give the latter a right to sue the former for any nuisance in the ordinary sense, and held that the result of the air in the respondent's yard becoming stagnant was too remote to give rise to any cause of action, and that if the appellants had been inconvenienced by anything the respondent had done, it was damnum absque injuriâ. The claim of the appellants to relief was based upon two main grounds. Firstly, upon the ground that by an enjoyment for twenty years and upwards, without interruption of the access and flow of pure and salubrious air over the premises of the respondent to the windows at the back of their premises, they had acquired a right by prescription to have such access and flow uninterrupted, or that a lost grant or covenant ought to be presumed in their favour as against the respondent not to interrupt the same. Secondly, upon the ground that, by enjoyment for twenty years without interruption of a current of air flowing to their windows-(a) over the yard of the respondent between the end of the appellants' wing building and the drill-hall wall opposite; (b) over the yard of the respondent and between the drill-hall wall and the backs of the appellants' and respondent's houses-a right to enjoy such current as being in each case a sufficiently defined flow of air has been acquired by the appellants by way of easement. In other words, they claimed the flow of air was through such sufficiently "defined channels as to be within the Prescription Act.

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As regards (1), the appellants did not plead prescription at common law (ie., by immemorial user), as the houses were known to have been erected early in the present century. Both Lords Justices Lindley and Lopes stated in their judgments that such a plea could not be sustained, as the houses had been erected within living memory. It is submitted, however, with respect, and counsel for the appellants were prepared to so contend, that it is open to doubt whether a house is not "ancient" for all purposes of presumption which has stood for twenty years. In Mr. Gale's view (Easements, 6th edit., p. 166) the courts ought, by analogy, upon the fixing of shorter periods of limitation in possessory actions (38 Hen. 8 and 21 Jac. 1), to have diminished the length of enjoyment from which a prescriptive right might be inferred in all like actions to the period of twenty years fixed by statute 21 Jac. 1, just as the length of enjoyment had previously been limited by the earliest Statute of Limitations (3 Ed. 1, c. 29), and the opinions of Serjeant Williams, Lord Mans'field, Chief Justice Abbott, and others, are quoted by him in support of this view. Though some of the judgments delivered in Dalton v. Angus (44 L. T. Rep. 844; 6 App. Cas. 795) seem to support the view taken by Mr. Gale, it is at variance with the generally received opinions on the subject. No argument, however, as to this took place, as the Lord Chancellor said he doubted whether it would be argued that the right to the access of air to a window could not be acquired by twenty years' user, and counsel for the respondent thereupon observed that they did not propose to so contend. It is, however, possible the Lord Chancellor was referring to the doctrine of "lost grant," and did not intend to express any concurrence in Mr. Gale's view, and, indeed, so far as the ultimate result is concerned, it seems immaterial whether a right is based upon user for twenty years because that period is now treated as equivalent to "immemorial user," or because it is sufficient to give rise to the implication of a "lost grant." It is to be regretted, however, that the question still remains undecided. The claim of the appellants rested, however, not only upon long user, but upon the doctrine of the modern lost grant or an implied covenant in lieu thereof. Whether the proper presumption in the case of a negative easement (such as air or light) ought to be one of a "covenant" rather than a grant," as decided by Mr. Justice Fry in Hall v. Lichfield Brewery Company (43 L. T. Rep. 381), following Mr. Justice Littledale in Moore v. Rawson (3 B. & C. 333), seems to be immaterial so far as the right to relief is concerned, but the appellants claimed upon both grounds. The Court of Appeal refused to presume any "lost grant" in the present case, apparently upon the ground that the claim to air was, in their opinion, a claim to the passage of undefined air over the property of the respondent, and because it was impossible for the respondent by any reasonable means to prevent the acquisition of the right to the flow of air by the appellants, Lord Justice Lopes saying: "The plaintiff cannot in support of the alleged right rely on prescription at common law, because the houses have been built within legal memory nor on the presumption of a lost grant from long.continued enjoyment, because such a presumption only arises where the person against whom the grant is claimed might have prevented or interrupted the exercise of the subject of the supposed grant. Such prevention or interruption is practically impossible here"; while Lord Justice Lindley said: "The plaintiff does not prove enjoyment of air coming in any definite direction over the servient tenement, and to burden the servient tenement to the extent necessary to protect the plaintiff from the diminishing of the free passage of air to the yard at the back of his house, is, I think, contrary to the authorities, and would be to stretch the doctrine of lost grant further than principle warrants." For the above reasons the Court of Appeal seem to have regarded the case as on all-fours with Webb v. Bird (4 L. T. Rep. 445; 13 C. B. N. S. 841), Bryant v. Lefevre (40 L. T. Rep. 579), and Harris v. De Pinna (54 L. T. Rep. 770; 33 Ch. Div. 249), where there was interference with the current of air to a windmill, chimney, and timber-stage respectively. None of these, however, were authorities against the right to a flow of air to ancient windows, and to put the appellants, case within that class of case was, as the Lord Chancellor said, to reduce the appellants' claim to one to a flow of air to a blank wall. So far as the possibility of interruption was concerned, it is to be observed that interruption was clearly possible at a reasonable expense by blocking the 28-foot space, and in any case the window over the respondent's yard, and this was apparently a view the House of Lords were prepared to take, for they said the respondent had blocked the flow of air effectively by his new buildings. In Dalton v. Angus, however, the feasibility of interruption to prevent the acquisition

of a right to support was held to be no test as to whether the doctrine of lost grant should be applied or not, and in Chastey v. Ackland Lord Herschell referred to Dalton v. Angus as finally disposing of this point. Counsel for the appellants were not therefore called upon in the House of Lords to argue the question of lost grant, the Lord Chancellor intimating that such an argument was unnecessary, apparently upon the ground that it is clearly the duty of a judge, or a jury at the direction of a judge, to infer a lost grant after twenty years' usage of a practice in the nature of an easement; and he referred to Jenkins v. Harvey (1 C. M. & R. 894) and Bright v. Walker (Ibid. 217) as correctly stating the rule: (see Gale, 6th edit., p. 165). There can be little doubt, therefore, that the House of Lords were prepared to hold that the present case was one to which the doctrine of lost grant or implied covenant ought to have been applied. They seemed to consider interruption as feasible because in fact it had occurred, though whether so or not immaterial, having regard to the case of Dalton v. Angus, and that, as the authorities showed, a right might be acquired by prescription or long enjoyment at common law to have the accustomed flow of air through the windows of an ancient house; such an interruption as had been here caused was actionable. As to the claim upon the ground of an implied covenant, it may be mentioned that the Court of Appeal seemed to regard an implied covenant as something quite distinct from a lost grant, and that in the present case there was no evidence from which any covenant could be implied. It is submitted, however, that the term "implied covenant" is merely another expression for "lost grant when a negative service or easement is being prescribed for; and this being so, it would seem to follow that just as it is the duty of a judge or jury to infer by way of fiction a lost grant in the case of a positive easement, so is it their duty to infer by way of fiction an implied covenant in the case of a negative easement without inquiring whether in fact there is any evidence that such a covenant was ever made or not: (Goddard, 5th edit., p. 128).

