forbidden Austrian steamers to land on the shores of the Danube; at another we find Russian and Austrian journals breathing violent hostility-the latter congratulating Turkey on its change of Government, with a decided leaning manifested towards the English view of the situation.

If the indications of growing antagonism between Russia and Austria were striking, hardly less marked was the uneasiness felt in Germany. The Berlin correspondent of the 'Times' was perpetually sounding a note of warning, and drawing attention to warlike preparations, not merely in Servia and Montenegro, but also in other petty surrounding states not generally believed to be eager for the fray. The German Government maintained an ominous silence; its organs in the press declared that Germany was not immediately interested in pending events. Decisive action on either side of the question was hardly to be expected from either Germany or Austria. The one has the fear of France perpetually before its eyes; the other has not yet buried all grounds of serious difference with Italy. But the Governments of both countries, by an attitude of reserve and cold disapprobation, have materially assisted in checking the aggressive and warlike spirit which was rising fast in the East. The German newspapers, for instance, have not yielded to our own in sympathy for the Rayah, and distrust of Turkish rule. But they, equally with our own, deprecated strongly the new policy which the Berlin Note was evidently intended to usher in. The 'Cologne Gazette,' said to be a good specimen of the German press, expressed what is understood to be the public feeling of Germany, in a way that the Government, hampered by its understandings with Russia,

and the necessity of keeping its hands free to deal with France, could hardly have ventured upon. The 'Gazette' spoke out forcibly on the position of affairs, and without hesitation, early in the events which succeeded the conference at Berlin. It insisted that the melancholy position of Turkey "is not so desperate as painted by those interested in the decay of the Ottoman empire;" for in spite of the reckless maladministration and extravagance of the late Sultan, Turkish revenue doubled itself in the last twenty years. last twenty years. It urged that the Turks were strong enough to deal with their subject nationalities if diplomatists would only abstain from intervention. "Favoured by circumstances, Russia again occupies as powerful a position as she did in the days of Nicholas I. Germany has become a mighty empire; but, gratefully remembering past services, anxiously avoids what might give offence to the Czar. France has long been courting the friendship of Russia for her own purposes. Italy, saddled with domestic difficulties, has no time to attend to foreign politics unless some little piece of territory can be gained by the act. Austria is too weak to resist Russian cunning on the Lower Danube, and every now and then actually helps Russia in the short-sighted hope that she too will be regarded as a Sclavonic State and a convenient patron by the Rayah. To-day she looks upon the Bosnian rebellion as a danger to herself, and asks Turkey to put the insurgents down; to-morrow she allows arms for the insurgents to pass from Austrian territory. Thus England is left alone to speak out openly upon Russian doings, and to resist them in case of extreme necessity. English statesmen decline to feign belief in Russia's sincerity when she speaks

of her wish to preserve Turkey. They call a spade a spade, and designate it as an outrage on commonsense that the Servians and Montenegrins are allowed to assist the insurgents, and to brag of their doing so, while the Turks are forbidden to go to war with the two recusant principalities. English statesmen, too, are frank enough to declare that Russia's real motive in exacting excessive reforms is to encourage the rebels, and to accelerate the dissolution of the State to which they belong."

With this state of feeling amongst two of the nations responsible for the production of the Berlin Note, the refusal of the British Ministry to give in its adhesion to it was not likely to place this country for any length of time in a position of isolation. The immediate effect of such refusal was to strangle the last production of imperial diplomacy before it saw the light, and to range the whole of Europe, including the two cosignatories of Russia, in opposition to the further development of an aggressive policy. Moreover, when the implied justification of the Note was that peace had not been restored to the revolted provinces, and that the Porte was hopelessly incapable that the insurgents were continuing their resistance, and even raising their terms; when the Turkish Government was required by a prolonged armistice virtually to recognise the independence of the insurgents, and to abdicate the functions of sovereignty in favour of others; the extreme gravity of the situation was sufficient to prevent any Government from sharing responsibility, while it was not in a position to control the future course of events. The supreme direction of the new policy must inevitably have centred in the hands of Russia a Power which has never yet defined its aims, or the precise settlement which it de

sires. Moreover, it was impossible not to look backwards upon the occurrences which had been skilfully conducted to this conclusion. The obstinacy of resistance, and the sources of its vitality, were as mysterious as the character of the unknown settlement, which seemed as vague and uncertain as ever. Under these circumstances a new Ottoman ruler sprang into existence; he announced, with the approval of Great Britain, and probably of other European Powers, his intention to preserve his sovereignty unimpaired and his empire intact; he has granted of his own free-will an amnesty and armistice; and for a time, at least, the whole question has fallen from the hands of the Northern Powers. If the new Sultan can pacify the insurgents on the lines of the Andrassy Note, the difficulty will be at rest; but there are far too many rival interests at work without, and desperate antipathies within, to render us sanguine of the result.

