me to say in this occasion, cautiously avoiding, however, in the first instance, (as well knowing the King's sentiments upon the subject) the mention of introducing foreign troops into his kingdom. In going over the letter, however, the allusion to a system of the barrier description immediately struck him, and he said that, if this was to bring about the introduction of foreign troops into his garrisons or kingdom, he could never admit it, making use of these words: "Il faut que mes sujets mangent et qu'ils ne soient pas mangés." Certain that the present confirmation of the idea in the King's mind that such was the object in view would work more evil than good, without pretending to observe what was said, I proceeded to the further parts of the letter, and have subsequently, in strict confidence, furnished him with a copy of it. The King took the communication with all the kindness which I could have expected, and assured me he would well consider the matter, with the view to which his attention had been principally directed, and should have pleasure in fully and confidentially communicating his sentiments to the Prince Regent upon it through me.

I fear it will be a difficult matter to bring his Majesty to the admission of foreign troops; but if the proposal should be for the admission of Prussian troops, I should hold the object of impossible attainment, with the consent either of the King or of his people. One of three things must, however, be done: either all the nations of Europe must consent to a proportionate and reasonable reduction of their armies; or this King must raise his to a number sufficient to withstand the first efforts of any sudden attack from France; or his Majesty must be brought to the admission of foreign troops for a time, at least, into his territories. How far the first may be practicable it is impossible for me to say. Though something further might perhaps be done upon the second, yet, to the extent pressed by the Duke of Wellington of fifty thousand regular infantry, as a peace establishment, with the finances of this country, and

under the system of voluntary enrolment established in it, I should hold the matter absolutely impossible. Upon the third, if the troops to be proposed should not be Prussian, and arrangements shall be made for placing them in reasonable dependence upon the King, though the object would still be most difficult, I should not utterly despair of its accomplish

ment.

It was at this conference with the King, at which the pending matter of the Slave Trade Treaty was touched upon, as noticed in my despatch of this date, No. 24, the King manifestly seemed embarrassed on the subject, and as if labouring to say something to qualify his former assurances. He did not, however, produce anything further than that constitutional difficulties had been started, which he was bound to consider and avoid, and ended by apologizing for the time which had been occupied, stating that I knew the Dutch well enough to have observed that they were slow in their proceedings, and must therefore excuse it as part of their nature. I cannot, however, say that I am quite easy upon this point, or can well predict the line either the King or his Ministers will now adopt upon it. They certainly appear to me to feel that his Majesty has committed himself upon it; and I hardly think they will again venture to controvert this fact—indeed, Nagell's reluctance to answer my note of the 1st pretty well proves this but then the details are open to them, and if they are now really averse to enter into this treaty, they may in the negociation so clog these, and raise such difficulties to the adoption by them of any precautionary measures which may be discussed respecting the right of search, as to render assent to the principle nugatory. On Tuesday, I hope to be able to furnish you with more light upon this subject than it is within my power at present to convey. CLANCARTY.

Yours, my dear lord, &c.,

Mr. C. Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, April 7, 1818. My dear Lord-You will receive by this mail a despatch from me respecting the Fisheries, in which I refer to a conversation which I had had upon the subject with Mr. Adams, when I communicated to him the orders which Sir David Milne proposed to give to the ships under his command, in regard to the American vessels found fishing upon our coast during the present season. I have thought it better not to mention in this despatch, but to reserve for a private letter, some part of the conversation which then passed between us, and which was not a little remarkable.

I met Mr. Adams accidentally in the street, and when I told him of the letter which I had received from Sir David Milne, he showed some surprise, but certainly no irritation. In the course, however, of our conversation, which lasted about ten minutes, he said, not with a tone of anger, but with the ordinary tone of earnestness with which he usually speaks upon business, that, after all, "he believed that they should have to fight about it, and that his opinion was, that they ought to do so."

I deprecated in some common-place phrase a resort to such an extremity, when he proceeded to say that, "holding as he did the right of participation in the United States to be unequivocal, undeniable, and absolute, it was a matter only to be settled by agreement or by force; and, all arrangement by assignment of coast being out of the question, he did not see distinctly what proposition of arrangement could be made, which would promise a satisfactory result."

He then said that "we could have no right to seize their ships; that all the lawyers in England with whom he had spoken upon the subject were of that opinion; that our own judge had last year released the vessels which had been captured by the Dee, and that, without an Act of Parliament for

the purpose, they could not be taken; or, if they were taken, the American Government would have a claim upon Great Britain for full indemnity for them."

this conversation, the more Mr. Adams is, I presume, suffered himself, in his offi

The more I have reflected upon extraordinary I have thought it. much too cautious a man to have cial situation, to be betrayed by mere temper into the use of such expressions to me. On the other hand, I equally presume that he cannot seriously believe that the point itself is a ground of war for this country; or, even if it were, that this country could now be excited to a war with Great Britain upon a point in which two States at the utmost have any immediate interest whatever. The only explanation which I can conceive of his conversation is either that, being himself of the State of Massachusetts, the only State which is deeply interested in the question, he is anxious to hold a very high tone upon the subject; or that it is the policy of the Government not to let the matter be brought to any arrangement, but to reserve it as a grievance, to be used as it may hereafter be wanted. Whatever may have been the motive which prompted Mr. Adams's expressions, they are, as coming from him, somewhat extraordinary, and it is certainly my duty to report them to your lordship.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CHARLES BAGOT.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, April 7, 1818. My dear Lord-I received your letter marked Private, of the 4th inst., yesterday. You will see by my despatch of this date, whereabout we are in our negociations on the Slave Trade. The agreement of this King in your views for the establishment of the mixed commission appears to me essential; and the objection of the Minister of Justice, if admitted, would have been absolutely destructive of all our hopes of

concluding a Convention by which the right of search could ever have been rendered efficient.

The matter is not quite so simple a one, to combat any question here, in which a constitutional question may be supposed to be, however remotely, involved, as it would be in England. There the King, Lords, and Commons, are supreme, and can dispose of all questions: but here, to work a change in any principle laid down by the Loi fondamentale, the measure for this purpose must be sent to the provincial States. These add a double number of representatives to the second Chamber of the States-General. The measure must be submitted to this body, and receive the assent not of a simple majority, but of a majority consisting of three-fourths of those present; and two-thirds of this double representation are the least which form the quorum.

To have encountered such a process would have been impossible for our Slave Trade Treaty: it therefore became essential that the fallacy of the position of the Minister of Justice should be, in the first instance, clearly demonstrated. This, I hope, (though I cannot yet state absolutely) has been done; and, the constitutional difficulty removed, we shall, as we had before intended, proceed precisely as you have recommended, viz., by concluding our treaty, and submitting the same hereafter to the States-General, for the purpose of obtaining from them the requisite legal enactments.

Nagell has formally renounced the constitutional difficulty opposed to us relative to confiscation, so that we have now only that of the jurisdiction of a mixed commission to struggle with, as alleged to be unconstitutional. In my conversation with M. de Nagell on Saturday, he told me that the King had read with much attention your private letter to Lord Cathcart; that it had made considerable impression upon him; and that he believed it would probably have the effect of inducing him to enter into a contract with the Elector of Hesse for ten thousand additional men. I recommended that the King

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