child's share so if there be one child the husband gets a half and the child a half, etc. If any child dies leaving issue the issue takes the parents share (per stirpes).

136. Whole Blood and Half Blood.

Relationship by the whole blood is where two persons are descended from the same pair of ancestors as where two persons have the same grandfather and same grandmother. Relationship by the half blood is where two or more persons have only one common ancestor; as where they are descended from the same grandfather, but from different grandmothers.

By the intestate act of Pennsylvania (See Section 5, page 174) collateral heirs who are of the half blood are postponed until all of the whole blood are extinguished. But observe this distinction as to whole and half blood exists only as to real estate and not as to personal property.

137. Advancements.

The intestate laws provide "that if any child of an intestate shall have any estate by settlement of such intestate, or shall have been advanced by him in his life time, either in real or personal estate, to the amount or value equal to the share which shall be allotted to each of the other children of such intestate, such child shall have no share of the real or personal estate of such intestate" (Act of April 8, 1833, Sec. 16, P. L. 315 (Sec. 18, Par. 134 supra). The intention of the act is plainly that all children should share equally. Thus advances made to children bar them from participating in the estate to the amount of the advancement received. An advancement is an irrevocable gift by a parent to a child of the whole or part of what it is supposed the child will be entitled to on the death of the parent, who afterwards died intestate (Eshleman's Appeal, 74 Pa. 42). But to make a gift an advancement it must have been intended (Dare's Estate, 9 D. R. 431).

as such when made

188. Recital of Deed of One Inheriting by Descent.

When the owner of real estate dies the record at the recorder of deeds office still shows title in the decedent's name because the heir gains title not by virtue of deed, but by mere operation of law. When therefore the heir conveys the land he should show by deed how he gained title in order to fill up the gap existing on

the record between his grantee and his ancestor. This is done by the recital. The following is a form of recital to be inserted in a deed drawn for a conveyance from a grantor who has derived his title by operation of the intestate laws:

BEING the same premises which Adam Smith by Indenture bearing date the 23rd day of February, 1896 and recorded in the Office for the Recording of Deeds in and for the City and County of Philadelphia in Deed Book J. V. No. 23, Page 322, &c., granted and conveyed to Samuel Moore in fee.

AND the said Samuel Moore being seised of said premises departed this life intestate on the Fifteenth day of September, A. D. 1912, leaving surviving him as sole heir Robert Moore to whom said premises decended in fee.

This estate has already been defined (See Par. 3). It is the right of the husband to enjoy a life estate in all his wife's real estate at her death. At common law the husband was not entitled to his curtesy unless there was a child born of the marriage, but this condition as well as others stipulated by the common law are no longer in force in Pennsylvania, so that the present day estate by curtesy is somewhat different from the common law estate. By marriage alone, whether a child be born thereof or not, the husband becomes vested in his estate by curtesy, which becomes consummate upon his wife's death (Act of April 11, 1848, P. L. 536, Sec. 10; see also Act of May 4, 1855, P. L. 430). His interest is an absolute one and can only be divested once it vests by his own acts. It subsists and follows such land which his wife may have conveyed without his joining in the deed. While the estate vests the moment of marriage, enjoyment thereof is postponed until the death of the wife. Nor since the Act of 1850 (Act of April 22, 1850, Sec. 20, P. L. 553) can the creditors of the husband levy upon and sell this interest during the lifetime of the wife. Nor is a judgment against the husband during the life of the wife a lien against his curtesy (Act of April 1, 1863, Sec. 1, P. L. 212).

140. Against What Land Curtesy Attaches.

In general it may be stated that a husband's right of curtesy attaches to all land to which his wife has title at time of marriage or to which she acquires title thereafter, whether by deed, descent, will or otherwise. There is, however, this exception, such land as may be expressly devised to her by will or conveyed by deed of trust wherein the instrument stipulates that the land is to be for her sole and separate use, free from control of her husband and specifically shows the intent of the testator or grantor, that the husband's right of curtesy should be barred.

141. How Curtesy May be Barred.

The husband's estate of curtesy is absolute and exists unless barred by the husband's own acts in any of the following methods.

(a.) By Voluntary Joinder in a Deed of Conveyance.-Should the husband join in his wife's deed to convey away her land his curtesy is barred. Mere consent given by husband to his wife to sell does not bar him; he must join in the deed. If he, however, signs the agreement of sale with his wife he can be compelled to sign the deed.