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Among the authorities cited by counsel for the appellants in support of their claim by way of prescription (lost grant or implied covenant), may be mentioned the following: Bland's case, cited in Aldred's case, 8 James, 1, 5 Coke, 9, 58b, where Chief Justice Wray said: "For stopping as well of the wholesome air, as of light, an action lies, and damages shall be recovered for them, for both are necessary; for it is said et vescitur aura therea and if the stopping of the wholesome air, &c., gives cause of action, à fortiori an action lies in the case at bar for infecting and corrupting the air." This case is thus abridged by Rolle (141 Nus. G.): The stoppage of salubrious air is a nuisance as well as the stoppage of light." Counsel for the respondent urged that the reference to air in Aldred's case was a mere dictum, which drew from the Lord Chancellor the remark: "It was more than a dictum. The declaration in the case cited there of Bland v. Moseley-alleged obstruction of air. The court decided that obstruction of air to an ancient window was actionable as well as interference with light, and that interference with prospect (a mere matter of delight) was not actionable. For 300 years it seems not to have been questioned until lately"; while Lord Herschell said, "The right spoken of in the old cases is a right to the access of fresh air as distinguished from stagnant air." The case of the City of London, 1661 (Calthrop's Reports of Cases within the City of London, p. 5); Darwin v. Upton, 1786; Cress v. Lewis, 1824 (2 B. & C. 689); Moore v. Rawson, 1824 (3 B. & C. 337), where Justice Littledale says: 'Light and air not being to be used in the soil of the land of another are not the subject of actual grant, but the right to insist upon the non-obstruction of them more properly arises by a covenant which the law would imply not to interrupt the free use of the light and air. The right therefore is acquired by mere occupancy, and ought to cease when the person who so acquired it discontinues the occupancy." As regards (2), the Court of Appeal considered that the right to air was clearly not an easement within the Prescription Act; but nothing passed in the House of Lords to show that the Lords of Appeal either approved of or dissented from this view. It seems, however, to be the generally accepted opinion (notwithstanding that of Lord Selborne expressed in Dalton v. Argus as to the decision in Webb v. Bird), that the Prescription Act only applies (with the exception of light which is specially provided for) to affirmative services, and this upon the authority of Webb v. Bird and Dalton v. Angus (cited ante). If this be so, it is difficult to see why the fact of air passing through a "defined channel" should make any difference as to the applicability of the Act; and but for the dicta of Lord Selborne in Dalton v. Angus; of Lord Justice Cotton in Bryant v. Lefevre, 48 L.J. 180, C.P.; Baron Pollock in Bass v. Gregory (25 Q. B. Div. 481); and Mr. Justice Chitty in Harris v. De Pinna (33 Ch. Div. 249), no authorities could be quoted in support of the claim made by the appel lants to a right to air upon this ground. This point, therefore, still remains an open one so far as the House of Lords is concerned, and though Lord Herschell seemed to think the twenty-eight foot space was a "defined channel," no attempt to define the expression was made, and nothing further could be gathered as to their Lordships' views upon this part of the appellants' case.

The importance of the case therefore lies in the recognition of the right attaching to an ancient house to have the accustomed flow of pure and salubrious air as apart from light to its windows uninterrupted, and anything (whether a building upon the adjacent owner's land or not) which interrupts such flow of air so as to substantially interfere with the health and comfort of the occupiers of such house, or prevents them from using their rooms for the purposes of trade, as before, is an actionable wrong. Aldred's case, Dent v. The Auction Mart Company, and Hall v. Lichfield Brewery Company, and the other cases cited above are therefore to be be regarded as correctly enunciating the law. Moreover, the case also recognises the fact that a house twenty years old is an "ancient house" for all legal purposes and presumptions, and that in the case of easements it is the duty of a judge or a jury to infer a lost grant or implied covenant, if any. thing, prevents the common law prescription from being relied upon. Also

that the question as to whether "interruption" is feasible or not, is immaterial in considering whether the doctrine of lost grant is applicable or not. It is to be observed also that, though the right to air thus recognised in the case of ancient windows is undoubtedly an important limitation upon the rights of an adjoining owner to build upon his own land, yet the limitation so imposed is in principle similar to that imposed in the case of light, water, and support, and seems clearly warranted by the authorities; as Mr. Goddard thus expressed it in his Law of Easements (5th edit., p. 45): "The same principles relative to natural rights which govern air flowing over the open country to a windmill or chimney apply to currents of air flowing to a window; but in the case of a window the law steps in, and says that, as the window is capable of receiving the air in a definite direction only, and in a definite quantity, it only requires an open space for a short distance, and as thus the claim is limited and the enjoyment is capable of obstruction by reasonable means, it will presume, if the window is ancient, that there has been a grant of an easement or a covenant by the adjoining owner not to build, and building shall be unlawful." Lastly, it may be observed that the case still leaves without final authority the question whether the period necessary for prescription at common law has been limited by analogy to the Statutes of Limitation to twenty years, as suggested by Mr. Gale; and also the further question whether the right to air can be claimed as an easement within the Prescription Act where the air passes to windows through such "defined channels" as it did in this H. BROUGHTON EDGE.

case.

A FREE PARDON.

WE did our best to secure for the police constable Murray what he has now received at the hands of the Home Secretary, practically a reversal of the conviction by a jury at the Old Bailey.

