Mr. Hemsley, the prisoner's master, replying to Mr. Montague Williams, said the deficiencies, in all, amounted to at least £200. The jury found the prisoner guilty of feloniously uttering the forged cheque. Montagu Williams said there was another charge against the prisoner of embezzling two sums of £52 odd belonging to the estate, but, after the verdict, he did not propose to proceed with it. The prisoner, he added, had been convicted at this court upwards of twenty-two years ago; but the officer who had him then in charge had died, and it was impossible formally to prove the conviction. Mr. Commissioner KERR sentenced him to five years' penal servitude. UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND. [Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.] HARVEY (Chas. Guildford, Surrey, licensed victualler, seven dividends on the sum of £161 1s., and one dividend on £506, 16s. New Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Chas. Harvey. WINTERBOTHAM (Thos.), Great Dover-street, Southwark, Robinson (Thos. Leedham), Croydon, and Roberts (John), Sidmouth-st., Gray's-inn-road, wine and spirit merchants, £925 Three per Cent. Anuuities. Claimants, said Thos. Winterbotham and Thomas Leedham Robinson, the survivors. APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. COLONIAL AND FOREIGN MEAT SUPPLY Co. (LIMITED).Petition for winding-up to be heard March 13, before V.C. H. CO-OPERATIVE BREWERY COMPANY (LIMITED). Creditors to send in by March 27 their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors, if any, to D. Roberts and Peckham and Co., solicitors, 17, Knight Rider-street, Doctor's Commons, London, liquidators of the said company. April 18; at the chambers of the M. R. at eleven o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. JUNIUS NEWSPAPER COMPANY. Creditors to send in by March 14 their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors, if any, to R. Lee, 5, Furnival's Inn. London, the official liquidator of the said company. March 28; at the chambers of the M. R., at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. TUNIS RAILWAY COMPANY (LIMITED). Creditors to send in by April 11 their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors, if any, to Lieut.-Col. F. D. Grey and J. H. Webster. 152, Gresham House, Old Broad-street, London, the liquidators of the said company. April 20; at the chambers of V.C. M., at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. LAST DAY OF PROOF. BELL (James), Leicester, gentleman. March 20; C. J. Hunter, solicitor. March 27; V.C. B. at twelve o'clock. CAFFIN (William), Blackheath, Kent, Esq. March 20; William Holmes, solicitor, 20, Threadneedle-street, London. April 15th; M. R. at eleven o'clock. COLLUM (William), Bombay, East Indies, a medical officein the Bombay army, and assay master at Bombay, and of Piccadilly, Middlesex. May 2; F. Wm. Farrer, solicitor, 66, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. June 5; V.C. H., at one o'clock. COPPARD (Wm.), 34, Bennett street, Greenwich, Kent. March 23; Wm. Holmes, solicitor, 20, Threadneedlestreet, London. March 31; V.C. H., at one o'clock. CHOWDEN (Wm.), March, Isle of Ely, Cambridge, former April 1; Dawbarn and Wise, solicitors, March. April 21; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. DEAN (Henry), 4, Vernon-road, Old Ford, Middlesex, oilman. April 1, R. D. Strong, sol citor, 54, Bishopsgate. street Within, London. April 20; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. KEKEWICH (Samuel T., Peamore, Devon, Esq., M.P. March 18; Crarles J. Follett, soli itor, Exeter, Apr 1 15. V. C. B., at 12 o'clock. LOWERY (Thos.), 3, Albion-terrace, Commerc'al-road East, Middlesex, Trinity pilot. March 30; H. Grain, solicitor, 26, Philpot-lane, London, April 15. V. C. H., at 12 o'clock. MANN (Jas. H., 3. Albert-road, Regent's-park, Middlesex, gentlemas. April 2; Edward Hoare, solicitor, 2, Great James-street, Bedford-row, Middlesex, April 15. M. R., at 11 o'clock. MOON (Wm.), Godalming, Surrey, common carrier and farmer. March 31; J. and M. Pontifex, solicitors, St. Andrew's-street, Holborn Circus, London. April 15; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock. MOREY (Jos.), 3, Pulteney-street, Barnsbury, Middlesex. April 20; E. E. Toller, solicitor, Dean's-court, Doctor'scommons, London, March 31; V. C. M., at twelve o'clock. MUSKETT (Jas. F.), 90, High-street, Clapham, and the Nursery, Clapham. Surrey, florist April 4; Jas. Neal, solicitor, 4 and 5. Pinner's Hall, Old Broad-street, London. April 18; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock. ORMSTON (Ralph), 5, Upper Weymouth-street, Middlesex, greengrocer. April 1; J. Goren, solicitor, 29, South Molton-street, Oxford-street, London. April 15; M.R., at half-past eleven o'clock. STUART (John), 1. High-street, Hornsey. Middlesex, baker. March 30; J. P. Poncione, jun., 5, Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn, Middlesex. April 13; V.Č. M., at twelve o'clock. SATCLIFFE (Wm.), Royal Lunatic Asylum, Cheadle, Chester, a person of unsound mind. March 31; Edwin Almond, solicitor, Kennedy-street, Manchester. April 13; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. TEBBY (Richard). Long Stratton, Norfolk, farmer. March 17; Geo. A. Rooks, solicitor, 16, King-street, Cheapside, London. March 25; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. WILKIN (Jas.), Jackett's Farm, Danbury and Dalton's Hall, Purleigh. Essex, farmer. March 28; Wm. J. Bruty, solicitor, 6. Tokenhouse-yard, London. April 14; M. R., at eleven o'clock. BEARE (Major Wm. G.), 34, Devonshire-place, St. Marylebone, Middlesex. March 31; Palmer. Eland, and Nettleship, solicitors, 4, Trafalgar-square, London. BECK (Elizabeth), Church House, Washington, Sussex. March 31; C. A. Wright, solicitor, Ironmonger's Hall, Fenchurch-street, London, E.C. BEISBY (Sidney). The Codars, Laurie Park, Sydenham, Kent, Esq. May 1; Pattison, Wigg, and Co., solicitors, 50, Lombard-street, London. BRAITHWAITE (Mary), New Millflat, Slegill, Morland, Westmoreland, spinster. March 18; George R. Thompson, solicitor, Appleby. BROADWOOD (Charles H.), Belgrave House, Preston, near BARDEN (John). Ledbury, Hereford, mercer and woollen CоBB (Mary A.), The George, 2, St. Mary Axe, London, CORNWALL (Geo.), Parkview, near Bandon, Cork, late of 108, Jermyn-street, St. James's, Middlesex, late a Major in H.M.'s 93rd Regiment of Highlanders. March 30; Deane and Co., solicitors, 14, South-square, Gray's-inn, London. COTGRAVE (Richard E. F.), 74, Gloucester-street, Pimlico, Middlesex, a retired Colonel in the R. E. Bombay Army. March 20; Wm. Woolfryes, solicitor, Banwell, Somerset. CRAIGIE (Gor. Sir Patrick E.), K.C.B., formerly of Fuilbrooks, Old Maldon, afterwards of Millmead House, Guildford, Surrey, and late of St. Leonard's-on-Sea. April 4 Fladgate and Co., solicitors, 40, Craven-street, Strand, London. CURWEN (Jane P.), Lapton Towers, Lupton, Kirkby Lonsdale, Westmoreland, spinster. March 81; T. Milburn, solicitor, 5, Washington-street, Washington, Cumberland. ECCLES (Richard), Walthew House, near Wigan, Lancaster, and of Lark Hill, Lord-street, Southport, Esq. April 8; Anderson and Co., solicitors, 4, Brunswick-court, Liverpool. EDWARDS (John), Trematon Hall, St. Stephens, Saltash, Cornwall, Esq. March 31; N. Bennett, solicitor, 1, Furnival's.inu, London. FRY (Geo.), formerly of Hastings, afterwards of the Island of Sark, and late of High Beech, Hastings, surgeon. April 1; Walter Sprett, solicitor. Mayfield, Sussex. GIFFORD (Wm. J.). formerly of Ford, near Wellington, Somerset, Esq, afterwards of King-street, Bloomsbury, Middlesex, and subsequently of Gray's-inn-square, Middlesex. March 14; O. Leefe, solicitor, 60, Lincoln's-innfields, London. JACKSON (Frances J.), Berkhampstead, Hertford. spinster. March 31; Fielder and Sumner, solicitors, 11, Godlimanstreet, Doctors'-commons, London. JEFFS (Sarah), late of 15, High-street, Stoke