February 29, 1816.
My dear Charles—I wrote to you so lately in answer to yours of the 16th, that I have little to add to what I then said. Prince Metternich may imagine, and probably does, that he has acted with wonderful dexterity in arranging matters with Bavaria, at the expense of so considerable a sacrifice as that of the province of Main and Tauber, the property of a third party. But measures of this kind are not so easy to accomplish as to imagine; and, however he may have succeeded in effecting his own views upon Bavaria, he will find it totally different, and, if I mistake not, an unattainable matter to satisfy the expectations he has raised at the Court of Munich, for the purpose of extracting her consent to the recent arrangements.
You know the complexion of Lord Castlereagh's feelings upon this projected sacrifice of Baden, and how little his despatch to you of the 29th of January would justify our support of so considerable an unindemnified demand from the Court of Carlsruhe, more especially in addition to the cession required of her by the Protocol, and to the disposal in succession of a considerable and valuable territory belonging to that Government, without any concert with, or privity on its part.
If this is our case, what is likely to be the conduct of Russia on this new subject? Is it likely that she should stand forward to support this additional sacrifice on the part of her brother-in-law? I am not so simple as to imagine that his Imperial Majesty of Russia has any violent attachment to his wife's family, but, en revanche, he certainly does possess considerable predilection for his own fame, quite sufficient to prevent him from laying himself open to the censure of affording his support to the sacrifice required—not demanded with a view of indemnifying Bavaria, for that has been already amply done by the Protocol, but for the purpose of effectually aggrandizing that Power.
If this is the case with Great Britain and Russia, how stands it with Prussia upon this subject? If we may believe the assertions of her plenipotentiary here, (and I see no reason to discredit them on this point) he is directed to give full support to the arrangements of the Protocol; but (and these very recently received) on no account to go beyond these, unless he shall receive further and specific instructions to this effect; which, no doubt, if they shall be issued, will be based upon the demand of some considerable and probably inadmissible quid pro quo, as the price of Prussian good offices ; so thus another complication will arise in direct contravention of the wishes of all the Allies, as expressed at Paris.
With this view of the probable opinions of the several Allied Courts, there would appear to be but little likelihood of carrying the ulterior negociations, so brightly imagined by Prince Metternich, into effect. But this is not all-as I learn, and from good authority, Baden has resolved (and who can blame her?) not to send any Minister here, for the purpose of negociating sacrifices on her part without indemnities. If these shall be held out, in order to induce her to grant full powers to her Minister here, they must be held out at the expense of some other Power, possibly Wirtemberg, who will have the same right, and probably act in the same precise manner: so that, if these negociations shall ever be commenced, they will be interminable. If, on the other hand, an attempt should be made to carry Prince Metternich's happy project into effect by force, besides the public scandal of such a measure, it is very clear that two out of three Courts will never lend themselves to such a proceeding; neither will the third, unless induced to do so at a price for exceeding the value of the service. Under these circumstances, I can see but one way out of this labyrinth.
Prince Metternich acted with some dexterity in taking Count Rechberg at his word with respect to the estimated revenues of the circle of Main and Tauber. These being placed at 100,000 florins, Bavaria can have no title to look for more, although I doubt not these revenues amount to at least three times that sum. Nay, upon a subject of such complicated difficulty, aggrandized as she has been, and still will be, it would not be too much to ask of the Court of Munich to retire a little from the amount of the estimate of her plenipotentiary, and to be satisfied with a less increase of revenue than 100,000 florins. I should therefore propose that Austria, by her deliveries of salt to Bavaria, to the amount of 50,000 florins annually, without payment, should personally indemnify her to this extent; or, if she should like it better, that she should withdraw her demands upon the Court of Munich to that amount. Lord Castlereagh's despatch to you, of the 29th of January, would authorize the support of some further moderate sacrifice from Baden; and this, I should think,