REMARKS ON WHAT ENGLISH GRAMMARIANS CALL MODES OR MOODS.

We will introduce our remarks by citing Mr. Locke's observations on the use of scientific expressions. In his epistle to the reader, he observes:

"The commonwealth of learning is not, at this time, without master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity but every one must not hope to be a Boyle or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces such masters as the great Huygenius and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain, it is ambition enough to be employed as an under labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much incumbered with the learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the sciences, and then made an art of to that degree, that philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit, or uncapable to be brought into well-bred company and polite conversation. Vague and insignificant forms of speech and abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of science, and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade, either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge. To break in upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance, will be, I suppose, some service to human understanding; though so few are apt to think they deceive or are deceived in the use of words; or that the language of the sect they are of, has any

faults in it, which ought to be examined or corrected, that I hope I shall be pardoned, if I have in the third book dwelt long on this subject, and endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the inveterateness of the mischief, nor the prevalence of the fashion, shall be any excuse for those who will not take care about the meaning of their own words and will not suffer the significancy of their expressions to be inquired into."

To find English grammatical works which stand high in public estimation, not only differing in their definitions of the same thing, but contradicting each other, naturally creates our astonishment, and awakes our suspicion that all is not correct. We in vain try to reconcile these differences, but instead of being able to do so, every effort discovers still greater inconsistencies, and contributes to confirm Mr. Locke's observations. Indeed, so jarring and frivolous is all that has been written on the English moods, that one can hardly help thinking Mr. Locke must have had on his mind, when he wrote these observations all that has been written on the English moods since his time, as well as all that was written before it, on the same subject. If the writers from whose works we have taken the following extracts, were to write a description of the Phoenix, that they would agree better and have fewer incongruities than they have, in what they wrote on the moods, is more than probable. What inference must we draw ? Must we believe in the non-existence of the English moods, as we do in that of the Phoenix; or must we infer these writers had an imperfect knowledge of the moods? We must believe either the one or the other, when we test what they have written, by what I consider a good definition, namely :

A good definition of any thing is a direct, full, and perspicuous reply to the question, what is that thing?

We cannot believe that any respectable author can write badly, carelessly, or unintelligibly, on a subject which he perfectly understands; particularly when he is fully aware at the

time of writing, that the correctness of his ideas, and the accuracy with which he delineates them, can alone establish an enviable reputation, insure public gratitude, and enable him to leave to posterity a name and memory to be revered.

However great may be our respect for an author or his memory, that respect is overruled by our public duty, which imperatively demands that the truth of everything written for instructing youth in the principles of their language should first be strictly investigated, and that these investigated truths should be imparted in the manner best calculated to relieve masters and teachers, and facilitate the acquisition of knowl→ edge.

We have two motives in giving the following long extracts; first, to save our readers the trouble of seeking or purchasing the works from which we quote; second, to enable them by reading before and after the disputed passage to determine the author's spirit and exact meaning, without which they cannot decide with any degree of certainty whether we have wrested the signification, or acted honourably towards these authors or not.

HARRIS'S HERMES, Chapter VIII., page 140.

"We have observed already that the soul's leading powers are those of perception, and those of volition, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that all speech or discourse is a publishing or exhibiting some part of our soul, either a certain perception, or a certain volition. Hence, then, according as we exhibit it, either in a different part or in a different manner, hence, I say, the variety of modes, or moods.

"If we simply declare, or indicate something to be, or not to be (whether a perception or volition, it is equally the same), this constitutes that mode called the declarative or indicative.

"If we do not strictly assert, as of something absolute and certain, but of something possible only, and in the number of contingents, this makes that mode, which grammarians call

the potential; and which becomes on such occasions the leading mode of the sentence.

"Yet sometimes it is not the leading mode, but only subjoined to the indicative. In such case, it is mostly used to denote the end, or final cause; which end, as, in human life, it is always a contingent, and may never perhaps happen in despite of all our foresight, is therefore expressed most naturally by the mode here mentioned. For example; Thieves rise by night, that they may cut men's throats.

"Here that they rise, is positively asserted in the declarative or indicative mode; but as to their cutting men's throats, this is only delivered potentially, because how truly soever it may be the end of their rising, it is still but a contingent, that may never perhaps happen. This mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by grammarians, not the potential, but the subjunctive.

"But it so happens, in the constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely to declare ourselves to others.

"We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have some perception informed, or some volition gratified. Hence, then, new modes of speaking; if we interrogate, it is the interrogative mode; if we require, it is the requisitive. Even the requisitive itself hath its subordinate species; with respect to inferiors, it is the imperative mode; with respect to equals and superiors, it is a precative or optative.

"And thus have we established a variety of modes; the indicative or declarative, to assert what we think certain, the potential, for the purposes of whatever we may think contingent; the interrogative, when we are doubtful, to procure us information, and the requisitive, to assist us in the gratifications of our volitions. The requisitive too appears under two distinct species, either as it is imperative to inferiors, or precative to superiors.

Page 145.- "As therefore all these several modes have their foundation in nature, so have certain marks or signs of them

been introduced into language, that we may be enabled by our discourse to signify them one to another. And hence, those various modes or moods, of which we find in common grammars, so prolix a detail, and which are in fact no more than so many literal forms, intended to express these natural distinctions."

Page 150. And hence, if we be permitted to digress, we may perceive the near affinity of this interrogative mode with the indicative, in which last its response, or return, is mostly made. So near indeed is this affinity, that in these two modes alone the verb retains the same form, nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the addition or absence of some small particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the words, or sometimes only by a change in the tone or accent."

Note. Page 149.-"But for these, and all other speculations, relative to the genius of the English language, we refer the reader, who wishes for the most authentic information, to that excellent Treatise of the learned Doctor Lowth, entitled, A Short Introduction to English Grammar."

Doctor Lowth informs us, in page 33 of his Grammar,

"That mode is the manner of representing the being, action or passion. When it is simply declared, or a question is asked concerning it, it is called the indicative mode; as, “I love, lovest thou;" when it is bidden, it is called the imperative; as, "Love thou." When it is subjoined as the end or design, or mentioned under a condition, a supposition, or the like, for the most part depending on some other verb, and having a conjunction before it, it is called the subjunctive; as, "If I love, if thou love;" where it is barely expressed without any limitation of person or number, it is called the infinitive; as, "to love;" and when it is expressed in a form in which it can be joined to a noun, as its quality or accident, partaking thereby of the nature of an adjective, it is called the participle; as, "loving."

Note. Same page.- "A mode is a particular form of the verb, denoting the manner, in which a thing is, does, or suffers; or expressing an intention of the mind concerning such