Newington (formerly known as 6, Midd eton-place, toke Newingtonroad, Middlesex, widow. April 6: Bicknell and Horton, solicitors, 161, Edgwar road, Hyde-park, L ndon. JOHNSON (John), Altrincham and Hale, Chester, timber merchant and wood turner. April 2; M. Fowden, solicitor, Market-street, Altrincham. JONES (John W.), North Petherton. Somerset, gentleman. March 25; Reed and Cook, soli itors, Bridgewater. LAWRENCE (Reuben), 13, Caroline-street, Bloomsbury, Middlesex, gentleman. March 31; S. Potter, solicitor, 36, King-street, Cheapside, London. LAWRINSON (Matilda) formerly of 7. Clifton-place, and afterwards of 10, Albert-terrace, St. Leonard, Exeter, and late of Southport, Lancaster, spinster. May 1; Simpson and Cullingford, solicitors, 85, Gracechurchstreet, London. LAZARUS (Moses), 46, Woburn-place, Russell-square, London, Middlesex, jeweiler. March 31; D. Woolf, solicitor, 17, King-street. Cheapside, London. LLOYD (Robert N.), the Stock Exchange, London. May 4; Alfred Borwick, Lloyds, London, E.C. NATTRISS (Geo.), Bristol, confectioner. May 1; Whittington and Co., solicitors, 14, Smail-street, Bristol. NEWEY (John), Westow Hill, Norwood, Surrey, painter and glazier. March 31; Gu co te, Wadham, and Daw, soli. citors, 19, Essex-street, Strand, London." PENNY (Sarah), Eversfield House, 105, Abbey-road, St. John's Wood, Middlesex, spinster. April1; White and Co., Folicitors, 6, Whitehall Place, Westminster, London. PRINCE (Anne), of Goodyers, Hendon, Middlesex, widow. May 1; Kynaston and Gasquet, solicitors, 88, Queenstreet, Cheapside, London. ROBERTS (Chas.), Castle Tavern, Holloway-road, Middlesex, licensed victualler. March 31; J. Parkinson, soli. citor, 35, Holloway-road, London. ROOKE (Sarah E.), Barnton, Chester, widow. March 20; Strand, Middlesex, Berks. REPORTS OF SALES. Saturday, Feb. 21. By Messrs. RUSHWORTH, ABBOTT, and Co., at the Mart. Maida-hill.-No. 67, Hamilton-terrace, term 62 years-sold for £1230. Great Berkhampstead. - Raven's-lane, a residence, with stabling and pleasure grounds, freehold-sold for £640. By Messrs. WILKINSON and HORNE. Fulham road.-No. 61 and 63, Waterford-road, term 82 years -sold for £320. Edgware-road.-No. 1, Milner-mews, term 48 years-sold for £220. By Messrs. EDWIN Fox and BOUSFIELD. Clapham-common. -The freehold residence, Holywoodsold for £6100. Balham-hill. The residence Chestnut House, freehold- Tuesday, Feb. 24. By Messrs. BROAD, PRITCHARD, and WILTSHIRE, at the Mart. Gray's-inn-road.-No. 15, Portpool-lane, and Nos. 1 to 5 Policy for £200, life, aged 44 years-sold for £36. By Messrs. CHINNOCK, GALSWORTHY, and Co. Newington.-One thirty-sixth share of the leasehold estates and funds of the late Samuel Brandon, Esq. - sold for £1600. By Messrs. DEBENHAM, TEWSON, and FARMER. Portman-square. No. 26, Upper Berkeley-street, with stabling, term 14 years-sold for £900. Marylebone.-No. 18, Crawford-street, term 30 years-sold for £710. No. 30, Upper Baker-street, term 27 years-sold for £950. Nos. 12 and 13, Park-place, and Nos. 25A and 25в, Park street, term 27 years-sold for £1820. Portman-square.-No. 10, York-street, term 14 years-sold Freehold ground-rent of £5 per annum-sold for £120. St. John's-wood.-No. 3, Cunningham-place, term 49 years for £590. Poplar.-No. 120, Grundy-street, freehold-sold for £20. Limehouse.-No. 20, Piggot-street, term 41 years-sold for. £230. Mile-end road.-No. 42, St. Peter's-street, term 66 yearssold for £250. Hammersmith.-Nos. 11 and 13, Redmore-street, term 97 years-sold for £260. Euston-square.-Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Little Clarendon-street, term 10 years-sold for £150. Tuesday, March 3. By Messrs. HARDS, VAUGHAN, and JENKINSON, at the Mart Dudley-cottage, freehold-sold for £270. Twenty £100 shares in the Vauxhall-bridge Company-sold for £360. Wednesday, March. 4. By Messrs. WINSTANLEY and HORWOOD, at the Mart. New Cross-road.-No. 288, term 68 years-sold for £775. St. George's-in-ihe-East.-No. 3, North-east-passage, term 32 years-sold for £205. MR. J. G. MACCARTHY, M.P. for Mallow, was admitted an attorney and solicitor in Easter Term 1853. He was born at Cork, where he is still in the exercise of his profession. He was educated at St. Vincent's College, Cork. MR. W. GORDON, M.P. for Chelsea, was ad mitted an attorney and solicitor in Trinity Term 1840, and is in practice alone in the City of London, having succeeded to his deceased father's extensive English, Scotch, and Colonial practice there. IT is reported that the post of Chairman of Ways and Means, filled in the last Parliament by Mr. Bonham Carter, late M.P. for Winchester, has been offered by the new Premier to a member of the House who is a solicitor. MR. C. E. LEWIS, M.P. for Londonderry city, was admitted an attorney and solicitor in Hilary Term 1847. He formerly practised in Lincoln'sinn-fields, but is now the senior partner in the firm of Messrs. Lewis, Munns, and Longden, of Old Jewry, in the City of London. He is a member of most of the institutions supported by solicitors. MR. JUSTICE BLACKBURN's complaint, at the recent sittings at Guildhall in the City of London, upon the subject of the inconvenience occasioned by attorneys not giving notice to the officers of the court when causes were intended to be withdrawn, was, we think, misdirected. Attorneys are themselves officers of the Superior Courts, and it is competent for the judges to make rules on the subject in question, with which, of course, all officers of the courts will comply, and for complying with which their proper costs, charges, and expenses should be allowed on taxation. THE Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is composed of the Lord President, the Lord Chancellor, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Lords Justices of the Court of Appeal in Chancery, the Lord Chief Justices Queen's Bench and Common Pleas, the Lord Chief Baron of Exchequer, the judge of the Court of Probate and High Court of Admiralty; also such prelates as are Privy Councillors, and all of the CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ALLENDER (Geo.), formerly of Copthall-court, London, stockbroker, late of 35, Kennington-park-gardens, Middlesex, gentleman. March S Paine and Layton, solicitors, 47, Gresham House, Old Broad-street, London. BAILEY (Jane), 10, Park-hill, Bristol, widow. March 21; Hunt. Hodgson, and Bobbett, solicitors, Bristol Cham Kensington.-No. 15, Durham-villas, term 78 years-sold for Privy Councillors who have held any of the offices bere, Nicholas street, Bristol. £2150. before mentioned, with four paid judges and the following subordinate officers: An Indian Assessor, a Clerk of Appeals, a Registrar, a Registrar in Admiralty and Ecclesiastical Causes. A large portion of the business which comes under the cognizance of this tribunal is conducted by gentlemen who are not members of the legal Profession. THE following is, we believe, a correct list of the names of the several solicitors who have from time to time been concerned in the celebrated case commonly known as the Tichborne case, now happily terminated: Messrs. Holmes; Moojen; Gibbes; Baxter, Rose, and Norton; Gorton; Hendricks; Harcourt; Dobinson and Geare; Cullington; Gray, Q.C.; Pollard; Stephens; and Bowker. THE following Lectures and Classes are appointed for the ensuing week at the Hall of the Incorporated Law Society, Chancery-lane, for the Instruction of students seeking admission on the roll of attorneys and solicitors: Monday, class, 4.30 to 6 o'clock, Conveyancing; Tuesday, class, 4.30 to 6 o'clock, Conveyancing; Wednesday, class, 4.30 to 6 o'clock, Conveyancing; Friday, lecture, 6 to 7 o'clock, Common Law. To prevent interruption at the lecture, subscribers are not admitted to the Hall after a lecture has commenced. AN issue of 2,500,000 dols. (£500,000 sterling) First Mortgage Seven per Cent. Sinking Fund Gold Bonds of 1000 dols. (£200) each of the Paris and Danville Railroad and Coal Company of