Charging for Government (Routledge Revivals): User charges and earmarked taxes in principle and practiceOriginally published in 1991, user charges and earmarked taxes are methods by which people pay directly for the services they recieve from government. As such they are frequently supported by those who oppose increased taxation, who argue that they are more like market transactions than traditional forms of taxation. This book explores the cogency of these arguments in the light of public choice analyses of political processes. |
Contents
| 1916 | |
a survey | 1935 |
User charges rent seeking and public choice | 1956 |
some bureaucratic implications | |
Subjective cost property rights and public pricing | |
the case of the French | |
The political economy of tax earmarking | |
Rent seeking and tax earmarking | |
Tax earmarking and the optimal lobbying strategy | |
Excises earmarked taxes and government user charges in a rent seeking | |
User fees and earmarked taxes in constitutional perspective | |
Other editions - View all
Charging for Government: User Charges and Earmarked Taxes in Principle and ... Richard E. Wagner No preview available - 1991 |
Charging for Government: User Charges and Earmarked Taxes in Principle and ... Richard E. Wagner No preview available - 2010 |
Common terms and phrases
activity actual allocation amount argue argument behaviour beneficiaries benefit principle Buchanan budget budgetary processes bureau bureaucratic Calculus of Consent cent charges and earmarked collective competitive Congress constitutional constraint consumers consumption demand developed earmarked taxes economists EDF’s efficiency electric environmental example excise tax expenditures external federal Figure firms fiscal exchange fiscal process fuel tax fund gasoline tax general-fund financing governmental gtentity highways imposed incentives increase indifference curves individual institutional interest group Journal Knut Wicksell lobbying marginal benefit marginal cost pricing market process maximize McChesney monopoly normative operate optimal outcomes output particular Pigovian Pigovian tax political economy political processes politicians pollution positive possible problem programmes proposed Public Choice public enterprises public finance reduce regulation rent seeking represent result rules smoking social Superfund surplus tax earmarking tax rate taxation theory transfer user charges user fees utility Wagner welfare economics Wicksell