of men, though in a less completely developed state; while, in comparing their mental powers with those of brutes, he says 'No doubt the difference in this respect is enormous' (vol. i. p. 34). As if, however, to diminish the force of this admission, he remarks, what no one would dream of disputing, that there are psychical phenomena common to men and to other animals. He says of man that

'He uses in common with the lower animals inarticulate cries' to express his meaning, aided by gestures and the movements of the muscles of the face. This especially holds good with the more simple and vivid feelings, which are but little connected with the higher intelligence. Our cries of pain, fear, surprise, anger, together with their appropriate actions, and the murmur of a mother to her beloved child, are more expressive than any words.'—vol. i. p. 54.

But, inasmuch as it is admitted on all hands that man is an animal, and therefore has all the four lower faculties enumerated in our list, as well as the two higher ones, the fact that he makes use of common instinctive actions in no way diminishes the force of the distinction between him and brutes as regards the representative, reflective faculties. It rather follows as a matter of course from his animality that he should manifest phenomena common to him and to brutes. That man has a common nature with them is perfectly compatible with his having, besides, a superior nature and faculties of which no brute has any rudiment or vestige. Indeed, all the arguments and objections in Mr. Darwin's second chapter may be met by the fact that man being an animal, has corresponding faculties, whence arises a certain external conformity with other animals as to the modes of expressing some mental modifications. In the overlooking of this possibility of coexistence of two natures lies that error of negation to which we before alluded. Here, as in other parts of the book, we may say there are two quantities a and a 2, and Mr. Darwin, seeing the two as but neglecting the x, represents the quantities as equal.

We will now notice the anecdotes narrated by Mr. Darwin in support of the rationality of brutes. Before doing so, however, we must remark that our author's statements, given on the authority (sometimes second-hand authority) of others, afford little evidence of careful criticism. This is the more noteworthy when we consider the conscientious care and pains which he bestows on all the phenomena which he examines himself.

Thus, for example, we are told on the authority of Brehm

that

'An eagle seized a young cercopithecus, which, by clinging to a branch, was not at once carried off; it cried loudly for assistance,

upon

upon which other members of the troop, with much uproar rushed to the rescue, surrounded the eagle, and pulled out so many feathers that he no longer thought of his prey, but only how to escape.'-vol. i. 76.

p.

We confess we wish that Mr. Darwin had himself witnessed this episode. Perhaps, however, he has seen other facts sufficiently similar to render this one credible. In the absence of really trustworthy evidence we should, however, be inclined to doubt the fact of a young cercopithecus, unexpectedly seized, being able, by clinging, to resist the action of an eagle's wings.

We are surprised that Mr. Darwin should have accepted the following tale without suspicion :—

'One female baboon had so capacious a heart that she not only adopted young monkeys of other species, but stole young dogs and cats which she continually carried about. Her kindness, however, did not go so far as to share her food with her adopted offspring, at which Brehm was surprised, as his monkeys always divided everything quite fairly with their own young ones. An adopted kitten scratched the above-mentioned affectionate baboon, who certainly had a fine intellect, for she was much astonished at being scratched, and immediately examined the kitten's feet, and without more ado bit off the claws.' (!!) —vol. i. p. 41.

Has Mr. Darwin ever tested this alleged fact? Would it be possible for a baboon to bite off the claws of a kitten without keeping the feet perfectly straight?

Again we have an anecdote on only second-hand authority (namely a quotation by Brehm of Schimper) to the following effect:

In Abyssinia, when the baboons belonging to one species (C. gelada) descend in troops from the mountains to plunder the fields, they sometimes encounter troops of another species (C. hamadryas), and then a fight ensues. The Geladas roll down great stones, which the Hamadryas try to avoid, and then both species, making a great uproar, rush furiously against each other, Brehm, when accompanying the Duke of Coburg-Gotha, aided in an attack with fire-arms on a troop of baboons in the pass of Mensa in Abyssinia. The baboons in return rolled so many stones down the mountain, some as large as a man's head, that the attackers had to beat a hasty retreat; and the pass was actually for a time closed against the caravan. It deserves notice that these baboons thus acted in concert.'-vol. i. p. 51.

Now, if every statement of fact here given be absolutely correct, it in no way even tends to invalidate the distinction we have drawn between instinct' and 'reason'; but the positive assertion that the brutes acted in concert,' when the evidence proves nothing more than that their actions were simultaneous,

shows

shows a strong bias on the part of the narrator. A flock of sheep will simultaneously turn round and stare and stamp at an intruder; but this is not concerted action,' which means that actions are not only simultaneous, but are so in consequence of a reciprocal understanding and convention between the various agents. It may be added that if any brutes were capable of such really concerted action, the effects would soon make themselves known to us so forcibly as to prevent the possibility of mistake.

We come now to Mr. Darwin's instances of brute rationality. · In the first place he tells us :

'I had a dog who was savage and averse to all strangers, and I purposely tried his memory after an absence of five years and two days. I went near the stable where he lived, and shouted to him in my old manner; he showed no joy, but instantly followed me out walking and obeyed me, exactly as if I had parted with him only half an hour before. A train of old associations, dormant during five years, had thus been instantaneously awakened in his mind.'—vol. i. p. 45.

