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night, that he did not know the face of one of his colleagues, and has not heen in France since 1790; you may therefore judge of the difficulties he has to encounter. The Assembly, I understand, will support the Court; if they can be kept in order, matters may go on whilst we stay here, and they may mend; but the great difference between the new and the former Government is that, with the dismissed Ministers, the King might have stayed in Paris, with the Allies on the frontier. With his new servants, there seems but one opinion, that, if the Allied troops were to withdraw, his Majesty would not be on his throne a week. This may all come round, but it is a serious experiment to force upon us, who are the guardians of his royal person.
The Duke of Richelieu's connexion with the Emperor of Russia, and Pozzo being mixed in all that is passing, gives naturally to the new Government a strong Russian tinge; and it is already attacked on this ground. Hitherto, notwithstanding the tone of protection, which is a favourite one with the Emperor, I do not think that we have had any reason to complain of his Imperial Majesty's conduct in any part of our negociation, even since the change, and he bears our operations at the Louvre very quietly. The whole will soon disappear. The King of the Netherland has finished; the Emperor of Austria is far advanced; and the Pope is going to begin.
Talleyrand played me a very shabby trick on this business. I promised to show him privately my note, and lent it to him, with a few lines marked private. Though evidently not addressed to him, he made the note a peg to hang a popular answer upon. Not choosing to sanction so shabby a breach of confidence, I sent him a very short answer, for the purpose of telling him he had done an unworthy act, and that it had made no impression. I shall write as soon as I can give you any delight.
Yours very sincerely, Castlereagh.
Mr. Foster to Lord Castlereagh.
Copenhagen, September 28, 1815.
My dear Lord—The Marquis de Bonnaye, in passing through Hamburgh, will deliver this into the hands of Mr. Mellish. I did not wish to omit so good an opportunity of writing to you, although I have not much to communicate.
Baron Hammerstein has left this, upon a visit to a near relation of his in Holstein, from whence he intends to proceed privately to Hanover, to give an account of the state of his negociation to Count Miinster, and will return here in about three weeks.
Your lordship will have perceived from my last letter what extravagant ideas M. de Kaas, one of the Danish Ministers, seems to have formed of the advantages likely to result to this country from his Danish Majesty's undertaking a journey to London, and in the event of his being willing to cede the duchy of Lauenburg to the kingdom of Hanover; but I beg your lordship to be assured that I was very careful not to give him any encouragement, and have simply confined myself to stating that, provided an exchange of the duchy could be effectuated for a fair equivalent with Hanover, his Royal Highness the Prince Regent would be well pleased and gratified; at the same time, on every occasion referring to M. de Hammerstein, as the sole person charged with the negociation.
I was particular in stating this, lest your lordship should suppose, from M. de Kaas' sanguine speculations, that I had at all exceeded the limits of my instructions, in the nature of the support I have given to M. de Hammerstein. But it would seem as if people here thought that we desired nothing so much as pretexts for making presents; and it is consequently necessary to be very cautious in treating with them.
Prince Christian is still at his country seat in the neighbourhood of Copenhagen. Since his return from Norway, and his marriage with the Princess of Augustenburg, he is
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not in favour at Court. The King of Denmark is very much attached to the elder of his two daughters, and would have wished the Prince, as heir presumptive to the Crown, to have married her; but, unfortunately, she is very far from being goodlooking; nevertheless, his Highness is accused of selfishness in not having preferred her. His conduct in Norway is said to have been strongly liable to reproach for want of courage; and I have even heard that a physician who was with him during the campaign in that country, makes no scruple of saying that he exhibited, on the occasion of some skirmish that took place, as strong symptoms of the effects of personal fear as he had ever occasion to observe. Nevertheless, the people of Copenhagen, who believe him to have behaved like a hero, received him with great applause when he returned here last year, and went to the theatre, making a public exhibition of himself, which was not thought becoming, after the inglorious issue of his enterprise, and the misfortunes which he had brought upon his country. Considerable jealousy was, in consequence, entertained in regard to him, and he will be obliged to go to the seat of his Government, at Odensee in Fiinen, for the winter, instead of being allowed to reside here: his stay in this neighbourhood, indeed, having only been permitted till now, in consequence of much entreaty.
Persons in the confidence of this Prince, affect to say that the Norwegians are still by no means amicably disposed towards the Swedes; but that the Prince Royal, as a Frenchman, is much more liked by them than a Prince of the Swedish royal blood would ever be; giving to understand, at the same time, that so capricious a people as the Swedes are, being very likely to make a change in their present dispositions relative to the succession to the Crown, the Norwegians would, in such case, probably not think themselves bound to imitate them.
Reflections of this sort certainly tally with the idea pretty generally received, that the Prince Royal, in the arrangements he made respecting Norway, had in view to carve out for himself some political support without the limits of Sweden, and which should make him continually necessary to the latter. I am even told that many Swedes impute to him that he thought too much of this in the terms of union which he agreed to.
I have the honour to be, &c,
Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.
Fife House, September 29,1815.
My dear Castlereagh—There are two points in your projet, upon which we are all agreed in principle; but which will require more attention than appears to have been paid to them in the draft you forwarded to us, before the projet is reduced into the form of a treaty for signature.
The first point is, that there appears to be no stipulation for not evacuating the fortresses, which we are to occupy temporarily till such time as the full amount of the contribution agreed upon shall be paid. A provision to this effect has always been understood as reasonable, and should be made as clear as possible.
The other point is of equal importance—the terms on which the restitution is to be made to the King of France and his lawful heirs. We are all agreed that the restitution should be stipulated only in favour of the King and his lawful heirs. Indeed, such a stipulation will be one of the best securities of his Majesty's throne, and to it, therefore, he cannot object. The words in your projet—" heritiers et successeurs"—may certainly be ambiguous, and I can recommend no words so likely to answer the purpose as those which the Chancellor suggested, viz.—" Louis XVIII., or his successors by rightful inheritance."
Believe me to be, &c, Liverpool.
Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.
Fife House, September 29, 1815.
My dear Castlereagh—We have received, this morning, your letters of the 25th instant, and most entirely approve all your proceedings.
The want of judgment of the King, in changing his Administration at this particular moment, is most truly to be lamented. I could not resist saying to the Prince Regent yesterday, that if his father had been in a situation to be obliged to make a humiliating peace, and at the same time was desirous to get rid of his Ministers, he would have taken care to make the Ministers whom he was anxious of turning out the instruments of the peace, and not have thrown the inevitable unpopularity and odium of such a transaction on those who were to succeed them.
The answer of the French Plenipotentiaries to the projet of the Allies is very much what we expected. I do not think, however, that you seem to be aware of an argument which may be of essential service to you in the view you have taken of the principles on which the negociation ought to be conducted. If the French Government insist upon the principle of the integrity of France, as it stood in 1789, before the French Revolution, they ought to restore certain enclaves within their own territory, viz., Avignon, the Corntat Venaissin, and Montbeillard, to their former Sovereigns. If they are allowed to keep these territories as enclaves, nothing is more reasonable than that they should cede to the Allies the enclaves which they claim in compensation.
By this mode of viewing the question, their honour might be completely saved, as the condition of the cession of the several enclaves might be made reciprocal. If they should, however, say—We would rather restore Avignon, &c, than cede Landau, Philipville, &e.—we might fairly reply that our proposition must, in reali more advantageous to both parties; that, in the sift: which we are placed, we have fairly a