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under any local Act for any purpose of the relief of the poor, or otherwise in the service of the guardians, were entitled to continue in office, provided that in case any officer of a union or a parish should be deprived of his office by reason of the operation of this Act, the Poor Law Board might award to him compensation for the loss of his office and its emoluments. The Poor Law Board refused to sanction the continuance of the solicitor's appointment, or to allow him compen. sation, on the ground that the appointment was not authorised by this enactment. Held, upon a rule obtained by the solicitor for a mandamus to the defendants, to whom the Poor Law Board's duties had been transferred, that he was an officer of a parish within the meaning of the Act; that he was deprived of his office by reason of the operation of the Act; and that he was entitled to compensation: (Reg v. Local Government Board, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 769. Q. B.)

LANDLORD AND TENANT-AGREEMENT TO PAY COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE DONE BY GAMEARBITRATION.-Declaration that the plaintiffs demised lands, &c.,to the defendant upon the terms that he would keep upon the demised premises such a number only of hares and rabbits as would do no injury to the trees and plantations, &c., belonging to the plaintiffs, or to their growing crops, or the growing crops of any of their tenants, and that in case the defendant should keep such a number of hares and rabbits as should injure the trees, &c., or the growing crops, &c., the defendant should and would pay to the plaintiffs or their tenants, a fair and reasonable compensation for such injury. Breach assigned, that the tenant kept such a number of hares and rabbits as did great injury to such trees, &c., respectively, and although frequently requested so to do, had not paid a fair and reasonable or any compensation. Plea, that "one of the terms of the said tenancy was that, in case any such injury should be done by the defendant, he would pay a fair and reasonable compensation for the same, the amount of such compensation, in case of difference, to be referred to the arbitration of two arbitrators, or an umpire, to be chosen respectively as therein mentioned; that a difference arose, and that no arbitrators had been appointed, nor had an award ever been made deciding the amount of such compensation according to the terms of the said tenancy." On demurrer it was held, by the Court of Exchequer (Kelly, C.B., and Pigott, B., dubitante, Bramwell, B.), that the plea was a good plea, inasmuch as the covenant was one and indivisible to pay such amount of compensation as should be settled by arbitration and not otherwise, and was not two separate and independent covenants, the one to pay a compensation, and the other to refer the amount of it to arbitration (Dawson v. Lord Otho Fitzgerald, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 776. Ex.)

V.C. HALL'S COURT.
Thursday, Jan. 22, 1874.

TURTON v. BARBER. Privilege-Bill of costs-Facts ante litem motam. MATTHEW TILDESLEY brought in a claim in the cause for damage sustained by the testator's inability to grant a lease of certain mines. In his affidavit he deposed that in consequence of obstacles arising the lease was not granted. He was then asked on cross-examination before the special examiner whether the obstacles were suggested by him to his solicitor, or by his solicitor to him," and he refused to answer the question, or to produce the bill of costs in respect of

the same matter.

Digby Seymour, Q.C. and W. W. Karslake now moved that the witness should answer the question or be committed, as the question referred to

3 mere matter of fact ante litem motam.

Powell, Q.C. and Grosvenor Wood, contra. The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the question could not be put, and also that the witness was not bound to produce the bill of costs; and he refused the motion with costs.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH (IRELAND). (From the Irish Law Times.) Saturday, Nov. 29, 1873. (Before the FULL COURT.) Re KEARSE. Debtors' Act (Ireland) 1872—Arrest on civil bill decree for debt contracted after the passing of the Act-Decree mis-stating date when debt occurred-Alteration of decree without sanction of chairman-Habeas corpus-Jurisdiction Discharge of debtor from custody. MOTION on behalf of Timothy Kearse, a prisoner in the gaol of Ennis, to make absolute a conditional order obtained for the issuing of a writ of habeas corpus to have him discharged. In support of the application, affidavits were made by the prisoner and his attorney, in reply to which an affidavit was made by T. Bunton, the attorney for the plaintiffs in the civil bill proceedings next re

ferred to. It appeared that a decree was obtained before the chairman of the county of Clare, J. O'Hagan, Q.C., at the Quarter Sessions at Killaloe, on the 25th June 1873, against T. Kearse, for the sum of £14 148s., on a civil bill process, for goods sold and delivered, and on an account stated; and the defendant, who did not appear, was arrested on the 20th August 1873, under the decree, and remained since then in custody-the plaintiffs on the civil bill, Trousdell and O'Brien, although required by notice, refusing to have him discharged. The civil bill process did not contain any statement when the debt had accrued, and the bills sent by the plaintiffs showed that the goods had been supplied in September 1872. But, on the decree signed by the chairman there was a statement (inserted by the plaintiff's attorney, in the presence of the clerk of the peace) that the goods were sold in the year 1871. The decree was drawn up against the body of the debtor, and it was thus signed by the chairman. The further facts of the case sufficiently appear in the judg. ments delivered.

P. O'Brien, in support of the motion, cited Cop. Co. Court, Pr. Johns. edit., pp. 147, 201; Add. Torts, edit. 1870, 714; Re Everard (7 Ir. Jur. N. S. 346); Govern v. Rowland (7 Ir. Com. L. 218, 619); Duchess of Kingston's Case (2 Sm. L. C. 424); 14 & 15 Vict. c. 57, s. 133; 35 & 36 Vict. c. 57. Clary, contra, cited Moore v. O'Donnell (Ir. C. L. 46; Dews v. Riley (11 C. B. 434); Page v. Williams (1 Ir. Com. L., 527); M'Ambridge v. Jellett (3 Cr. & E. 18); Cop. Co. Court. edit. Johns. 141, 144, 201, 287; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 57, ss. 78, 133; 27 & 28 Vict. c. 99, s. 57.

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face of the decree, the object being to seize the body of the debtor for a debt for which he could not be arrested under the Act that had not been passed until Aug. 1872. The plaintiffs here allowed to pass "the next assizes," mentioned in the Civil Bill Act, at which the defendant might have appealed, but to which, knowing nothing of what was done, he did not appeal; and the defendant now applies to us to be discharged, and his counsel have produced several documents which establish as clear as light that in point of fact there was no authority whatever to grant a decree against the body. The original entry on the book of the clerk of the peace-which is made by the Act of Parliament evidence of the decree, and no one else has authority to take it down-shows that no decree was given against the body of the defendant, a decree which it would have been illegal to make. It is said that the decree was altered. If it is meant that in the alteration there has been any moral fraud, it does not appear to us that there has been any such. The papers came into the hands of the attorney, who conducted the case for the plaintiffs, and what he says in his affidavit is, that it is utterly untrue that the word 'body' in the decree, and the words 'in the year 1871' were written after the decree had been signed by the chairman." I have no doubt, since the gen tleman has stated it, that he was under the impression that he was justified in what he had done, and that it was not after the decree was pronounced that the alteration was made. But the failure in his affidavit is in not showing what decree was pronounced, and we have no evidence what it was save the entry in the book of the clerk of the peace. No doubt, the attorney made a memorandum on the original civil bill, as he states-"Decree against body." But what authority had he for doing so? He was not the officer of the court, nor the chairman, and he has cautiously abstained from stating that any such decree had been pronounced by the chairman. I can easily understand that an attorney in large practice might naturally fall into such an error, but how is this to preclude the matter from being taken into consideration by this court, or to stand explanatory of a decree, when neither the officer of the court nor the chairman adopts it, nor is it warranted by the facts. He proceeds in his affidavit to show how the document was altered. As originally drawn, it does appear that it was a correct decree against the goods of the defendant. How, then, comes it to be changed? "My clerk, through mistake, drew it as a decree against the goods, instead of against the body." This is the way in which the matter stood, and the sagacious clerk who drew the decree against the goods is to be commended. The attorney goes on to say: checking over my decrees before handing them in to John Henry Harvey, the deputy clerk of the peace, I discovered said mistake, and having called his attention thereto, he, in my presence, erased the word 'goods,' and inserted the word 'body,' in his own handwriting, and the alteration was made before the decree was signed by him or by the chairman." I do not understand what authority this gentleman had to make the erasure. He does not state that it was pointed out to the chairman. What power he had to change the decree, from one against the goods into one for the arrest of the body, I cannot comprehend. He does not state by what authority he inserted the words "in the year 1871." In point of fact, the goods were sold in the autumn of 1872. The thing was innocently done, but the attorney put into the decree what was not in the process, nor on the book of the clerk of the peace, and I cannot discern by whose authority, or upon what evidence this was done. A statement is then made which is wholly immaterial-that the chairman defendant at a subsequent sessions, but that he was applied to for the purpose of liberating the had held (and correctly so) that he had not any authority to do so; and the defendant still continuing in prison, the question is, whether this court has any jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. In point of fact and law, this is a clear case to sustain the allegation that the arrest is illegal. The decree is against the body of a person for goods sold and delivered to him after the passing of the Act of Parliament. It is said by the counsel for the plaintiff that the civil bill decree was only issued irregularly, and that if so a habeas corpus would not lie in this case. That may be so, though I am not prepared to consent to it, nor do I find that the discharging of the prisoner would be conflicting with the principal case referred to. We are told that we should not meddle in a case in which a party is in gaol under civil process. The matter was brought before the Court of Exchequer in the case of Page v. Williams (1 Ir. C. L. 527). With the profoundest respect for that court, it must be borne in mind that it is not the Court of Queen's Bench; and in that case the authority of the court was correctly expounded as derived from the Habeas Corpus Act only, and it was said that the words of that Act did not give them any authority to interfere with a person who had been

