THERE probably never was in the history of Europe a scene of more hopeless entanglement than that which Turkish affairs present. The interminable writing which it occasions appears to us unmeaning and bewildered. No one seems to have definite ideas on the subject, or to have a definite conclusion in view. All who either act or write in reference to it seem to be at cross purposes, and no one seems to maintain any marked consistency of view, as if any object was present to his mind which he dared to avow. A knot which no one can untie and no one dares to cut is placed before diplomatists and journalists. It has dangled before their eyes for nearly twelve months. No one knows, or at least no one says, what it is that he wants. All appear to be actuated by the most earnest desire for the pacification of a handful of armed insurgents. There are three or four millions of regular troops at the command of those interested in the subject; splendid fleets hover in the neighbourhood; the three great Northern Powers have been harmoniously concerting their measures; the Porte has promised everything they have yet asked; we ourselves pursue, and intend to pursue, a policy of precaution; and the insurgents remain in statu quo. All of a sudden the three Northern Emperors and their Chancellors meet; a Note is drawn up which is not made public, which is not even presented to its intended recipient; and then the whole scene changes. Everybody appears to have been the cat's-paw of everybody else; the Sultan is hurled from his throne; the triple alliance is dissolved. The insurgents and their grievances are forgotten: Eu

rope is interested in a totally different spectacle,-namely, Russian intrigue foiled by English firmness. England exults with the sympathy of all Europe at her own unwonted ascendancy; and the Eastern question, or at least the relations of the Turkish Government to the insurgents, remain where they were twelve months ago. Apparently all that Europe cares for is the pacification of the disturbed provinces, the avoidance of a serious war. That negative result will probably be attained, but the causes of dispute will remain as before. No progress is made, or is likely to be made, towards a settlement of these ever-recurring difficulties. The consideration of them will probably be adjourned sine die, and that is the sum total of what modern statesmanship can achieve.

The latest indications of events point in that direction. It must be admitted that England has taken a leading part in bringing about that purely negative result-a result which can give no permanent satisfaction to any one who, in the interests of future European peace, or of the unhappy subjects of the Turkish Government, wishes to see some progress made towards a final solution of those difficulties. It cannot, however, be said to be the fault of the English Government. Throughout those negotiations and transactions, it has been universally conceded that the initiative does not rest with us. All that England could pretend to undertake was to give a moral support to any bona fide attempts to redress bonâ fide grievances, and at the same time to take every precaution that no advantage should be taken of the disturbed condition of the

northern provinces in order to promote the injurious aggrandisement of any one Power in a manner hostile to our own interests. The policy of the triple alliance was ostensibly benevolent and philanthropic; the English policy is represented by its detractors as wearing the appearance of a cold and calculating spirit of self-protection and indifference to the suffering and permanent depression of a degraded population. But the public opinion of Europe has not been deceived by outward appearances. It has almost unanimously recognised in the English Government the faithful champion of peace and order, the arbiter to whose disinterested judgment the policy of the three Powers had to be submitted, and by whose conclusive award it was at length practically adjudged to be wanting in sincerity and singleness of purpose. England has held, as it always can hold, if its power is wielded by men of courage and capacity, the casting vote in the councils of Europe. Public opinion on the Continent has sanctioned and applauded the decision which it gave; and if the result is that no visible progress has been made in solving the ever-recurring difficulty of Turkish Government, the failure must lie at the door of the three Powers, whose ill-advised efforts have shown that their councils were dominated by a sinister intention.

In the view which we take of this matter no war is imminent; but the imposing ceremonial of three great military Powers meeting in solemn conclave to concert measures for pacifying a few insurgents will henceforth be discontinued. The triple alliance is at an end, dissolved by mutual suspicions; and Russia is not prepared forcibly to carry out any aggressive schemes. The dissolution of the alliance has

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happened unexpectedly, and is due to a wide divergence of interests. The Berlin Note was accepted hurriedly, and apparently without time for consultation. It seemed involve not so much the supersession of Turkish authority-that is, of the personal rule of the late Sultan, which no one was anxious to uphold-but the substitution in its place of a virtual Muscovite supremacy which no single Power in Europe, not even the cosignatories of the Note, was prepared to acquiesce in. England met this diplomatic move with a direct dissent, followed by an imposing demonstration of naval force. Had the same firmness been manifested three-and-twenty years ago, when Russia first displayed a decided spirit of aggression, the whole world now believes that the Crimean war might have been spared. The spirit of Lord Aberdeen no longer dominates in the councils of the Queen, and Europe immediately ranged itself on the side of the British Ministry. Turkey itself replied to the menace by a timely coup d'état, and the apologists of Turkish misrule have discovered that insanity alone can account for the policy or machinations which they defend.