No doubt! but this is not reason.' Indeed, we could hardly have a better instance of the mere action of associated sensible impressions. What is there here which implies more than memory, impressions of sensible objects and their association? Had there been reason there would have been signs of joy and wonder, though such signs would not alone prove reason to exist. It is evident that Mr. Darwin's own mode of explanation is the sufficient one-namely, by a train of associated sensible impressions. Mr. Darwin surely cannot think that there is in this case any evidence of the dog's having put to himself those questions which, under the circumstances, a rational being would put. Mr. Darwin also tells us how a monkey-trainer gave up in despair the education of monkeys, of which the attention was easily distracted from his teaching, while a monkey which carefully attended to him could always be trained.' But'attention' does not imply reason.' The anecdote only shows that some monkeys are more easily impressed and more retentive of impressions than others.

Again, we are told, as an instance of reason, that 'Rengger sometimes put a live wasp in paper so that the monkeys in hastily unfolding it got stung; after this had once happened, they always first held the packet to their ears to detect any movement within.' But here again we have no need to call in the aid of reason.' The monkeys had had the group of sensations 'folded paper' associated with the other groups—' noise and movement' and 'stung fingers.' The second time they experi

ence

ence the group of sensations folded paper' the succeeding sensations (in this instance only too keenly associated) are forcibly recalled, and with the recollection of the sensation of hearing, the hand goes to the ear. Yet Mr. Darwin considers this unimportant instance of such significance that he goes on to say :

'Any one who is not convinced by such facts as these, and by what he may observe with his own dogs, that animals can reason, would not be convinced by anything I could add. Nevertheless, I will give one case with respect to dogs, as it rests on two distinct observers, and can hardly depend on the modification of any instinct. Mr. Colquhoun winged two wild ducks, which fell on the opposite side of a stream; his retriever tried to bring over both at once, but could not succeed; she then, though never before known to ruffle a feather, deliberately killed one, brought over the other, and returned for the dead bird. Colonel Hutchinson relates that two partridges were shot at once, one being killed and the other wounded; the latter ran away, and was caught by the retriever, who on her return came across the dead bird; she stopped, evidently greatly puzzled, and after one or two trials, finding she could not take it up without permitting the escape of the winged bird, she considered a moment, then deliberately murdered it by giving it a severe crunch, and afterwards brought away both together. This was the only known instance of her having wilfully injured any game.'

Mr. Darwin adds:

'Here we have reason, though not quite perfect, for the retriever might have brought the wounded bird first and then returned for the dead one, as in the case of the two wild ducks.'-vol. i. pp. 47, 48.

Here we reply we have nothing of the kind, and to bring 'reason' into play is gratuitous. The circumstances can be perfectly explained (and on Mr. Darwin's own principles) as evidences of the revival of an old instinct. The ancestors of sporting dogs of course killed their prey, and that trained dogs. do not kill it is simply due to man's action, which has suppressed the instinct by education, and which continually thus keeps it under control. It is indubitable that the old tendency must be latent, and that a small interruption in the normal retrieving process, such as occurred in the cases cited, would probably be sufficient to revive that old tendency and call the obsolete habit into exercise.

But perhaps the most surprising instance of groundless inference is presented in the following passage:

My dog, a full grown and very sensible animal, was lying on the lawn during a hot and still day; but at a little distance a slight breeze occasionally moved an open parasol, which would have been wholly disregarded by the dog, had any one stood near it. As it was,

every time that the parasol slightly moved, the dog growled fiercely and barked. He must, I think, have reasoned to himself in a rapid and unconscious manner, that movement without any apparent cause indicated the presence of some strange living agent, and no stranger had a right to be on his territory.'-vol. i. p. 67.

The consequences deduced from this trivial incident are amazing. Probably, however, Mr. Darwin does not mean what he says; but, on the face of it, we have a brute credited with the abstract ideas movement,' 'causation,' and the notions logically arranged and classified in subordinate genera-'agent,' 'living agent,' 'strange living agent.' He also attributes to it the notion of 'a right' of 'territorial limitation,' and the relation of such limited territory' and 'personal ownership.' It may safely be affirmed that if a dog could so reason in one instance he would in others, and would give much more unequivocal proofs for Mr. Darwin to bring forward.

Mr. Darwin, however, speaks of reasoning in an 'unconscious manner,' so that he cannot really mean any process of reasoning at all; but, if so, his case is in no way apposite. Even an insect can be startled, and will exhibit as much evidence of rationality as is afforded by the growl of a dog; and all that is really necessary to explain such a phenomenon exists in an oyster, or even in the much talked-of Ascidian.

Thus, then, it appears that, even in Mr. Darwin's speciallyselected instances, there is not a tittle of evidence tending, however slightly, to show that any brute possesses the representative reflective faculties. But if, as we assert, brute animals are destitute of such higher faculties, it may well be that those lower faculties which they have (and which we more or less share with them) are highly developed, and their senses possess a degree of keenness and quickness inconceivable to us.

Their minds*

being entirely occupied with such lower faculties, and having, so to speak, nothing else to occupy them, their sensible impressions may become interwoven and connected to a far greater extent than in us. Indeed, in the absence of free will, the laws of this association of ideas obtain supreme command over the minds of brutes: the brute being entirely immersed, as it were, in his presentative faculties.

There yet remain two matters for consideration, which tend to prove the fundamental difference which exists between the mental powers of man and brutes:-1. The mental equality

* The words 'mind,' 'mental,' 'intelligence,' &c., are here made use of in reference to the psychical faculties of brutes, in conformity to popular usage, and not as strictly appropriate.

between