Exalted each a nymph: forfake the fand,
And fwim the feas, at Cybele's command.
No fooner had the goddess ceas'd to speak,
When lo, th' obedient fhips their haulfers break;
And, ftrange to tell, like dolphins in the main,
They plunge their prows, and dive, and spring again x
As many beauteous maids the billows fweep,

As rode before tall veffels on the deep.

Dryden's Virg.

THE Common opinion concerning the nymphs, whom the ancients called Hamadryads, is more to the honour of trees than any thing yet mentioned. It was thought the fate of thefe nymphs had fo near a dependance on ⚫ fome trees, more efpecially oaks, that they lived and died together. For this reafon they were extremely grateful to fuch perfons who preferved thofe trees with which their being fubfifted. Apollonius tells us a very remarkable ftory to this purpofe, with which I fhall conclude my letter.

A CERTAIN man, called Rhecus, obferving an old oak ready to fall, and being moved with a fort of compaffion towards the tree, ordered his fervants to pour in ⚫ fresh earth at the roots of it, and fet it upright. The Hamadryad or nymph, who must neceffarily have perifhed with the tree, appeared to him the next day, and ' after having returned him her thanks, told him, she was ready to grant whatever he should ask. As fhe was extremely beautiful, Rhacus defired he might be entertained as her lover. The Hamadryad, not much difpleafed with the requeft, promifed to give him a meeting, but commanded him for fome days to abstain from the embraces of all other women, adding that he would 'fend a bee to him, to let him know when he was to be happy. Rhacus was, it feems, too much addicted to gaming, and happened to be in a run of ill luck when the faithful bee came buzzing about him; fo that in⚫ftead of minding his kind invitation, he had like to have • killed him for his pains. The Hamadryad was fo pro'voked at her own difappointment, and the ill ufage of her meffenger, that the deprived Rhacus of the use of his limbs. However, fays the ftory, he was not fo much

a cripple, but he made a fhift to cut down the tree, and confequently to fell his mistress.'

N° 590.

Monday, September 6.

Affiduo labuntur tempora motu

Non fecus ac flumen. Neque enim confiftere flumen,
Nec levis hora poteft: fed ut unda impellitur unda,
Urgeturque prior venienti, urgetque priorem,
Fempora fic fugiunt pariter, pariterque fequuntur;
Et nova funt femper. Nam quod fuit ante, relictum eft;
Fitque quod haud fuerat: momentaque cuncta novantur.
Ovid. Met. 1. 15. v. 1792 -

E'en times are in perpetual flux, and run,
Like rivers from their fountains, rolling on.
For time, no more than ftreams, is at a ftay;
The flying hour is ever on her way:

And as the fountain ftill fupplies her ftore;
The wave behind impels the wave before;
Thus in fucceffive courfe the minutes run,
And urge their predeceffor minutes on,
Still moving, ever new: for former things
Are laid afide like abdicated kings ;

And ev'ry moment alters what is done,

And innovates fome act till then unknown.. Dryden..

The following difcourfe comes from the fame hand with the effays upon infinitude...

WE

7E confider infinite fpace as an expanfion without a circumference: we confider eternity, or infinite duration, as a line that has neither a beginning nor an ☛d. In our fpeculations of infinite fpace, we confider that particular place in which we exift, as a kind of centre to the whole expanfion. In our fpeculations of eternity, we confider the time which is prefent to us as the middle, which divides the whole line into two equal parts. For this reafon, many witty authors compare the prefent time to

1

an ifthmus or narrow neck of land that rifes in the midst of an ocean, immeafurably diffused on either fide of it.

PHILOSOPHY, and indeed common fenfe, naturally throws eternity under two divifions; which we may call in English, that eternity which is past, and that eternity which is to come. The learned terms of æternitas a parte ante, and æternitas a parte post, may be more amufing to the reader, but can have no other idea affixed to them than what is conveyed to us by those words, an eternity that is past, and an eternity that is to come. Each of thefe eternities is bounded at the one extreme; or, in other words, the former has an end, and the latter a beginning.