That conviction was accompanied by serious reflections upon the Hampstead Bench of magistrates, who are now entitled to be heard on their own behalf. The following is an account of their proceedings on Wednesday last from the Times of Thursday :

Yesterday, at the first sitting of the Hampstead magistrates since the grant of Her Majesty's 'free pardon' to Police-constable Murray, with reinstatement in the Metropolitan Police and full pay from the 24th Nov., the day of his conviction (now officially declared by the Home Secretary to have been erroneous') at the Central Criminal Court for alleged perjury, the constable appeared in uniform before the Bench by special desire of Mr. Basil Woodd Smith, the chairman. Mr. Smith, addressing Murray, said the Bench desired to congratulate him on his reinstatement in the ranks of the police, and to express their gratification at the complete vindication of his character which was afforded by the action of the Home Secretary and the Commissioner. The justices who heard the case from the beginning, and who had it presented to them from both sides and in an exhaustive manner, were convinced of his complete innocence of the charge brought against him, and every extension of their inquiry only confirmed them in their belief. He had suffered wrongfully and acutely as the result of the trial at the Old Bailey, but they hoped that, after this painful ordeal, he might have a long and honourable career in the service of the public. Constable Murray expressed his acknowledgments, and Mr. Basil Woodd Smith then further said: It is not usual for the members of a lower court to make any observations on the action of one that is higher, but the course of Murray's case has been so abnormal that I feel bound, on my own responsibility, to say a few words. It is not for me to criticise publicly the circumstances of the trial, astonishing as they were to those who, like myself, were present for the first time in the Second Court of the Old Bailey, nor, of course ought I to speak of the legal aspects of the case. But I feel bound to protest against the censures which the Common Serjeant went out of his way to heap upon this Bench, casting imputations upon them which I do not hesitate to say any gentleman ought to have been ashamed to make upon others as honourable and conscientious as himself, attributing to them, as he did, not mere errors of judgment, to which we are all liable (though I am not aware of any in the present case), but what amounted to deliberate bad faith and betrayal of their trust in the administration of justice. These allegations were made against men who have been before their neighbours and the public, some of them for more than twenty years, and they were made upon the strength of ex parte statements, some of them altogether untrue and others misleading, when the persons attacked were not represented in court or able in any way to explain or defend themselves. There is no doubt that these censures upon this Bench-which, if they had been as well-founded as they were the reverse, would have been wholly beside the mark-materially influenced the jury in the conviction which the Home Secretary has stigmatised as erroneous.' This Bench were urged from various quarters to defend themselves against the attack of the Common Serjeant, but we thought it wiser and more dignified to keep silence, at least until the case had been finally disposed of, and I think we may now claim that events have proved us right in so doing. We can only retort the words of the Common Serjeant when he expressed his astonishment at what had occurred, and his hope that such proceedings would never, in the interests of justice, be heard of again."

WARNING TO INTENDING HOUSE PURCHASERS AND LESSEES.-Before purchasing or renting a house have the sanitary arrangements thoroughly examined, tested, and reported upon by an expert from Messrs. Carter Bros., 65, Victoria-street, Westmirster. Fee quoted on receipt of full particulars. (Established 21 years.)—[ADVT ]

COMMENTS ON CASES.

THE common condition of sale to the effect that incorrect statements, errors, or omissions that may be discovered in the particulars affecting the nature of the property shall not annul the sale, but be the subject of compensation, though general in its terms, has clearly defined limits. For instance, in Re Neale and Drew's Contract (noted ante, p. 364) Mr. Justice Kekewich declined to allow compensation in respect of a certain amount of minerals alleged by the purchaser to be incapable of being granted to him, as they had been reserved to a lord of a manor at a date preceding the root of title. He looked upon this as a defect in title and guarded against by the condition that the commencement of title should be from a certain date; the objection in the case originating at a period prior thereto. A decision on these lines may be recalled in Ex parte Riches (27 Sol. J. 313), where a vendor purported to sell as absolute owner, whereas he had in fact no more than a life estate. Jessel, M.R., Lords Justices Baggallay and Lindley held that the condition for compensation did not apply. The circumstances in that case were peculiar, and pressed so hard on the purchaser that the Court evinced a clear inclination to assist him if any way could be shown to be available. These conditions are applicable, however, to the cases of easements in restricted rights of user. The rule with respect to the construction of these clauses is conveniently discussed in Webster's Conditions of Sale (2nd edit. at p. 274 et seq.).

THE Court of Appeal, in the recent decision of Garside v. Liverpool Railway Permanent Benefit Building Society (13 Times L. Rep. 189) had once more to consider the old dispute as to how far the carelessness of a legal mortgagee with regard to the custody of the mortgage deeds can give priority to a subsequent equitable mortgagee who has been defrauded through such carelessness by the mortgagor. The facts of the case, so far as material, were as follows: In February of 1890 the mortgagor, a solicitor named Harper, who also acted as solicitor to the defendant society, mortgaged to them a freehold house to which he was entitled under a conveyance of January 1880. The society, although their rules required that all deeds &c. belonging to them should be immediately deposited in a box, which could be opened only with certain formalities, neglected to ask for the deeds till the following November, when Harper handed them the orignal mortgage deed and a forged instrument purporting to be the conveyance of January 1880. In reality in July he had obtained a further advance from the plaintiff, to whom he had given the genuine deed of conveyance. It was admitted in argument that the restrictions with regard to the deed box were so irksome that they had not been observed by the society, and that this was the only negligence of which they had been guilty. On appeal Lord Justice Lindley, in giving judgment, said that the rule laid down by Lord Justice Fry in Northern Counties of England Fire Insurance Company v. Whipp (51 L. T. Rep. 806; 26 Ch. Div. 482) after very great care was to be applied to this case, and that, as was stated therein, the authorities justified the following rules being laid down: (1) That the court will postpone the prior legal estate to a subsequent equitable estate (a) where the owner of a legal estate has assisted in or connived at the fraud which has led to the creation of a subsequent equitable estate without notice of the prior legal estate, of which assistance or connivance the omission to use ordinary care in inquiry after or keeping title deeds may be, and in some cases has been, held to be sufficient evidence where such conduct cannot otherwise be explained; (b) where the owner of the legal estate has constituted the mortgagor his agent with authority to raise money, and the estate thus created has by the fraud or misconduct of the agent been represented as being the first estate. (2) But that the court will not postpone the prior legal estate to the subsequent equitable estate on the ground of any mere carelessness or want of prudence on the part of the legal owner. The Court upon these principles held, upholding the decision of the Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster, that the building society had not lost its priority by reason of its negligent keeping of the conveyance of January 1880.