WHITESIDE, C.J.-This case is an important one. It has been ably argued, and arose upon a motion to make absolute a conditional order, for a writ of habeas corpus, in order to discharge Timothy Kearse from prison. The facts shortly stated are as follows: The civil bill process, which had been originally served upon him at the suit of Messrs. Trousdell and O'Brien, was brought to recover the sum of £14 14s., for goods sold and delivered and for the balance of an account stated, but it did not appear by it in what year the debt had been incurred. Kearse, the defendant, did not appear at the hearing of the case, so that we have to look closely at the actual facts, and consider what occurred on the occasion. It appears from an inspection of the books of the clerk of the peace-who by the statute law is bound to make the entry made in such cases, and to set out the process correctly (and this entry he has properly made)-that he has entered a sum of £1414s. for shop goods sold and delivered. Having stated the substance of the decree and the heads of it in due form, he has certified it to be a true copy of the decree-which certificate is itself evidence of the fact. But turning to the decree itself, we und that it improves on the note in the book of the clerk of the peace. It appears from the book of the clerk of the peace that the proceedings were for goods sold and delivered, aud for the balance of an account stated, exactly following the process as it should according to law; but the words in the year 1871 are added in the decree. The question is, how came these words into the decree? There is not a trace of the record "in the year 1871" in any of the papers or proceedings antecedent to this document. The date of the process was the 24th May 1873, and the date of the decree the 25th of June 1873. There happens to be an Act of Parliament restraining arrest for debt, which was passed on the 6th of August 1872, and if the shop goods, as the clerk of the peace expresses it, were sold after the Act had passed, there was not any jurisdiction in any inferior or superior court, after that Act came the body of any man for goods which had been into operation, to arrest, or issue a decree against sold after Aug. 1872; and if this appeared upon the face of the decree it would be utterly void, having been without any authority, and an excess of the jurisdiction of the court, and, therefore, it would be the duty of this court to redress the wrong by discharging from custody the person who had been thus illegally imprisoned. It is obvious why the change was made in the decree. If the goods had been sold in the year 1871, that would have been before the passing of the Act for the abolition of arrest for debt. Before that Act came into operation the body of a debtor might be taken in execution, but after the Act came into operation it would be impossible to do this legally in respect of a debt contracted after the passing of the Act; therefore, we find an entry on the face of the decree itself, for which there is not any foundation in the original entry of that decree in the book of the clerk of the peace. How did this occur? On the facts it is clear that the goods in respect of which the decree was granted were sold and delivered in Sept. 1873; the amount, £14 14s., is made up of three several items, for goods sold and delivered in Sept., 1872, stated in the bill furnished by the plaintiffs. The Act for the abolition of imprisonment for debt having passed one month before this, somebody had an interest in putting this untrue entry upon the

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arrested under civil process. The court, having no original authority, very properly refused to grant the writ of habeas corpus, although the Chief Baron differed on a very important point. I do not by any means criticise what judges of so much learning have enunciated, when they held that though the person was arrested under an irregular process, yet as there was a subsequent valid detainer, in which the person was properly named, he could not be discharged from custody. The question here is, whether, independently of a distinction as to the facts, we have jurisdiction to liberate this prisoner? Our jurisdiction, unlike the modified jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer, is not derived merely from the Act of Parliament, and we have authority to give redress, although the custody be under civil process. The case of Re Everard (7 Ir. Jur., N. Š., 346), which has been referred to, was not a hasty deci. sion, and it is one that it is impossible to distinguish in principle from the case now before us. In that case my brother Fitzgerald, before whom the motion was made, said: "The question is, whether the Court of Queen's Bench, or a single judge of that court, has in vacation, at common law, jurisdiction to order a writ of habeas corpus to issue, to be made returnable before himself, for the purpose of discharging from arrest a party confined under civil process." And he then points out the all-important provision which distinguishes this case from the case that came before the Court of Exchequer, Page v. Williams (1 Ir. C. L. 527), namely, that the power of that court was solely derived from statute 56 Geo. 3, c. 100, which did not include the power of issuing a writ of habeas corpus in the case of persons in custody under civil or criminal process. It appeared that before my brother Fitzgerald pronounced the decision in Re Everard, discharging the prisoner, he had directed a search to be made for precedents in this country, and he found that Lord Chief Justice Blackburne had, in December 1846, liberated a prisoner who was in custody under civil process. The prisoner claimed exemption from arrest as a soldier in the East India Company's service, inasmuch as he could not be arrested for a debt less than £30. How does the present case differ in principle from that case, for there the prisoner was exempt by statute from arrest if the debt were less than £30 ? In this case there could not be any legal arrest whatever. There were similar orders made in vacation-one by Judge Crampton, another by Chief Justice Lefroy. The latter case was that of a married woman, who had been induced to join her husband in accepting bills, and a decree had been obtained by some means against her, under which she was arrested, but she was discharged in vacation. There is another case, that of Peter M'Dona, who was under arrest in Enniskillen, under a civil bill decree, and my brother O'Brien, in all the plenitude of conscious authority, discharged the prisoner. Those authorities cited in support of a motion for a habeas corpus are satisfactory; they in principle apply to the present case, which is an application made in term time to the Court of Queen's Bench, to declare that one of her Majesty's subjects being illegally incarcerated, should be discharged under a writ of habeas corpus. We have perfect authority for liberating the prisoner, not derived alone from statute, but fortified also by the common law. And, therefore, in accordance with the justice of the case, we shall make the order absolute for the issuing of the writ of habeas corpus, in order that the prisoner may be discharged.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Jan. 28 and 29.

issue. Within those first seven days, as he understood, Mr. Wallis did move here for a rule to show cause why the award should not be set aside, and the rule was refused by the court. He came here again on the 25th Nov., and upon a voluminous affidavit (which the plaintiff had another affidavit to contradict) he obtained a rule, which ordered that the plaintiff should show cause at chambers, on a day to be appointed by the judge, why the master's certificate should not be set aside as not being final, through his not having gone into all the matters. The grounds were thus miscarriage of reference and error. He (Bullen) was the first instance instructed to apply for a rule to set aside this very rule, but as he could not find any precedent, he asked for a rule making the former rule returnable before the full court. He was quite content that he should simply obtain a rule in this form, although he had been instructed to move to set aside the other rule, on the ground that the affidavits were false.

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DENMAN, J. said that, in the absence of any explanation, it appeared as if there had been an attempt to entrap the court.

KEATING, J. thought the rule must have been granted as a matter of course, as he had nothing about it on his notes for that day.

Bullen said that, although the rule was granted, on the 25th Nov., the plaintiff had only been served with it on the 20th Jan., with notice that it would be heard at chambers to-morrow (Thursday.)

DENMAN, J. could not understand how the rule could have been granted without it being stated that the motion had before been refused. KEATING, J. Could not understand how it could have been done, except by counsel saying that the affidavits had been amended.

Lord COLERIDGE.-We think, Mr. Bullen, that this rule ought to be returnable here to-morrow, instead of at chambers, and that you should show cause at once. We also order Mr. Wallis personally to attend here.

KEATING, J.-You should give notice as soon as possible.

Bullen promised that it should be done at

once.

Jan. 29.-Grantham said that in this case the court had ordered Mr. Wallis to be present at ten o'clock. He was now here in pursuance of that order, which was only served upon him in the country at seven o'clock last night, and he had had no time to get up his case. He therefore asked that the matter be allowed to stand over until Saturday. He himself knew nothing about the matter until he heard the application made by Mr. Bullen on Wednesday. His client had not been able to see Mr. Philbrick, who made the former application to the court.

Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., said the matter was extremely simple, and it was for Mr. Wallis to explain, if he could, whether the instructions to Mr. Philbrick made any mention of the facts brought before the court yesterday. None of the judges on the bench had any note of the case, nor had the Master more than a brief note; and it must have been the very last thing in the day, on the last day of term, and asked of the court quite as a matter of course. They were certainly led to believe that it was an ordinary motion, of course, to correct a mistake in an affidavit.

Grantham said he was told by Mr. Wallis, so far as he remembered, that he had been waiting for some three days for an opportunity of moving, and Mr. Philbrick mentioned the case as one that had been before the court before, but as it was so late he did not propose to weary the court by going into details at that time, the court being on the point of rising.

Lord COLERIDGE.-If the facts brought before (Before Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., and KEATING and point of fact, I must say they require some very us yesterday cannot be contradicted directly in

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DENMAN, JJ.)

