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compenser en partie les inconvénients qui autrement resulteraient pour nous de la remise de Montevideo aux Espagnols.
Excusez, Mylord, l'etendue que je me vois forcé de donner à toutes ces explications. La chose est pour nous de telle importance que je crois de mon devoir de donner le plus de développement possible à tous les raisonnements. Il me semble qui si le Cabinet de Madrid a un désir sincère de terminer cette affaire il ne se refusera pas au leger sacrifice que nous demandons d'une concession fort importante pour nous et presqu'indifferente pour lui. Si cependant il s'y refuse, les Puissances médiatrices seront pleinement autorisées à croire que le véritable but de ce Cabinet soit de tenir avec le Portugal une querelle ouverte pour en profiter selon les occurrences. J'offre cette conjecture à votre méditation, Mylord, et je suis fâché de dire que les nouvelles les plus récentes que j'ai reçues des dispositions de M. de Pizarro n'y laissent pas d'y ajouter du poids; car il parait que ce Ministre prend un ton plus hautain et devient plus difficile à contenter à mesure que j'ai montré de mon côté plus de condescendance et de désir de determiner la discussion d'une manière conciliante.
Quels que «oient les projets cependant que le Cabinet Espagnol pourrait nourrir à l'égard du Portugal, il est plus que probable qu'il ne trouverait pas à les exécuter les facilités qu'il suppose peut-être; et, de mon côté, cette crainte ne me déciderait jamais à signer un traité que ma conscience me montrerait comme désavantageux, et à consentir à l'évacuation de Montevideo, sans aucune espèce d'indemnisation, et un laissant la frontière du Brésil exposée au renouvellement des mêmes vexations et des mêmes dangers qui ont déjà forcé deux fois à entreprendre à grands frais des expéditions toujours plus ou moins dangereuses.
Songez, Mylord, sous quels funestes auspices j'irais me présenter pour prendre sur moi la responsabilité du Ministère des affaires étrangères après avoir signé en Europe un traité honteux et désavantageux pour le Brésil! Veuillez, je vous en prie, ni'epargner par votre puissante intervention une tell© douleur, et soyez bien persuade* que le Ministre Espagnol, malgre* ses ide'es exagérées et malgre- ses bravades, ne resistera pas a l'opinion £nonc£e par les Puissances médiatrices, si elles employent a cette occasion le ton ferme et decisif qui convient.
Daignez agréer, Mylord, l'assurance de mes hommages, et de la parfaite consideration avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'etre, &c.
Sir H. Welleslsy to Lord Castlereagh.
Madrid, June 21, 1818.
My dear Lord—I have not thought it right to state in an official despatch all that has passed between me and M. de Pizarro, relative to the Portuguese negociation. At the same time, in order that your lordship may be enabled to judge of the probable determination of this Court, it is necessary that you should be apprized of the sentiments and language of the Spanish Minister upon the receipt of the last communications from Paris.
In speaking of the conduct of the Conference, he said that, after the turn which the negociation had taken, he should not require of them to act in a manner consistent with the dignity of their respective Sovereigns; all that he should insist upon (after an acknowledgment that their mediation had failed of success) was that the two kingdoms of Spain and Portugal should be left to themselves to settle their differences.
Adverting, then, to the policy of the Prince Regent's Ministers, he said that some of them had been deceived by Count Palmella, but that the proceedings at Paris were much disapproved by others; and that, as to the Duke of Wellington, he was in circumstances which often compelled him to act contrary to his judgment. I replied that, from whatever quarter he received his information with respect to his Majesty's Government, he was grossly deceived; that I could /
not allow, even in a confidential conversation, his observation with respect to the Duke of Wellington to pass without serious notice—that the Duke of Wellington had, neither in this nor in any other case, acted contrary to his judgment— that, if the demands of Spain were deemed inadmissible by Portugal, it was the duty of a mediator to endeavour, as the Duke of Wellington had done, to bring matters to an accommodation by mutual concession—that if, however, the Spanish Government were dissatisfied with the conduct of the Duke of Wellington, I would engage for his abstaining in future from taking any concern in their affairs. This drew a sort of explanation from M. de Pizarro, to the purport that he had expressed his sentiments to me in confidence; but that what he had stated was not to be considered as reflecting upon the conduct of any of the persons alluded to. In the course of the conversation, he insinuated that there had been an intrigue here and at Paris for the purpose of removing him from office, which had failed. I do not state all this with a view of recommending that any step should be taken in consequence; but your lordship will easily understand how difficult it is, even in the most ordinary transactions, to deal with a Minister of a temper so hasty and unguarded.