Rymer v. McIlroy (noted ante, p. 412) is a curious instance of a permanent right of way being granted when the grantees had only a leasehold interest in the dominant tenement at the time of the grant. The governors of a charity covenanted and granted to A. and B. that it should be lawful for them, their and his heirs and assigns, and each of their agents and servants, and the tenants and occupiers for the time being of certain lands therein specified, to enjoy and use a right of footway at all times thereafter over adjoining lands of the charity. The greater portion of the dominant tenement was at that time held under two leases which have long since expired, but a portion was held by B. under a parol tenancy. It was naturally argued that this was an attempt to give A. and B., who had only such a limited interest in the dominant tenement, an easement in gross which is not recognised by the law: (Goddard on Easements, 5th edit., p. 9). However, B. subsequently purchased the freehold of the portion of which he was tenant by parol, and the defendant claimed through him. Mr. Justice Byrne held that the right of way was subsisting so long as A. and B., their heirs or assigns, had any interest in the property. The curious point is, that the interest which made the easement a permanent one was not acquired until after the grant.

THE decision of the Court of Appeal in Re The National Bank of Wales (76 L. T. Rep. 1) will probably command the assent of the Profession, though it is the reversal of the judgment of the judge below. After a voluntary winding-up had commenced, T. with the liquidator's assent transferred his shares to P., who again with the liquidator's assent

transferred them to R. The Court has decided that R., who had the benefit of the shares, must also bear the burden of the call which has been made and be put on list A., while T. and P. are put on list B. The liquidator's assent thus has much the same effect as the consent of the court when a company is being wound-up by it.

:

COMPASSION for unfortunate trustees and members of Parliament are liable to be of the number themselves-induced the Legislature in the Judicial Trustees Act 1896 to authorise the court to relieve a trustee personally liable for a breach of trust "who has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of the court in the matter in which he committed such breach" (sect. 3). Mr. Lely, in his notes to the Annual Statutes of 1896, states that, "It was clear before this section that the court had no power to relieve for a breach of trust once seen by it." It may be of most service in cases where trustees have not asked the court for directions but have acted in a reasonable manner, though events have proved their opinion wrong. An attempt has been made, in Re Turner; Barker v. Ivimey (noted ante, p. 414), to obtain relief in accordance with that section under the following circumstances: A linendraper and a solicitor, who had power to charge for professional work, were co-trustees of a will. The linendraper relied on the representations of his co-trustee, and the trust moneys were invested on mortgage of undivided shares in land tenements and china clay works, in which the solicitor-trustee was the owner of other shares, unknown to the linendraper, and no report was obtained as to their value. The linendraper died, but when the interest fell into arrear the beneficiaries took proceedings against the solicitor and the executors of the deceased trustee to compel them to make good the loss. Mr. Justice Byrne decided that the linendraper, though he had acted honestly, had not acted reasonably, and, therefore, the section did not apply. His executors were, however, entitled to an indemnity from the solicitor-trustee.

OCCASIONAL NOTES.

The operation of the County Court Rules of March 1897 has been postponed from the 25th March to the 25th May.

Burnham-on-Crouch has received the unanimous sanction of the Essex County Council to its application to be made an Urban District.

Mr. Gully, Q.C, M.P., the Speaker of the House of Commons, has been admitted to the honorary freedon of the Skinners' Company, at the Skinners' Hall.

Divisional Courts will sit for the week ending the 20th March as follows: Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, Ex parte motions on the Crown Side and Crown Paper; Thursday, Ex parte motions on the Civil Side and Special Paper; Friday and Saturday, Special Paper.

The Lord Chancellor has consented to open the new County Courts and offices recently erected in Derby, on the 9th April. The High Sheriff of the county and the mayor and corporation are expected to take part in the ceremony.

Mr. John Pawley Bate, M.A., who has been appointed by the Council of Legal Education as a Reader in Roman and International Law and Jurisprudence, is also a lecturer at King's College. He is best known as a Cambridge coach.

Mr. Schreiner, Attorney-General in the last Cape Administration, landed at Plymouth, on the 5th inst., from the Tantallon Castle. He has come to England for the South African inquiry. Judge Vincent also landed the same night and proceeded to London.

The Bar Point-to-Point Steeplechase Meeting will be held, under the management of the Pegasus Club, on the 3rd April 1897, about three miles from Epping station, G.E.R., in Essex. A dinner will take place in the evening at the Grand Hotel, at which the Lord Chancellor will preside.

M. Goron, the former chief of the detective department in Paris, has begun the publication of his memoirs in Le Journal. They will subsequently appear in book form, and promise to give a full account, from the police point of view, of all the causes célèbres of the past fifteen years.

A number of the personal friends of Mr. Willis, Q.C., have felt that they would like to entertain him at dinner before he leaves London to take up his new duties as a County Court judge. It has, therefore, been arranged to hold the dinner on Saturday, the 20th March, at the Trocadero Restaurant, at 7.15 for 7.30 o'clock.

The funeral of the late Judge Bristowe, Q.C., took place on Wednesday, at Caunton Church, near Newark, which borough he represented in Parliament for ten years. Representatives of the Newark Corporation, varicus political associations, and of the Southwark County Court officials attended.

Mr. James Hopgood, of Southside, Clapmam-common, formerly of the firm of James and John Hopgood, solicitors, who died on the 2nd Feb., aged eighty-six years, leaving personal estate valued at £75,079, bequeathed to the British and Foreign Unitarian Association, Essexstreet, Strand, for its general purposes £2000, and to the Metropolitan Free Hospital, Gray's-inn-road, £1000.

Mr. John B. Purchase, solicitor, of 11, Queen Victoria-street, E.C., notifies that he has taken his brother, Mr. Frank Purchase, into partnership, and in future the title of the firm will be Messrs. John B. and F. Purchase.

The vacant judgeship in Her Majesty's High Court of Judicature at Bombay, occasioned by the retirement of Mr. Justice Jardine, has been filled up by the appointment of Mr. E. M. H. Fulton, I.C.S. The authorities will be called upon shortly to appoint a sessions judge at Kurrachee, Mr. Hart-Davis, the present judge, being on the point of retiring from the service. Mr. Hart-Davis has long been a popular member of the I.C.S.at Kurrachee, and his retirement has occasioned much regret.