Illinois is announced. The issue price is £170 sterling per bond of £200. At the price of issue shese bonds will yield as an investment nearly 8 per cent. per annum. The principal and interest of this issue are secured by a first mortgage upon the whole of the company's railroad franchises, rolling stock, and property of every description, and real estate, including coal and mineral lands now owned. The bonds having a priority of lien upon all the franchises and property of the company of whatever kind or quality of every description of the value of £1,800,000 now owned, and also upon all property which may be hereafter acquired by the company. The following par. ticulars are furnished by the company: The road is located between the Illinois Central Railway and Wabash River through a densely populated, wealthy, and productive country, of about seventy miles in width, containing no other parallel railroad in competition for its business. Its line is through a succession of highly-cultivated farms, growing cities, and villages. The road, when completed, will form the middle one-third of a through line from Chicago to Cairo, Paducah, and Shawnee town, and connecting these points, and through them the leading southern railways with Chicago by the most direct route. The road is 102 miles long, thirty-six miles of which are now completed and in operation. 1,050,000 dols. have been expended in the construction of the road and the purchase and development of the mines. 5000 dols. per mile is paid up to the capital stock of the company at par by individual and corporate subscribers. MAGISTRATES' LAW. Shoemakers WORSHIP. STREET POLICE COURT. Monday, March 2. (Before Mr. BUSHBY.) Master and Servants Act 9 Geo. 1, c. 27. A MAN was brought up charged with stealing a pair of boots, value 18s., the property of his employer. The short facts of the case were that the prisoner had been employed by a bootmaker to make up a pair of boots, he working on his master's premises. He left ostensibly for dinner, and never returned. The boots were afterwards missed, and information was given to the police. Some time afterwards the prisoner was appre. hended, and when charged said that he would pay for the boots if the prosecutor would forgive him. Before the court he attempted to set up the defence that some other person had stolen the boots. The prosecutor, however, in reply to Mr. Bushby, said that the prisoner did not return for his wages. Mr. BUSHBY, having looked into the Master and Servants Act, said that he found recited there the Act 8 & 9 Geo, 1 c. 27, 8. 4. That Act provided for offences of the kind charged against the prisoner, and from its being unrepealed it was impossible to deal with the charge in any other way. The Act provided that from and after the 1st May 1740 any person or persons employed in cutting, making up, &c., any skins, boots, shoes, &c., who should fraudulently purloin, "embezil,' secrete, pawn, exchange, &c., any portion of the material in which such person or persons should be employed, or do any act to lessen the value of such material, either before or after the making up, &c., should upon conviction be ordered to make a reasonable recompense for his offence, such " recompense not to exceed the double value of the goods so purloined, "embeziled," &c. He had, therefore, to order the prisoner to pay the double value, 368., of the boots he had purloined, or in default of sufficient distress to be imprisoned for fourteen days with hard labour. The Act further provided that the prisoner while in gaol should be once whipped in such manner as the justice might think fit. He could not think, however, that the Legislature, when amending the law relating to master and servant, had intended, although referring to the Act of Geo. 2, c. 8, but not mentioning the section, to allow such a law to stand, and, therefore, he would take upon himself to dispense with the second portion of the punishment. He added that the Act ought to be called attention to, and he hoped it would be done. By the same section a person guilty of purloining or making away with any portion of goods intrusted to him to make up by a master is rendered liable to pay quadruple value, and to be twice flogged publicly. REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WILL-ESTATES OF TRUSTEES-PAYMENT OF DEBTS RULES OF CONSTRUCTION CONTINGENT REMAINDERS-DECREE.-J. C., by will, in 1827, devised freeholds to trustees, their heirs, and assigns, and to the survivor of them, and his or her heirs, upon trust that they and their heirs, and the survivor of them, and his or her heirs, should stand seised thereof during the life of W.C., and also until the testator's debts were paid, upon trusts to set and let the same, and to apply the rents and profits, and the value of the timber, in discharge of debts, and then for W. C. for life, and then and after the debts were paid, for the heirs of the body of W. C., with remainder to his own heirs. In 1830, the debts having been paid, the trustees conveyed to W. C. for life. In 1838 W. C. suffered a recovery. He subsequently mortgaged to the defendant in fee. Upon a bill filed to have it declared that the conveyance of the life estate by the trustees was a breach of trust, and that the defendant was a trustee for the plaintiff, a son, and heir at law, of W. C.: Held (disapproving the decision of Lord Romilly in Collier v McBean, 34 Beav.426), that the trustees took an estate of freehold; that the devise to them "and their heirs " gave a fee simple, unless something appeared by the will to cut it down; that it is not to be cut down unless another estate can be pointed out on the face of the will for the trustees to take; that neither a chattel interest superadded to, or concurrent with, the life estate, until the debts were paid, was a proper construc tion of the gift, nor was it a correct view that they took a freeheld interest per autre vie during the life of the tenant for life with a further chattel interest, till the debts were paid; but that they took the fee; that a trust to "set and let " gives not a bare power, but an estate which, being indefinite, must be a fee simple; that a trust to apply the "value of whatever timber may be considered at its best growth" implies a fee for tenant per autre vie, as the owner of a chattel interest cannot cut timber; that the contingent remainder having gone at law by recovery it did not remain in equity; that the trustees were not in any sense trustees to preserve contingent remainders; and that the conveyance to the tenant for life was not a breach of trust. There is no such thing as an implied trust to preserve. Held, also, that the mortgagee having in another suit, to which the present plaintiff was a party, obtained a decree for getting in the outstanding legal estate, the plaintiff was bound by that decree: (Collier v. Walters, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 869. M. R.) AUCTIONEER-MEMORANDUM IN WRITING OF A BARGAIN-INTERNAL REFERENCE TO SEVERAL DOCUMENTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS. Plaintiff authorised defendant, an auctioneer, to sell a mare, which was accordingly entered as a lot in the catalogue attached to the conditions of sale for a certain day; "49, grey mare, 6 years old, 15-3 hands high; steady to ride and drive." She was knocked down at the sale on the day fixed for 33 guineas, and a clerk made an entry at the time, opposite the lot, in the defendant's sales ledger, of the price and name of the buyer. This ledger was headed "Select Sales by Auction," with the same date as the catalogue. The description had been entered before the sale, as "Lot 49, grey mare, aged 6." The buyer the same day returned the mare to the defendant, with a letter written and signed by him, "I herewith return the grey mare, Lot 49, bought at your sale this day, as not being steady in harness, as warranted: Held, in an action against the auctioneer