fixed and definite supposed circumstances. But if we attempt to reduce our conclusions to practice in any particular cases of actual conduct, in any peculiar circumstances of real life, we shall find that it is not applicable. And why? Because the circumstances, from a reference to which the conclusion was drawn, and which give it its peculiar form and character, are different from those to which we attempt to apply it.

But it may be said, that by the phrase right in the abstract is meant what is right for man simply as man, without reference to any peculiarity in talents, temperament, relations, or circumstances. But this, it will be perceived, upon a moment's reflection, is but a change of ground, not an escape from the difficulty. For it is only divesting man of all the peculiarities ordinarily attaching to him. But the very circumstance of his being divested of these, constitutes a new and strange peculiarity. The conclusions, and principles, and rules, which would be applicable to him under this peculiarity, would not be applicable to him in the ordinary circumstances of actual life. If this then be a correct idea of right in the abstract, it is rendered still more evident than before that it is a mere fiction of the brain, that it has not and cannot have a real and positive existence in any community of living and acting men. For, the moment you place men together in a community, you place them in the midst of a great variety of relations, the peculiarities of which are ever changing; consequently, the conclusion as to which is right in the abstract is no longer applicable. Since, then, men do not exist in the abstract, divested of all peculiarity of talent, temperament, circumstance or relation, but are placed under every variety in these respects, and subjected to a constant succession of changes in the grounds of duty, there is and there can be no such thing as right in the abstract in regard to specific duties.

But, even if there be such a thing as right in the abstract in regard to specific duties, no one of the human race is capable of ascertaining, with infallible certainty, what that is. We are so constituted, that we can view duty only through the medium of our temperaments and circumstances and interests and prejudices. Here are two individuals engaged in conversation upon the great moral evils which prevail in the community and threaten its best interests. The one is calm and cheerful, fully aware indeed of the real nature and dangerous tendency of the evils upon which they are conversing, but, at the same time,

perfectly confident as to the favorable character of the final issue. The other is much excited upon the subject. He dwells upon the darkest aspect which the times present, and is filled with despondency as to the future. These two individuals

would differ materially as to the course of conduct, which they might think the state of the times demanded; and their dif ference of opinion would arise from their different constitutional temperaments. This same cause, difference in constitutional temperament, would produce a similar difference of opinion in regard to the course of conduct, which would be regarded as right in the abstract. Again, if you travel through the land and listen to the conversation which occurs in the public conveyances, you will perceive a great difference of feeling and opinion in regard to the comparative magnitude of the different evils which are supposed to threaten the community. One regards the spread and increase of the Roman Catholics as the greatest and most fearful source of danger, and, consequently, he thinks that the whole energies of the community should be concentrated and put forth in opposition to this evil. Another regards the existence of slavery as the dark cloud which portends the destruction of our liberties, and wonders that men can think of or direct their exertions to any other object than the removal of this great evil. A third is of opinion that the temperance cause is the great philanthropic movement of the day, which should enlist the warmest affections and call forth the most strenuous exertions of every friend of man. Now why this difference of opinion? These individuals are, it may be, men of equal intellectual power; they are equally honest, and equally unconscious of being under the influence of any prejudice or undue bias in any particular direction. Why then this difference of feeling and opinion? Is it not because these different individuals have been placed in different circumstances, and have looked at the question of duty from different positions and through different mediums? Still further, here is one engaged in some lucrative branch of business, which is thought, by many, to be injurious to the best interests of the community. Of such an one, it is often said that he is so blinded by a regard for his own interest that he cannot distinguish the path of duty. This may be, and in many cases it undoubtedly is, true. But it may be equally true that those, who object to this branch of business, have become so deeply interested in some particular cause, and so strongly prejudiced against every thing which

may oppose the rapid progress of that cause, as to be unable to judge impartially. It may be, that while the one looks at the question of duty through the medium of self-interest, the other looks at it through the equally blinding medium of party attachment or individual prejudice. In all these cases there is an honest difference of opinion in regard to questions of duty. And the truth illustrated by them will hold true in regard to the question of right in the abstract. For we shall view even that question through the medium of our circumstances, temperaments, interests, and prejudices, and, consequently, we are none of us capable of ascertaining, with infallible certainty, the Course which may be right in the abstract. Who of us will say that he is so free from any undue bias, so free from prejudice, so impartial in his feelings, and has such a thorough knowledge of all the elements necessary to the formation of a correct opinion, that he can, in all cases, judge with infallible certainty?