An answer given by Mr. Gerald Balfour in the House of Commons on Friday last week seems to countenance "the setting up," to use the words of Mr. Hallam, "of the principle of desuetude against an unrepealed enactment." In reply to a question as to whether a register was kept of the members of the Masonic Society in Ireland in compliance with the provisions of Geo. 3, c. 39, the Chief Secretary for Ireland stated that no such register was kept, and that the Act referred to had not been repealed, but that it had fallen into disuse and become obsolete."

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Mr. J. B. Rye, B.A., late scholar of Balliol, Oxford, and first in 'Greats," who was admitted a solicitor last year, has just taken the "Arnold" at Oxford. His father and grandfather are solicitors, his father being Mr. Walter Rye (the Norfolk antiquarian and topographer), and his grandfather, Mr. Edward Rye, well known to old practitioners as a very able lawyer and co-pupil with the late Lord Bramwell. Mr. J. B. Rye is probably the first solicitor who has taken such high honours at Oxford.

The Lord Chancellor of England, who arrived in Dublin on Wednesday morning on a visit to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, paid a visit to the Four Courts, and took a seat on the Bench in the Appeal Court beside Lord Ashbourne, Lord Chancellor of Ireland, and Lords Justices FitzGibbon and Walker, who were at the time engaged in hearing an appeal. The court was crowded with members of the Bar and others. Subsequently Lord Halsbury was conducted through the library, and then visited the Rolls Court, where the Master of the Rolls was engaged in hearing a case.

In the Chancery Division, last Saturday, Mr. Justice Romer, in the case of Re Hunter; Hood v. The Attorney-General, held that a gift was not a good charitable gift if the trustees had power to apply it to some purposes other than charitable, although the testator might have thought that all the objects in his will were charitable. It was, in his (the Judge's) opinion, decidedly uncharitable to compel parishioners to have for ever an Evangelical clergyman, whether they wanted one or not. His Lordship held that the gift in question failed on the ground that the purchase of advowsons or presentations was not a charitable trust.

The March sessions for the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court were opened at the Sessions House, in the Old Bailey, last Monday, before Sir Forrest Fulton, Q.C. (Common Serjeant). The calendar contains the names of seventy-six persons for trial, the offences charged being thus enumerated: Murder, one; manslaughter, two; procuring abortion, one; assaults on girls, two; burglary, ten; uttering counterfeit coin, four ; conspiracy, six; forgery, four; housebreaking, six; larceny, six; larceny, person, three; larceny, servant, one; libel, two; misdemeanour, eleven ; receiving stolen goods, one: robbery with violence, eight; shooting with intent to injure, one; and wounding, seven.

The criminal statistics, relating to criminal proceedings, police, coroners', prisons, reformatory, and industrial schools, and criminal lunatics for the year 1865, have been issued as a Blue-book. The statistics show that the number of crimes known to the police which have been committed during the year 1895 was 81,323. This statement is followed by these remarks: "These figures cannot claim any high degree of accuracy, as, apart from many crimes which entirely elude the knowledge of the police, it is much affected by the unwillingness of some police forces to admit a high rate of crime in their districts." There were 81,323 crimes, 53,985 persons were arrested, and 4825 were dealt with on summonses, making the total number prosecuted 58,810.

Mr. William Willis, Q.C., who was for five years M.P. for Colchester' and who has since frequently attended political meetings in the borough is bidding farewell to party warfare and to forensic strife (says the Essex County Standard). To the general surprise he has, in spite of his pronounced political views, been offered by the Lord Chancellor a County Court judgeship in Norfolk; and, to the surprise of many of his friends, he has accepted it. Fifteen hundred a year, plus the Recorderships of Maldon and Saffron Walden, and plus the dignity of judgeship, are perhaps a good exchange for the wear and tear and uncertainties of a fighting practice. But perpetual banishment from the political platform will be a severe sentence for Mr. Willis, Q.C. Perhaps it is more appropriate, after all, that such a punishment should be awarded by a Conservative Lord Chancellor.

In consequence of the business at the York Assizes not lasting as long as was expected, the Lord Chief Justice, having unexpectedly two days at his disposal, returned to London on Monday, and, although no list had been arranged for him, dealt in his own court with cases which appeared in the lists of other judges, but which were brought before him. He first of all had before him two cases set down under Order XIV. for summary trial with common juries before Mr. Justice Grantham, and they were promptly disposed of, the first being referred and the second settled. Then the learned judge took a special jury case from Mr. Justice Hawkins's court, which was at once settled, and after that he appealed to members of the Bar if they knew of any cases which he could try, as he was seeking employment. He was offered a case from Mr. Justice Cave's court, but, as he was told that the learned judge would probably deal with it himself in the course of the day, he declined to try it, as he said he did not want to take the bread out of anybody else's mouth. Finally, however, two non-jury cases from Mr. Justice Mathew's court were brought in, which Lord Russell considered.

On the 5th ult., Mr. Joseph M. Moore, solicitor, South Shields, completed the thirtieth year of his office as clerk to the justices of the county of Durham acting in the East Division of Chester Ward, and on the 17th ult., at the Station hotel, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, the magistrates commemorated the event by a dinner at which he was the chief guest. Mr. E. I. J. Browell, of East Boldon House, the chairman of the division, in very kind and complimentary terms, proposed Mr. Moore's health. Mr. Moore was town clerk of South Shields from 1871 to 1892, when he retired from that position. He is a justice of the peace for the borough of Jarrow, and for the present year is president of the Newcastle-uponTyne Incorporated Law Society.

Members of the Central Criminal Court Bar Mess dined together at the Trocadero Restaurant last week. The chair was taken by Mr. Besley, Q.C., who was supported on his right by the Lord Mayor, and on his left by Sir Forrest Fulton, Q.C. There were also present Mr. Alderman Treloar, Mr. Alderman and Sheriff Ritchie, Mr. Alderman Truscott, Mr. Alderman Morgan, Mr. Alderman Alliston, Mr. Alderman and UnderSheriff Halse, Mr. Sheriff Rogers, Mr. Under-Sheriff Glynes, Sir W. Charley, Q.C., Mr. C. F. Gill, Sir Douglas Straight, Mr. Purcell, Lieutenant-Colonel Milman, Mr. Lister Drummond, Mr. Hannay, Mr. Horace Avory, Mr. J. F. Torr, Mr. Beaumont Morice, Mr. Marsham, Mr. Curtis Bennett, and many others.

