and support, the strongest that words could be found to give utterance to, were tendered him by the President. It was his own plan of conducting the war, just as he had propounded it, that was adopted, or professed to be, with unreserved and hearty approval. And he was himself to command in the campaign, with which the Executive Government at Washington was to have little else to do, than take care that every requisition made by him for the enterprise, whether of force, or of supplies, of whatever kind, should be, as far as possible, promptly and faithfully furnished. This was the voluntary and solemn engagement of the President and Secretary of War. In the written orders with which he was furnished, scarcely exceeding half a dozen lines, he was told :

"It is not proposed to control your operations by definite and positive instructions, but you are left to prosecute them as your judgment, under a full view of all the circumstances, shall dictate. The work is before you, and the means provided, or to be provided, for accomplishing it. It is committed to you in the full confidence that you will use them to the best advantage."

It was in the full confidence, and with the buoyant hopes, inspired by treatment and assurances apparently so full of generosity, undoubting trust and implicit reliance, that General Scott took the field in command of an expedition, first for the prompt reduction of the city of Vera Cruz, and the strong Fortress of St. John, and then for a victorious march upon the Mexican Capital. And who now could be made to believe, but for facts too flagrant and notorious for contradiction or dispute, that at the very moment of dismissing General Scott to his command, with all these protestations and promises of implicit confidence and full and vigorous support, the President had asked for, and received, from another source, and had actually approved and adopted, another plan of military operations in Mexico, in some material respects different from, inconsistent with, and opposed to that of General Scott; and was then actually under promise and engagement to the individual from whom this plan emanated, a citizen in civil life, to give him the command in Mexico, over General Scott, and all others, by making

soon as the assent of Congress, then about to meet, could be obtained! The settled purpose and the perfect good faith with which this engagement was made, are shown in the fact of the open and strenuous efforts made by the President, and his partisans and friends, through the whole ensuing session of three months, to push a measure through Congress, by which he should be enabled to carry his undertaking into effect. A more bold and shameless game of deception, falsehood and purposed treachery, than this towards General Scott, was never played, by any man, or set of men, in any government, however corrupt, degraded and debased, on the face of the globe.

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But we must not leave this matter to rest in generalities. We must come to particulars. The war policy of the Executive Government was especially vacillating and uncertain along in the autumn of 1846. They did not know what to do. They settled and unsettled plans in quick succession. Even their projected expedition to Vera Cruz with 4,000 men, was not a fixed purpose. The order to General Taylor, of the 22d October, was to hold the 4,000 men ready to embark for Vera Cruz, or such other destination as may be given them." And it is quite certain that after that, for a period, the conclusion was to stand still and do nothing. A writer, known to speak by the book, wrote from Washington to the New York Journal of Commerce, on the 7th of November:— "There will be no expensive movements -no energetic movements-made before the meeting of Congress. *** The whole responsibility of further action will be thrown upon Congress." And so late as the 11th of November, the Secretary of War answered an application from a gentleman in Kentucky, who proposed to raise a company of volunteers for a reduced regiment then in Mexico, by saying," It is not contemplated to fill up the regiments that have been reduced. The amount of force already in service is deemed sufficient for the prosecution of the war."

But, somehow, a sudden change came over these gentlemen; for on the 16th of November, only five days after the Secretary's letter to Kentucky, an order and requisition was issued by him for nine ad

Thus strictly and earnestly did the President adhere to his engagements with Mr. Benton, and to his plan for conducting the war in Mexico. Nor did his efforts stop here. The Bill for the appointment of new Major-generals was passed, and Mr. Benton was promptly appointed a Majorgeneral, and a commission tendered to him. A serious design was entertained of finding in existing laws, or pretending to find, or of assuming, authority in the President, to assign Mr. Benton to the command over General Scott, and all others in Mexico, in spite of the refusal of Congress to sanction such a proceeding. Mr. Benton signified to the President, in a note, with characteristic modesty, that his acceptance of his commission would depend on the question, whether he should have "the command of the army, and authority to sign preliminaries of peace." And to this the President, on the 9th of March, replied:"Immediately after your nomination as Major-general had been confirmed by the Senate, I carefully examined the question, whether I possessed the power to designate you-a junior Major-general-to the chief command of the army in the field. The result of this examination is, I am constrained to say, a settled conviction in my mind, that such power has not been conferred upon me by existing laws."