SKINNER v. WALLIS.

Action against an attorney-Award-Moving to
set aside Showing cause at chambers
Practice.
Bullen said that in this case a rule was obtained

on the 25th Nov. last, which was to be returnable before a judge at chambers, at a time to be fixed by the said judge, and his application now was to vary that order by making it returnable before the full court. The action was brought by Mr. Vincent against Mr. Wallis, an attorney, formerly practising at Portsmouth, but now resident in London, and he (the learned counsel) could well understand why Mr. Wallis did not wish the matter to come before this court, as Mr. Skinner had been bail for him on a criminal charge tried at the Winchester Assizes. When the action was originally brought, it was referred to Master Kaye by an order of Honyman, J. It was gone into before the master, who gave his award on the 29th July last, against Mr. Wallis, the defendant. The Common Law Procedure Act, under which the action was brought, provided that unless the court were moved to set aside the award within seven days, or the first seven days of the following term, it should be final, and execution should

strong explanation.

Grantham said he was instructed that they could be contradicted; but he did not know what

the facts were.

Their Lordships having consulted the Master, Lord COLERIDGE said it seemed to have been stated that there had been an earlier application, which had been refused, but there was not a word about the execution having been levied.

Grantham did not think it had been levied then.

Bullen said the fact was that the execution was levied after the rule had been refused.

Lord COLERIDGE said they must be ready to show cause after luncheon.

In the afternoon Grantham said his client had made an affidavit of what took place on the occasion referred to, and what instructions were given to Mr. Philbrick. Mr. Philbrick was now here, and might, perhaps, say what took place before the judges, who were the same as were now on the bench, with the exception of the Lord Chief Justice.

Philbrick said he understood there was some doubt in the minds of some members of the court as to how it was that the rule was granted 'in the way it was.

KEATING, J.-Having been refused. Philbrick said that he moved in the first place, upon some affidavits, that the award was not final, and those affidavits, he thought, showed sufficient reason for a rule. Master Kaye, who had made the award, made a communication to the court, and one of the judges said: "If the matter be susceptible of this explanation, would it be worth while to take a rule ?' He (Philbrick) said he thought not, but his client was not in court, and he had no instructions. He afterwards communicated with his client, and further affi. davits were placed in the hands of Sir John Kars. lake and himself, for the purpose of moving. Sir John not being able to move, he attended for that purpose, and on the last day of term he came into court to move the rule just as the Lord Chief Justice was leaving the bench. He (Philbrick) said it was in substance a renewal of the motion, and he had affidavits in explanation of the matters referred to by Master Kaye. The court suggested that it should go to Chambers, and he acquiesced, and heard no more about it.

KEATING, J.-Did you tell the court the nature of these affidavits ?

Philbrick-Oh no, my lord; I never went into

them.

BRETT, J.-Did you suppose it was to go before a judge at chambers, to say whether there should be a rule or not?

Philbrick was certainly under that impression. The court did not go into the matter at all. The order of Master Kaye was a certificate finding that the defendant was indebted in £58 to the plaintiff, and an indorsement was that that order did not embrace the £50 advanced upon mortgage by the defendant and left untouched his rights therefor. It did not appear to be a final award upon the face of it; but the Master explained that, although the sum referred to was due, it was not payable at the time when the action commenced, and he put this note in in order to make it quite clear that the defendant's rights, although it was pleaded as a set-off, should not be prejudiced.

BRETT, J.-The note in the rule book is that upon explanation given to the Master, rule refused."

Philbrick-It was put in this way-"If sus. ceptible of that explanation, is it worth while taking a rule ?"

Lord COLERIDGE said the rule must have been taken to be refused, and asked what the new materials were on which it was moved again.

Philbrick said it was an affidavit showing the circumstances under which the set-off arose; and the point, so far as his memory went, was the question whether the £50 was then payable back or not. That was not the point in controversy before the Master. It was not gone into, as the point was not raised.

BRETT, J. thought Mr. Philbrick must have forgotten a little. He could scarcely be correct in saying that it was to go to chambers to know whether the rule should be granted or not. The endorsement on his own brief was that it was to go to chambers to show cause.

Philbrick said at any rate it was to go to chambers to be disposed of.

Grantham said he knew nothing about the matters in dispute until the brief was handed to him the other day to go before the Master; but, after looking at it and the affidavits now, he was bound to say that it appeared to him their Lordships would not disturb an award where there were different views as to what took place at that time. Looking at these affidavits, he did not think the court would interfere with the award, and certainly his client would not be wise in occupy ing their time when the Master had made his award.

Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-That is all very well, so far as it concerns yourself personally; but does your client offer any explanation as to not putting in his affidavit that the money had been paid on execution ?

Grantham was instructed that his client told Mr. Philbrick of the money having been paid, and asked if it made any difference, he having paid it under protest, upon which Mr. Philbrick told him it would make no difference, but if the award was given in his favour he would get his money back. There was also notice given to the other side that it was paid under protest. Philbrick said the facts were scarcely so, according to his remembrance. It was an agent on the other side who said the money had been paid, and when he asked Mr. Wallis he was informed it was true.

BRETT, J. asked if it was not stated in the affidavit ?

Philbrick said it was not. He only heard it verbally.

Their Lordships having consulted, Lord COLE RIDGE, C.J. said. We are of opinion there was no pretence for making this application to the court, and the rule must be discharged, and with costs.

Rule discharged, with costs.

HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. CLARE (Sir Michael Benignus), who was born in the year 1777, at Maidford, Northamptonshire, ard who resided in Jamaica (where he practised as physician-general), and then of London, and subsequently and at the time of his death in Cromarty, Scotland. Next of kin to come in by March 9, at the chambers of V C. B. March 3, at the said chambers at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. NETHERSOLE (Win. Austin), Kingston, Jamaica, merchant. Next of kin to come in by April 21, at the chambers of V.C. H. May 5, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

WRIGHT (Hannah), Brookfield, Hathersage, Derby. Heirat-law or next of kin to come in by March 3, at the chambers of the M. R. March 17 at the said chambers at eleven o'clock is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

STEPHENSON (Geo. H.), Hope House, near Ripon, York, gentleman. March 12; Henry Calvert, solicitor, Masham, near Bedale, York. March 26; V. C. H., at twelve o'clock.

STEPHENSON (Mark), Ossett, York, millowner. Feb. 16; John Barker, solicitor, Dewsbury, York, March 4; M.B., at half past eleven o'clock.

TASKER (Jas.), Aughton, in Ormskirk. Lancaster, yeoman.
Feb. 25 Jos. Bradley. solicitor, 91, Burscough-street,
Ormskirk March 9; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.
WATSON (Thos.), Wattisfield, Suffolk, farmer and potter.
March 6; J. W. King, solicitor, Walsham-le-Willows,
Ixworth, Suffolk. March 20; M. R., at eleven o'clock.

UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE ASHTON (Edward), Friar-street,

BANK OF ENGLAND.

[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Deot, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.]

CROSSLEY (Sir Chas. Decimus), Knt., Kensington-gardensterrace, Hyde Park. One dividend on the sum of £5000 New Three per Cent. Annuities; claimant, said Sir Chas. Decimus Crossley, Knt.

EGGLETON (Wm.), warehouseman, and ALCHIN (George), plumber, both of Barnes, Surrey, 233 9s. 6d. Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimants, said William Eggleton and George Alchin.

MACKENZIE (Hannah Margaret Cochrane), Wandsworthroad, spinster, £2563 28. 5d. Three per Cent. Annuities, £2750 New Three per Cent. Annuities, and 37 10s. Reduced Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimants, Hector Mackenzie and Hugh Mackenzie, administrators de bonis non to Hannah Margaret Cochrane Mackenzie, spinster, deceased. MELLIAR (Andrew Foster), Moulden, Bedfordshire, Esq., two dividends on the sum of £1000 New Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Andrew Foster Mellier. PARKER (John), Preston, and LEATON (William), Upping. ham, gentlemen, 31 98. 2d. Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimants, said John Parker and Wm. Leaton. READE (Rev. Jos. Baneroft), Stone Vicarage, Bucks, clerk, and READE (Rev. Richard), Backstone, Lincolnshire. 2151 148. 9d. Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Rev. Richard Reade, the survivor.

WILLES (John). Hungerfo.d Park, Esq., fifteen dividends on the sum of £1000 9s. 8d. Turee per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, Charles Thomas Willes, one of the acting executors of William Willes deceased, who was the surviving executor of John Willes, deceased.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS.