for damages for not making a binding contract with the buyer, that, without express authority, an auctioneer's clerk cannot be taken to be agent to sign a buyer's name; and that there was not sufficient internal reference to each other in these three writings to constitute a note of a bargain within the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds (Pierce v. Corf, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 919. Q. B.) MARITIME LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. COLLISION-FOG-RIGHT OF FERRY BOAT to boat continuing to cross and recross the river RUN-LIABILITY-PRACTICE. A steam ferry Mersey during a dense fog takes upon herself the responsibility incident to such a course, and is not entitled to set up public convenience against the probability of loss of life and property; but she will be liable for any damage done to other vessels those vessels take the precautions required by with which she may come into collision, provided law to warn her of their position. A receiver of wreck in taking depositions under the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 101) sect. 448, should put down the facts deposed to as given by the deponent, and should not correct any statement made by the deponent which within the personal knowledge of the receiver is erroneous: (The Lancashire, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 927. Adm.) COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. CONTRIBUTORY VOID AMALGAMATION BETWEEN APPLICATION FOR SHARES AND LETTERS OF ALLOTMENT.-In the year 1869 an amalgamation was agreed upon between the P. Company (Limited), and the U. Company, which was an unlimited company, under which the paidup shareholders in the P. Company were to have paid-up shares in the U. Company to the amount of their shares in the P. Company, and the partly paid-up shareholders in the P. Company were to have shares in the U. Company, on which an amount was to be considered to have been paid proportionate to the amount credited on their P. shares. The P. Company was to assign its assets to the U. Company, and the U. Company to undertake its liabilities. An indenture in two parts but in consequence of a variation between the was drawn up and executed by the two companies, respective parts executed by the companies the indenture was in 1873 held incomplete, and the amalgamation void. B., the holder of forty shares in the P. Company, on which £100 had been paid, signed, and sent to the P. Company a form of application supplied by them to him, for shares in the U. Company, "credited with £100 thereon, in exchange for forty shares held by me in the P. Company, on which £100 has been paid," and on the 5th Aug. 1869, received a letter of allotment informing him that he had been entered as a shareholder in the U. Company, and that "the amount to be credited on such shares will be the proportionate amount of the net assets of the P. Company (Limited)." B. took no steps to repudiate the shares, although the allotment letter varied from the application, but made several applica tions for certificates of the shares allotted. The certicates were never sent to B., and on the 9th Nov. 1869 a winding-up order was made against the U. Company. Held, that there was no contract between B. and the U. Company to take shares, that he was not bound by acquiescence, and that he could not be placed upon the list of eontributories: (Beck's case, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 907. V.C. B.) COUNTY COURTS. SALFORD COUNTY COURT. Equitable mortgage. A., an equitable mortgagee, without deposit of deeds, under an agreement which charged certain leasehold property with the payment of a certain sum, and in which it was provided that the defendant should at any time thereafter execute a legal mortgage of the property with snch power of sale and other powers as the plaintiff might require, asked for the usual accounts and a sale of the mortgaged property. Held, that he was only entitled to specific performance of the agreement. Ashton v. Corrigan, Matthews v. Goodday, Peto v. Hammond, Hermann v. Hodges, and James v. James referred to. S. Hall (barrister), instructed by C. W. Dawson, This was a plaint by an equitable mortgagee asking for the usual accounts and sale of the mortgaged property. The plaint stated an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, whereby the defendant, in consideration of £283 10s. owing by him to the plaintiff, charged certain leasehold premises with the repayment of the said £283 10s., and of further advances and interest, and agreed at any time thereafter to execute a legal mortgage of the said premises subject to certain building society mortgages, with such power of sale and other powers as the plaintiff might require; and after stating that the defendant refuses either to execute a mortgage or to pay the amount owing on the security of the said agreement, prayed the relief above mentioned. There was no actual deposit of deeds. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the proper relief on the above plaint was not a sale, but a specific performance of the agreement, and counsel quoted Ashton v. Corrigan (L. Rep. Eq. 76), James v. James (16 L. Rep. Eq.), Seton on Decrees (vol. 1, p. 443), and Fisher on Mortgages (vol. 1). Hall, for the plaintiff, in reply, said that under the above stated agreement he was entitled to a sale at his option, if he chose to waive the specific performance of the agreement, and referred to Prideaux's Precedents (vol. 1), from which the agreement seemed to have been taken, and also to Matthews v. Goodday (8 Jur. N. S. 90), and Peto v. Hammond (8 Jur. N. S. 550). Ashton v. Corrigan only decided that the mortgagee under the special terms of his agreement was entitled to a mortgage containing an absolute power of sale, and the earlier cases were not discussed. Neither Hodges, and Janes v. James, nor the autho rities in Fisher and Seton are inconsistent with Matthews v. Good day. There could have been no actual deposit of deeds in this case, but that can that case nor the later cases of Hermann v. make no difference. His HONOUR, in giving judgment, said that so careful and distinguished a judge as Wickens, V. C. would not have decided Ashton v. Corrigan without considering its effect on the earlier cases, and on the authority of that case he should hold that specific performance of the agreement was the proper remedy, and not sale. Leave would be given to amend, and the costs would be reserved. On the 10th Feb. the case came on again, when specific performance was decreed, and costs were allowed to the plaintiff. BANKRUPTCY LAW. COURT OF BANKRUPTCY. Monday, March 2. (Before Sir J. BACON, Chief Judge.) Ex parte JACOBS, Re CARTER. Proof-Secured creditor-Production of securities. THIS was an appeal from the decision of the Birmingham County Court upon a point of some little importance in practice-whether it is necessary at the first meeting of a bankrupt's creditors, under the Bankruptcy Act 1869, to produce bills of exchange and other securities, the particulars of which are scheduled to the proofs of creditors. De Gex, Q.C. and Finlay Knight, were counsel for the appellant. Roxburgh, Q.C. and Horton Smith, for the respondents. The facts of the case appeared to be that at the first meeting, held on the 19th Jan., Mr. Registrar Chauntler presided, when Mr. T. S. Smith, the holder of a proxy of the Worcester City and County Banking Company (Limited), tendered a proof on their behalf for £2301, for money lent to the bankrupt by the company, and for interest, commission, and other banker's charges, and the proof stated that the bank had received no security or satisfaction for that sum other than a mortgage or charge upon a messuage, therein described and thereby assessed at the value of £740, and the bill of exchange and promissory notes, particulars of which were set forth in the form prescribed by the