Never was a scheme of treachery more pertinaciously prosecuted than this of the President's towards General Scott. And it was a scheme of treachery and bad faith which, in active and labored efforts to consummate it, covered the whole period of time from the 18th of November, when he informed him that he might prepare for the field, down to the 9th day of March, when he was actually engaged in disembarking his troops for the attack on Vera Cruz. Nor, though the particular scheme of treachery finally fell through on the latter day, did the disposition and will of the Executive Government, to wound, insult, neglect, disappoint, and betray General Scott, ever desert them, through his whole

That this scheme of treachery-the design to supersede General Scott, both in his command and in his plan of campaignexisted in the beginning, when he was first ordered to take the field and his plan pretended to be approved and adopted, and every protestation made of confidence and support, admits of no doubt from the testimony of Mr. Benton, and the dates he gives us. He was in Washington early in November; his first interview with the President on the subject of his plans, was the day after his arrival—not later, certainly, than the 10th; and so taking were they, that no time was required for deliberation. They were approved and adopted, and he was to be made a Lieutenant-general, to carry them into execution.

And here the question presents itself,Why was General Scott dispatched to the field, as if for the prosecution of another and a different plan of his own, if the purpose all the time was to supersede him and his plan, by Mr. Benton and his plan, as soon as the necessary authority could be obtained? To our mind, the answer is not difficult. Mr. Benton's plan, it is manifest, contemplated an invasion of Mexico, at some point on the Gulf coast, and a march upon the Capital, as General Scott's did, though by way of being original, he would leave "the idle and solitary Castle of San Juan of Ulloa" standing unconquered in his van! He would require much the same force in the field that General Scott required, for a movement towards the Capital. It would probably, however, be late in the winter, or the time might run quite into the spring, before the President could obtain the necessary authority for sending him to the field, and it was quite important that as much of the force required by him, as could be collected in the mean time, should be on the spot, organized and dis

ciplined for his use. General Scott was as good a man as any-perhaps the best of any-to be his locum tenens, and his Messenger, to prepare the way for his coming. Meanwhile, General Scott's independent design of reducing Vera Cruz and the Castle of St. John, whether only attempted or actually accomplished, would in no way materially interfere with his, Mr. Benton's, more original plan of operations. If the thing were done, very well-though he would not do it; and if not done, it would be just as well, since he would cut across lots, in some inexplicable way, for the Capital. All he wanted was to have his force, as much of it as might be, at some point on the coast nearest the capital, at as early a day as possible. He flattered himself -so he plainly intimated in his speechthat when he should take the field and the command, it would be quite agreeable to General Scott, being only a Major-general while he would be a Lieutenant, to remain under his orders as a "fighting General!" It will be observed, moreover, that by sending General Scott to the field, the Executive Government secured to itself an alternative plan, and an alternative Commander-in-chief, in case the scheme of superseding him in the command should unluckily turn out a failure. In this connection, too, it is as well to say that it is easy enough now to see, why it was not considered of any particular importance at Washington, along during the winter, and so long as the prospect lasted of sending Mr. Benton to Mexico, whether Vera Cruz and the Castle of San Juan should be taken or not. It was not in his programme. And this, much better than the Secretary of War does in his letter of the 21st of April, accounts for the neglect and failure of the Department to furnish General Scott with the supplies for this work which had been promised him-why ten large transport ships from the north were not sent to him, why he received only half the number of surf boats required, and why, at the signing of the capitulation of the City and Castle, only about one fifth of the siege train, stipulated for, had arrived!

The exposition we have now made of the real relation-so false, hollow and heartless-in which the Executive Government stood towards General Scott and his

VOL. I. NO. VI. NEW SERIES.

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plan of operations in Mexico, is sufficient to enable us and our readers, we trust— to put at its true value the estimation in which we ought to hold the Secretary's Letter of the 21st of April, and his statements of facts and materials used both in defence and in crimination; and especially, to enable us to estimate truly the language of injured innocence, in which he has so freely indulged. Hear how the Secretary of War talks-as if he were an Israelite indeed, without guile!

"In conclusion, I may be permitted to say, that, as one of the President's advisers, I had a full share in the responsibility of the act, which assigned you to the command of our armies in Mexico. I felt interested, even more than naturally appertained to my official position, that rations. It was my duty to bring to your aid success and glory should signalize your opethe efficient co-operation of the War Department. I never had a feeling that did not harmonize with the full and fair discharge of this duty. I know it has been faithfully performed. be done to make them grateful, or even just, There are some men, for whom enough cannot unless acts of subserviency and personal devotedness are superadded. From you I expected bare justice, but have been disappointed. I have found you iny accuser."