HEREFORD AND SOUTH WALES WAGGON AND ENGINEEING COMPANY (LIMITED). Petition for winding-up to be heard Feb 14; before the M. R. MANGHOLD HEAD MINING COMPANY (LIMITED). Petition for winding-up to be Leard. Feb. 14; be ore the M. R METROPOLITAN CONSUMERS' CO-OPERATIVE ASSOCIATION (LIMITED)-Creditors to send in, by Maren 2, their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Geo. Whithin, 8, old Jewry, London, the official liquidators of the said association. Marca 21, at the chambers of the M. R., at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. WESTERN OF CANADA OIL LANDS AND WORKS COMPANY (LIMITED).-Creditors to send in, by March 9, their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any) to Chas. F. Kemp, 8, Walbrook, Loudon, the official liquidator of the said company. March 23, at the chambers of the M.R., at half past eleven o'c ock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. WINE AND SPIRIT CO-OPERATIVE SUPPLY ASSOCIATION (LIMITED).-Petition for winding-up to be heard reb. 14, before the M.R.

WIRE THAMWAY COMPANY (LIMITED).-Creditors to send in by March 2 their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to the official liquidator of the said company, at their office, 21, Gresham--treet, London. March 23, at the chambers of V.C. M., at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY.
LAST DAY OF PROOF.

BACHELOR (Edward), Wimborne Minster, Dorset, inn-
keeper. March 2; Henry Moore, solicitor, Wimborne
Minster, March 17. V. C. M., at 12 o'clock.
CHADWICK (Jos.), Cinder Hills, Mirfield, York, gentleman.
Feb. 26; B. Chadwick, solicitor, Dewsbury, March 12.
M. R., at 11 o'clock.

DORIN (Jas. A.), formerly of 38, Queen's-gardens, Padding-
ton, Middlesex, and afterwards of Scarborough, Yorks,
Esq. Feb. 28; H. R. Freshield, solicitor, 5, Bank-build-
ings, London. March 10; V.C. M. at twelve o'clock.
EVANS (David M.). Albion House, King Edward's-road,
South Hackney, Middlesex, newspaper proprietor. Feb.
28; A. Beddall, solicitor, 108, Bishopsgate-street, London.
March 12; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.
FIELD (Catherine), Warwick, widow. Feb. 20; Edward
Hoare, solicitor, 28, Great James-street, Bedford-row,
London, March 6, M.R., at half-past eleven o'clock.
FISHER (John), Southampton, shopkeeper. Feb. 16; E.
Coxwell, solicitor, Southampton, Feb. 26, V.C. H., at one
o'clock.
GAGGS (Thos), Howden, York, surgeon. Feb. 28; Geo.
England, solicitor, Howden. March 16; M.R., at half-
past eleven o'clock.

GREENSMITH (Thos.), Thorpe, Derby, gentleman. Feb. 27; Edwd. Hoare, solicitor, 28, Great James-street. Bedfordrow, London. March 13; M.R., at half-past eleven o'clock.

GREGORY (Susan M.), 1. Clarence-place, Dover, spinster. Feb. 28; Crook and Smith, solicitors, 173, Fenchurchstreet, London. March 14; V.C.H. at twelve o'clock. GWYER (Edmund), 7, West Clifton-terrace, Bristol, merchant. March 2; Bush and Ray, solicitors, Bristol. March 14; M.R. at twelve o'clock.

HARDWICK (Benjamin), Leeds, gentleman. Feb. 28; W. B. Craven, solicitor, 6, East Parade, Leeds. March 17: V.C.B. at twelve o'clock. HEAGARTY (Jas.), 23, St. Martin's-road, Stockwell, Surrey, and 3, Walker's-court, Golden-square, Middlesex, fishmonger. Feb. 28; H. M. Dalston, solicitor, 161, Piccadilly, Middlesex. March 11; V.C. B. at twelve o'clock. JOHNSON (Geo.), Millfield House, York. March 19; O. B. Wooler, solicitor, Darlington. March 30; V.C. M. at twelve o'clock.

ROPER (John), Grove House, Hollingbourne, Kent, gentleman. March 2; Wm. Beale, solicitor, Maidstone. March 12; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.

Ross (Thos.), Ravensbourne Park, Lewisham, Kent. March 9; Chas. Francis, solicitor, 22, Austinfriars, London. March 12; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock,

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ARBUTHNOT (Edmund), Newtown House, Hants. March 1; Waiters and Co., solicitors, 9, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, London. Everton, Liverpool, labourer. April 1; Bremner and Son, solicitors, 1, Imperial-chambers, 62, Dale-street, Liverpool. BAKER (Geo.), Elm Lodge, Elm-grove, Southsea, and Broad-street, Portsmouth, merchant. March 25; Cousins and Burbidge, solicitors, St. Thomas-street, Portsmouth. BARKER (Rev. Chas. A.), late of Apedale-road, Chesterton, Stafford, previously of the Old Hall, Chesterton, and formerly of 12, Onslow-square, Middlesex. April 10; 1od and Longstaffe, solicitors, 16, Berners-street, Middlesex BATTERSBY (John), Mansfield, Notts, bank manager. March 2; Wm. Bryan, solicitor, Mansfield, Notts. BEARBLOCK (Mary A. F.). Rockstone, Ryde, Isle of Wight, spinster. Feb. 28; Clifton and Haynes, solicitors, Romford, Essex.

BLUNDEN (Wm.), East Peckham, Kent, grocer, draper, and general shopkeeper. April 10; Monckton and Co., solicitors, 72, King-street, Maidstone.

BLUNT (David), 3, Portman-square, Middlesex, Esq. Feb. 28; Cope, Rose, and Pearson, solicitors, 26, Great Georgestreet, Westminster.

BOWDITCH (Elizabeth A.), Cranfield Lodge, Church-road,
Upper Norwood, Surrey, widow. March 25; Bailey and
Co., solicitors, 5, Berners-street, London.
BOWDITCH (Hugh), Biggin Wood, Norwood, Surrey, Esq.
March 25; Bailey and Co., solicitors, 5, Berners-street,
London.

BREDIN (Lieut.-Col. Edgar G.), R.A., Woolwich, Kent.
March 2; R. H. Wilkins, solicitor, 19, King's Arms-yard,
London.

BROOKS (Leonard), 4, Cable-street, Liverpool, and of Waterloo, near Liverpool, commission agent. March 2; Peacock and Cooper, solicitors, 7, Union-court, Castlestreet, Liverpool.

BROWNLOW (Geo., otherwise Courtenay), formerly of $3, Brunswick-gardens, Kennington, late of 23, Mortimerstreet, Cavendish-square, Middlesex, Esq. March 10; F. J. and G. J. Braikenridge, solicitors, 16, Bartlett'sbuildings, Holborn-circus, London. BUTTERWORTH (Maria), 60, South Cross-street, Bury, Lancaster, spinster. Feb. 4; Geo. Whitehead, Son, and Dodds, solicitors, 16, Bolton-street, Bury. COLEMAN (Ann D.), 22, Richmond-place, Brighton, widow. March 2; Thos. King and Son, solicitors, Brighton. COLLIN (Jonathan), Scotland.road, Penrith, butcher. March 10; W. B. and C. N. Arnison, solicitors, 17, Devonshire-street, Penrith.

CORBALLIS (Edward C.), War Office, Pall Mall, and 14,
Beaumont street, Middlesex, Esq. March 1; S. Spof-
forth, solicitor, 35A, Great George-street, Westminster,
London.

COTTLE (Mary A.), 6, Ferry Lane, Dolemeads, Bath, widow.
March 14; Stone, King, and King, solicitors, 13, Queen-
Square, Bath.
CRESSWELL (Wm.), Swinton, York, beerhouse keeper.
March 1 Nicholson and Co., solicitors, Wath, near

Rotherbam. CRUTCHLOW (Eusebius H.) Coventry, gentleman. March 25; H. J. Davies, solicitor, Hay-lane, Coventry. CUSSACK (Sarah), formerly of Ruby Hall, Monkstown, Dublin, late of Langstone Cliff, Starcross, Devon. Feb. 23; Wood and Co., solicitors, 6, Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn, Middlesex.

CUSING (Francis), 2, Gresham-villas, South Church-road, New Town, near Southend, Essex, architect and surveyor. Feb. 8; Wm. Sturt, solicitor, 14, Ironmonger-lane, London.

DENISON (Bobert), formerly of 9. Chapel-street, Somers' Town, butcher, late of 13, Eton-villas. Belgrave-road, Shepherd's Bush, Middlesex, out of business. April 21; Andrew and Wood, solicitors, 8, Great James-street, Bedford-row, London.

DIXON (Ann), Cedar Lawn, Grappenhall, Chester, widow. March 20; Marsh, Buckton and Jeans, solicitors. Warrington.

DOLAN (Lawrence), 97, St. Martin's lane, and 15, Cavendish-
road, St. John's-wood, Middlesex, Esq. March 2; M.
Dolan, solicitor, 4, 1 okenhouse-yard, London.
DREW Wm.), 67, Hamilton-terrace, St. John's-wood, Mid-
dlesex, Esq. March 25; Symes, Sandilands, and Hum.
phry, solicitors, 33, Fenchurch-street, London.
DURHAM (Margaret M.), 64, Victoria-road, Kentish Town,
Middlesex, widow. Feb. 28; W. S. Robertson, 79, Lever-
ton-street, Kentish Town, Middlesex.