Act, but the bills themselves were not produced. The proof was objected to on the ground of the non-production of the bills, and the Registrar overruled the objection. Application was then made to the judge by the counsel for the debtor, when the judge ordered that the proof should stand ad. mitted. Mr. Jacobs, on whose behalf the objection had been taken, appealed. The CHIEF JUDGE said the practice in bankruptcy had been established for many years. A creditor coming to prove his debt, who had a bill of exchange or other security, ought to produce it. That he was bound to produce his security before the receipt of dividend was quite another thing. There might be cases in which, from some accident, a creditor seeking to prove could not produce his securities. In such cases the judge would exercise his discretion. Here the bank was the holder of the bills, and there was no shadow of a reason why they should not be produced. The order of the court below would be discharged. Quare, whether a transfer of property requires registration as a bill of sale. THIS was a motion by Mr. Bolland, the trustee of the property of the debtor, a rag and rope merchant in Liverpool, for an order of the court to declare that certain rope lying at the railway station in the name of Malley, of which rope a Mr. Hewetson held the railway advice notes, was the property of the trustee. Kennedy, instructed by Masters and Fletcher, appeared for Mr. Hewetson. Martin, solicitor, for Mr. Bolland. The question, by arrangement, originally came before a jury, and was reported in the LAW TIMES of 16th Dec. last, but it being found that the issue was one of law rather than of fact, the jury were discharged, and the question left for the decision of the court. rope, the ownership of which is in dispute, was His HONOUR now said: In this case certain sold by arrangement between the parties, and the trustee under the liquidation moves for an order that he is entitled to retain the money arising from the sale. This application I think well founded, for, assuming that the writing of 30th Sept. 1872, given by Malley to Hewetson did not require registration under the Bills of Sale Act 1854, I think that the rope in question was property divisible amongst Malley's creditors, as being, by the consent of Hewetson, in the possession, order, or disposition of Malley, the reputed owner, within sub-sect. 5 of sect. 15 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869. I therefore make the order asked for, and with costs. Friday, Feb. 27. (Before J. F. COLLIER, Esq., Judge.) Ee parte BOLLAND; Re LUND. Bankruptcy Act 1869, rule 292-Costs of proceedings under an abortive composition arrangement -When are the proceedings pending? Held that an extraordinary resolution to accept a composition which is duly registered, and the composition unpaid when due, still leaves the court with jurisdiction over the debtor, and therefore, where bankruptcy supervenes, the proceedings are pending, and the solicitor for the debtor under the composition petition is entitled to his costs out of the bankrupt's estate. THE facts of this case are fully set forth in the judgment. T. H. James, instructed by Bellringer, supported the order for costs. Myburgh, instructed by Duncan, Hill and Dickenson, opposed. His HONOUR said.-The motion in this case is that the court should order the trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of Thomas Lund to pay to Mr. John Leigh, an attorney, the amount of his taxed costs in the matter of a petition for liquidation or composition, filed by the said Thomas Lund in the County Court of Lancashire holden at Blackburn. The facts are these: On the 22nd Aug. 1872, Thomas Lund filed a petition for liquidation or composition in the Blackburn County Court. The first meeting of creditors was held on the 17th Sept., at which a resolu. tion was duly passed to accept a composition of 103. in the pound in instalments extending over a period of twelve months. That resolution was confirmed at a second meeting, and the two together formed the extraordinary resolution_required by the Act. The resolutions were duly registered. The debtor proved unable to pay the first instalment. Another meeting of credi tors was called on the 1st Nov., under the 126th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, to vary the previous resolution, but no resolution was passed. Mr. Leigh was the attorney employed in and about the affairs of the debtor up to the registration, and to him the registration of the resolutions was entrusted by the creditors. On the 28th Nov. a petition was filed by a creditor who had not assented to the composition, that the debtor should be adjudicated a bankrupt, the act of bankruptcy alleged being the filing of the original petition for liquidation or composition. The debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt on this act of bankruptcy on the 9th Dec., and on the 30th the proceedings in the bankruptcy were removed into the Liverpool court. Under these circumstances Mr. Leigh claims his costs, as taxed by the registrar of the Blackburn court, from the trustee in bankruptcy. The 292nd rule provides that where bankruptcy occurs pending proceedings for or towards liquidation or composition, the proper costs incurred in relation to such proceedings shall be paid by the trustee, unless the court shall otherwise order. The question is, were proceedings for a composition pending at the time of the bankruptcy? Fortu nately, I am not entirely without guidance as to the construction which ought to be put upon this rule. In the case of Ex parte Howell, re Hawes (29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 859), Mellish, L. J. is reported to have said that the object of the provision made by the rule was, he thought, plain enough. If there were no such provision, no solicitor would ever act on behalf of a debtor who de sired him to present a petitton for liquidation, or would recommend a debtor to adopt such proceeding, without getting his costs beforehand, and that might prevent many persons from presenting petitions at all. The object of the rule was that solicitors, if they acted fairly, might be able to get their costs although the proceedings for liquidation proved abortive and bankruptcy ensued. That being the object of the rule, such a construction should, if possible, be put upon it as would fairly carry out that object. In his Lordship's opinion it was not necessary to put such a strict construction on the words as to hold that whenever anything occurred which rendered liquidation impossible under the petition, the proceedings were no longer pending. In that case a petition for liquidation had been filed; at the first meeting the creditors negatived the resolution for liquidation, and on the following day the debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt. The Chief Judge, whose decision was upheld on appeal, held that the proceedings were pending within the 292nd rule, and that the solicitor in the liquidation was entitled to his costs out of the bankrupt's estate. I quote that case only because I believe all previous cases bearing on the subject were mentioned in the argument, and it is the latest case in which the subject has been considered. Mellish, L.J., based his decision principally upon the fact that as the receiver had not been discharged the property remained under the protection of the court, and the proceedings for liquidation were thus still pending. I am afraid I have hardly such substantial ground to go on; but the composition was payable by instalments extending over twelve months. By the 126th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, it is provided that the provisions of any composition may be enforced by the court on a motion made in a summary manner by any person interested. This being so, can it be said that the proceedings are absolutely dead until the composition has been