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which is thrown in the way of every dis- | which we must all leave so soon, that which tinguished man in France, that of establish- passes riches." ing himself in the capital. He has resisted | The muse of Jasmin is generally of a seit with a constancy worthy of the highest rious turn, but there are, nevertheless, two praise. The inducements must have been humorous pieces in the collection before us, strong. In Paris, he would have lived in which are very excellent. The one is a dethose literary circles in which his talents scription of a journey which the poet once would have been fully appreciated ; but took,and in which his travelling companions at the same time, he would have experi were quietly discussing the merits of Jasenced the envy of rival authors. At Agen, min, without being at all aware that he was on the contrary, he lives quietly and ad sitting by their side. The reader can easily mired by all his countrymen. We find imagine to what amusing scenes such a among his poems, an epistle addressed to mistake might give rise. The other, entia rich farmer of the neighborhood of Tou- tled Le Chalibari, is a mock heroic poem, louse, who had strenuously urged his go- like Boileau's Lutrin, and Pope's Rape ing to the metropolis to make his fortune. / of the Lock, and which, had it been writThere is in this piece of poetry an energy ten at an earlier period, might have claimed and a vivacity of expression, which must à place by the side of those two capital have been anything but agreeable to the poems. The nineteenth century is not experson to whom it was addressed. “And actly the best period for writing a parody you too, sir,” he says, “ do not fear to of a style of composition, which is nowtrouble the peace of my days and nights, and we trust ever will be out of fashion. but write to me to carry my guitar and A satire on the manners and customs of comb to the great city of kings! There, the Middle Ages would be almost as well you say, my poetic vein and the verses by | adapted to our times. There are many which I am already known, would cause other poems in the works of Jasmin which a stream of dollars to flow into my shop. are well worthy of notice, but we have You might, sir, during a whole month, sing neither the leisure nor the desire to write the praises of this golden rain—you might out an index of the two octavo volumes tell me that fame is but smoke! glory before us; we therefore dismiss the subnought but glory, but that money is money! | ject, sincerely wishing that no person who I would not even thank you. Money! Is admires true poetry, will take our word inoney anything to a man who feels burn- for the beauties contained in the poems of ing in his breast the flame of poetry? I | Jasmin, but that they will judge for themam happy and poor with my loaf of rye, selves. We are much mistaken, or he will and the water from my fountain. .....1 feel something of the pleasure we have enjoy everything. Nothing makes me sigh. ourselves experienced in perusing them, I have cried long enough; I mean to make and, we may add, in endeavoring to make amends for it. Wiser than in the days of them known. my youth, I begin to feel in this world, I

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All created life exists under two as- | cannot be held for one moment asunder. pects, and includes in itself what may be The ideal can have no reality, except in denominated a two-fold form of being. In the form of the actual; and the actual one view, it is something individual and can have no truth, save as it is filled with single, the particular revelation as such, the presence of the ideal. Each subsists by which, in any given case, it makes itself only by inseparable union with its oppoknown in the actual world. In another site; each is indispensable to the other, as view, it is a general, universal force, which the complement of an existence, that could lies back of all such revelation, and com- otherwise have no force. The bond which municates to this its true significance and I unites them, accordingly, is not mechanipower. In this form, it is an idea ; not cal and outward merely. The life in which an abstraction or notion simply, fabrica- | they meet, is not to be regarded as, in any ted by the understandiug, to represent its sense, two lives. The two forms of existown sense of a certain common character, | ence which it includes, are at the same belonging to a multitude of individual time the power of a single fact, in whose objects; but the inmost substantial nature constitution they are perfectly joined of these objects themselves, which goes together, in an inward way. The ideal before them, in the order of existence, at and the actual, the general and the particleast, if not in time, and finds its perpet-1 ular, are both present in all life, not by ual manifestation through their endlessly juxtaposition or succession, but in such a diversified forms. All life is at once ideal way as to include each other at every and actual, and in this respect, at once point. The very same life is both general single and universal. It belongs to the and particular, at the same time—the ideal very nature of the idea, (as a true subsist in the actual, and the actual in the ideal ; ence and not a mere notion,) to be with- and each is what it is always, only by out parts and without limits. It includes having in itself the presence of the other, in itself the possibility, indeed, of distinc- as that which it is not. tion and self-limitation; but this possibil- Take, for instance, the life of a particuity made real, is nothing more nor less lar plant or tree. Immediately considered, than the transition of the idea over into it is something single, answerable to the the sphere of actual life. In itself, it is outward phenomenal form under which it boundless, universal, and always identical. | is exhibited to the senses. But it is, at It belongs to the very conception of the the same time, more also than this. It actual world, on the other hand, that it becomes a particular plant or tree, in fact, should exist by manifold distinction, and only as it is felt to be the revelation of a the resolution of the infinite and universal life more comprehensive than its own, a into the particular and finite. All life, we | life that appears in all plants and trees, say then, is at one and the same time, as and yet is not to be regarded as springing actual and ideal, individual also, and gen- from them, or as measured by them, in eral; something strictly single, and yet any respect. The general vegetable life is something absolutely universal.