EDWARDS (Mary), Ely, spinster. March 16; Whitakers and
Woolbert, solicitors, 12, Lincoln's Inn-fields, Middlesex.
EMERSON (Thos. G.), formerly of Bridge-street, Creenwich,
Kent, afterwards of Jamaica place, Limehouse, and of
Green-street, Stepney, Middlesex, but late of 19, St.
Peter's-road. Mile End, Middlesex, pilot. March 4; S.
Prentice, solicitor, 238, Whitechapel-road, Middlesex.
FAGG (Sarah), late of 1, Abbey-gardens, Abbey-road, St.
John s-wood, Middlesex, and formerly of Rose-cottage,
Water-lane, Brixton, Surrey, widow. Feb. 21; Lowless
and Co., solicitors, 26, Martin's-lane, Cannon-street,
London.
FARRER (John), 47. Princess-gate, Hyde-park, Middlesex,
and of Gurthalougha Borrisolnane, Tipperary, Ireland,
Esq., and late in H. M.'s 1st Regiment of Life Guards.
Feb. 21; Duncan and Murton, solicitors, 45, Bloomsbury-
square, London.

Fox (Edmund), 25, The Pavement, Clapham, Surrey, and of 12, Little Britain, London, photographic mounter. March 20; Cox and Sons, solicitors, 4, Cloak-lane, London.

FRY (Ann), heretofore of Barston Hayes, Kent, and late of 70, Marine-street, St. Leonard's-on-Sea. March 2; J. W. Fry, solicitor, 30, Gracechurch-street, London. FRYER (Mary), 25, Castlenan-villas, Barnes, Surrey, widow. March 1; Farrar and Farrar, solicitors, 2, Wardrobeplace, Doctor's-commons, London.

GARLE (John), formerly of West View, Bickley, Kent, and late of Lubbock road, Chislehurst, Esq. March 20; Beachcroft and Thompson, solicitors, 18, Ing's-road, Bedford-row, London.

GARLICKE (Lettice), Tenby, Pembroke, widow. March 25; Gwynne and Stokes, solicitors, Tenby.

GIBB (Wm.) Swinton Park, near Manchester, Esq. (formerly carrying on business as a wine and spirit merchant in Manchester). March 31; Claye and Son, solicitors, 8, St. James's-square, Manchester.

GOFF (Alicia F.), 5, Burlington-road, Westbourne-park, Middlesex, widow. Feb. 20; Lowless, Nelson, Jones, and Thomas, solicitors, 26, Martin's-lane, Cannon-street, London.

GOSNELL (Edward), formerly of 18, St. Mary's-road, Canonbury, Islington, Middlesex, and of Ryde, Isle of Wight, Esq. March 31; Rutherford and Son, solicitors, 14, Gracechurch-street, London.

GRIGGS Money F.), Little Fransham, Norfolk, farmer. March 5; T. Palmer, solicitor, Swaffoam.

HARLOCK (Wm.), Newmarket, St. Mary, Suffolk, training groom. March 1; Kitchener and Fenn, solicitors, Newmarket.

HAZELDINE (Ann), Danemore, Godstone, Surrey, widow. March 31; Chas. Wellborne, solicitor. 17, Duke-street, London-bridge, S.E.

HESKETH (Maria C.), 34, Southampton-road, Maitlandpark, Middlesex, spinster. Feb. 26; H. J. Grueber, solicitor, 38, Walbrook, London.

HODSON (Mary), formerly of Longcross, Chertsey, Surrey, but late of Vegtana, Chillon, Switzerland, spinster. Feb. 28; Roscoe, Hincks, and Sheppard, solicitors, 14, Kingstreet, Finsbury-square, London.

HOLLYMAN Wm.), Clevedon, Somerset, butcher. March 25; H. Woodford, solicitor, Clevedon.

HOUGHTON (Aubrey A,), Abbey-road, St. John's-wood, Middlesex, Esq. April 1; C. Morgan, solicitor, 15, Old Jewry chambers, London.

JAKEN (Wm.), 10, Addisoombe-road, Croydon, Surrey, gentleman. April 2; Drummonds, Robinson, and Till, soli. citors, Croydon.

JarrCOAT (Thos.), Hertford House, Coventry, Esq. March 2; Twist and Sons, solicitors, 16, Hertford-s.reet, Coventry.

JONES (Edward), 183, Leadenhall-street, and 1, Canonbury
Place South, Middlesex, merchant. March 10; Wm. D.
Cole, solicitor, 81, Guildford-street, Middlesex.
KERR (John), 71, Great George-street, Liverpool, house and
ship painter, paperhanger, and decorator. March 14;
Toulmin and Co., 3. Lord-street, Liverpool.
KINGHORN (Margaret J.), 86, Lorrimore-square, Walworth,
Surrey, spinster. April 21; E. Byrne, solicitor, 3, White-
hall-place, Westminster.
LANGFORD (Thos,), Shedford Woodlands, near Hungerford,
Berks, yeoman. March 9; H. E. Astley, solicitor, Hun-
gerford, Berks.

LEESON (Mary J.), 40, Ebury-street, Pimlico, Middlesex.
March 31; J. Halse, 108, Guildford-street, Russell-square,
Middlesex.

LIPYEATT (Chas, J. P.), The Priory, Dawlish, Esq. March 25; Geare and Tozer. solicitors, Queen-street, Exeter. LUKER (Chas.', Cheriton House, Westbury-on-Trym, Gloucester, lime burner and miller. March 2; Osborne Ward and Co., solicitors, 41, Broad-street, Bristol. MACHEN (John), formerly of Wardsend House, Ecclesfield, late of 27, Gladstone-terrace, Broomhill, Sheffield, gentleman. March 2; Edward Machen, Hillsborough, near Sheffield, MARSH (Robert), late of Erpingham, Norfolk, Esq., formerly a major in H.M.'s service. Feb. 23; Fosters, Burroughes and Robberds, solicitors, Bank-street, Norwich. MAUGHAN (Wm. K.), Laura-placo Lower Clapton, Middlerex, gentleman. March 1; R. S. Gregson, solicitor, 8, Angel-court, Throgmorton-street. London. M'KENZIE (John). Rose Bank, Worcester, engineer. May 1; W. Ikin, solicitor, 10, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. MILLER (Wm. A.), 103, Upper Tulse-hill, Brixton, Surrey, Doctor of Medicine aɛd a Professor of Chemistry in King's College, London. March 25; L. Smith, solicitor. Eden-place, Ann-street, Birmingham.

MYLNE (George Wm.). 4, Paragon-terrace, Cheltenham. March 1; Barker and Ellis, solicitors, 15, Bedferd-row, London.

NEWBURY (Geo.), formerly of Biggleswade, Bedford, bank, manager, late of Sandy. March 23; Hooper and Raynes solicitors, Biggleswade, Beds.

NOBLE Henry A.), Harvest-hill, Cuckfield, Sussex, gentleman, March 20; F. Flux and Leadbitter, solicitors, 158, Leadenhall-street, London.

OELRICKS (Heloise), formerly of Bremen, Empire of Germany, late of Frieburg, in the said Empire. Feb. 26; Wm. A. Crump, solicitor, 10, Philpot-lane, London, E.C. OLIVER (Wm.), 9, Fitzroy-square, Middlesex, Esq. Feb. 12; W. H. Oliver, solicitor, 64, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex.

ORE (Robert), formerly of Church-lane, Islington, Middlesex, late of 1, St. John-street, Essex-road, Islington. March 7; M. Boyce, solicitor, 21, Abchurch-lane, London. PARKER (Thos.), 18, St. Paul's-churchyard, London, 15, Spring-gardens, Middlesex, and The Brook, Lamberhurst, Kent, Esq. March 23; Parker and Co., solicitors, 18, St. Paul's-churchyard, London, E C. PARSONS (Harriett), 18, Addington-street, Margate, Kent, Spinster. March 1; Munton and Morris, solicitors, 3, Lambeth-hill, Queen Victoria-street, London.

PEARSE (Peter), 4, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex, and Dereham Villa, Lewisham-road, Forest Hill, Kent, gentleman. Feb. 24; F. Carter, solicitor, 9, Old Jewry Chambers, London.

PENDARVES (Tryphena W.), Pendarves, Cornwall, and of Tristford, Devon, widow. Feb. 28; Carlyon and Paull, soliciters, Truro.

PIERCE (Mary A.), formerly of the Yorkshire Grey, London-street, Middlesex, but late cf 2, Brunswick-villas, Wood-street, Barnet, widow. March 15; E. J. Layton, solicitor, 2, Suffolk-lane. Cannon-street, London. PIERREPONT Joseph D.), Milnton, Marham Clinton, Nottingham, yeoman. March 14; Messrs, Burnaby and Denman, solicitors, East Retford.

POLLARD (Thos.), West Whitleigh, St. Budeaux, Devon, Esq. April 20; Sole and Gill, solicitors, 8, St. Aubynstreet, Devonport.