Mr. Leggatt, who represented the Middlesex County Council, applied to Mr. Lane, Q.C., at West London Police-court, last Tuesday, for thirtytwo summonses against persons for allowing dogs to be at large unmuzzled. -Mr. Lane: Is the muzzling order still in force in Middlesex ?—Mr. Leggatt: Yes, sir.-Mr. Lane: Do you proceed under an order of the Board of Agriculture ?-Mr. Leggatt, who did not appear to understand the question, said he proceeded under an order of the county council.Mr. Lane said he asked the question because recently he had to hold, under an order of the Board of Agriculture, that the owner of a dog was not liable for the negligence of the servant. In granting the summonses, the magistrate advised Mr. Leggatt to look up the order in the meanwhile.

In the House of Lords, on the 4th inst., the Lord Chancellor moved the second reading of the Land Transfer Bill, which, he explained, was in substance similar to the measure which had been passed by their Lordships more than once, and which had been read a second time in the other House and referred to a Select Committee. The various suggestions laid before the Select Committee had been carefully considered in framing the present Bill, and had been for the most part complied with, every endeavour having been made, especially in drafting the clause relating to compulsory registration of title, to obviate reasonable objections. After some remarks from Lord Thring, Lord Herschell, and Lord Kimberley, the Bill was read a second time.

Gray's is the first of the Inns of Court to decide upon the form of its festivities next June. The Benchers, under the Treasurership of Mr. Mattinson, Q.C., purpose holding a huge fête in their beautiful gardens, their guests to be "the working women and children of the neighbourhood." They will also give, for the members of the society, a ball which is to be planned on the same magnificent scale as the entertainments of the Inn in the reign of Elizabeth. It is felt that this revival will serve to remind members of the society's ancient glories, now happily returning, while the fête will be in accord with the charitable aims of the Commemoration. The ball will be interesting historically, as probably the first which the hall has seen since Queen Elizabeth danced a measure there three hundred years ago. The suggested joint masque of the four Inns has been found to be impracticable.

Before the day's business began at Southwark County Court, last Monday, Mr. Pasmore said that, as representing the oldest firm of solicitors practising at that court, he wished to express on behalf of his fellow solicitors the great regret with which they had learned of the death of his Honour Judge Bristowe. They had all been filled with admiration at the splendid pluck with which he had stuck to his work almost up to the last moment of his life, when the physical pain which he was suffering would have driven many a younger man into retirement. Mr. Sills, the deputy judge, said he had been personally acquainted with Mr. Bristowe for nearly forty years, and he fully indorsed all that Mr. Pasmore had saidi It was touching to think that Mr. Bristowe must have sat for a long time after he was physically unfit to do the heavy work of the court, but he was one who never let weakness of body interfere with the labours of his mind. He would long be remembered as an honourable, upright, and careful judge.

Proposals for legislation introduced into the House by private members are not ordinarily regarded with too friendly an eye, but the Juries Detention Bill, which has passed through committee without amendment and has been read a third time, embodies within its few lines a reform that will be generally welcomed and approved (writes the Pall Mall Gazette). The absurdity in these later days of locking jurymen up in cases of felony, when the trial has not concluded at the rising of the court, while the prisoner was often allowed out on bail, had grown into something little short of a scandal, and the annoyance and inconvenience thus attached to the performance of an important public duty did much to bring it into unpopularity. Apart from the discomfort of twelve men being constrained to remain together, in some instances for many days and nights, it was necessarily to most of them a serious matter to be deprived of all opportunity of attending to their private business, and this because the prisoner of whom they were in charge was being tried on an indictment that contained the word feloniously. The Juries Detention Bill 1897 proposes to get rid of this ridiculous state of things, and upon the trial of any felony to give the court power to permit the jury to separate. Mr. Lloyd Morgan and his five learned co-sponsors of this admirable measure are to be

warmly congratulated on having steered it successfully through the House of Commons, and we hope that the learned Lords in another place will hasten to do all that is necessary to qualify it for a place on the Statutebook of 1897.

The Standing Committee on Law, Courts of Justice, and Legal Procedure sat on the 9th inst. for the first time this session, the Bill referred to it being the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act (1888) Amendment Bill. Sir James Fergusson presided, and the Solicitor-General represented the Government. The object of the Bill, which is backed by Mr. Kemp, Sir C. Dilke, Mr. Burns, Mr. Tennant, and others, is to amend the law regarding preferential payments in bankruptcy by setting aside the priority which is now given to debenture-holders over workmen's wages in the winding-up of companies under the Companies Act. Sir C. Dilke, who had the first amendment on the paper, remarked that from the fact that the Government had not thought it necessary to put down any amendments it might be assumed they did not consider any necessary. He moved to extend the scope of the Bill by setting aside the preference now given to holders of mortgages and the like class of securities, his contention being that mortgagees were, after all, only creditors, although the law at present regarded them as property owners. Mr. Hopkinson, Sir J. Woodhouse, and other members of the Grand Committee, however, urged that such an amendment would be likely to wreck the Bill, and that it would be prejudicial to the interests of working people themselves by putting unnecessary obstacles in the way of raising money for the starting or extension of businesses. The Solicitor-General opposed the amendment, and Serjeant Hemphill supported it, and on a division the amendment was rejected by fifteen to ten. A number of amendments were withdrawn in deference to a declaration of the Solicitor-General that extension of its scope might ruin the prospects of the measure. Eventually the Bill passed through Grand Committee and was ordered to be reported without amendments.