The course which Russia adopted, directly its manoeuvres stood detected before the world, was unhesitating and decided. It beat a retreat at all points; as soon, at least, as it was convinced, by the determined resistance of England and the defection of Europe, that the game was up. It received, according to Mr Disraeli "in no unfriendly spirit,' the dissent of this country from the Berlin Note; it took no offence at the despatch of the British fleet to the Bosphorus, for that was a measure of precaution justified by the massacre at Salonica; it joined with the other Powers in formally recognising Murad V. The key to the whole position was found in Servia. The crisis was at hand when Mr Disraeli informed the House of Commons that the great Powers, including Russia, had joined in impressing upon Servia the importance of temperate conduct. According as Russia joined in this

representation with sincerity or otherwise depended the issue of peace or war. She chose the former, and Europe is freed from impending calamity.

That obscure principality was at the moment the cynosure of all eyes. It held momentous issues in its grasp. Its conduct for some months increased the anxiety of the situation. Every day had brought news of some warlike preparation; the Slavic press breathed nothing but war. Seventy thousand men were ready to take the field, armed with breech-loaders and good modern rifles. Preparations were hurried on for crossing the frontiers; the Government was said to have refused its tribute, and could not be withheld from a declaration of war. Suddenly Servia was quiescent. It gave to the Ottoman Government satisfactory explanations, and reiterated its pacific intentions. The Berlin correspondent to the Times' stated openly that Prince Gortschakoff had given the word to desist, and that accordingly the Servo-Montenegrian troops could not immediately cross the frontier and make open war upon that Turkey which they had been attacking so long underhand, and in the capacity of volunteers; and that the insurgents would be obliged to submit. The reason hinted at "is that the rapid equipment of several squadrons, and the preparations in manning the entire navy, were considered so many unmistakable symptoms that Great Britain was making ready to encounter any contingency." It was all but asserted, that before setting to work she had secured a Continental ally; that otherwise the spirit shown promised a prolonged conflict, in which she would be sure to obtain assistance. Germany, it was stated, could not help to restore the mouth of the Danube to Russia; and as a proof that Germany as well as England had incurred Russia's displea

sure, it was stated that the Russian finance department had even to its own loss placed a prohibitive duty upon English and German rails-a serious blow in the present state of commercial depression upon German manufactures, and not by any means a conciliatory measure to ourselves. The three Emperors' alliance was described as a mere arrangement for the exchange of friendly communications; and when Russia was held responsible for what occurred, she found herself alone. The reproaches levelled at this country were at first somewhat wild; and the result of England's interference was represented to be that brute force and a struggle of extermination would alone end the scene. "What is asked of Mr Disraeli and Lord Derby is to say what they want." That is the question of Russian newspapers-a compliment which, so far as we recollect, was never paid to Mr Gladstone's Government. The answer might probably be given in the very words which have been used to describe the ostensible purposes of the three Emperors-viz., "(1) The maintenance of the political status quo, which cannot be tampered with without endangering the peace of the East and Europe; (2) Effective amelioration of the condition of the populations, so as to dry up a source of permanent agitation as fatal to Turkey as to the tranquillity of her neighbours and the general peace."

The total result of these important events is that, with the virtual rejection of Prince Gortschakoff's proposal, Count Andrassy's Note, to which the six Powers have given their adhesion, becomes once more the base of operations, until it is superseded by the miracle of Turkish resurrection. France is represented to be active in endeavouring to soothe down asperities between England and Russia, and to modify the Berlin stipulations so as

to insure to them the same approval as was accorded to the Austrian Note. The difficulty is mainly, as it always has been, and always will be, with regard to the necessary guarantees. With the accession of Midhat Pacha to his present office, the Turkish Government may be credited with greater willingness to carry out a policy of reform; but so long as the Bosnians and the Herzegovinese remain subject to the Sultan, they cannot conclude a treaty or obtain guarantees. The six Powers must, if the difficulties are now to be solved, act as trustees for both sides of the controversy in a matter of that delicacy and importance, and must regulate the nature of the arrangement which may eventually be arrived at. At present the instructions of the new Grand Vizier to the Ottoman Commissioners in the two provinces remain. They are directed, quantum valeant, to carry out, without delay and very actively, the reforms granted by the Government. The local authorities are ordered "to listen with justice to the requests and legitimate grievances of the delegates who will be nominated on the part of those who wish to make their submission." Turkey, therefore, has assumed the initiative, and it remains to be seen what she is willing and able to do, and for the six Powers to decide what, in the event of her failure, is the course which they can agree upon pursuing. The alternative is between the establishment of a condition of things which, under the imposing name of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire and the amelioration of the status quo, shall in reality perpetuate the miseries and degradation with reports of which the newspapers teemed a short time ago; and the establishment of another condition of things, which, under the like imposing name, in