QUICK (Geo.), Southampton, and of Bitterne, common brewer and wine and spirit merchant. March 31; Hickman and Son, solicitors, 7, Albion-place, Southampton. ROBINSON (John G.), late of Speen House, Speen, Berks, and of 2, Montague-square, Middlesex, Esq., formerly Lieut.-Col. in H.M.'s Guards. March 1; Langley and Gibbon, solicitors, 32, Great James-street, Bedford-row, London.

ROBINSON (Susan H.), 21, Montague-square, Middlesex, and of Speen House, Speen, Berks, widow. March 1; Langley and Gibbon, solicitors, 32, Great James-street, Bedfordrow, Middlesex.

SCOTT (Binny), formerly of Columbo, Island of Ceylon, late of Cheltenham, Esq. April 1; Freshfields and Williams, solicitors, 5, Bank-buildings, London.

SKELTON (Wm.), Four Swans Hotel, Bishopsgate-stroet, and Clarence Villa, Station-road, New Barnet, Herts. hotel keeper. March 25; Wm. Elam, solicitor, 87, Walbrook, London.

SIDDEN (Thos.), Rochester, Kent, Esq. Feb. 8; Acworth and Son, Solicitors, Star Hill, Rochester.

SMITH (Emma), 37, Chester-square, Middlesex, spinster. March 31; Thos. W. Nelson, solicitor, 6, Lawrence Pountney Lane, London.

SMITH (Thos.), Beaufort, Australia. March 1; Ralph W.
Smith, farmer, Crien, Derby.

SOULBY (John), Cranfield, Bedford, Esq. Feb. 28; H.
Norris, solicitor, 25, Chancery-lane, London.
STACEY (John Wm.), 31, St. Leonard's terrace, King's-road,
Chelsea, Middlesex, gentleman. Feb. 21; Robinson and
Preston, solicitors, 85, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex.
STAPLETON (George Jas.), formerly of St. Albans, Herts.
late of 34, Chepstow-place. Pembridge-square, Bayswater,
Middlesex. March 15; Hunter, Gwatkin, and Co., soli-
citors, 9, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, London.
STEVENS (Stephen), Sutton, Surrey, shoemaker. Feb. 19;
G. H. Hogan, solicitor, 28, Martin's lane, Cannon-street,
London.

STRUDWICK (Sarah), Park-place, Ealing, Middlesex, widow. March 6; Bailey and Co., solicitors, 5, Berners-street, Oxford-street, London.

cheap, London.

SWAIT Jas.). Charlton, Andover, gentleman. March 13; J. Smith, solicitor, High-street, Andover, Hants. TAYLOR (Lieutenant-General Arthur J.), late of 34, Colbyroad. Norwood, Surrey, formerly of 8, Beaufort gardens. Middlesex. March si; H. A. Dowse, solicitor, 6, New Inn, Strand, London. TAYLOR Rev. Henry J.), heretofore of Dulverton, Somerset, late of Beauchamp Washfield, near Tiverton. Devon. Feb. 13; C. E. Rowcliffe, solicitor, Stogumber, Somerset. THOMPRO (Robert B.), Middleton-road, Hornsey, Middlesex, gentleman. March 2; J. Miller, solicitor, 48, EastTHOROLD (Chas.), formerly of Wirrcanda, near Kangaka, South Australia, sheep farmer, but lat of 49, Morningtonroad, Camden Town, St. Pancras, Middlesex, England, gentleman. Aug. 19: Stow and Ayers, solicitors, Waymouth-street, Adelaide, South Australia. THREADKELL (Sarah), Petistree, Suffolk, widow. Feb. 28; W. W. Welton, solicitor, Woodbridge, Suffolk. TURNER (Chas. H.), Rooksnest, Surrey, Esq. March 31; Symes and Co. solicitors, 33, Fenchurch-street, London. WALLER (Josephine E M.) 8, Westbourne-park, Bayswater, Middlesex, widow, March 1; Capron and Co., solicitors, Savile-place, Conduit-street, London. WARRINER (John, 86, Mount Pleasant, Sale, Chester, stonemason. Feb. 25; Payne and Galloway, solicitors, 28. Brazenose-street, Manchester. WATKINS Elizabeth), formerly of 14, Drummond-road, Bermondsey, widow. Feb. 21; Wilkinson and Drew, solicitors, 151, Bermondsey-street, Bermondsey. WILSON (Willoughby Jas), formerly of 2, Berkeley-place, Connaught square, Middlesex, but late of 16, King-street, Portman-square, a captain in the R.A. Feb. 28: R. W. Childs and Batten, solicitors, 93, Fleet-street, London.

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Three shares in the Northam Bridge Roads-sold for £400 Two policies of £999 and £300 each, life aged 80 years-sold for £885.

Mid-Hants Railway.-£250 debenture stock-sold for £180. London and South Western Railway.-£150 debenture stock -sold for £130.

Friday, Jan. 30.

MERCANTILE LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. CONTRACT-SALE OF GOODS-DELIVERY BY PARCELS-NON-PAYMENT FOR FIRST PARCEL RESCISSION. By contract of 28th Nov. 1871, plaintiffs bought of the defendants 250 tons of iron at 50s. a ton, half to be delivered in two weeks, remainder in four weeks, payment, net cash, fourteen days after delivery of each parcel. No iron was delivered within the periods specified, but the time was extended by arraugement, and a quantity of iron was delivered on different days between the 19th Feb. and the 18th May 1873, under constant pressure from the plaintiffs for a continuous delivery. On the last-mentioned day the delivery of the first parcel of 125 tons was completed, and fourteen days afterwards the defendants demanded payment for that parcel; no payment was however made. When, therefore, the plaintiffs requested further deliveries of iron, the defendants absolutely refused to deliver any more. To an action for non delivery of the second parcel, the defendants pleaded rescission of the contract. Held, that the non-payment for the first parcel by the plaintiffs was not such an abandonment or refusal to perform their part of the contract as to amount to a rescission which freed the defendants from their liability to deliver the rest of the iron: (Freeth and another v. Burr and another, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S, 773. C. P.)

THE LAW OF RE-INSURANCE. THE subject of re-insurance has been surrounded with additional interest by the fact that several important suits have lately been brought, in which the principles of this subject are to be applied, and consequently an expression of the law as it now stands will not be unprofitable.

The old authorities hold that, in case of loss, the re-insurer is bound to pay the amount for which he is re-insurer, without any regard to the circumstance that the re-assured may have probe unable, because of bankruptcy, to pay in full: cured an abatement from the first insured, or may (Emerigon, tome 1, ch. 8, s. 14.) The insurer may at once proceed against the re-insurer, or he may await a suit, and recover the judgment obHe need not pay the judgment against him first, tained against him, with costs, from the reinsurer. but may recover all the re-insurer is liable to pay: Sandf. 137.) Chancellor Walworth, in Herckenrath (Hone v. Mutual Safety Insurance Company, 1 v. American Insurance Compang (3 Barb. ch. 63), considers that the authorities required the reinsurer to pay the amount the insurer becomes liable to pay, not what he has paid. In Eagle Insurance Company v. Lafayette Insurance Company (9 Ind. 443), the suit against the insurer had been dismissed, and not renewed in six months, which was the limitation for suits in the Lafayette Insurance Company. The court held that, although the re-insurer can make any defence which the original insurer might make, yet the limitation not being a good defence for the Lafayette Insurance Company, could not be invoked in favour of the Eagle Insurance Company, the Lafayette, in fact, being yet liable to the first insured.

The insurer, in seeking his remedy against the re-insurer, is obliged to prove up the character and extent of his loss: (Hastie v. De Peyster, 3 Caines, 190; Yonkers Fire Insurance Company v. Hoff. man Fire Insurance Company, 6 Robts. 316.) The custom in France is for payment on proof of payment of loss by the insurer. But when there is no special contract, the re-insurer will be obliged to pay all that the first insurer ought himself to pay, and consequently must prove the exThe prelimi

istence and extent of the loss.

Re-insurance has been practised for several hun-nary dred years, and in marine insurance has become quite thoroughly defined, and there can hardly be

By Messrs. DRIVER, at Billingborough. Lincolnshire. Billingborough-The Fortescue Arms, with found any sufficient reason why these same rules paddock, frechold-sold for £1000.

Tuesday, Feb. 3.

By Messrs. CHINNOCK, GALSWORTHY, and Co., at the Mart Knightsbridge.-Freehold ground rents of £99 per annumsold for £2300. Brompton.-Nos. 349, 351, 353, and 355, Fulham-road, term 35 years, with short reversions-sold for £1550. Chelsea-An improved rent of £15 per annum, term 22 years-sold for £89.

Nos 97, 99, 101, 115, and 117, Flood-street, term 10 yearssold for £400.

By Messrs. D CRONIN and Sons, at the London tavern. Kensington.-the lease of the King's Arms wine vaults, term 30 years-sold for £2200.

MAGISTRATES' LAW.

