if it does not throw light upon the question as to who is the real enemy to the reformed administration of the provinces. Between impracticable views as to the sacredness of Ottoman sovereignty and its immunity from direct limitation on the one hand, and Russian views of military occupation on the other, there is a wide field for contending negotiators to traverse before they discover ground which all may agree to occupy. But at any rate it ought to be clearly ascertained in which direction each Government is designedly travelling. Up to the present time there are at least many reasons for concluding that Russia has not been bonâ fide seeking a pacific solution of these difficulties. The Porte may have seemed impracticable; but its general disposition to yield to the will of Europe, and particularly of Great Britain, has been clearly marked; while its recalcitrant movements have generally been explicable by reference to the foregone determination of its opponents to reject proposed arrangements, and the natural desire of a sovereign to avoid unnecessary humilation in dealing with refractory subjects, encouraged and supported by foreign aid. At the last moment, however, after Lord Salisbury has started, there comes a despatch from Prince Gortschakoff, and another from Lord A. Loftus, which, if the representations made therein may be literally construed, would seem to assure the conclusion of peace. At all events it is a satisfactory sign, not merely that the Emperor Alexander, whose past history and pacific disposition deserve well of this country, is willing to make such assurances, but that he is anxious to publish them to the world. We shall see to what extent they may be relied upon when the Conference begins its work. As a leading member of the Ottoman Cabinet is said to have phrased it, Turkey will give guarantees for the execution of these reforms: do not place us in a position of requiring guarantees in our turn against those who will watch over and supervise that execution. Prince Gortschakoff says that the Cabinet of St Petersburg can be satisfied no longer with promises; nor, we may add, can the English people. The wastepaper currency of reform promises will no longer be tolerated; but the question of providing guarantees will throw light upon the sincerity of Russia's demand upon the concert of the six Powers for a pacific solution. Let Russia show clearly when she gets into Conference that these guarantees are not to be made the pretext for encroachment, and Europe will gladly accept the Czar's assurances to Lord A. Loftus that he desires no conquest and aims at no aggrandisement. Until then it must be remembered that the imperial protestations as to the illusions and phantoms concerning Peter the Great's will and Catherine's aims, the misfortune to Russia of acquiring Constantinople, the inveterate suspicion of Russian policy, and the continual fear of Russian aggression and conquest, were combined with a very decided hint that necessity might oblige him to occupy Bulgaria. Lord Derby received with the greatest satisfaction the Emperor's assurance that he desired co-operation with England, and had no views on Constantinople,. or of conquest. But while acceding to the imperial desire that such assurances should be made public, he added with a touch of appropriate sarcasm, "I thought its publication might be opportune, since the last few days had brought us the intelligence of the mobilisation of a considerable Russian force, and of the emission of the new Russian loan for 100 million of roubles." Under these circumstances, the duties of Lord Salisbury at the approaching Conference weight him with the heaviest responsibility, and he ought to be supported by the people of England. What we all of us want is either the establishment of a durable pacification, or the settlement of a broad and intelligible issue, the merits of which all may appreWe hope it will be clearly understood who is responsible for repressing a peaceful solution, what are the grounds on which war is appealed to, and the reasons for the particular attitude which may be assumed by Great Britain. If Turkey puts herself hopelessly in the wrong, and refuses adequate concessions, she must look to herself and her own capacity for guarding her empire and her territory. If, on the other hand, the treaty of Paris is to be set at nought, and a war of encroachment is begun, we must come to a clear understanding with the guaranteeing Powers as to the course to be taken. England will not, we are convinced, shrink from her treaty obligations and her duties as the champion of Ottoman independence. But at the same time, her interests, as Mr Disraeli observed in 1875, are not so direct as those of other Powers. They are substantial interests which she cannot afford to neglect. If the issue of the negotiations at Constantinople is that war is the immediate result, it is in vain to speculate beforehand as to the duties of England, or the line which she will be bound to take. That depends, in the first place, upon the casus belli which is chosen, and the attitude of the rest of Europe with regard to it. If, unfortunately, that scramble for territory begins which all have deprecated, and a regard for public law and treaties is openly set at nought by Europe, it will be in vain to persuade Englishmen that Constantinople, the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, and the means of access to the Black Sea, are to be allowed to fall beneath the sway of a hostile and unprincipled Power. It is sometimes argued in Opposition newspapers by the political successors of the men who risked the fortunes of this country before the walls of Sebastopol, that we may abandon Constantinople to its fate. The authors of the Crimean expedition were men who believed that the English empire was scarcely safe unless that distant fortress was destroyed; for unless Russian encroachment were stayed, the