Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical EssaysPeter Baumann, Monika Betzler Practical conflicts pervade human life. Agents have many different desires, goals, and commitments, all of which can come into conflict with each other. How can practical reasoning help to resolve these practical conflicts?In this collection of new essays a distinguished roster of philosophers analyze the diverse forms of practical conflict. Their aim is to establish an understanding of the sources of these conflicts, to investigate the challenge they pose to an adequate conception of practical reasoning, and to assess the degree to which that challenge can be met. |
Contents
Introduction Varieties of Practical Conflict and the Scope of Practical Reason | 1 |
Willing the Law | 27 |
The Myth of Egoism Christine | 57 |
Thinking about Conflicts of Desire | 92 |
Putting Together Morality and WellBeing | 118 |
The Second Worst in Practical Conflict | 159 |
Personal Practical Conflicts | 172 |
Sources of Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret | 197 |
Involvement and Detachment A Paradox of Practical Reason | 244 |
Outcomes of Internal Conflicts in the Sphere of Akrasia and SelfControl | 262 |
Are There Insolvable Moral Conflicts? | 279 |
Moral Dilemmas of Transitional Justice | 295 |
Do Conflicts Make Us Free? | 316 |
List of Contributors | 334 |
| 336 | |
| 338 | |
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Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays Peter Baumann,Monika Betzler No preview available - 2004 |
Common terms and phrases
akrasia akratic action argue argument Aristotelian Aristotle Bernard Williams Cambridge University Press Categorical Imperative choice situation choose Christine Korsgaard claim commitment compensation comprehensive value conception confirmation bias conflicting reasons conformity consequentialist deliberation determine egoistic principle emotions equally Ethics evaluative example fact favor functionalist give given goals happiness Harry Frankfurt incommensurable incompatibilist incompatible indefeasible reason indetermined insolvable moral conflicts involve irrational Joseph Raz judgment Kant Kantian kind Korsgaard matters maximizing Mele moral and prudential Moral Dilemmas moral reasons motivation nameless value normative relations objection one's options Oxford University Press particular person Peter Baumann possible practical conflicts practical reason practically incommensurable preface paradox problem prudential values question rational egoism rational resolution realized reasons for action regret relative normative weights relative weights relevant resolved responsible role satisfaction seems sense simply suppose theory things considered trait V-maximality values at stake Velleman virtue