(b.) By Divorce A. V. M.-Divorces are of two kinds: a vinculo matrimoni, usually abbreviated A. V. M., which means literally from the bonds of matrimony. It is the so-called absolute divorce and entitles both parties to re-marry. The other is a mensa et thoro, meaning literally from bed and board, which is really in effect a legal separation and does not entitle either party to re-marry. The former, viz: the absolute divorce, bars the husband's curtesy, the latter does not (Schock's Appeal, 33 Pa. 351).

(c.) Desertion and Non-support by Husband.-Under the Act of May 4, 1855 (P. L. 430), a husband who has for a period of one year or upwards before his wife's death wilfully neglected or refused to support her or for that period or upward wilfully and maliciously deserted her shall have no claim to her real or personal estate after her decease, whether by the curtesy or under the intestate laws of Pennsylvania. The burden is on the husband who has left his wife, to justify his desertion and to do so he must show such cause as would have entitled him to a decree of divorce A. V. M. against her (Hahn v. Bealor, 132 Pa. 242; Weller v. Weller, 213 Pa. 265).

(d.) By Voluntary Agreement or Release.-A husband may agree in writing either before marriage or thereafter to forego all claims of curtesy against his wife's estate. Such agreement when properly executed is valid and bars his curtesy (McBride's Estate, 81 Pa. 303; Singer's Estate, 233 Pa. 55).

(e.) By Sheriff's Sale.-A sheriff's sale of the wife's real estate on a judgment confessed by or obtained against her bars the husband's curtesy (Wells v. Bunnell, 160 Pa. 460). But if the judgment is collusive or a mere fraudulent scheme to deprive either husband or wife of their interests it will be set aside (Waterhouse v. Waterhouse, 206 Pa. 433).

By dower we mean a life estate which the law gives to the widow in a third of land and tenements of her husband of which he was seised at any time during the marriage. This also is an old common law estate that still survives, although it, like curtesy, has been changed in many respects. Common law dower is taken away in all cases where the husband dies intestate, seised of lands and in its place a statutory provision consisting partly of real and partly of personal estate is given to the widow by the intestate laws (See Act of April 8, 1833, P. L. 249, Sec. 11, and amendment thereto by act of 1909 [supra]). By this provision, as is set forth before (Par. 134, Sec. 1, Clause 1-2-3), the widow, if there be children, is given one-third of personal property absolutely and one-third of the real estate for life. If no children, the widow is given $5,000.00 absolutely out of real or personal property or out of both together, with one-half of the remaining personal property absolutely and one-half of the remaining real estate for life. This provision the law specifically says shall be in lieu of a dower (See Par. 134, Sec. 17).

143. Common Law Dower Still Exists During Husband's Life. It should be remembered that the statute in Pennsylvania does not abolish dower, but makes the provision above referred to in lieu of dower. Now, as the wife only becomes entitled to that provision upon her husband's death, it follows that the interest which she holds during his lifetime is still the old common

law dower of one-third. But upon his death she receives by statute the provision above referred to in lieu thereof. Suppose, therefore, a husband conveys land without his wife joining in the deed; the grantee takes title to the land subject to the dower right of the wife. Upon the husband's death she can bring her action against the grantee or any subsequent holder of the land to recover her common law dower right. This is the sole instance in which it can be said common law dower still exists in Pennsylvania.

144. When the Dower Right of Wife Vests.

Just as in the case of tenant by curtesy the dower right of a wife vests from the instant of marriage. From that time on she has a one-third interest in the husband's land or such as he may acquire thereafter; an interest which can only be released by one of the methods set out in the next paragraph.

145. How Dower May be Barred.

Dower may be barred or forfeited by various acts of a wife just as we have seen a husband's curtesy may be barred. These methods are:

(a.) By Voluntary Joinder in a Deed of Husband.-If the wife joins in a husband's deed of conveyance she thereby is held to have signed away or relinquished her dower rights. Mere consent to the transaction does not bar her rights unless she actually signs or agrees to do so by signing the agreement of sale.

(b.) Divorce A. V. M.-A divorce A. V. M. (See Par. 141 b), i. e., an absolute divorce, also bars her right (Richardson's Estate, 132 Pa. 375; Miltimore v. Miltimore, 40 Pa. 151). But not a mere separation or even desertion (see c. f., infra).

(c.) Elopement and Adultery of the Wife.-Should the wife elope from the husband and commit adultery her dower rights are barred (Lewis v. Parrott, 37 W. N. C. 330). Though if the husband deserts her first her subsequent adultery will not bar her dower (Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. 308). Mere desertion by wife does not bar dower nor will mere adultery bar dower, both must combine (Helsop v. Helsop, 82 Pa. 537).

(d.) Devise in Lieu of Dower.-Where a husband devises a portion of his property by will to his widow and she accepts said provision of the will, it is presumed to be in lieu of dower.