Mediterranean would be converted into a Russian lake. Their successors now tell us, in their desperate straits for a weapon wherewith to assault the foreign policy of the Government, that even Constantinople itself is not worth a blow; and that we, who in the interval have abandoned Corfu and other harbours of importance, can safely permit the capital of the East to pass into the hands of an enemy. The fatal result, as it appears to us, would be, that a commanding position would be attained by Russia from which she could securely plan, and at her own time and option execute, an assault upon our Eastern communications, whether by the invasion of Egypt or a harassing naval warfare in the Mediterranean. We should have to secure the defence of Egypt; we should have to double the expenditure on our navy; and even then we should have to deal with an enemy who would have a secure base of operations, and an excellent harbour of refuge. It has been the unbroken policy of England ever since she obtained her Indian em pire to secure her safety in the east of the Mediterranean. The purchase of the Suez Canal shares owed all its popularity to the fact that the whole country, with a true instinct, regarded it as a resolute as sertion of British interests in that quarter of the globe. Mr Gladstone argued that they were valueless, and might be divided amongst the members of the Cabinet in acknowledgment of their services in buying them. And doubtless there are many Liberals who would readily contend that Constantinople might belong to Russia and Gibraltar be ceded to Spain. But before they will ever obtain a hearing from the vast majority of their countrymen, or induce the inaction of their country, whilst Constantinople is menaced, they must first ask some military or naval authority of eminence to pledge his professional reputation before the world, that in his opinion the possession of that city by a hostile Power would have no strategic importance whatever. Until then it is in vain to question the settled determination of the English people to struggle, with the utmost energy of which they are capable, in order that a stronghold of such enormous importance should not pass from the hands of a friend ly and neutral Power. It is of vital importance to us that it should not pass into the hands of others, least of all into those of Russia. By all means let it remain where it is as long as possible, and then, if no international occupation be possible, Great Britain must hold it totis viribus. We at least might be trusted to maintain the freedom of the Straits, and our only interest is to render the Mediterranean secure. It is, however, premature for the present to raise this controversy: if ever it becomes a subject of immediate practical interest, the great mass of Englishmen will be unanimous upon it. Meanwhile, although the overwhelming interest which England takes in the Eastern Question is due to considerations of this kind, they are happily too remote to affect her impartiality in the discussion of the existing differences. generally recognised by Europe-by all, in fact, except a few discontented Opposition organs-that her Majesty's Government have no interest at present in Turkey except that peace should be secured; and as a chief means to that end, that the better government of its subject populations should be effectively guaranteed. It is INDEX TO VOL. CXX. Addison, generosity of Swift to, 523. 168. ALFRED DE MUSSET, see Musset. Antigone, analogies between, and Romeo ARMY, MOBILISATION OF THE, and na- ARMY PROMOTION AND RETIREMENT, 601. Austria and the Eastern question, 87 et Baden, the suppression of gaming at, Bad-Gastein, the village, &c., of, 347. Barlow's Columbiad, 25. Bürstadt, the village of, 685. Beaconsfield, Lord, his speech on the Bul- Berlin Note on the Eastern question, the, Bishops, the, the Prince Consort on their Bismarck, Prince, review of his career, Bolingbroke, Swift's friendship for, 535, Bombay, residence in, its climate, &c., Bright, Mr, deputation on the Eastern Brougham, hostility of Macaulay to, 524. Búdhist remains in Júnághar, 400. Bullock-gárhí, travelling by, in India, 197. CALDERON'S TRAGEDIES OF JEALOUSY, Calderon's Tragedies, differences between Camel, the wild, in Thibet, 706. Channel Islands, a yacht visit to the, Chartist meeting of 1848, the, 614. Cherbourg breakwater, dockyard, &c., 162. CHILDHOOD, PAGES FROM THE STORY OF China, sketches in, 691-the great wall Christopher North, papers, &c., of, on Clytemnestra and Lady Macbeth, analo- Colebrooke, Sir Edward, the attack on, in Colquhoun, the works of, on sporting, Coltness Collection, extracts from, on CONFERENCE AT CONSTANTINOPLE, THE, Continent, country life in, as compared Dalai-nor, the lake of, 692. Delany, Dr, his character of Swift, 536. DEVIOUS RAMBLES WITH A DEFINITE Dissenters, Swift on the, 532. Dooly travelling in Kathiawar, 578. Dungans or Tungans, the, 702. Dutch and Swiss, resemblances between EAST, THE PROSPECTS IN THE, 245—pre- Edinburgh Review, Macaulay's contribu- Education Bill, the, 385 et seq. Egyptian finance, recent history of, 303. England, position assumed by, on the English squire, life of the, 501. Erskine, W., on the origin of the Kathis, 405. Europe, position of the great Powers as Foreign stocks as investments, 301. France, present exhaustion of, 281- FRIEND OF THE HERO, THE, 417. Gambling, great increase of, on the Stock Gastein, scenery, &c., of, 346. Germans, differences between them and Germany, position, &c., of, as to the of the Strathmore by, 320, 339. - Gobi, the desert of, 690, 700. Granville, Lord, on the Eastern question, Greece, position of, as regards the Eastern GREEK GIRL, a, 600. Greek Tragedies, analogies between the, Hardy, Mr, his army administration, 385. Head's 'Bubbles from the Brunnens of Henderson, Mr and Miss, passengers by Herzegovina, position of the Powers to- Highland proprietor, life, &c., of a, 495. |