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not in favour at Court. The King of Denmark is very much attached to the elder of his two daughters, and would have wished the Prince, as heir presumptive to the Crown, to have married her; but, unfortunately, she is very far from being goodlooking; nevertheless, his Highness is accused of selfishness in not having preferred her. His conduct in Norway is said to have been strongly liable to reproach for want of courage; and I have even heard that a physician who was with him during the campaign in that country, makes no scruple of saying that he exhibited, on the occasion of some skirmish that took place, as strong symptoms of the effects of personal fear as he had ever occasion to observe. Nevertheless, the people of Copenhagen, who believe him to have behaved like a hero, received him with great applause when he returned here last year, and went to the theatre, making a public exhibition of himself, which was not thought becoming, after the inglorious issue of his enterprise, and the misfortunes which he had brought upon his country. Considerable jealousy was, in consequence, entertained in regard to him, and he will be obliged to go to the seat of his Government, at Odensee in Fünen, for the winter, instead of being allowed to reside here: his stay in this neighbourhood, indeed, having only been permitted till now, in consequence of much entreaty. Persons in the confidence of this Prince, affect to say that the Norwegians are still by no means amicably disposed towards the Swedes; but that the Prince Royal, as a Frenchman, is much more liked by them than a Prince of the Swedish royal blood would ever be; giving to understand, at the same time, that so capricious a people as the Swedes are, being very likely to make a change in their present dispositions relative to the succession to the Crown, the Norwegians would, in such case, probably not think themselves bound to imitate them. Reflections of this sort certainly tally with the idea pretty generally received, that the Prince Royal, in the arrangements

he made respecting Norway, had in view to carve out for himself some political support without the limits of Sweden, and which should make him continually necessary to the latter. I am even told that many Swedes impute to him that he thought too much of this in the terms of union which he agreed to.

I have the honour to be, &c.,


Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, September 29, 1815. My dear Castlereagh_There are two points in your projet, upon which we are all agreed in principle ; but which will require more attention than appears to have been paid to them in the draft you forwarded to us, before the projet is reduced into the form of a treaty for signature.

The first point is, that there appears to be no stipulation for not evacuating the fortresses, which we are to occupy temporarily till such time as the full amount of the contribution agreed upon shall be paid. A provision to this effect has always been understood as reasonable, and should be made as clear as possible.

The other point is of equal importance-the terms on which the restitution is to be made to the King of France and his lawful heirs. We are all agreed that the restitution should be stipulated only in favour of the King and his lawful heirs. Indeed, such a stipulation will be one of the best securities of his Majesty's throne, and to it, therefore, he cannot object. The words in your projet—" héritiers et successeurs"—may certainly be ambiguous, and I can recommend no words so likely to answer the purpose as those which the Chancellor saggested, viz.-“ Louis XVIII., or his successors by rightful inheritance."

Believe me to be, &r., LIVERPOOL.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, September 29, 1816. My dear Castlereagh-We have received, this morning, your letters of the 25th instant, and most entirely approve all your proceedings.

The want of judgment of the King, in changing his Administration at this particular moment, is most truly to be lamented. I could not resist saying to the Prince Regent yesterday, that if his father had been in a situation to be obliged to make a humiliating peace, and at the same time was desirous to get rid of his Ministers, he would have taken care to make the Ministers whom he was anxious of turning out the instruments of the peace, and not have thrown the inevitable unpopularity and odium of such a transaction on those who were to succeed them.

The answer of the French Plenipotentiaries to the projet of the Allies is very much what we expected. I do not think, however, that you seem to be aware of an argument which may be of essential service to you in the view you have taken of the principles on which the negociation ought to be conducted. If the French Government insist upon the principle of the integrity of France, as it stood in 1789, before the French Revolution, they ought to restore certain enclares within their own territory, viz., Avignon, the Comtat Venaissin, and Montbeillard, to their former Sovereigns. If they are allowed to keep these territories as enclares, nothing is more reasonable than that they should cede to the Allies the enclares which they claim in compensation.

By this mode of viewing the question, their honour might be completely saved, as the condition of the cession of the several enclares might be made reciprocal. If they should, however, say-We would rather restore Avignon, &c., than cede Landau, Philipville, &c.—we might fairly reply that our proposition must, in reality, be more advantageous to both parties ; that, in the situation in which we are placed, we have fairly a right to make the option between two alternatives not very unequal in their value and amount; and that we cannot admit that, from any motive of perverseness, or, from the endeavour to advance a principle inconsistent with the whole public law of Europe, they should defeat an arrangement, which would be highly advantageous to Europe, and not prejudicial to


We have been most truly gratified with reading the Duke of Wellington's letter to you on the subject, and removing the pictures, &c., from the Museum. It is a most satisfactory statement in all respects, and will, I trust, sooner or later meet the public eye. I shall be most happy to hear that the statues and pictures belonging to the Vatican are packed up. It is become now of the utmost importance that our principle should be carried through consistently. We cannot irritate the French more by completing our work than we have done by beginning it; and, as I have stated to you in a former letter there is more safety, in my judgment, in a general removal of the whole plunder, than in one which is only


Beliere me to be, &c.,


Lord Bathurst to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, September [blank) 1815. Sir—The immediate departure of the messenger, the bearer of your despatches of the 7th instant, prevented my replying to that part of your despatch No. 22, of the 19th July last, which relates to the transactions between Major Nicolls and the Creek Indians, against which the American Government has remoustrated. In order that you may be evabled at once to convince the Americans of the total ignorance in which this Government was respecting the conduct of that officer, and of its disapprobation of it, I transmit to you the copy of the answer which was returned to Major Nicolls by the War Department, previously to the receipt of your above-mentioned

despatch, to a communication made by him on this business ; and I likewise enclose a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Indian Chief who accompanied Major Nicolls to this country.

These documents will satisfy the Government of the United States that the interference of Major Nicolls may have been occasioned by an ill-judged zeal in the prosecution of the military duties with which he was entrusted, but was in no way sanctioned by his Majesty's Government.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, October 1, 1815. Dear Liverpool-Having pushed our discussions in Conference with the Duke de Richelieu as far as was desirable, and the principal difficulties being narrowed to the two fortresses on the Meuse, some reduction of the money arrangement, and the permission to have a nominal garrison, under suitable regulations, in the fortresses within the Allied line of demarcation, but not occupied by them, it was thought advisable to entrust to the Duke of Wellington to bring the negociation to an issue in a separate interview. I have no doubt more might have been extorted, if the four Powers had been unanimous in taking their sine qua non higher; but you will have perceived that it required some management to carry Russia so far. In truth, I believe nothing but our early moderation would have induced the Emperor to insist on so much.

The Duke of Wellington and myself would have been disposed to be satisfied with the frontier of 1790, with the enclaves, and stood to it; but, having broke ground to manage Prussia, we did our best to fight up to the demand made, and we have succeeded in getting the fortress of Saar-Louis for Prussia. It is, perhaps, as well that the King should have obtained some relaxation of the original terms.

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