for the very good service which he did on this

occasion.

In making special mention of Captain Lightfoot for his good services this day, I beg to state how very much indebted I am to the officers and men of his, the 1st or "Eagle," Troop Bombay Horse Artillery, for their excellent and gallant conduct throughout the campaign. In my actions, I made very liberal use of the troop, in pouring an unexpected or flank fire into the enemy. On all these occasions, the 1st Troop was worthy of its former fame, and proved that no arm of the service is more dangerous to its foes than fleet artillery.

I beg to make special mention of BrigadierGeneral Napier for the very important assistance which he afforded me in the action of the 16th of June.

I beg to bring to his Excellency's notice the good spirit and gallantry which the troops displayed in the rapid and successful operation against the Morar cantonments. Their march from Calpee was a very trying one. In consequence of the great heat in the tents by day, the men could not get the rest which they lost by marching at night to avoid sun.

Notwithstanding a long march to Bahadurpoor, the troops ceased their preparations for encamping, and marched, fasting, with the utmost alacrity and steadiness, against Morar, going five miles, and taking it in two hours, under a heavy and welldirected cannonade, and a resolute resistance on the left. The capture of Morar had good results. It was the first defeat which the combined forces of the Calpee and Gwalior rebels had sustained.

Morar, the Military Station, and an outwork of Gwalior, was an important strategical point. It gave me the command of the line of the Morar River, of the road to Agra, and enabled me to

communicate with Brigadier Smith to the left, and the Residency to the right.

The rebels were surprised by my rapid march from Calpee; they intended to make a determined stand at Morar, and had commenced storing it with supplies, which fell into our hands. They had not time to burn the houses, still standing since the mutiny, nor the temporary sheds prepared by Scindiah, all of which were turned to good account.

I got immediately into communication with Brigadier Smith at Kotah-ka-Serai, and reconnoitred Gwalior.

*

I have the honour to enclose Brigadier Smith's Report of his operations from Kotah-ka-Serai. I beg fully to confirm his recommendation of the officers under his command, and to draw His Excellency's attention particularly to the great gallantry and devotion displayed by Her Majesty's 8th Hussars, in the brilliant charge which they made through the enemy's camp; of which one most important result was the death of the Ranee of Jhansi; who, although a lady, was the bravest and best military leader of the rebels. The enemy's guns, which the 8th Hussars brought back out of the rebel camp into their own, were the best proofs of how nobly they had fought and conquered.

Brigadier Smith having asked for reinforcements, I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Robertson to join him with the force detailed in the margin.t

My reconnoissance of Gwalior satisfied me that the information on which I had decided to attack it was good. If I had attacked it from Morar, I should have had to cross the plain between Morar

* No. 2, Enclosure, Brigidier Smith's report. † 3 Troops 14th Light Dragoons, 4 Guns No. 4 Light Field Battery, 25th Bombay Native Infantry.

and Gwalior, under the fire of the fort, and of masked and formidable batteries established in strong houses and gardens on the banks of the old canal, and a dry river in front of the Phool Bagh Palace.

I could not leave Morar so close to Gwalior without adequate protection. The arrival of the troops which had been left to garrison Calpee, on the morning of the 18th of June, enabled me, leaving my incumbrances, to march from Morar on the afternoon of the same day, for Kotah-kaSerai, with the force detailed in the margin,* leaving in Morar the force also detailed in the margin, under Brigadier-General Napier, for its protection, the investment of Gwalior, and the pursuit of the enemy, when they retreated from it.

The march to Kotah-ka-Serai, about 20 miles, was very harassing; 100 men of Her Majesty's 86th Regiment alone were compelled by sunsickness to fall out and go into dhoolies. These same men, the next day, unmindful of their illness, fell in with their companies, and took part in the assault of Gwalior, which corroborates what I said in a previous report, that the spirit of the soldie's often made them fight when they were too weak to march.

My column bivouacked on the left bank of the river Morar, and during the night I communicated

* 2 Troops 14th Light Dragoons, No. 18 Light Field Battery, Madras Sappers and Miners, Wing H.M's. 71st Highland Light Infantry, H. M's. 86th Regiment, Wing 5th Hydrabad Infantry, 2 18-pounders and 1 8-inch howitzer.

tist Troop Bombay Horse Artillery, 3 Troops 14th Light Dragoons, 3 Troops 3rd Light Cavalry, 50 ist Hydrabad Cavalry, 3rd Hydrabad Cavalry, 2 squadrons Meade's Horse, 21st Company Royal Engineers, Wing 3rd Bombay Europeans, 4 Companies 24th Bombay Native Infantry, 3 Guns Hydrabad Artillery.

with Brigadier Smith and Colonel Hicks, Commanding Artillery, Central India Field Force.

Brigadier Smith reported to me that, in conse quence of the enemy occupying in great numbers the hills opposite Kotah-ka-Serai on the other side of the river Morar, and pressing on him, he had advanced from his position at Kotah-ka-Sera, and, following the road from that place to Gwalior, by the ford across the river, had attacked and driven the enemy from the hills on his right front, and occupied the road, which led through a pass about two miles in length, through the hills, and to the left or south side of a very deep and dry old canal, cut out of the rock, which led from the ford close by the left of the road through the pass, to the foot of the rock, or Fort of Gwalior.

The enemy retained possession of the hills to the left of the pass and canal.

To the left of the road and canal in the pass rose from a narrow plain a succession of slopes, intersected by ravines: a ridge ran along the top of the slopes, on which the enemy had placed a battery of 9-pounders. To protect the battery and position, the enemy had concentrated a numerous force of all arms on the ridge, as well as a large body of cavalry in rear of it.

About a mile and a half further back, and about the same distance from the left of the road, was stationed in a gorge of the hills a large body of the enemy's infantry, with guns. They guarded s road which branched off from the ford southwards through the hills to Gwalior.

Brigadier Smith's position in the hills was weak and cramped. His left and rear were threatened by the two bodies just described. The camp baggage and guns were in the pass, into which came shots from the enemy's battery on the ridge.

It was clear that the enemy must be driven

from both positions, the one on the ridge and the other in the gorge, before I advanced on Gwalior.

The enemy, by occupying positions on the hills so far from and unsupported by Gwalior, had exposed himself to be cut off. The impediment to my doing so was the deep canal, impracticable for cavalry and infantry: on this obstacle the enemy probably relied for protection. To remove it I directed the company of Madras Sappers and Miners to make a bridge some way to the left rear of our position, across the canal. The bridge or dam was to be ready by sunset. I made the plan to cross over this bridge during the night, with a force of all arms, get on the south road to Gwalior through the hills above-mentioned, place myself between Gwalior and the enemy's two positions, fall on them a little before daybreak, when Her Majesty's 86th and 95th Regiments, supported by the rest of Brigadier Smith's Brigade, were, concealed by the ravines, to attack their front and turn their left flank.

I beg to make special mention of Major the Honourable E. C. H. Massey, 95th Regiment; Captain Bolton, Deputy Assistant QuartermasterGeneral, Rajpootana Field Force, and Lieutenant Harris, of the 3rd Troop, Bombay Horse Artillery, for the assistance which their intelligence and knowledge of the ground enabled them to give me in making the reconnoissance and plan

Lieutenant Haggard, Commissary of Ordnance, by my desire, had during the night moved the two 18-pounders and 8-inch howitzer from our bivouac up to the top of a steep height, which was to the right of the road and canal and opposite the ridge. I selected a point at the extremity of a spur of the height towards Gwalior as a position for these guns, from whence they commanded the plain below the entrance to the pass, and were