Corporate Governance in ContentionCiaran Driver, Grahame Thompson Corporate governance is a complex idea that is often inappropriately simplified as a cookbook of recommended measures to improve financial performance. Meta studies of published research show that the supposed benign effects of these measures - independent directors or highly incentivised executives - are at best context-specific. There is thus a challenge to explain the meaning, purpose, and importance of corporate governance. This volume addresses these issues. The issues discussed centre on relationships within the firm e.g. between labour, managers, and investors, and relationships outside the firm that affect consumers or the environment. The essays in this collection are the considered selection by the editors and the contributors themselves of what are seen as some of the most weighty and urgent issues that connect the corporation and society at large in developed economies with established property rights. The essays are to be read in dialogue with each other, giving a richer understanding than could be obtained by shepherding all contributions into a single mould. Nevertheless taken together they demonstrate a shared sense of deep concern that the corporate governance agenda has been and still is on the wrong track. The contributors, individually and collectively, identify in this compendium both a research programme and a platform for change. |
Contents
Corporate Governance and Why It Matters | 1 |
Corporate Forms and the Law | 23 |
Corporate Governance Systems and Innovation | 115 |
Worker Involvement and Corporate Governance | 191 |
Broadening the Corporate Governance Debate | 261 |
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activities agency approach argument assets banks become benefit capital cash cent chapter co-operatives commitment Committee Commons companies complementarities concern consider consumer corporate governance costs countries customers direct directors downward accountability economic effects employees engage enterprise equity European evidence example executives external firms foundation functions funds Green growth impact important incentives increase industrial innovation institutional interests internal investment investors involved issues Journal labour Lazonick limited London long-term major managerial managers operations organization organizational owners ownership Oxford parties pension performance policies political positive practices Press problem production profits protection reduced regulation relation requires responsibility result returns Review risk role share shareholders social specific stakeholders standard stock market strategy structure theory trust University workers