the same household; while "aphestic" morality lies in the legal relations of fellow-citizens to each other.

It need hardly be said that even after Mr. Sutherland's labors there is still a great deal left for other workers in the same field. Up to the present time the subject of the historical development of morality has suffered the most extraordinary neglect. A glance at

the bibliographies will verify this. In Mr. Fortescue's indexes from 1880-1895 there is only one work which pretends to be complete,-Letourneau's "Évolution de la morale," and not more than three or four German pamphlets. Nor is the deficiency made up by previous writers. Mr. Lecky's "History of European Morals," learned and interesting as far as it goes, is but a fragmentary study of one curious epoch. The historian of morality has in fact not yet appeared before the world, and a most magnificent literary and philosophic opportunity still remains unseized. Such facts as these are a sufficient answer to sceptics who ask whether, in view of the length of time that men have been philosophizing, there can be anything left for philosophy to do. The main problem may be briefly stated. In civilized society there is recognized a certain moral ideal, or norm of moral conduct, regulating all conduct concerned with family life, property, civic intercourse, the state, and so forth. Among savages we find a vastly different ideal, much more rudimentary and greatly different in its features. Now, how is this difference to be accounted for? For what reasons, by what processes, through what variations, under what influences, has this mighty change taken place in the most vitally interesting of all matters of human action? To this great question we have as yet nothing but fragments of an answer. Mr. Sutherland's contribution, welcome though it be, cannot claim to be more than an instalment of the whole.

OXFORD, ENGLAND.

HENRY STURT.

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS, AS BASED ON THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. By Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Translated by A. E. Kroeger, edited by the Hon. Dr. W. T. Harris, Commissioner of Education. London: Kegan Paul, French, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1897. Pp. xii., 399.

It is difficult to imagine what can justify the publication of such a book as this. So far as mere familiarity with German is concerned, Mr. Kroeger would, indeed, seem to be sufficiently equipped

for the task he has undertaken; for it is not very often that he has totally mistaken the sense of any particular sentence. But his inaccuracy and unfaithfulness to his original are so gross as to render his translation absolutely useless, as a substitute for the German, to any serious student of philosophy. It may, indeed, be doubted whether a student, whose object was to learn German and philosophy together, might not get as much good as harm, by using this translation with the original; but some false notions he could hardly fail to get from it; and Fichte's German, by itself, is far from difficult. For the general public the difficulty of the book itself must be a bar to its utility; and any one who hoped to get from this translation any notion of Fichte's simple and forcible style would be sorely disappointed; for Mr. Kroeger has, with great consistency, omitted those turns of phrase which are the most charming and characteristic in his author; and has, on the other hand, crammed his own style with barbarisms not to be met with in the German.

These charges are so serious that some substantiation of them seems owing alike to the two gentlemen whose names appear upon the title-page, to the readers of this JOURNAL, and to myself. I propose, therefore, to tabulate, with a few examples, those faults. which seem to me most conclusive against the pretensions of this book to be considered an adequate translation. (1) Mr. Kroeger has adopted a division of the book into chapters and sections which seems to differ needlessly from that of Fichte. This division frequently prevents the reader from discovering the author's own classification of his matter. Thus, Fichte divides his book into three main parts; Mr. Kroeger into two. To take a more important instance: Fichte develops the Content of the Moral Law in five distinct steps (pp. 280-307, Ed. 1798); Mr. Kroeger proceeds with him to the end of the third, and then begins a new chapter in which Fichte's IV. appears as a new I. (p. 241), and, what Fichte treats as a part of V. (p. 311), is elevated by Mr. Kroeger into a new III. (p. 246.) On this head we may add that Mr. Kroeger arbitrarily rearranges the titles and paragraphs throughout, misleading in the former case, and losing much in the latter, since Fichte is accustomed to denote subsections within paragraphs by dashes, which Mr. Kroeger generally either omits altogether or elevates into new paragraphs. The sectional numbering, which runs throughout the whole of the original and is a considerable convenience for reference, is entirely omitted by this modern translator. (2) Mr. Kroeger frequently omits two or three whole sentences at a time, without

leaving any sign that he has done so; and also, though less frequently, inserts sentences of his own. His object is apparently to make the sense plainer, and to reject superfluous repetitions; but this is certainly not translation, and moreover he appears to follow no principle in it. For instance, he omits on p. 32 a most significant note on the transcendental stand-point; and further instances may be found on pp. 25, 41, 51, 59, 85, 310, etc. For a specimen of his explanatory insertions we may refer to p. 307, where will be found eight lines of matter which have no place in the German. Omissions of mere clauses are too numerous to call for special mention. (3) Of the desperate inaccuracy of Mr. Kroeger's terminology we may give the following instances. "Selbst-ständigkeit" is throughout translated "self-determination," and so rendered indistinguishable from "Selbst-bestimmung:" in one place, indeed, Mr. Kroeger uses "self-sufficiency," but never the proper equivalent, "self-subsistence." Causality" is made to serve not only for "Kausalität," but also frequently for "Wirksamkeit," and even for "Thätigkeit" (p. 3). For "Wirklich" and "Real," "actual" and "real" are used quite indiscriminately; and similarly for “Lust," "Genuss," "Befriedigung," which Fichte pointedly distinguishes, "enjoyment" and "satisfaction" (pp. 153, 154). "Empfindung" is consistently rendered "perception," and thus in no way distinguished from "Wahrnehmung." In particular instances you can never be sure what German word you have to deal with: e.g., "thinking" in one place (p. 63) represents "Vorstellung" (and "Vorstellung" in italics, too), whereas in many others it represents "Begriff" (p. 47); and who would guess that "actions" (p. 61) stands for "Wollen"? To pass to a more disputable point, it seems a pity that the title "Sittenlehre" should have been translated "Science of Ethics," since "Lehre" has none of the connotations of our word "science :" Mr. Kroeger has himself used in the text (p. 2) the appropriate translation, "doctrine." Finally, we come to some examples which border on our next division—that of bad English. For "Sollen," "shall" (and Mr. Kroeger does not shrink from "shall-ing;" cf., too, "the canning" (p. 282), is much more often used than "ought," the only word which represents its ethical meaning in English; and the use of "a thinking," "this thinking," for "ein Denkendes," "dieses Denkende," as well as for "ein Denken," ""dieses Denken," is as misleading as it is barbarous (p. 23). (4) This latter barbarism of using an English adjective to represent the substantival use of the German