-

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. ERECTION OF PILES IN BED OF A NAVIGABLE RIVER OBSTRUCTION NUISANCE INJUNCTION. An information was filed by the AttorneyGeneral at the relation of the Mayor and Corporation of Sandwich to restrain by injunction the defendant, who was the owner of a wharf abutting on the river Stour, a public navigable river forming the harbour of Sandwich, from erecting a structure, having its foundation in the bed of the river, which interfered with the navigation. Held, that no person has a right to put an obstruction in the bed of a navigable river, although at the time it may not be a nuisance. Held, also, that the erection of the structure was a nuisance to persons using and navigating the river; that, the erection being for the purposes of the defendant's trade, it was too remote a benefit to the public to say that the encouragement of the trade of a single individual was a benefit to the public; and that the injunction must be granted. The question whether erections made in a harbour are a nuisance

or not depends on whether, upon the whole, they produce public benefit, not giving to the words "public benefit" too extended a sense, but apply. ing them to the public frequenting the port. The benefit to the public must be a direct benefit: (Attorney General v. Perry, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 716. M. R.)

CANAL-POWER TO SUPPLY WATER FROM ALL SOURCES RIPARIAN PROPRIETORS-DIVERSION OF STREAMS.-By an Act of Parliament passed in 1821 for amalgamating two canal companies, the united company were empowered to maintain and keep navigable the united canal; and "for that purpose to supply the said united canal at all times for ever thereafter with water from all springs and streams which had been or should be found within 2000yds." of the same canal. Held, that the Act did not confer on the company powers over such springs or streams equal to those of a riparian proprietor, but only empowered them to take such water within the prescribed limits for the purposes of the canal, as was not required for the ordinary purposes for which the riparian proprietors might require it: (Wilts Canal Company v. The Swindon Waterworks Company, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 722. V.C. Malins).

should not be applied to fire insurance. When insurance was carried on by individual underwriters, such persons might wish to change their business, or become bankrupt, or as companies now, might find they have tno much at risk in a particular neighbourhood, and thus desire to relieve themselves from a portion of the risk.

Re-insurance is defined by Arnold to be a contract by which, for a certain consideration, the original insurer throws upon another the risk, (or according to Marshall, part of it) for which he has made himself responsible to the original assured, to whom, however, he remains liable on the original insurance.

The contract of re-insurance was valid at common law, but in England it was made a gambling device, and was suppressed by Act of Parliament (19 Geo. 2, c. 37, s. 4), which declares that reassurance is void unless the assured be insolvent, become a bankrupt, or die: (Andree v. Fletcher, 2 T. R. 161.) The contract is valid in most of the maritime states of Europe (Marsh. Insurance, 143; Beawes Lex. Mercatoria), and is held good in the United States. In Mercy v. Prince (2 Mass. 176) it was held that the Act of Parliament did not extend to the colonies; also Hastie v. De Peyster (3 Caines, 190).

As early as Lucena v. Crawford (3 Bos. & P. 75), it was held that an insurable interest may spring from a prior insurance. Insurable interest is sufficiently shown, if it is shown that the plaintiffs were insurer or reinsurer: (Yonkers Fire Insurance Company v. Hoffman Fire Insurance Company, 6 Robts. 316; New York Bowery Insurance Company v. New York Fire Insurance Company, 17 Wend. 359.)

proofs ordinarily furnished are not suf ficient, as the burden of proof is upon the re-insured to prove the extent of the loss in the original insurer must have proved it against him. There is no distinction between insurance and reinsurance policies as to the amount of proof required: (Yonkers Fire Insurance Company v. Hoffmann Fire Insurance Company, 6 Robts., 316.)

The insurer is bound to perform all the conditions of his re-insurance policy, and a failure to give notice of loss within a reasonable time will preclude recovery. Five days after the insurer was notified, the re-insurer was notified, and the court held it to be a sufficient compliance: (New York Central Insurance Company v. National Protection Insurance Company, 20 Barb. 468.) Any misrepresentation on the part of the insurer as to the character of the risk will avoid the policy, as when the insurer knew of the bad character of the insured, and did not disclose the fact: (New York Bowery Fire Insurance Company v. New York Fire Insurance Company, 17 Wend. 359.) And when the insurer reinsured the entire risk which was on goods, and stated that they had buildings in addition, which was false, the reinsurance could not be recovered, there being a custom among New Orleans underwriters to divide the risk and to consider it divided, unless the application stated otherwise: (Louisiana Mutual Insurance Company v. New Orleans Insurance Company, 13 La. An., 246.) If the insurer, on payment of loss, receives any benefit from salvage, this will accrue to the re-insurer; and if the salvage be improperly sold, the re-insurer is entitled to deduct the damage whibh can be proved up: (Delaware Insurance Company v. Quaker City Iusurance Company, 3 Grant's Cases, 71.)

An ordinary fire policy may be used with the substitution of the word re-insure for insure (New York Bowery Fire Insurance Company v. New York Fire Insurance Company, 17 Wend. 359; Mutual Safety Insurance Company v. Hone, 2 Comst. 235); and if the loss is in terms made payable to the "assured" this can only mean the insurer, and not the original insured (Carrington v. Commercial Fire Insurance Company (1 Bosw.

The contract is not a wagering contract, but one of indemnity, and companies which are authorised to make insurance contracts are, by implication, authorised to make reinsurance contracts: (Bowery Fire Insurance Company v. New York Fire Insurance Company (sup.) The contract being one of indemnity, the re-assured should only recover for actual loss sustained: (Eagle | 152). Insurance Company v. Lafayette Insurance Com- The same good faith must be observed between pany, 9 Ind. 443; Mutual Safety Insurance Com-insurer and re-insurer as between insured and pany v. Hone, 2 Comst. 235.) This actual loss will include costs incurred in defending suits, and if the reinsurer is notified of the suit, and does not appear and see that the costs are reasonable, he will be supposed to have approved of them by his silence: (New York State Insurance Company v. Protection Insurance Company, 1 Story, 458; Hastie v. De Peyster, 3 Caines, 190; New York Central Insurance Company v. Protection Insurance Company, 20 Barb. 468.)

Re-insurance is not the retaking of the specific risk. It may be on a risk equal or less than the original, but not greater; for then there would cease to be an insurable interest: (Philadelphia Insurance Company v. Washington Insurance Company, 11 Harris, 256.) It has also been held that the insurer may insure his entire risk, and include the premium.

insurer, and consequently the same person can not be agent of both parties, and insure in one company for which he is agent, and then reinsure in another for which he is also agent: (Utica Insurance Company v. Toledo Insurance Com pany, 17 Barb. 132); also when the same person was agent of one company and secretary of the other: (New York Central Insurance Company v. National Protection Insurance Company, 4 Kernan, 85.)

The contract of re-insurance is totally distinct from the primitive insurance, and the re-insurer has nothing to contest or settle with the primitive insurer (Hastie v. De Peyster, 3 Caines 190), not even if specific policies were reinsured (Carrington v. Commercial Insurance Company, 1 Bosw. 152). The amount received by the insurer from the reinsured is a general fund to be equitably distri

buted among the creditors of the insurer, and the original insured has no privity with the reinsurer, and, consequently, cannot come under the rule that the principal creditor is entitled to the benefit of all counter bonds and collateral securities (Herckenrath v. American Mutual Insurance Company, 3 Barb. c. 63).—Western Insurance Review.

COMPANY LAW.

EUROPEAN ASSURANCE ARBITRATION.
(Before Lord ROMILLY.)
Monday. Feb. 2.
LINES'S CASE.

THIS is the first case in the arbitration in which Lord Romilly has been concerned with the question of "novation." On the amalgamation of the Waterloo Company with the British Nation Association in 1862, Mr. Lines, a policyholder in the Waterloo, had received a circular announcing it, and stating that the "terms and conditions contained in the policies will remain unaltered by this arrangement." He thereafter paid his premiums to the British Nation, and after 1865 to the European Society. In 1867 a reversionary bonus was announced to him by the European, but he took no notice of the announcement. In 1862-3 the Waterloo had been ordered

to be wound-up, and advertisements had been inserted in various newspapers, calling on creditors to come in and prove their claims; but Mr. Lines now alleged he knew nothing about the Winding-up.

Lord ROMILLY now delivered judgment, and held that the subsequent dealings with the British Nation and the European were not sufficient by themselves to constitute a novation. Yet Mr. Lines must be deemed to have had notice of the winding-up of the Waterloo, and inasmuch as he had omitted to prove on his policy against that company in pursuance of the advertisements duly issued, he must be taken to have abandoned his rights against the Waterloo Company, and consequently could not now prove against them.

This being a representative case, costs were allowed to Mr. Lines. Napier Higgins, Q.C. and Cookson were for the official liquidator.

De Gex. Q.C. and Horton Smith for Mr. Lines.

STEVENS'S CASE; NUTTALL'S CASE. THESE cases were complicated cases with regard to the arrangements made on the amalgamation of the Professional Company with the European Society.