not simply the sum of the actual vegetaThese two forms of existence are oppo- tion that is going forward in the world. site, but not, of course, contradictory ; | It is before this in order of being, and can their opposition involves, on the contrary, never be fully represented by its growth ; the most intimate and necessary union. for in its nature it has no bounds, while The ideal is not the actual, and the actual this last is always necessarily finite, made is not, as such, the ideal ; separately con- up of a definite number of individual existsidered, each is the full negation of what | ences. Still it is nothing apart from these is affirmed in the other; and still they existences, which serve to unfold its presence and power; and which, in doing so, place apart from the second. The two and only in doing so, come also to be what forms of existence are not the same in they are in truth. The life of each par- themselves, but they are indissolubly ticular tree is thus at once the universal joined together, as constituent elements of vegetable life, in which all trees stand, and one and the same living fact, in the person the single manifestation to which this life of every man. has come in that particular case. Abstract All this belongs to our constitution, confrom it the invisible, ideal, universal force sidered simply as a part of the general or fact, which as a mere particular tree it system of nature. But man is more than is not, but which belongs to it only in nature, though organically one with it as the common with other trees, and you reduce basis of his being. His life roots itself in this its existence at once to a sheer nullity: sphere, only to ascend by means of it into an object absolutely single in the world, one that is higher. It becomes complete could never be anything more than a spec- at last, in the form of self-conscious, selftral prodigy for the senses. So also, if it active spirit. The general law of its existbe attempted to sunder the particular from ence, as regards the point here under conthe general. Vegetable life can have no sideration, remains the same; but with reality, save as it shows itself through par- this vast difference, that what was mere ticular plants and trees. The claims of blind necessity before, ruled by a force the particular here, are just as valid and beyond itself, is now required to become full, as the claims of the general. We the subject of free intelligence and will, have no right to push either aside, in order in such way as to be its own law. It is to make room for the other. The ideal or as though the constitution of the world general cannot subsist without the actual | were made to wake within itself to a clear or particular; and it is equally impossible apprehension of its own nature, and had for this last to subsist without the first. power at the same time to act forth its They can subsist both, only in and by each meaning by a purely spontaneous motion. other; and it is this mutual comprehension Reason and will are concerned in the moveand inbeing of the two precisely, which ment of the planet through its appointed gives life its proper realness and truth. orbit, in the growth of the plant, and in The real is not the actual as such, nor the the activity of the animal ; but in all these ideal as such, but the actual and ideal cases, they are exerted from abroad, and perfectly blended together, as the presence not from within the objects themselves. of the same fact.