reality means the vigorous correction of abuses. The third alternative, which, under the like title, means the effective substitution of Russian authority, has just been rejected by all Europe as inadmissible. While the six Powers, equally with the Sultan's Government, unanimously accept the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, and the amelioration of the status quo, as the end and aim of their policy, no two Powers seem to have the same ideas of the meaning of those terms. And the difficulty with which public opinion has to contend is, that the former expression has all along been taken to mean something quite different from what, as applied to other European countries, would be meant by the term, and which, therefore, is vague and indefinite; and that the latter expression comprehends detailed and minute arrangements in dealing with circumstances foreign to the ordinary experience of Europe. But, nevertheless, the present is an opportunity, which may not speedily recur, favourable to arriving at some satisfactory understanding with regard to Turkey-its internal relations and its future course. There has been a silent trial of strength between the two principal actors, which has terminated amicably. With the aid of the new Sultan and his Government, from whom Europe, which absolutely and spontaneously recognised them, has a right to expect the utmost consideration, it ought not to be beyond the reach of political science to institute the first beginnings of a settlement.

It would, for instance, be a monstrous conclusion to recent events if Turkey, leaning as she is compelled to do on European, and especially on English, alliances, should be allowed to settle scores with her rebellious subjects and disloyal vassals in any manner that she pleases.

The atrocities which have been committed already-the arming of Bashi Bazooks and of wild Circassians, the desolating vengeance which the Turk would be willing to inflict would be a worse scandal than the triumph of Russian intrigue. It is of the utmost importance to distinguish between the maintaining the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, and allowing its rulers, on the other, to exercise without supervision and control the rights of government. To meet the wishes of Europe, the pacification of the disturbed provinces must ostensibly be the work of the Ottoman Government; but the Allies, by whose aid that work alone can be accomplished, must be held responsible at the bar of public opinion for the manner in which it is effected. Nothing comes out clearer in the prolonged discussions upon this subject than this, that the independence of the Ottoman Empire means simply that Europe insists upon its independence of Russia. With that proviso, its actual position is "one of dependence amounting virtually to tutelage." No doubt the recent treaties of guarantee only bind the contracting Powers to repel external aggression, and do not extend to justify interference in internal quarrels between the Ottoman Government and either its tributary vassals or its provincial population. But considerations of policy cannot be bound down by the guarded phraseology of treaty stipulations. If Russian aggression involves an assumed protectorate of Christian races to an extent which invites them to arm against the fanaticism and tyranny of the Turk, British resistance to that aggression cannot in justice, or with a view to our own future security, involve the riveting of the chains of Mussulman supremacy, or the abandonment of the tools of Russian intrigues to become the victims of Ottoman revenge. The victors in the outer

circle of competing ambitions must become responsible for the settlement of conflicting hopes and passions within the inner circle of the Turkish Empire. All the Powers are agreed that the policy of maintaining that Empire must include what is called the amelioration of the status quo, which will be successful only so far as it succeeds in drying up the causes of disputes and disturbances.

We deny, then, that the work of pacification can honourably be abandoned to the Turkish authorities without control or supervision by the signatories to the Andrassy Note. That would be placing a wholly erroneous construction on the policy of preserving Ottoman independence, on the duty of noninterference in her internal affairs. The successful execution of the policy involves the duty of interference, unless the policy is to be branded with the most execrable selfishness. To preserve another's independence is a contradiction in terms. And when we inquire what is the nature of the independence which all Europe in this case is upholding, we cannot cite more authoritative testimony than that of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. According to that evidence, Turkish dependence dates back for more than one hundred years. Not merely has the Empire been from time to time dismembered by the withdrawal of vast provinces from its direct authority, but in the remainder, in spite of energetic reforms, the recovery of its power was hopeless. "Disunion, ignorance, corruption, a debased coinage, a diminishing population, and financial mismanagement, could hardly fail to override, if not to increase, the weakness originating in causes less capable of correction." The disaffection of the Rayahs is a growing cause of weakness, especially as they advance in numbers, knowledge, wealth, the sense of de