paid? But if they are not dead they are pending. The court still has cognisance of the matter. Again, if a composition is not paid, the original debts may be recovered in full by action at law, or, in the alternative, the better opinion seems to be-though this, I believe has not been actually decided--a creditor may ask for an adjudication on the act of bankruptcy committed by filing the petition; but if this is so, if the creditors may revert to the petition, if anything is in action by means of which the creditors may resort to further proceedings, can the proceedings in the composition be said to have come to an end? I think, although I acknowledge the matter is not free from doubt, that, upon the construction which ought to be put upon the 292nd rule, they must be held to be sufficiently alive to enable the solicitor in the composition to have his costs paid. For these reasons I think that Mr. Leigh is entitled to have these costs out of the estate. On the question by whom they should be taxed, I have come to the conclusion that the taxation ought to be conducted in the Liverpool Court. The trustee in bankruptcy has to pay them out of the bankrupt's estate; he is responsible to the creditors in bankruptcy; the proceeding is in bankruptcy, not in composition; the bankruptcy is in the Liverpool Court; and I think the taxation should be in the court in which the bankruptcy is pending. The costs will come out of the estate. In this case Re A. TAPPENBECK AND CO. His HONOUR said:-This matter comes before me on an application to vary or reverse the decision of the trustee of the estate of Augustus Tappenbeck and Co., rejecting a proof for £300. The following are the facts:-About the beginning of the year 1873, Mr. Augustus Tappenbeck and Mr. A. L. Christiansen carried on business as merchants in Liverpool, under the style of Augustus Tappenbeck and Co. On the 15th Feb. in the same year, the same two persons established the firm of Augustus Christiansen and Co., in Para, in Brazil. The two firms, although consisting of the same persons, carried on different businesses. The firm in Brazil bought produce on account of the firm in Liverpool, and shipped it to them. The Liverpool house traded in the goods, but the Brazil house received commission only. Messrs. Nash, Ferreira, and Co., another firm MANCHESTER COUNTY COURT. (Before J. A. RUSSELL, Q.C., Judge.) KEIGHLEY V. MURRAY (TRUSTEE); Re WIKE AND SON. Bankruptcy Act 1869-Re hearing. Application for re-hearing on the ground that fresh evidence had been discovered since former hearing, referred by Chief Judge in Bankruptcy to County Court Judge. Application refused, there being no ground for suggesting surprise," and the question being one in the discretion of the court under the 71st section of the Bankruptcy Act. 66 Ambrose, barrister, in support of the motion. His HONOUR, in giving judgment, said this case was originally tried before him on the 18th July last year, and, after hearing the evidence and arguments thereon, he found as follows:First, that prima facie there is no authority in law for one partner to bind a firm by giving a guarantee; secondly, that J. M. Wike had not, in point of fact, any authority, express or implied, 66 Your "That your petitioner is desirous that his name may be taken off the books of this society, as he is not now practising at the Bar, and it is his intention not to practise as a barrister in future either in this country or in any of the colonies. petitioner therefore prays your Worship will be pleased to take his name off the books cf the society, and order the bond to be cancelled on payment of all his arrears of dues and duties to the treasurer and the fine on leaving, within one month from the date of the order made hereon." 66 66 Since the time when this petition was sent to him, the terms thereof, as now required to be signed by members of the society desirous of withdrawing therefrom, have been altered by the addition of the word "India" after "colonies," and by the substitution of the word composition' for the word fine," by which latter alteration, as the plaintiff believed, the Masters of the Bench of the society meant to assert more plainly the right of retaining, if they think fit, upon their books for the term of his life, the name of any one who might have been called to the Bar by the society. The plaintiff signed the above petition, and shortly afterwards he received the following order, dated the 15th to give guarantees in the name of his firm; pressing his wish or intention to withdraw from LEGAL NEWS. BARRISTERS v. THE INNS OF COURT. Times: : Dec. 1869: "Upon the petition of Charles Neate, a barrister of this society, praying that his name may be taken off the books, as he is not now practising at the Bar, and it is his intention not to practise as a barrister in future either in this country or in any of the colonies, it is ordered accordingly, and that his bond be cancelled on paying all his arrears of dues and duties and the customary fine to the treasurer of this society within one month from the date hereof, or this order to be void." The plaintiff did not, in fact, pay the amount of dues then owing by him to the society within the month allowed by the order, and so lost the benefit thereof, and he continued to be, and was now, a member of the society. The plaintiff stated by his bill that he was now indebted to the society in the sum of £23 11s. for dues and charges. In July 1873 the defendants, the Hon. R. Denman and the Hon. G. Denman, as executors of the late Lord Denman (the surviving obligee of the bond), sued the plaintiff at law for the amount. They did so, as the plaintiff alleged, by the direction of Lord Justice James, as treasurer of the society. The plaintiff offered to pay the £23 11s., but, wishing to cease to be a member of the society, desired at the same time to have the bond delivered up to him. The society, however, declined to release him till he had signed a declaration of intention according to the "altered" form of petition already referred to. The bill then stated that the plaintiff refused to make any such declaration of intention as that which was required of him by the terms of the altered petition, because it would be a restraint upon his using any right that he might otherwise have by law of practising as a barrister without being a member of Lincoln's Inn or of some other similar society, and because such declaration was evidently intended to assert for the Inn, or the Masters of the Bench of it, the right of imposing such restrictions; that the making of such declarations a condition of withdrawal from the Inn was contrary to public policy, and, therefore, illegal, as restricting the plaintiff or any person making the same from practising in any part of the United Kingdom; that such condition was, further, contrary to public policy as interfering with the right which our colonies or some of them had or claimed to have of regula ting the practice of their own courts; that the Society of Lincoln's-inn was and claimed to be a private association, and, as such, claimed to exercise the uncontrolled right of admitting whom it pleased to be members thereof, and administering or allowing the Masters of the Bench to administer, without publicity or accountability to any but themselves, the funds and property belonging to or held in trust for the society; that the society had at different times repudiated and successfully resisted the right of the Court of Queen's Bench to interfere with their proceedings by the process of mandamus, which right the Court of Queen's Bench would undoubtedly have if the society were a body corporate or politic, or otherwise claiming to exercise or to possess any public function or character; that, even supposing that such monopoly of conferring the right of admission to the Bar might in some other form be useful and desirable, it was, nevertheless, contrary to public