LET us firft of all confider that eternity which is past, referving that which is to come for the fubject of another paper. The nature of this eternity is utterly inconceivable by the mind of man: our reafon demonftrates to us that it has been, but at the fame time can frame no idea of it, but what is big with abfurdity and contradiction. We can have no other conception of any duration which is past, than that all of it was once prefent; and whatever was once prefent, is at fome certain distance from us, and whatever is at any certain distance from us, be the distance never fo remote, cannot be eternity. The very notion of any duration's being paft, implies that it was once prefent; for the idea of being once prefent, is actually included in the idea of its being paft. This therefore is a depth not to be founded by human understanding. We are fure that there has been an eternity, and yet contradict ourselves when we measure this eternity by any notion which we can frame of it.

If we go to the bottom of this matter, we fhall find, that the difficulties we meet with in our conceptions of eternity proceed from this fingle reafon, that we can have no other idea of any kind of duration, than that by which we ourfelves, and all other created beings, do exist t; which is a fucceffive duration, made up of paft, prefent, and to come. There is nothing which exifts after this manner, all the parts of whofe existence were not once actually prefent, and confequently may be reached by a certain number of years applied to it. We may afcend as

127 high as we please, and employ our being to that eternity which is to come, in adding millions of years to millions of years, and we can never come up to any fountain-head of duration, to any beginning in eternity: but at the fame time we are fure, that whatever was once present, does lie within the reach of numbers, though perhaps we can never be able to put enough of them together for that purpose. We may as well fay, that any thing may be actually prefent in any part of infinite fpace, which does not lie at a certain diftance from us, as that any part of infinite duration was once actually prefent, and does not alfo lie at fome determined diftance from us. The diftance in both cafes may be immeafurable and indefinite as to our faculties, but our reason tells us that it cannot be fo in itself. Here therefore is that difficulty which human understanding is net capable of furmounting. We are fure that fomething must have exifted from eternity, and are at the fame time unable to conceive, that any thing which exifts according to our notion of existence, can have exifted from eternity.

It is hard for a reader, who has not rolled this thought in his own mind, to follow in fuch an abftracted fpeculation; but I have been the longer on it, because I think it is a demonstrative argument of the being and eternity of a God and though there are many other demonstrations which lead us to this great truth, I do not think we ought to lay afide any proofs in this matter, which the light of reafon has fuggefted to us, especially when it is fuch a one as has been urged by men famous for their penetration and force of understanding, and which appears altogether conclufive to those who will be at the pains to examine it.

HAVING thus confidered that eternity which is paft, according to the best idea we can frame of it, I fhall now draw up thofe feveral articles on this fubject, which are dictated to us by the light of reafon, and which may be looked upon as the creed of a philofopher in this great point.

FIRST, It is certain that no being could have made itfelf; for if fo, it must have acted before it was, which is a contradiction.

SECONDLY,

SECONDLY, That therefore fome being must have exifted from all eternity.

THIRDLY, That whatever exifts after the manner of created beings, or according to any notions which we have of existence, could not have exifted from eternity.

FOURTHLY, That this eternal Being must therefore be the great Author of nature, the ancient of days, who, being at an infinite diftance in his perfections from all finite and created beings, exifts in a quite different manner from them, and in a manner of which they can have no idea.

I KNOW that several of the schoolmen, who would not be thought ignorant of any thing, have pretended to explain the manner of God's existence, by telling us, that he comprehends infinite duration in every moment; that eternity is with him a punctum ftans, a fixed point; or, which is as good fenfe, an infinite inftant; that nothing, with reference to his exiftence, is either paft or to come: to which the ingenious Mr Cowley alludes in his defcription of heaven.

Nothing is there to come, and nothing paft,
But an eternal NOW does always laft.

FOR my own part, I look upon thefe propofitions as words that have no ideas annexed to them; and think men had better own their ignorance, than advance doctrines by which they mean nothing, and which, indeed, are felf-contradictory. We cannot be too modeft in our difquifitions, when we meditate on him, who is environed with fo much glory and perfection, who is the fource of being, the fountain of all that exiftence which we and his whole creation derive from him. Let us therefore with the utmost humility acknowledge, that as fome being muft neceffarily have exifted from eternity, fo this being does exift after an incomprehenfible manner, fince it is impoffible for a being to have exifted from eternity after our manner or notions of exiftence. Revelation confirms thefe natural dictates of reafon in the accounts which it gives us of the divine existence, where it tells us, that he is the fame yesterday, to-day, and for ever;

that