The planet obeys a law, which acts upon it The same order holds in the sphere of irrespectively of all consent on its own humanity. Every man comprehends in part. So in the case of the plant: it himself a life, which is at once both single grows by a life which is comprehended in and general, the life of his own person, itself, but in the midst of all, it remains as separately considered, and the life at the dark as the stone that lies motionless by same time of the race to which he belongs. its side ; its life is the power still of a forHe is a man ; the universal conception of eign force, which it can neither apprehend · humanity enters into him, as it enters also nor control. The animal can feel, and is

into all other men; while he is, besides, this able also to move itself from place to place; or that man, as distinguished from all yet in all this, the darkness of nature conothers by his particular position in the tinues unsurmounted as before. The inhuman world. Here again, too, as before, / telligence which rules the animal is not its the relation between the general and the own; and it cannot be said to have any particular or single, is not one of outward inward possession whatever of the conconjunction simply; as though the man tents of its own life. This consummation were, in the first place, complete in and of of the world's meaning is reached at last, himself, and were then brought to stand in only in the mind of man, which becomes certain connections with other men, previ- thus, for this very reason, the microcosm ously complete in the same way. His or mirror, that reflects back upon the completeness as an individual involves of whole inferior creation its true, intelligible itself his comprehension in a life more gen- image. Here life is no longer blind and eral than his own. The first can have no unfree. The reason and will, by which it is actuated, are required to enter into it, universal reason in himself, accompanied fully, and to become, by means of it, in with such spontaneous assent to its authorsuch separate form, self-conscious and ity, is that precisely, in the case of any self-possessed. This is the idea of person human individual, which makes him to be ality, as distinguished from the conception at once rational and free. The person is of a simply individual existence in the form necessarily individual; but in becoming of nature. Man finds his proper being at personal, the individual life is itself made last, only in such life of the spirit.

to transcend its own limits, and maintains Personality, however, in this case, does its separate reality, only by merging itself not supersede the idea of individual nat- completely in the universal life which it is ural existence. On the contrary, it requires called to represent. this as its necessary ground and support. Personality and moral freedom are, The natural is the perpetual basis still of properly speaking, the same. By this last the intellectual and moral. The general we are to understand simply, the normal character of life, therefore, in the view of form of our general human life itself. As it which is before us at this time, is not such, it is nothing more nor less than the overthrown by this exaltation, as has been full combination of its opposite poles, in a already intimated, but is only advanced by free way. In the sphere of nature this it into higher and more significant force. union is necessary and inevitable ; in the It still continues to revolve as before, be- human spirit, it can be accomplished only tween the two opposite poles, which we by intelligent, spontaneous action, on the have found to enter into it from the start, part of the spirit itself. The individual and exhibits still to our contemplation the life in this form, with a full sense of its same dualistic aspect, resulting from the own individual nature, and with full power action of these forces, whose inseparable to cleave to this as a separate, independent conjunction at the same time forms its only interest, must yet, with clear conscioustrue and proper unity. It is still at once ness and full choice, receive into itself the actual and ideal, singular and universal ; general life to which it of right belongs, only now the union of these two forms of so as to be filled with it and ruled by it at existence is brought to be more perfect every point. Then we have a proper huand intimate than before, by the intense man existence. spiritual fusion to which all is subjected in Moral freedom then, the only liberty the great fact of consciousness.

that is truly entitled to the name, includes Consciousness is itself emphatically the in itself two elements or factors, which apprehension of the particular and single, need to be rightly understood, first, in in the presence of the universal. The two their separate character, and then in their forms of life flow together, in every act of relation to each other, in order that this thought or will. Personality is, by its idea itself may be rightly apprehended. It very conception, the power of a strictly is the single will moving with self-conuniversal life, revealing itself through an scious free activity in the orbit of the individual existence as its necessary medi- general will. The constituent powers by um. The universal is not simply in the which it comes to exist, are the sense of individual here blindly, as in the case of self on the one hand, and the sense of a the lower world, but knows itself, also, moral universe on the other, the sense of and has possession of itself, in this form ; | independence, and the sense of authority so far, at least, as the man has come to be or law. It is the perfect union of the sinactually what he is required to be by his gle and the universal, the subjective and own constitution. The perfection of his the objective, joined together as mutually nature is found just in this, that as an in- | necessary, though opposite, polar forces dividual, inseparably linked in this respect in the clear consciousness of the spirit. to the world of nature, from whose bosom | Let us direct our attention now, for a he springs, he shall yet recognize in him- / moment, separately to each of these great self the authority of reason, in its true constituents of freedom. universal character, and yield himself to it! Freedom supposes, in the first place, spontaneously as the proper form of his entire INDEPENDENCE on the part of its own being. Such clear recognition of the subject.

