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As regards the length of the rifle, it should be as short as possible, but not a fraction should be taken off that would in the slightest degree diminish its shooting powers. How it should be carried is simply a matter of brains and will be discussed later.

As an example of the disastrous way in which one-sided views are allowed to injure efficiency, the following, which I have heard on excellent authority, may

serve:

It had been recognised, as the result of experience in the South African War, that cavalry should carry a rifle. A suitable weapon, handy and shorter than the present infantry rifle, had, after due consideration and the exercise of clever ingenuity, been made and submitted for approval. What was the decision? That this rifle must be shortened by five inches, as otherwise it could not be carried by cavalry (presumably in the present carbine-bucket)!

I ask, if trivial or absurd reasons (such as appearance) are to decide weighty questions, how can there be any real or progressive reform? And if the principle that the weapon (in the sense used above) is the raison d'être of the soldier is so entirely ignored, how can he be efficiently armed?

How to carry the arms is the next question. First, we would remark that the present carbine-bucket is not only too short but is also on the wrong, i.e., the off, side, being thus placed as far as possible away from the side on which a man mounts and dismounts? Also that the sword, which is used only when mounted is carried also on the wrong, i.e., the near, side of the saddle, as far as possible from the sword-hand?

All difficulties with regard to carrying the sword and rifle were, by adopting the following method, got over successfully by the commander of a mobile column that I had some experience of in South Africa.

The rifle was carried in the hanging rifle-bucket on the near side of the saddle, the left arm passing through a short sling attached to the rifle. Thus the rifle was most conveniently placed for mounting or dismounting. The sword was carried on the of side of the saddle, edge to rear, being much more quickly drawn when in this position than when carried on the near side, and, moreover, being as easily and quickly drawn when at a gallop as at a walk. This is far from being the case when the sword is carried on the near side, as now ordered.

The two cavalry regiments that carried their arms in this manner were the 5th Dragoon Guards and 13th Hussars, and this they did for the best part of a year; so the trial was not a short one. This method was found thoroughly serviceable. Of course, this was only a makeshift plan arrived at by utilising the equipment issued, simply altering the fittings to suit the change. Possibly a better method may be found. The barbarous system of making men carry a rifle slung on their backs for long hours is a humiliating confession of want of ingenuity.

Mounted infantry, armed as suggested, can relieve cavalry of the rôle of divisional cavalry and all such duties as escort for artillery, &c., thus leaving cavalry brigades and divisions intact. British divisions have only one squadron of divisional cavalry, whereas divisions of Continental armies have from eight to twelve squadrons. This deficiency can be accounted for by the small number of cavalry we possess. If each division had one or two regiments of mounted infantry instead of one squadron, our cavalry brigades and infantry divisions would mutually benefit. It would be to the interest of the G.O. commanding the division to supervise the quality and condition of the horses and to provide a constant supply of men and material for his mounted infantry.

To enable them to perform their duties efficiently mounted infantry should be as well mounted as hussars. During the war in South Africa mounted infantry were at times used for duties for which their previous training, equipment, and the manner in which they were mounted, were unsuitable; in spite of their difficulties, they rose to the occasion. In the recent pursuit under Colonel Kenna, in Somaliland, deficiencies in these respects were still more apparent. As practical requirements in the field will cause mounted infantry to be used in the future as they have been in South Africa and Somaliland in a considerably more advanced role, is it not reasonable and wise to arm, equip, train, and mount them in peace time, so as to enable them to perform efficiently the duties that will be expected of them in war?

The Boer War has led some to take extreme views. Because Boer tactics gave few opportunities for shock action, extremists say the days for shock. action are past, and that cavalry should be trained chiefly to rely on the rifle. Thoughtful experts, on the other hand, resent this opinion. As there is no reason to suppose the tactics employed by future enemies will resemble those of the Boers, it stands to reason that cavalry should be trained to perfect themselves in shock action more than ever, and so that the lesson of how the Boers used the rifle may not be thrown away, cavalry should be provided with a perfect rifle and trained so as to get the most out of it; both these separate branches being dealt with exhaustively, equal value being attached to each.

Mounted infantry, on the other hand, should be trained to rely chiefly on the rifle, and trained only to use a weapon when mounted, such as a sword or revolver, as a secondary measure, but so as to make them independent and capable in case of circumstances occurring rendering its use a matter of necessity.

The only sound alternative to making mounted infantry efficient for all-round mounted work is, to do away with them altogether and raise more cavalry. No other nation finds it economical to maintain such a hybrid dependent force as is our mounted infantry as at present organised, and owing to our comparatively small army, it is less true economy for us, than for other nations, to do so.

The retention of the lance in certain cavalry regiments, if desired, need in no way affect the application of the general principles here proposed.

To sum up: We have been led to the conclusion that all mounted men should be able to perform all the duties that may be required of any of them; they should all have the same arms, viz., the most effective rifle that can be devised, and, specially for attack, a long straight sword (the revolver being reserved for special services); these weapons should be carried as practical needs dictate.

A word as to scouting: Although, as some suggest, special scouts may well be specially trained, yet none the less should squadron and company commanders feel it essential to train all their men generally in scouting and all detached duties. This is a responsibility that must never be evaded. Such training leads to a high average of efficiency and produces the best results, developing and improving, as it does, the intelligence and reflective powers of all concerned, both officers and men.

It has been said "experience is the best teacher, but the fees are high." I will conclude by expressing the hope that the fees thus paid by the Empire in the Great Boer War may not prove to have been paid in vain.

March 1904

"EXPERTUS.'