The important Berlin Note, the dethronement of the Sultan, and the altered attitude of England, have succeeded in giving a wholly new aspect to the question. We have never regarded war as probable, partly from the known character of the chief actors in the scene, and especially the known moderation of the Czar-partly because the great military Powers, by their mutual animosities and growing indebtedness, have to a great extent bound themselves over to keep the peace. By the recent change in the condition of affairs peace is even more assured than before. But we

confess to considerable disappointment at the turn which events have taken. No doubt our own interests have not suffered; on the contrary, they have been amply vindicated, and English influence and authority have never in recent years stood higher. But the tide of sympathy which was steadily flowing in the direction of those unfortunate populations has been turned back. Turkey has got rid of its maniac ruler, but her misgoverned subjects have not gained at present one iota of advantage. The proclamation of Murad V. carried matters no further than they have stood at any time since the Conference of Paris. Its terms were not as favourable as the provisions of the Andrassy Note. At the first blush, the chances of improved organisation and government appeared to depend upon whether Midhat Pasha could maintain his ascendancy, although the opponents of his policy held more influential and more numerous offices. But in the present distracted state of Constantinople, revolutions and assassinations confound all speculation. While Englishmen, of whatever party, have every reason to congratulate themselves on the part which they have played in Europe and towards the great Powers in this matter, as far as Turkey and her disaffected provinces are concerned, we have done nothing, and apparently can do nothing, except tender advice and extort promises which are as idle as the wind. In the outer circle of the surrounding Powers our will and policy have predominated, and the British Ministry are upheld by the whole force of European approval. But within the inner circle of Turkish maladministration the whole subject remains in statu quo, except that on the one hand the sympathy heretofore felt for the insurgents has been intercepted, and jealousy of Russian

aggression aroused in its stead; and on the other, a new government of Turkey, for a time at least, appeals with success to the forbearance of Europe. The hopes of those who place all their security in the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman empire are renewed; nothing now is heard of charters of autonomy; and the prospects of Bosnia and Herzegovina attaining the same privileges and security as Roumania and Servia are daily growing more remote. Had Russia been more honest in its statesmanship, or the triple alliance more adroit and patient in its manoeuvres, a more fortunate result might have been the consequence.

The policy of England in this matter cannot easily be mistaken or misrepresented. Lord Derby at first declared that the insurrection was unimportant from a military point of view; that the great Powers were not supporting it; that a good radical cure of grievances was impossible, though they could be alleviated, and the rest be left to time. He objected to local autonomy on the ground of differences in religion and race. Then came the financial catastrophe, the coincidence of which, in point of time, explained the insurrection without resorting to the theory of foreign intrigue. The Andrassy Note was approved in the belief that "if the Austrian Government fulfil in an efficient manner, as it has undertaken to do, the duties which international obligations impose upon it, the area of hostilities will be greatly limited," and the affair reduced to the dimensions of a local disturbance. But the Note was not accepted by the insurgents; Turkey insisted upon a modification which prevented that financial decentralisation which was of extreme importance; and she appeared to render her assent conditional on the sub

mission of the insurgents. The Note remained perfectly ineffectual. While there was no abatement of its sovereign authority on the part of the Sultan's Government, either as regards the great Powers or its own subjects, it was hopelessly incapable of fulfilling its engagements to the former, or asserting its authority over the latter. As regards the great Powers, all outward demonstration of forcibly aiding the insurgents was repressed; as regards the Ottoman Government, with an empire in an extreme stage of moral, political, and financial ruin-with its Christian population burning with hatred and animosity-with its Mussulman subjects divided between the fanatical supporters of Mussulman ascendancy and the determined opponents of the late Sultan's fearful misrule,—it folded its hands in supreme indifference, believing that in one form or other Europe must, for its own security, settle the difficulty so as to preserve Ottoman independence. So long as the rulers of Constantinople can at any time threaten Europe with a religious war and its remote consequences, or even with the prospect of a disturbed balance of power, they feel themselves masters of the situation, in the sense of attracting the attention of Europe, baffling its diplomatists, and scandalising its philanthropists. A ruined empire lies at their feet, cursed with every form of atrocity and desolation.