Lord ROMILLY now held that the society was entitled to recover the balance of the sum charged upon Stevens's policy, with interest at 4 per cent., after giving credit for the dividends received by the society from the Professional, and that the debt might be set off against any dividend payable to him by the society on his proof for his policy. And that the society was entitled to recover from Nuttall the amount of the dividends received by him from the Professional.

Napier Higgins, Q.C., Roxburgh, Q.C., Pearson, Q.C., Waller, and Cookson appeared for the parties.

PHILLIP'S CASE.

JUDGMENT was delivered to-day in this case. The question was as to the validity of a transfer of European Society's shares, which Mr. Phillips had made to a pauper transferee, whose name had been furnished to Mr. Phillips's solicitors by a share dealer called Bensusan. In the notice of the wish to transfer, the consideration had been described as £29 10s. paid by the transferor. A cheque for that amount was sent to the transferee and indorsed by him; but it appeared that £7 15s. only had been kept by him, £10 of it going to one Bermingham, a transfer clerk of the society, and the remainder to Bensusan and his clerk.

Lord ROMILLY held that, if all the facts had been stated to the directors, and they had, in the bona fide discharge of their office, though fit to pass the transfer, no complaint could have been made, but under the circumstances of the case the transaction could not be allowed to stand, and the transferor must be placed on the list of contributories. His Lordship further stated: Though I disapprove the practice of throwing the debts of the company on the remaining shareholders, yet I do not mean to lay down that, where a person seeks to speculate in shares that are worth less than nothing in the market in the hope that something may ultimately come out of them, he may not do so. However, I repeat that, in all such transactions, in order to make a valid transfer which shall bind the shareholders of the company, who trust their affairs entirely to the directors, it is essential that the full transaction shall be laid before the directors in all its details, and that no officer of

the company, particularly one so important as the transfer clerk, who has the care of the books, shall have any pecuniary advantage arising from it. These transactions are very complicated, and the object of the persons who are engaged in them is to mix them up in such a manner that it is very difficult to unravel them. It is for this reason that I have stated the burden of proof-and in this I have followed Lord Westbury-lies upon the transferor, and that it is his duty to show that everything that is material for the decision of the directors has been brought carefully to their attention.

Napier Higgins, Q.C. and Cookson were for the official liquidators.

Southgate, Q.C. and Miller for Mr. Phillips.

CHATTERIS's CASE-LAWSON'S CASE. IN these cases the amalgamation of the British Commercial Insurance Company with the British Nation Assurance Association had been carried into effect by means of a deed, whereby several of the British Commercial shareholders covenanted to transfer their shares to trustees for the Association.

holders executed this deed, and also transferred The greater part of the sharetheir shares to trustees. Mr. Chatteris was one who executed the deed, but did not transfer his shares. The official liquidators songht to place

him on the list of contributories, but

Lord ROMILLY now delivered judgment and held that the question was governed by Lord Westbury's decisions in Blundell's case (Law Times European Reports, p. 39) and Rivington's case (Law Times European Reports, p. 57). The trustees, Messrs. Bermingham and Lake, would be placed on the list of contributories, and would be left to compel their cestuis que trustent to pay the calls made on them.

official liquidators. Napier Higgins, Q.C., and Cookson were for the

Millar and Bevir for the respondents.

COUNTY COURTS.

agreed that the goods are to be forwarded solely at the risk of the owner, with the exception that the company shall be responsible for any wilful act or wilful default of the company or their servants, if proved, for fraud or theft by their servants, and for collision of trains conveying the goods within the company's limits." During the transit the damage complained of was done to the goods.

Upon these facts the defendants contended that they were protected by the contract note.

The plaintiffs contended that as consignee had not authorised the signature of the contract note, he was not bound by the signature of the consignor's servant.

The defendants were allowed to appeal on the condition that they paid the costs of the appeal. Mayd now appeared for the respondent. BLACKBURN, J., asked what he had to say in support of the ruling, as he was loth to believe that the County Court judge could so have ruled. think he could support such ruling. Mayd said that with all submission he did not

BLACKBURN.-I should be surprised if you

could.

Mayd.-The next point is, whether or not the condition is a reasonable one.

in which I think you will find still greater diffi BLACKBURN, J.-There is still a further step, culty, there being no evidence the judge ruled "That supposing the contract note is to be binding on the plaintiff the injury must be presumed to have been caused by the wilful act or default I confess I cannot help thinking must be a of the company or their servants." That is what forgery, and if so it is a gross libel upon the judge; but if he did really rule it, and is in the Lord Chancellor should be made aware of it. habit of making such rulings, I own I think the

tainly had a month to consider the judgment.

Mayd.-As to forgery, I can say the judge cer

BLACKBURN, J.-Really, how can you support such ruling?

Mayd.-As there was no evidence, and as your Lordship entertains such a strong opinion, I will add nothing further.

BLACKBURN, J.-Then I simply say we must reverse the judgment.

Douglas Walker, for the appellants, as to costs.

EQUITY IN COUNTY COURTS. EQUITY suits apparently are increasing in the County Courts, but unfortunately the decisions-We made the condition that we should pay the are very generally reversed on appeal. We noticed last week an appeal against the dismissal upon which my clients were allowed to appeal costs of the appeal. Those were the only terms of a plaint on the ground of want of jurisdiction from the judge's decision, and we had no means of when the case ought properly to have been trans-bringing it to the attention of the court except by ferred. We now extract the following from the stating it in this way. Weekly Notes of the Law Reports for Jan. 31: V.C. MALINS' COURT. Monday, Jan. 26.

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Alfred Darby took possession of William Gandy junior's estate as executor de son tort, and Thomas Richardson brought an action against him as such executor in the Court of Exchequer for his debt. Letters of administration to William Gandy junior were then

granted to William Gandy senior.

On the 22nd Oct. 1873 Albert Nokes, another creditor of William Gandy junior, filed an administration plaint against William Gandy senior and Alfred Darby in the County Court of Chelmsford.

By rule 8 of the first of the County Court Orders no decree in an equitable suit can be made till one month after plaint filed.

Before decree, on the application of the plaintiff, an order was made ex parte restraining Thomas Richardson from continuing his action. The latter moved in the County Court to discharge the order, but the judge refused to dissolve the injunction.

Thomas Richardson appealed.

Glasse, QC. and Nalder, in support of the appeal.
Cotton, Q.C. and Begg, for the respondents.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the power of the beyond that of the Court of Chancery, and an action by County Courts in administration suits did not go a creditor could not be restrained in an administration suit before decree, or on an ex parte application. The appeal was therefore allowed with costs.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Tuesday, Jan. 27. TAYLOR V. THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

sum of

A County Court appeal. THIS was an action brought in the Haverhil County Court of Suffolk, before Edmond Beales Esq., M. A., judge, to recover the £2 178. 10d. for damages sustained by the plaintiff, through the alleged negligence of the defendants, to certain articles of furniture. At the trial the following facts were admitted.

That the furniture in question was sent from London to Haverhill by the detendants' railway. That the person who delivered the goods to the defendants, for the purpose of being carried, and who was a servant of the consignor, signed a contract, the material part of which was as follows: "In consideration of the company accepting the goods to be forwarded at the lower rate it is

BLACKBURN, J.-If you have bound yourself in honour not to ask for the costs, and you are to pay the costs, well and good. It may be that the conditions he seeks to impose upon you are in excess of his jurisdiction, but that is not a matter before us. Nobody on one side or the other is

asking us to enforce this condition or to quash it, but I think probably after the strong expressions that have fallen from the court as to the absurdity of the decision of the court below, it will hardly be insisted upon. Judgment reversed.

BIGGLESWADE COUNTY COURT. (Before EDMOND BEALES, Esq., Judge.) Tuesday, Dec. 2, 1873. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. SWAFFIELD.

Carriers-Horse-Consignee not ready to receiveRight of company to recover livery charges. THIS WAS an action brought by the Great Northern Railway Company to recover certain charges paid by them for the keep of the defendant's horse, under the circumstances stated in the judgment.

James P. Aspinall (barrister) instructed by Johnstone, Farquhar, and Leech, appeared for the plaintiffs.

Stimson for the defendant.

His HONOUR gave judgment as follows.-In this case the plaintiff claimed the sum of £17 from the defendant under the following circumstances, as admitted or proved by evidence. On the 5th July of last year (1872) the defendant sent a horse by the plaintiff's 8.40 p.m. train from King's Cross to Sandy, consigned to himself at the latter place. On the arrival of the train at Sandy at 10.8 p.m. there was no one on the part of the defendant to receive the horse, and the defendant being unknown to the station master there, who also did not know where the defendant lived, he directed the horse to be taken to Bennett's livery stables for safe custody. The defendant lives at Wootton, near Bedford, between fifteen and sixteen miles from Sandy, and a man in his employ, who had been directed to meet the horse at Sandy, arrived there by the London and North Western train from Bedford at between 10.35 and 10.40, some short time only after the horse had been placed at the livery stables. He produced the ticket for the horse, and was informed by the railway porter that it was at the livery stables, and the station master being applied to told the defendant's man he could have the horse on pay

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