It can have no place accordingly, as we clear. The subject is not simply an indihave already seen, in the sphere of mere na- | vidual centre, but knows and seeks itself ture. God is free in upholding and carrying under this character. In such form first, forward the world, in this form, according it attains to what we call subjective indeto its appointed laws; but the world itself pendence. is not free. Its activity is for itself alto- By means of intelligence, the individual gether blind and necessary, accompanied self emerges out of the night of nature with no self-apprehension, and including | into the clear vision of its own existence, in itself no self-motion. It is actuated and is thus prepared to embrace itself as a throughout by a foreign force, with no separate living centre. It is no longer an possible alternative but to obey ; while yet object merely as before, acted upon from its obedience carries in itself no light or abroad, but is constituted a subject, in the love, no intelligence or will. Nature is strict sense of this term, having possession held in slavish bondage to its own law, of itself, and capable of self-action. as a power impressed upon it perpetually Mere intelligence, however, is not of from abroad, and in no sense the product itself independence. If a planet were enof its separate life. The earth rolls round dowed with the power of perceiving its the sun, the sap mounts upward in the own existence, without the least ability to tree, the dog pursues its game, with like modify it in the way of self-control, it is subordination to a force by which they plain that it would be just as little indeare continually mastered, without the least pendent as it is in its present state. Con power to master in return. Animal im- sciousness in absolute subjection to nature, pulse and instinct are no better here, than would be, indeed, a species of bondage, the plastic power that fashions the growth that might be said to be even worse than of the plant. There is individual existence | that of nature itself. And so if the intelin each case, included in the bosom of a ligence were ruled and actuated, not by general ideal life, and comprising action nature, but by some other intelligence in powerfully turned in upon itself; but there the like irresistible way, the result would is no independence: the subject of the be the same. No matter what the actuaction hangs always, with helpless neces- | ating force might be, if it were even the sity, on the action itself, and is borne | Divine will itself, which were thus intropassively along upon the vast objective duced into the conscious life of the indistream of the world's life, without concur vidual, so as to carry this along with overrence or resistance of its own.

whelming necessity in its own direction, It is only in the sphere of self-conscious the subject thus wrought upon from spirit, then, that individual independence abroad, without the power of self-impulse, becomes possible. Hence it involves two could not be regarded as having the least things, the light of intelligence and the independence. The case calls for somepower of choice. Both of these, in their thing more than mere intelligence. To very nature, refer to an individual centre, this must be joined also the power of or self, from which their activity is made choice. to radiate, and towards which, again, it is The supposition, indeed, which has just found continually to return. All knowl been made, is in its own nature impossible. edge begins and stands perpetually in the Reason and will necessarily involve each consciousness of self; and every act of the other; and the light of intelligence, therewill may be denominated, at the same fore, can never be sundered in fact, (but time, an act of self-apprehension.

only hypothetically,) from the motion of It belongs to the conception of indi- choice. Self-consciousness is itself always vidual life universally, that it should be in self-action. itself a centre of the manifold activities by Individual independence, we say, rewhich it makes itself known. In the quires the power of choice ; that the selfsphere of nature, this relation holds in the conscious subject shall not be moved simform only of a blind plastic law, or at least ply from abroad, but have the capacity of in the form of an equally blind instinct. moving itself, as though it were the origiIn the sphere of consciousness, which is nal fountain of its own action. If the will above nature, it is no longer blind, but | be itself bound by a force which is foreign

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