policy that such a monopoly should be enjoyed and made a source of revenue by a private and irresponsible association; that such monopoly was in fact a source of revenue or pecuniary advantage to the society, and more especially to the Masters of the Bench of it; that no grant of such monopoly or of any share therein was ever in fact made by any charter or letters ex-patent to the society; and that, even supposing The plaintiff in this case was Charles Neate, In the year 1845 the plaintiff withdrew from (which the plaintiff did not admit) that any such monopoly could be legally claimed on the ground of prescription by a body corporate or politic, the society, not having that character, and not being or having been otherwise capable of receiving a grant in its collective capacity, was not capable of making a title to it by prescription; that for the reasons so stated the plaintiff was entitled to be discharged from his liability under the bond, and to have the same delivered up to him or cancelled on paying to the defendants or to the society the dues incurred by him up to the present time, which the plaintiff had already offered and thereby again offered to do on delivery or cancelling of the bond, and that he was further willing and thereby offered to pay all costs hitherto incurred by the defendants, the Hon. Richard Denman and the Hon. George Denman, in the action at law; but that as to the composition required of him, in addition to the dues, the plaintiff desired to be informed of the amount of such claim and the grounds thereof. The bill then, as originally framed, prayed a decree that the defendants might make a full and true discovery and disclosure of and concerning all and singular the transactions and matters in the bill mentioned, and that in the meantime the defendants (the plaintiffs in the action at law), might be restrained by injunction from proceeding in the action at law commenced by them against the plaintiff in this suit, and from commencing or prosecuting any other action or proceedings at law against the plaintiff in respect of or concerning the matters aforesaid, or any of them, and that the defendants, or such one or two of them as had the custody or disposal of the bond and petition, or either of them, might, on payment by the plaintiff of the dues and costs and also of the composition, if properly chargeable upon him, to the person or persons entitled to receive the same, deliver up the bond and petition to the plaintiff. The bill (as amended during the hearing at the bar) then prayed for a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to retire from the Society of Lincoln's Inn without giving any undertaking not to practise as a barrister, and without, being subject to any condition against his practising as a barrister, and without being liable to the payment of any fine or composition on his retiring from the society. Dickinson, Q.C., and Pemberton, for the defendants, supported the demurrer, and contended that there was no equity whatever in the plaintiff's case. They said, inter alia, that what he really sought to obtain by his bill was the power of practising, if he chose to do so, as a barrister, without being also the member of an Inn of Court. But both law and custom were alike opposed to that. To be a barrister, a man must first become a member of an Inn of Court. The benchers of his inn, in due course called him to the Bar. The publication of the call to the Bar was by the benchers of the society, who had, as benchers, no authority in court. The call was not to the bar of this or any other court, but only to the Bar of the particular society. That was a consequence of the moots or exercises which, in ancient times, were required from those who desired to attain the degree of a barristerat-law. If a man ceased to be a member of any of the inns of court, he lost his right to practise as a barrister in the ordinary sense of the term. The inns of court were private bodies. Their origin was, perhaps, obscure; but from time immemorial they had the power of admitting members or rejecting applicants for admission to their own societies. They alone had the privilege of calling their own members to the Bar; and in all matters of internal regulation and manage. ment of their property and otherwise, the only forum of appeal for the societies or their members, if aggrieved or at variance inter se, was to the judges of the Superior Courts of England, as visitors of the societies. There had, indeed, been some cases at common law in which the jurisdiction of the inns of court over their members had come under discussion with respect to the issuing of a writ of mandamus, such as Cunningham v. Wegg (2 Brown's Ch. Cas. 241); Reg v. Gray's Inn (1 Douglas, 353); Reg. v. Barnard's Inn (5 Ad. & Ell. 17); Reg. v. Lincoln's Inn (4 Barn. & Cres. 858). But there never had been any instance of the interference of a court of equity with the private and internal affairs of an Inn of Court. The plaintiff's position then was, in equity, this: He had voluntarily joined a voluntary society, governed by rules of its own, to which he, as a member, had assented, and he had given that society his bond, conditioned for the payment of certain money, which by his bill he admitted he owed, and for which he had been sued at law, and yet he sought to be discharged from such liabilities. No doubt he had ceased to practise, but he could not say he had not derived some benefit from his having been a member of the society. In conclusion, there was not any ground for his bill. He had not made out a case, either of trust or of contract, of fraud, mistake, or account. There was absolutely nothing to justify the interference of this court, as he proposed; and if the court did grant him the relief he sought, it would not only be utterly without precedent, but would operate as a revolution of the society which there was nothing to palliate or excuse. Neate, who appeared in his robes.-The points which he intended to raise were these: That there was a monopoly now enjoyed by the Inns of Court, which depended entirely on the allowance of the judges; that it was in the power of the judges to admit other persons than members of an inn of court to practise as barristers-for instance, those who had taken a degree in laws at the Univerities; that the judges possessed that power under delegation from the Crown, as appeared from Dugdale's Origines Juridiciales"; that the paper which the society required him to sign on leaving it was intended to restrain him from using the liberty which might be given by any alteration in the rules to be made by the judges, and was therefore contrary to public policy. The VICE-CHANCELLOR, having heard the plaintiff state a résumé of the arguments he proposed to offer in support of his bill, said that if the defendants' view was correct-viz., that this court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit-it would not only be waste of time, but improper to discuss, as he otherwise must do, the characters, constitutions, and powers of Lincoln's and other similar societies. He wished the plaintiff, therefore, to confine his arguments to the preliminary question of jurisdiction. Neate upon that contended that the right of every man now to enter into the service of the public in any way he chose was much more fully recognised than it was formerly. The case of the profession of a barrister was analogous. It was perfectly idle, therefore, to regard our Inns of Court as mere private bodies, and as wholly and solely governed by what was called a domestic jurisdiction. The Inns of Court were really pub. lic bodies. Each was a corporation "de son tort," if he might so say. The defendants spoke of an appeal to the Judges, but was there ever any case heard of-certainly none like the present-in which they had acted, or would be disposed to act, in the manner now suggested? He then commented briefly on some of the authorities cited on the other side. After a few observations on the pleadings, and remarking that a Master of Arts of either University might be, and was a M.A., without being a member of the University, concluded by submitting that he was entitled to the relief he prayed by his bill, and that the demurrer to it ought to be overruled. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said.-It appears to me that I have no jurisdiction to try the question raised in this case. Mr. Neate, no doubt, is well aware of the difficulties which may arise between a member of an Inn of Court and the Inn itself with reference to the management of its property, because he has commented on the case of Cun ningham v. Wegg (ante). He says that decision cannot be maintained. But sitting here as a Judge of First Instance, I could not do otherwise than follow it. However, I will express no opinion on that case; for my judgment in the present one does not depend on that case. The jurisdiction of this court, as well as that of a court of law, may in certain cases, and, indeed, must in some, be found to exist in respect of the management of property, even although in such instances an Inn of Court may be parties to the litigation. However, a case of property, in the strict sense of the term, is one with which I am not dealing on the present occasion. If it it were such a case, I should be found to follow Cunningham v. Wegg (ante). This is a case in which the question is between the plaintiff and the defendants, the latter of whom may, for the purposes of this suit, be considered as representing the Society of Lincoln's-inn. The question is simply and solely as to the position and rights of the plaintiff as a member of the society. He voluntarily became a member of it, and gave it a bond to pay certain dues during the whole of the time that he should be and until he ceased to continue a member of it. The condition of the bond contains no stipulations as to the mode or circumstances by or under which he should cease to be a member of the society. That was left to the internal regulations of the society itself, of which he had become, and still is, a member. Therefore, in that state of things, the right to retire from the society which the plaintiff claims is entirely a question between him and the society. He says he has a right to retire. He does not say he has already retired and is not now a member, because if he had said that it would have been a defence to the action at law. He says he made a proposal to the society to be allowed to retire from being a member of it, but that they refused to permit him to do so except on terms with which he says he is not bound to comply. That is a question entirely for the peculiar jurisdiction which has been referred to in the arguments, and which has always been recognised-namely, that of the Judges of the Superior Courts of England. They have the power of deciding such questions as the present. If the plaintiff had no remedy by an appeal to the Judges, he might, and probably would have, a right to apply to the Court of Queen's Bench for a mandamus. That, however, would be by reason of the fact that he had no other remedy. No case had been referred to in which the courts of equity have interfered between the Benchers of an inn of court and a member of the same society to restrain an action at law under such circumstances as the present. I consider that the judgments in the cases of Reg. v. The Benchers of Lincoln's Inn (ante), and Reg. v. Gray's Inn (ante), although judgments of common law courts are binding on me and prevent my entertaining any jurisdiction in this case. If there were no appeal to the Judges, there might be a right to a mandamus. I think I have no power to deal with this case, and that the bill in it is not wellfounded. It was said, however, that the claim to have the bond delivered up would of itself confer an equity on the plaintiff. With reference to that, the rule of this court is, as Mr. Neate knows, that the court will not interfere if the invalidity of the instrument appears on the face of it. A document is, on the face of it, either legal or it is not. If it is illegal, it is inoperative, and there is, therefore, a valid defence at law with respect to it. If, on the other hand, it is legal, but the circumstances are such that the party cannot avail himself of them at law, then, if the case be as this is, one between a society and a member of it, with a proper forum to which to appeal-viz., the Judges-this court ought not to interfere; and this court will not be induced to do so merely because the bill seeks the delivery up of the document. I may observe that it is not in every case that this court does interfere when it can. Its jurisdiction as to the delivery up and cancellation of documents is peculiar. It usually interferes in the instances of bills of exchange and promissory notes, because they may be negotiable; but the considerations applicable to these cases do not affect that of a bond. I have recently had to consider that in a case of Binns v. Fisher (17th Dec. 1873), in which I held that the plaintiffs had not sufficient equity to entitle them to have their bond delivered up to them. On the whole of this case, I am of opinion that the plaintiff has failed in establishing his right to the relief which he seeks. I have not made any observation on Mr. Neate's offer to pay the £23 11s., and his admission that he might have had, as he no doubt has had, some benefit from being a member of this society, such as the use of its library, and so forth. He does not rest his case on that; and, if he had done so, I think it would not have assisted him. Perhaps I should say that any relief he may seek with respect to future actions against him he may embody in his appeal to the judges. His case here really seems to me to be found in the amendment which was proposed to his billnamely, the declaration that he is entitled to retire from the Society of Lincoln's-inn without giving any undertaking not to practise as a barrister, and without being subject to any condi tion against his practising as one, and without being liable to the payment of any fine or composition on his retiring from the society. In conclu sion, I must hold that the demurrer must be allowed. THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND ON THE DUTIES OF A JUDGE. We IN the course of his peroration in summing up the Tichborne case Sir A. Cockburn said. must remember that while it is the business of judicial action to protect innocence, so, on the other hand, it is the duty of the judge to take care that the guilty do not escape. In the conviction of the innocent and also in the escape of the guilty lies, as the old saying says, the condemnation of the judge. It is the condemnation of the judges of the fact as well as of the judge who presides at the trial. You must take care that the innocent does not suffer, but you owe it to society that if guilt is brought home to the accused that guilt shall carry with it the consequences of the verdict. You have been asked, gentleman, to give the defendant the benefit of any doubts you may entertain. Most assuredly it is your duty to do so. It is the business of the prosecu tion to bring home guilt to the accused to the satisfaction of the jury. But the doubt of which the accused is entitled to the benefit must be the doubt that a rational, that a sensible man may fairly entertain, not the doubt of a vacilla. ting mind that has not the moral courage to decide, but shelters itself in a vain and idle scepticism. It is not a doubt of that kind; it must be a doubt which honest and conscientious men can entertain. But, gentlemen, you have been addressed in language the like of which has never before been heard within these walls. You have been exhorted, if there should be one man who might entertain any different opinion from the rest of his brother jurymen, that he |