THE PRINCIPLES

OF

OF CONSTRUCTIVE

ECONOMICS AS APPLIED TO THE
MAINTENANCE OF EMPIRE *

I. THE DOCTRINE OF DEVELOPMENT

THE strength of the Manchester school lay in the simplicity of its creed. The Imperial school must endeavour to base itself upon an argument equally definite and compact. Statistics up to the present have played an indispensable part in the fiscal controversy, but there is a strict limit to their usefulness: they are trying to the popular head, they make speeches cold, meetings dull, and democracy depressed. Since enthusiasm cannot be generated by arithmetic, no great cause was ever carried by figures. It is essential that the case for Imperial union upon an economic basis should be made as far as possible independent of detail. By the use of undeniable figures we have succeeded in opening a controversy that is in creating doubt. But this is negative work, and the effect of our efforts must depend in the long run upon the extent to which we can make our ideas of positive policy intelligible and convincing. If we are not only to create doubt but establish conviction, we must substitute one creed for another, principles for principles, ideals for ideals. "When I got my method by the end," said Bunyan, "still as I pulled it came.” The attempt of the present paper is to seek the leading idea from which the fiscal tangle will come straight of itself in the mind of the plain man. That idea seems to be offered by the doctrine of development as applied to modern economics.

The classical economists belonged to the pre-Darwinian age. We differ from them in our whole view of life and of the ends of life-in our whole mental method as well as in our possession of the practical experience of the last sixty years. We now know, for instance, that the security of all the peace interests of nations depends upon the efficiency of their war apparatus. We know that the one thing worse than war is being beaten; that there is no economic injury more penetrating than defeat; that

This paper was discussed by the newly formed Compatriots Club (see "Episodes of the Month ") on April 22.

VOL. XLIII

34

there are no economic factors so potent, so creative, as national strength and the sense of it. We now know that abandoned colonies and dependencies would mean lost markets as well as a broken Empire, and the permanent weakening of national spirit and energy even at home. The doctrine of development starts from the direct denial of laissez faire. It holds instead that under modern conditions the economic progress, no less than the political preservation of a State, must largely depend upon the conscious purpose and efficient action of the State itself. Government, in a word, should be the brain of the State, even in the sphere of commerce.

England is not ruined, but for the most part exceedingly prosperous. Our purpose is served, not by denying that fact, but by accepting it and reasoning from it. There are of course serious qualifications to be made. A chart of the world's poverty would show the existence of large depressions in this country, and the lowest soundings of all would be taken in the povertydeeps of London. There is a steady accumulation of social sediment in all our great cities. It is not our immediate business to dwell upon these things, but rather to admit that the average level of material comfort is higher than in any other country in Europe. For there is no mystery connected with this admission. The octogenarian who had never gone to bed sober for half a century, used to be quoted as an instance of the beneficial effects of alcohol, but we should now take him as proving the vigour of an exceptional constitution. There is no doubt that Great Britain possesses, from the commercial point of view, an altogether exceptional constitution. In its maritime facilities and the character of its internal resources it enjoys, in proportion to its area and population, more natural economic advantages than any other country in existence. We inherit a vast amount of accumulated capital from the comparatively recent days of our monopoly, when we were the industrial centre of the world, and our manufacturing power was equal to that of all other nations combined. Cobdenism discounts our advantages, but has not yet reached the point of neutralising geology, geography, and history! Our gross profits are still greater-they ought to be far greater than those of any other European people. Trades Unionism enables labour in this country to wrest from capital a maximum percentage of our gross profits.

From this circumstance alone, even if our total earnings were no larger than those of Germany, or were even but slightly lower, the average wages of our working classes would be much higher-the more so as our labour-supply is smaller. Foreign

competition, recent as it is, has had no time to do more than weaken perceptibly the foundations of our industrial position. It has had no time to break down the mass of the structure. The rivalry of the United States and Germany has been acting with full effect for hardly more than a single decade. Above all, it must be pointed out that we still raise nearly as much coal upon our speck of an island as is raised in the whole of the United States. So long as coal remains the prime motive power of machine-industry, and our position in that respect continues to be anything like as favourable as it is now, our average income per head must be considerably higher than that of any other country in Europe, for reasons with which indiscriminate free imports have nothing to do. We owe to Cobdenism neither our collieries nor our coast line, nor the historic policy which gave us the mastery of the sea. Yet to the things we do not owe to Cobdenism we unquestionably owe the main fact of our prosperity-the excess of capital and income per head over the average per capita wealth of any continental people.

Our natural advantages in many respects are indeed by no means so exclusive as the classical economists thought. But as compared with a country like Germany-which seemed so hopelessly handicapped three decades ago by a poor soil, a bad coast, by traditional penury, by the struggle from the first against an insufficiency of capital, which is even yet by no means made wholly good-we have every natural qualification for exceptional prosperity. To say we have superior prosperity is nothing. So far as we have it, it is evidently owing to our natural resources, to our long monopoly before the rise of foreign competition, to our Imperial position—that is, to our superior advantages of all kinds. The real question is whether we are making the most or the least of these superior advantages. As democracy would put the matter, are we making the best or the worst of ourselves? The present paper sets out from the view that we are no longer making the best of ourselves and are distinctly tending to make the worst. Our fiscal policy acts as a check upon our natural advantages: the policy of other countries acts as a stimulus upon theirs. Under a good system we ought to have made far more progress in the last thirty years than we have achieved. We ought to be still upon the aggressive and not upon the defensive in every neutral market in the world. Our existing prosperity ought to be even greater than it is and our prospects more secure. The contention to be examined, in a word, is, that indiscriminate free imports in this country are no longer conducive to the highest attainable level of economic progress, that for the island

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