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Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.
Frankfort sur Maine, October 23, 1816. My dear Lord—I write merely to acknowledge the receipt of yours from Mount Stewart of the 9th inst. Though we might have received an answer to your communication by Mills, from Vienna, on Thursday last, the 17th, allowing sufficient time for consideration, yet nothing has been received by Wessenberg from Metternich. The usual weekly Austrian courier arrived on Sunday the 20th, without a line. In fact, Wessenberg has not received a single word, as he informs me, from Metternich, relating to the Bado-Bavarian negociation, since the 30th of August last. It may be possible that some view may be entertained at Vienna, of arranging matters with Bavaria, and thus terminating our proceedings during the reunion, in consequence of the approaching marriage; and the departure hence of the Comte de Rechberg, and his arrival on Monday last at Vienna, may afford apparent facilities for this.
I should, however, doubt, in the present irritable disposition of Bavaria towards Austria, and which appears but little allayed by the expected connexion, that it will be found easy to settle matters to the satisfaction of the former, without sacrifices which the latter will not be inclined to make. I hope you will approve and find the course I have adopted conformable with your views, as announced in your letter of the 9th, upon the subject of the 16th Article of the Netherland Treaty.
This Article has now been changed in redaction into the form herewith enclosed, and in this shape both Wessenberg and Anstett have approved of it, and also of the whole treatyobjecting on the part of my Court that, even in its present shape, it should enter into any treaty to which the Prince Regent should be made an immediate party, I have agreed that the treaty between Prussia and the Netherlands, of which it will form a part, should be annexed to and incorporated with
our final treaty here; and this, in the modified form in which this particular Article stands, and by which the whole discussion is left open for the Diet, cannot prejudice whatever his Royal Highness may think fit to do in his capacity of Regent of Hanover.
Adieu-I will send you in my next the copy of a letter I have received from Prince Leopold, and a copy of my answer, not yet written, in which a strong effort is made on his Highness's part to involve me in the little intrigue, of which one of your former letters makes mention. I need not add, that the attempt will be ineffectual.
ARTICLE XVI. La place de Luxembourg étant forteresse de la Confédération Germanique, et les Gouvernemens de la Prusse et des PaysBas ne pouvant, en conséquence, être censés avoir obligation de l'entretien exclusivement à leurs frais pour la défense commune, la question de ces entretiens, sur les modifications spécifiées dans les Articles précédens est expressément réservée aux discussions de la Diète.
Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.
Mount Stewart, October 26, 1816. My dear Bathurst— I feel, with you, the question between Spain and Portugal to be a very embarrassing one, especially to us; I also incline to think that, as a line of absolute neutrality or indifference would, in the long run, be hardly practicable, the most prudent mode of interfering will be by considering the whole as a species of infraction of the Treaty of Vienna, and that on this ground we should invite the five other Allied Powers who signed that settlement to concur with us in offering a joint mediation to arrange all differences in such manner as may be consistent with the preservation of the general pacification there concluded. This will mix France
and Sweden in the question. The latter will be no embarrassment: the former Power it is essential to carry along with us. If this is our ultimate measure, the only question is how to prevent additional complications that may in the mean time occur. I rather think, whatever may be threatened, that nothing can happen during the winter. The Spaniards have no army in a state of equipment to enter Portugal. At this season, and, I believe, till the green forage exists, which is not till late in May, operations are utterly impracticable in that country, without a scale of preparation of which the Spanish Government is wholly incapable. On the other hand, we hear of no preparations in Portugal for sending more force across the Atlantic; nor can this be attempted without our having full notice. My notion, then, is that, if you cannot gain time upon the plea of the present separation of the Cabinet, you should take up the ground of declining a separate interference, declaring, at the same time, that the Prince Regent cannot see with indifference so serious an interruption to the general tranquillity, and that it was his intention immediately to call the attention of his Allies who signed the Peace of Vienna to the question, for the purpose of interposing their good offices conjointly to settle matters. Pending this reference, I think it desirable, if possible, to keep matters quiet, without actually engaging to stop the Portuguese Government from moving troops. This is a strong measure in principle, and it is desirable to tranquillize the Spanish Government, by showing them the improbability of such an attempt, rather than by pledging ourselves by force to prevent it. As far as management goes, there can be no difficulty in saying that our endeavours will be so directed. Perhaps it is an additional motive for making this a Congress question, in order that we may be enabled, with the concurrence of Europe, to force upon Spain some more liberal
and practicable system for South America. The conduct of Portugal is not to be defended, and yet she might well say that Spain, by driving her colonies into revolt, was, in fact, republicanizing the whole continent, and ultimately subverting the Portuguese monarchy in the Brazils.
I think Spain may wait with the less impatience the interference of Europe, as she hardly yet can judge of the state of affairs in the Plate, and she must depend upon recovering her ground there by negociation rather than by arms. Whilst in Europe, if the attack upon Portugal is looked to upon a principle of holding that country as a counter-security, she had better not involve herself in a war of serious expense and possible failure, till she sees clearly that she has no other expedient left by which she can do herself justice.
The conduct of Portugal is odious and indefensible; and yet that of Spain to Portugal, about Olivenza, is little better. The two Cabinets are well matched in dishonesty and shabbiness.
Ever yours, in haste,
Mr. à Court to Lord Castlereagh.
Naples, October 28, 1816. My dear Lord--The whole of our embarrassments arise from the reports of Prince Ruffo, who does not cease to encourage this Government in its resistance of our demands, and it requires several conferences with M. de Circello to do away with the impressions produced by a single letter from Vienna, the nature of the advice given being so much in consonance with the feelings of the Government here. I am obliged to hold a strong language, to convince the Neapolitan Ministers that we are in carnest. Ruffo tells then that we are acting only for form's sake. This is readily believed, more particularly as the information is derived from a person so much in the confidence of Prince Metternich as Ruffo is supposed to be.
The Ministers here have received letters from the Governor of Messina, stating that it is certainly the intention of the American Commodore to winter in that port. Notwithstanding the refusal given to Mr. Pinkney, the Americans have again demanded permission to erect a telegraph and to establish an hospital; and, although the Governor of Messina has instructions to persist in his former refusal, M. de Circello is not without considerable uneasiness upon the subject.
The insolent and outrageous conduct of some of the American squadron towards the master of a British merchantman, has already been detailed to your lordship by Mr. Douglas. The recurrence of similar scenes is extremely probable, if the Americans winter at Messina. Indeed, we may almost consider it as certain ; and consequently the Marquis Circello asked me, a few days since, by desire of the King, whether he should confine himself to remonstrances, or adopt more rigorous measures, in the event of any future proceedings of the same nature. I told him that “our unarmed merchant-ships, so long as they continued in the ports of his Sicilian Majesty, must be considered as under his protection ; that it certainly was the duty of every Sovereign to cause the laws of nations to be respected within the limits of his sovereignty."
This is a subject which merits a very serious attention, and I venture to suggest to your lordship whether it may not be advisable that instructions should be sent to Admiral Penrose to order some of his cruisers to look occasionally into Messina, in order to observe the motions of these people, and to keep them in some sort of check.
I have not yet had time to look about me, or to inquire into the state of things here, but, from all I am told, I do not think that the complexion of affairs has improved during my absence. There is a great deal of intrigue going on, particularly in the military department. One intrigue has placed General Nugent at the head of the Neapolitan army, and another, I think, bids fair to remove him. The General, with