Judge Lumley Smith, Q.C., in the Westminster County Court, last Monday, had before him a case of considerable importance to the water consumers of London. The Grand Junction Waterworks Company sued Mr. Maxwell Dawson, of Piccadilly, for £32 for water supplied to the defendant. Mr. Ram was counsel for the plaintiffs; and Mr. T. Willes Chitty for the defendant. The facts were all admitted, and the question to be argued was as to the applicability of the Water Rate Definition Act of 1885. Counsel said that the company had supplied water for a very long time to the premises, and in 1871 the rateable value was £160 and the amount charged was £2 5s. per annum for a domestic supply. Later in that year the rateable value changed, and the water rate was fixed, so long as Mrs. Dawson occupied the premises, at four guineas per annum. Under The rateable value afterwards increased and was now £334. sect. 46 of the company's special Act of 1822, the charge for premises of the annual value up to £200 could not exceed £4 per cent., and over £200 £3 per cent. The Definition Act defined "annual value" as the rateable value. Mr. Chitty argued that the defendant was partner with Mrs. Dawson at the time the agreement was made, and he contended that the occupancy was not yet determined. The agreement could only be altered by the consent of both parties. The four guineas were paid for three years after Mrs. Dawson's death and were accepted without prejudice. The company had tried for £7 a year, £7 14s., and as much as £9. The Definition Act said nothing about the raising of the amount from time to time with the rateable value. Had that been intended the Act would have stated it clearly and not left it to be inferred. At the present time the company was supplying his client with less water than they used to do, and yet they wanted to be paid more money.-His Honour said that, as the rateable value varied, the water rate varied also. The agreement came to an end when Mrs. Dawson died. Judgment was given for the plaintiffs for the amount claimed with costs.

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There is a rule that a Lord Chancellor should not take the Great Seal out of the realm, and this has been observed by all Chancellors except Cardinal Wolsey, who, in 1521, carried it with him to the Low Countries, and sealed writs with it at Calais-a supposed violation of duty, which formed one of the articles of his impeachment. Indeed, the better opinion is that the Great Seal cannot be used out of the realm. During the existence of the Irish Parliament an Irish statute had to receive the assent of the English Sovereign, attested by the Great Seal of England, before it received the assent of the Lord Lieutenant, attested by the Great Seal of Ireland. In one instance the office of Chancellor of England and Chancellor of Ireland was held at the same time by an individual, Ralph de Neville, in 1233, but this personage never, we believe, visited Ireland. Lord Campbell, who held himself at one time the Lord Chancellorship of Ireland, has placed on record the strange notions entertained by an English Lord Chancellor, writing in 1787, of the office of an Irish Lord Chancellor and the learning of the Irish Bar. "I am much amused," writes Lord Campbell," and so will my legal readers be, with a view which Lord Loughborough gives of the office of Chancellor in Ireland and of the state of jurisprudence in that country. Mr. Eden (Lord Auckland), who had been called to the English Bar, but had soon left it for politics, was engaged in the diplomatic line, but his probable promotion here being very slow, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas (Lord Loughborough) thus advised him to turn to better account his favour with the Minister : My project for you may seem very chimerical, but it is not half so unlikely as it once was that you should be fixed in the corps diplomatique. Why should you not return to your old corps and to Ireland ? I have never heard of a successor for old Lifford (the Irish Chancellor), who was in every respect fitted for the office which requires much more than a technical knowledge of law. All that is wanting in this respect you could with your application acquire in a twelvemonth, and in half that time I am sure you would possess as much as any man at the Irish Bar. Take over with you some clever men bred

COURT OF APPEAL. Company-Shares-Underwriting Letter-Contract-Offer and Acceptance-No Communication of Acceptance-Estoppel.-The C. company was promoted by the M. company for the purpose of buying and working certain mining options belonging to the M. company. On the 11th Sept. 1895 S. signed a letter addressed to the M. company offering to underwrite 10,000 shares on or before the day after the day appointed for the closing of the list for subscriptions for shares, in consideration of a commission of 15 per cent.; agreeing that the offer should be irrevocable if certain conditions were fulfilled; and, in the event of his failing to comply with the terms therein stated, authorising the M. company as agent to apply for shares in S.'s name; and undertaking not to withdraw the application or agency. On the 12th Sept. 1895 the M. company, through its secretary, wrote its acceptance of this offer on the face of the underwriting letter, but did not communicate such acceptance to S. On the 15th Sept. 1895 the C. company was registered. The day for closing the list of subscriptions for shares was the 20th Sept. On the 27th Sept. 1895 the M. company applied for 10,000 shares in the name of S., and the allotment was duly made. On the 28th Sept. 1895 the M. company wrote to S. informing him of its application for an allotment, and asking for a remittance. On the 30th Sept. 1895 S. repudiated his liability, on the ground that his offer had never been accepted by the M. company. On the 10th Oct. the solicitors of the M. company wrote to the solicitor of S. saying that the M. company would hold S. responsible, and on the 11th Oct. S. was required to pay the allotment money. S. thereupon applied to have his name removed from the register of the C. company, on the grounds (inter alia) that the offer to underwrite had never been properly accepted, no notice of acceptance having been sent, so that the M. company had no authority to apply for shares in his name; and that he had done nothing that estopped him from denying the authority of the M. company. It was decided by North, J., on the authority of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Henry Bentley and Co. and The Yorkshire Breweries Limited; Ex parte Harrison (69 L. T. Rep. 204), that S., having given the M. company ostensible authority to apply for shares in his name, was estopped from denying the irregularity of noncommunication of acceptance as against third parties, such as the C. company. S. appealed. Held, that the terms of the underwriting letter showed that it was an offer by S., which required acceptance by the M. company in order to convert the offer into a binding contract; that mere acceptance of an offer, unless it was brought to the knowledge of the person making it, did not as a rule, and subject to certain exceptions, convert the offer into a contract (Carlill v. The Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 67 L. T. Rep. 837; (1893) 1 Q. B. 256, at p. 262); that it was essential that S. should know on the 21st Sept. 1895, the day after the day appointed for the closing of the list of subscriptions for shares, how many shares he was to take; that until S. was informed that his offer had been accepted and the extent to which it had been accepted, it was impossible to treat him as having failed to perform his obligation to apply for shares; and that therefore the authority of the M. company to apply for them in S.'s name never arose. Held also, that there was absolutely no proof whatever of any conduct on the part of S. which amounted to any representation that he had failed to comply with the terms of the underwriting letter so as to give rise to the authority of the M. company to act for him; and that therefore the doctrine of estoppel was inapplicable to the facts of the case. Re Henry Bentley and Co.; Ex parte Harrison (ubi sup.) and Re The Bultfontein Sun Diamond Mine Limited (75 L. T. Rep. 669) considered and distinguished. Decision of North, J. reversed.