Now, in the face of this doleful strain of complaint, and show of suffering virtue, there is likely, we think, to be found dwelling in the public mind, and finding a voice, too, in public speech, certain significant, and it may be awkward queries, which it were well, perhaps, if the Secretary would prepare himself to answer, that is to say, if he expects to gain much credit for his Popular Appeal against General Scott beyond that of having the ability to maintain a desperate cause with desperate and reckless cunning and ingenuity. What has the Secretary to say to a few plain questions. of this sort?

Were you cognizant of the underplot, laid and matured before General Scott was sent to the field, by which he was to be superseded in command, and in his plan of operations, by the appointment of Mr. Benton as Lieutenant-general? Did

you

abet and aid in that plot? Did you use your efforts and influence with Congress to procure its assent to this notable project? When you were taking your "full share" in having General Scott as

signed to the command in Mexico, and were feeling so "interested" for his "success and glory," did you know that it was intended, and did you intend, that he should be superseded at the earliest day possible? Did General Scott understand from you explicitly, that he was sent to Mexico in good faith, to execute, at his own discretion, his own plan of reducing Vera Cruz and San Juan d'Ulloa, and then marching on the Mexican capital? If so, was there at the time, a syllable of honest truth in the assurances thus given him? If Mr. Benton's plan was preferred by you, who proposed to let "the idle and solitary Castle of San Juan of Ulloa" alone, were you then particularly "interested to have General Scott reduce it? How, in this particular, did your feelings "harmonize with the full and fair discharge of your duty" to General Scott? If General Scott wanted certain large transport vessels from the north, and wanted one hundred and forty surf boats, and a large siege train, when Mr. Benton did not want any of them, and you preferred Mr. Benton's plan of operations to General Scott's, how did it "harmonize with the full and fair discharge of your duty" to General Scott, to furnish him with these useless supplies? Did you inform General Scott, in any way, or at any time, of the plot, or design, to supersede him in the command? Was it honest to send him off in ignorance of it? If this design, known to you at the time, did not command your approval, did it ever occur to you to express, or feel, any indignation at being made the chief instrument in playing off so gross a cheat, such a piece of dastardly treachery, on General Scott-in whose success and glory" you were so deeply "interested?" Did you remonstrate-did you threaten to throw up your office?

We think, when the Secretary shall have answered these significant questions, and some others like them, which will be found in the mind of every intelligent person who understands the facts of the case, and shall have answered them satisfactorily, that it will be quite time enough then for him to expect to be heard with favor, or even with patience, by an enlightened country, either in an attempted vindication of the conduct of the Executive Government towards General Scott, as the Com

mander of our forces in the field, or in bringing criminating or scandalous charges against the military conduct and operations of that eminent soldier.

Our remaining space does not allow us to notice, as we could wish to do, the Secretary's manifesto of the 21st of April. From the opening paragraph in it, to the closing sentence, facts are either misstated, misapplied, or perverted; false imputations are made, false premises laid down, and false inferences drawn. All the materials for a full exposition of this extraordinary paper, though well known to the Secretary, are not yet at our command. In the mean time, little more can be necessary, than to let that document be read in the light of the plain relation of facts which we have now laid before our readers. Only let it be remembered that General Scott was sent to Mexico, with a scheme already laid and matured, by the Executive Government, for betraying and superseding him; and "the neglects, the disappointments, injuries and rebukes," charged to have been inflicted on him, will be seen to be only the natural and necessary sequents of that original policy of imposition and fraud. It is not our purpose-and we are sure it was never General Scott's-to hold the War Department responsible for any failures merely accidental or unavoidable. Such must always occur. Only let the Department show what failures did occur in this way.

The Executive Government did not desire or mean to furnish General Scott, or allow him to supply himself, with a chief of staff in the department of Orders and Correspondence, such as he asked for and was entitled to have, and who should be at once an accomplished officer, a confidential friend, and a practiced writer. They preferred to compel him, as far as they could, to write everything himself, amidst the distractions of his campaign, and thus take the chance of catching him on the hip with some "hasty" letter. Here is the true reason, petty and contemptible as it may seem, why they refused to give him an Assistant Adjutantgeneral-whether major or captain-as he had asked them to do. They refused him such an officer, though there was a vacancy-unless he would take one of their choice, and not of his own. Taylor