With respect to a connexion between Spain and Russia, as adverted to in Sir Charles Stuart's despatch to your lordship of the 11th May, I have frequently apprised your lordship of its unpopularity in the country. The state of the squadron has contributed to increase this feeling, and the disappointment of the hopes arising from the promises of Russia has completely opened the eyes of this Government as to the little to be expected from that Court. M. de TatischefFs conferences with the King are less frequent than formerly; and, although his Majesty's behaviour in public is the same, it is easy to perceive that his influence is on the decline. For some time after his return from Cadiz, he appeared to be less intimate than usual with M. de Pizarro; but of late their conferences have been more frequent; and I should rather judge that M. de Pizarro is of opinion that the Russian Minister has still sufficient influence with the King to make his friendship worth preserving.
It is difficult to believe that M. de Pizarro was entirely ignorant of the negociation which terminated in the purchase of the Russian squadron, although I have reason to believe that it was not carried on in his office. It is certain, however, that, in September last, when the Russian Minister went to the Escurial to announce the sailing of the squadron from Revel, M. de Pizarro approved the purchase, and took upon himself to announce it to the corps diplomatique, insisting that the Russian Minister should proceed to Cadiz, without communicating the motive of his journey to his colleagues. He afterwards spoke of the acquisition of this squadron as being highly advantageous to Spain.
In justice to M. de Tatischeff, I cannot but add that he is using every effort to induce this Government to listen to reasonable terms of accommodation with Portugal. He has to-day had a conference with M. de Pizarro upon the subject, and, as the resolutions of this Government are not always to be depended upon, it is not impossible that he may have had better success to-day than I had last night. I asked M. de Pizarro last night whether the negociations between Spain and the United States of America had been removed to Madrid, and he assured me that they had not.
I have the honour to be, &c, H. Wellesley.
I omitted to mention that M. Garay and M. de Tatischeff are upon bad terms, and I have no doubt that each would do everything in his power to destroy the influence of the other.
Lord Clancarty to Lard Castlereagh.
The Hague, June 23, 1818. My dear Lord—Finding no answer yet returned to my official Note of the 7th of May, relative to the appointment of a Commissary on each side for the adjustment of the account for arms and clothing furnished by Great Britain to this country in 1814, I have thought it necessary again to mention the subject to M. de Nagell, who tells me that an official answer shall be sent me at an early date upon this subject.
I can easily conceive that this matter has considerably embarrassed them; lstly, because they had nursed the idea that these stores were advanced as a contribution by Great Britain to the common cause; and 2ndly, from the circumstance of their Budget accounts for this and the next year having been passed, and the States-General actually prorogued prior to my having received final orders to press this matter. I cannot, from any conversation with M. de Nagell or others, form a guess at what the nature of the official answer under the above circumstances is likely to prove. We must therefore wait its receipt.
A determination has been taken in the Prince's family, which, though it would perhaps be too much to say it, had reopened the breach so recently closed between him and his father, has nevertheless very much discomposed the King. All things had been settled for the Princess's accouchement here at the beginning of the ensuing month, when his Majesty had arranged that the whole Court should reassemble at this residence. Besides the propriety, if not necessity, of the presence of several of the branches of the royal family, and perhaps of others, on an event of this nature, at the christening and other ceremonies, it was hoped that the birth of one of his children at the Hague, and the advantage which the place itself would derive from the reunion of so many people, for a second portion of a year, would counteract the unpopularity which his Royal Highness's ill-concealed dislike to this residence had occasioned among its inhabitants and those of its neighbourhood.
The Princess has, however, resolved to lie-in at Zoosdyke, a country place of his Royal Highness's beyond Utrecht, where,