:

[Re The Consort Deep Level Gold Mines Limited; Ex parte Stark. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L.JJ. Feb. 18, 19, 20, 22, and March 6.--Counsel for the appellant, Swinfen Eady, Q.C. and W. F. Hamilton; for the respondents, Bigham, Q.C. and Upjohn. Solicitors: for the appellant, Walter J. Payne; for the respondents, Mellor, Smith, and May.]

Practice-Costs-Costs of Application under Order XIV.-Order as to Costs by Judge at Chambers-Discretion of Judge at Trial- Rules of the Supreme Court, Order XIV., r. 9 (a) and (b).-In this action the plaintiff sued to recover a liquidated amount from the defendant, and the writ was specially indorsed under Order III., r. 6. The plaintiff applied, under Order XIV., r. 1, for leave to enter final judgment. The master dismissed the application with costs, and refused to order the action to be put into the short cause list. The plaintiff appealed, and Day, J. at chambers, ordered the action to be put into the short cause list, and ordered that the costs of the application before the master and of the appeal should be costs in the cause. The action was subsequently tried by

Wright, J. without a jury, and the learned judge gave judgment for the plaiutiff with costs, but ordered that the costs of the proceedings under Order XIV. should not be allowed, being of opinion that those proceedings ought not to have been taken. Order XIV., r. 9, provides: (a) "The costs of and incident to all applications under this order shall be dealt with by the judge on the hearing of the application, who shall order by and to whom and when the same shall be paid, or may refer them to the judge at the trial: Provided that in case no trial afterwards takes place, or no order as to costs is made, the costs are to be costs in the cause; (b) "If the plaintiff makes an application under this order where the case is not within the order, or where the plaintiff, in the opinion of the judge, knew that the defendant relied on a contention which would entitle him to unconditional leave to defend, in any of such cases the application shall be dismissed with costs to be paid forthwith by the plaintiff." The plaintiff appealed against that part of the judgment which dealt with the costs of the proceedings under Order XIV. Held (allowing the appeal), that where the judge at chambers has ordered that the costs of proceedings under Order XIV. shall be costs in the cause, the judge at the trial without a jury has no power to order that the successful party shall not have those costs.

[Koosen v. Rose. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ. March 4.-Counsel: for the appellant, T. W. Wheeler, Q.C. and Nash; for the respondent, C. Matthews. Solicitors: for the appellant, H. Percy Beecher; for the respondent, A. W. Mills, for S. A. Bramsdon, Portsmouth.]

Specific Performance-Sale of Land-Contract contained in LettersReference in Acceptance to Date of Completion-New Term.-H. was the owner of a freehold estate, which was in the occupation of S. as tenant of H. On the 7th Nov. 1895 the agent of H. wrote to S. & letter offering the property to S. for £2000. Upon receipt of that letter, on the 8th Nov., S. at once wrote back, saying that he had not wished to give so much, but had decided to accept H.'s offer, and would give £2000 for the property; but he added, "I should like to know from what time H. wishes the purchase to date." Previously to these letters the agent of H. had by letter offered the property to A. for the same price, and on the 12th Nov. 1895 A. replied by letter accepting this offer, without being aware of the previous transactions between H. and S. Under these circumstances H. declined to complete either contract, and in Dec. 1895 A. brought an action against H. for specific performance of his contract. In the following March S. brought an action for specific performance against H. and A. The two actions were tried together, before Romer J., on the 18th Dec. 1896. The question was whether the inquiry in S.'s letter as to the time of the purchase was, or was not, a new term which prevented the acceptance being a clean one, and the letters forming a binding contract. It was decided by Romer, J. (75 L. T. Rep. 487) that the letter written by S. on the 8th Nov. 1895 was a sufficient acceptance, and made a binding contract between the parties; that it was not necessary for the contract to fix the time for completion, for where no time for completion was fixed a reasonable time was implied by law; and that the sentence in S.'s letter as to the time of purchase was not intended to introduce a fresh term, or to leave the point open for further negotiation, but was only a way of asking when the contract was to be completed. His Lordship accordingly gave judgment for S. with costs against H., except in so far as they had been increased by A. having been made a party, which costs had to be borne by A. The action of A. against H. was dismissed with costs. A. appealed from the judgment in the first action. Held, that the letter of the 7th Nov. was a definite offer, not an invitation to negotiate, of the property for £2000; and that the reply of the 8th Nov. was a complete acceptance and constituted a binding contract between the parties, and must be read just as if the inquiry as to from what time H. wished the purchase to date had never been inserted, for it was no part of the contract, a reasonable time within which the contract would be completed being imported by law. Held, therefore, that the appeal must be dismissed with costs. Decision of Romer, J. affirmed.

[Simpson v. Hughes. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lindley, Smith, aud Rigby, L.JJ. March 9.-Counsel: for the appellant, Neville, Q,C. and O. L. Clare; for the respondents, Eve, Q.C. and H. Fellows; George Lawrence. Solicitors for the appellant, Quayle and Ouvry; for the respondents, Hyde, Tandy, Mahon, and Sayer; Meredith, Roberts, and Mills, agents for Birch, Cullimore, and Douglas, Chester.]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Company-Articles of Association-Alteration of Articles-Reduction of Capital-Alteration of Voting Power.-J. C. Limited, under a clause in one of its articles of association, enabling a majority of the holders of any class of its shares to consent "to any scheme for the reduction of capital affecting prejudicially the class of shares," duly passed resolutions, with the requisite majority of each class of its shareholders, for the reduction of its capital, and at the same time passed a special resolution, in view of a subsequent subdivision of the capital, altering the voting powers so as to correspond with this subdivision. The reduction of capital was to be effected by cancelling the liability on certain ordinary £10 shares in respect of £2 remaining unpaid on each share, and the alteration of the articles admittedly diminished the voting powers of the ordinary shareholders. In Continental Union Gas Company (7 Times L. Rep. 476) Chitty, J. held this to be a fatal objection, but in Re Pinkney and Sons' Steamship Company (67 L. T. Rep. 117; (1892) 3 Ch. 125) Kekewich, J. held, that it could only be effected by an alteration of the articles of association. Buckley on the Companies Acts (7th edit., preface, p. iv.) was also referred to. Held, that the decision in Continental Union Gas Company (ubi sup.),