neuter with the article occurs throughout the book. For other examples of faulty English we may quote the following: The German construction of "wenn wir uns . . . bewusst zu sein glauben" (p. 73) repeatedly rendered "we believe to be conscious," instead of "we believe that we are conscious;" phrases such as "In simply a formaliter way" (p. 155), "It involves a twofold" (p. 183; cf. p. 355), “An absolute first, and in itself grounded somewhat" (p. 29), "Injurious, and all true morality-eradicating (sic) pretexts" (p. 330)," the all-to-his-wife sacrificing (sic) generosity of the husband" (p. 347); solecisms like "oppositedness" (p. 26), "objectivating" (p. 156), "continuating" and "esteemable" for "estimable" (p. 332, foll.); finally, vulgarisms, such as "shew up," "hunt up," "look up" (passim), and "sneak" (p. 207), which, in the sense in which Mr. Kroeger uses them, I cannot believe to be classical even in America. (5) Mr. Kroeger, while, as we have seen (p. 158), he ventures to omit some of Fichte's own explanations as unnecessary, has added just four notes of his own. The first of these (p. 102), in which he explains that the original points through which the Ego acts on nature are "a plurality of first men," is a mere absurdity, since Fichte immediately explains that they form the body as such. The second (p. 122), in which he identifies Fichte's natural organic totalities with Leibnitz's Monads, is also manifestly wrong; since Fichte allows to them neither consciousness nor complete independence. (Along with these, in point of falseness, may be reckoned the explanatory addition "or God" on p. 171.) The third note (p. 188), despite its irrelevant dogmatism, is at least questionable; since Fichte would appear to be speaking rather of the history of an individual than of "human history." The fourth (p. 350) would seem only to obscure what in the text was clear; unless, indeed, its reference to a man's "reason" as "reflected from some external thing" may be taken in connection with the curious remarks on "introspection," which occur in Dr. Harris's Preface (pp. vi. and vii.), as giving us some information about that sytsem of "rational psychology," which we are surprised to learn was established by Kant's Critique (ib.). (5) The number of misprints alone would suffice to prove the gross carelessness with which this book has been prepared. Omitting such as are of a common order, specimens of some interest may be found on the following pages: 2, 18, 41, 112, 135, 179, 219, 223, 227, 229, 252, 255, 265, 331, 349, 364, 384, 386, 392, etc.; we may instance "part" for "fact, ""anxious" for "conscious," "private" for "finite," "located" for "treated,"

"spirit" for "speech," "greater" for "preacher," "reorganize" for "recognize." (6) Absolute mistranslations, due either to carelessness or to misapprehension of the general sense, are not un

common.

I have given so much space to exposing this so-called translation, that little can remain for discussing Fichte's work. And yet, perhaps, some praise is due to Dr. Harris and Mr. Kroeger for calling attention to it. I cannot, indeed, agree with the former that "Fichte's writings form the classics of introspection," nor that "Fichte's insight into freedom . . . is the foundation-stone of the subsequent philosophies of Schelling and Hegel; in which . . . the psychology movement comes into harmony with the ontology movement, both reach the same highest principles, namely, the personality of God, human freedom, and responsibility, individual immortality in an eternal church invisible." I hope I may be nearer the mark in saying that the "Sittenlehre" contains the most thoroughgoing attempt ever made to build a complete ethical system solely on the basis of freedom. Fichte throughout refers all his conceptions to freedom; whereas with Kant and other moralists, who explicitly adopt that basis, the direct emphasis is often thrown on other principles, the connection of which with freedom is by no means immediately evident. For this reason Fichte's Ethics are at the same time more systematic and more paradoxical. He allows, for instance, that the profession of a scholar is "higher" than that of a merchant; but he would appear to leave no possible meaning for such a phrase, since the scholar is neither more of a means to the "Rational End" but as a mere "tool" precisely equal in value with the merchant, nor can anything in the world be regarded as an end in itself: Fichte generally carries out rigorously this latter point of view.

With regard to the Preface and the lengthy deductions which form the first two divisions of the book, I must confess myself totally unconvinced of their main object,—the establishment of the Ego as something outside Nature, subject-object, and possessed of Freedom. The main point would seem to lie in this: Whether anything can be thought at all without thereby being made into an object, a "thing" (p. 33), a "being." If not, then, neither can the Ego, nor "thought" itself. That everything which is, is for consciousness in some sense, may be admitted; but it does not follow that consciousness itself is in another sense, as Fichte seems to assume.

He confesses that he can only answer the "opposers of