But this position is confirmed by another circumstance. We are all tenacious of our own opinions, unwilling that others should judge for us upon questions of duty. But why not? If there be, in regard to all our specific duties, such a thing as right in the abstract, by which we are to be guided, and we are capable of ascertaining what this is, with infallible certainty, why may not one decide for another, a few decide for all? Why then are we unwilling, and why is it improper that another should judge for us upon questions of duty? Is it not because abstract principles must be modified in their application to specific duties, according to the circumstances under which these duties are to be performed, and because others, though equally honest with ourselves, are looking at the question of duty from a different point of view, are not in our position, and cannot look through the same medium through which we are looking? We may both agree in regard to the abstract principles of moral conduct, and we may allow that we ourselves are utterly unable to determine for others what course of conduct these general principles may require of them in their peculiar circumstances, while we deny that they are able to determine the same question for us. If then there be in regard to specific duties such a thing as right in the abstract, it is something altogether beyond the reach of our capacities. We may suppose indeed that, if there be such a thing, it is what appears to be right to the eye of Omniscience, because that eye can survey at one glance all the possible circumstances and consequences of an

act.

Whenever, then, the Almighty, the omniscient and eternal Jehovah, declares, by direct revelation, a certain course to be essentially and eternally right, it becomes finite and shortsighted man to submit. But in other cases, each one must judge for himself, according to the best of his knowledge and ability. And as we may suppose that Omniscience itself determines what is right in the abstract, not by looking at man divested of all peculiarity, of talent, temperament, situation, or circumstance, but by surveying, at once, all possible circumstances, and all the nearer and more remote consequences, so we are to endeavour to learn the course of duty not by looking at ourselves as divested of all peculiarities, but by ascertaining in each particular case all its peculiar circumstances, and all the nearer and more remote probable consequences, and by so modifying our general principles as to bring them into an accordance

with these.

But if the two positions, which we have already laid down, be correct, we may remark, further, that not only are we permitted, but that, from the very constitution of our natures, we are compelled to have recourse to the question of expediency, to consult the peculiar circumstances of the case, and to inquire for the probable consequences of the act, in order to determine what is duty. To pursue any other course is an absolute impossibility. He who thinks that he is pursuing a different course, that he is forming an impartial judgment upon questions of duty, from a single regard to right in the abstract, is only deceiving himself. Whether he may be aware of it or not, his judgment is in fact influenced by his peculiar temperament, by the prejudices of his education, by the circumstances in which he is placed. By these and by a thousand other influences to which he is exposed, is his judgment liable to be warped. That we are thus compelled to modify general rules by a regard to the circumstances of the case in regard to specific duties, may be made clearly manifest by the following illustrations. What would seem more unnatural, nay, what more sinful, when viewed, in relation to the question of abstract right and without regard to circumstances, than for a parent to shut out from the community of his fellow-men the son of his affections? But when that son becomes a maniac, whose liberty would be injurious to the community, it becomes the solemn duty of the parent. What more unnatural, what more sinful, than for a child to refuse obedience to the father who has watched over him, and even

to exercise a master's authority over one, whom, in the course of nature, he should only venerate? But that father may, by intemperance, become a madman, or a brute, and then it may be the solemn duty, unpleasant though it be, of the son not only to disobey his command, but also to exercise authority over him. These, we are aware, are extreme cases. But they serve to illustrate our principle. Right in the abstract in regard to the duties of parents and children is based upon some supposed circumstances which are taken for granted, and when these circumstances are changed, the general principles of duty based upon them must be modified to meet the peculiar circumstances in which the specific acts of duty are to be performed; and consequently the course to be pursued is to be determined, not by dwelling upon the general principles themselves, in the abstract view of them, but by inquiring carefully for the peculiar features of the case. It may be said, that no one objects to a careful examination of all the circumstances. peculiar to any particular case of duty, but that it is entirely different in regard to the probable consequences of any particular act; that with these we have nothing to do, no inquiry to make. "Duty is ours, events are God's," is the maxim with which the mouth is shut. But, in answer, we ask, first, what is meant by an examination of the circumstances, other than an inquiry as to what will be the probable result of a course of conduct pursued under these circumstances? We answer, again, that the maxim, "Duty is ours, events are God's," is true and valuable wherever it is found to be applicable, but that it does not apply to the question before us. This question supposes the course of duty to be doubtful, and it is contended that we are to inquire into probable consequences in order to ascertain what is duty, not to determine what may be the result of a course which we are satisfied is duty. And it seems to us that on this point there can be no question. An act may be performed to-day, which, on account of some known circumstances, we have every reason to believe, will result in disastrous consequences. But, at the same time, there may be strong ground to hope, and even to believe, that there will be such a change in the circumstances as will cause the proposed act, if postponed for a few days, to be beneficial in all its bearings. If then we are in doubt as to what is duty, and there is every reason to believe that one course will be followed by beneficial, and its opposite by disastrous consequences, this circumstance,