In this position of affairs occurred the conference at Berlin, which was closed almost as soon as it was opened, as if discussion would lead to differences, or the duty of registering a foregone conclusion was its only work. The Memorandum which was drawn up is not yet public property; but it is described as an ill-conceived and ill-drawn document; and its failure ensued the moment it appeared to push

matters to a crisis. That is the true strength of the Turk. The moment he is hard driven, all Europe takes alarm. The Gortschakoff ultimatum, coming from Prince Gortschakoff, was a diplomatic blunder of the gravest description. It retarded the work of pacification by startling Europe with the prospect of a costly and doubtful struggle. The result is to strengthen the hands of the Turkish Ministers, not for any useful purpose, but merely in carrying out their dog-in-the-manger policy, which owes its existence, or at least its success, to the jealousies of Europe.

When Lord Derby was questioned as to the Berlin Note, he said that "her Majesty's Government, after a careful examination of the proposals, found themselves unable" to give their assent to them. They came to that decision "with regret." The remarkable sentence. was added "If we had thought the plan proposed likely to effect its object," the Government would not have been influenced by the circumstance that it had had no hand in framing the document. Subsequently the fleet was moved up to the Dardanelles, and Mr Disraeli expressed a hope that the Memorandum might not be presented. He added: "There is no doubt that the state of affairs is critical in that quarter; it would be affectation to deny it. Her Majesty's Government have taken such measures of precaution as they thought were necessary to maintain the honour and interests of the country; and that policy of precaution they intend to pursue.' Obviously from this the character of the Memorandum which required to be met in so decided a manner must have been regarded as dangerous and menacing. All that is known of it, however, is that it pro

posed an international commission to enforce the execution of certain reforms and the observance of an armistice, amounting to a virtual recognition of the independence of the insurgent provinces, with a hint of such further measures hereafter as might be deemed necessary. Later on, upon the 10th Junethough the press of every country in Europe has been recommending the Porte to abandon the administration of provinces which were regarded as already lost to her-the result of the Berlin conference was plainly visible when Mr Disraeli spoke as if Russia alone were in his thoughts, and the integrity of the Ottoman empire the sole policy of his Cabinet. He pointed with cmphasis not merely to the unanimous recognition of the new Sultan by the great Powers, but also to "a general feeling of adhesion from all sections, creeds, and races among the subjects of the Porte." Referring to the beneficial influence which this would have over the insurgents, he hoped that it would lead them "to avail themselves of the opportunity which now seems to be offered, of insuring the pacification of Europe." The alternative to the detested aggression of Russia is the suppression of the revolt and renewed support of the Ottoman empire. We need hardly say that this is an alternative which no one can contemplate without dismay. Indications are not wanting that Russia herself regrets having forced it upon us. It has been announced, we know not with what authority, that she will not pursue a policy of isolation, and will concur in such measures as Europe may sanction for improving the condition of the Rayahs. If so, a more satisfactory announcement could hardly be made.

The repugnance to the Berlin Note seems to have been general,

though the action of the different Governments was influenced by the consideration of other circumstan

ces.

England speedily declared its views; those of other countries, and even of Austria and Germany, to judge from their newspapers, would appear to be hardly less pronounced. It seems to us that, from the moment the Andrassy Note was superseded by the Gortschakoff proposal, and active intervention was proposed in lieu of courteous but urgent representations, a silent revulsion of feeling took place, which found expression directly that England protested. The language used by Count Andrassy before the Committee of Delegation, showed that a marked divergence of feeling had arisen within the triple alliance; and that, whatever might have been the motive which induced the signatures to the Berlin Note, its policy represented the views of Russia singly, and did not command the approval of her allies. Count Andrassy explained his policy to be the maintenance of peace, the localisation of the disturbance, the prevention of its recurrence. As to the carrying out of the projected reforms, the sincere co-operation of the European Powers was required; he explained, and appeared to apologise for, the separate action of the Imperial Governments. He also said, that for him to engage to abstain from active intervention would be to encourage Russia to enforce her peculiar aims without compunction or reserve. The Austrian-Hungarian fickleness probably reflects the divided sympathies of amalgamated populations; for while at one moment we hear of the Government allowing 6000 breech-loaders and several million of cartridges to be landed at Cattaro for the benefit of the Montenegrins, and that the Turkish Government in consequence had