said, in plain English, "You'll be at liberty to do as much good as you please, but, by G—, you shall do us no hurt." The bishop sweetened the pill; for such it would appear in its simple form, to a mind fraught with notions of arbitrary power, and educated among a people, who, with the utmost simplicity, boast of their slavery.

What can be more ridiculous than to hear them frequently object to the English gentlemen that travel in their country, "What is your king? Commend me to our grand monarch, who can do whatever he pleases." But, begging pardon of these facetious gentlemen, whom it is not my intention to disturb, in their many notions of government, I shall go on to examine what were the sentiments of the ancient Romans on this head.

We find that their dictator, a magistrate never created but in cases of great extremity, vested with power as absolute during his office (which never exceeded six months) as the greatest kings were never possessed of; this great ruler was liable to be called to an account by any of the tribunes of the people, † whose persons were at the same time rendered sacred by the most solemn laws.

This is evident proof, that the Romans were of opinion, that the people could not in any sense divest themselves of the supreme authority, by conferring the most extensive power they possibly could imagine, on one or more persons acting as magistrates.

This appears still more evident, in remarking that the people sat as umpire of the differences which had

Qu'est ce que votre roi? Parlez-moi de notre grand monarque, morbleu! qui peut faire tout ce qu'il veut.

Si antiquus animus plebi Romanæ esset, (says one of the tribunes,) audaciter se laturum fuisse de abrogando Q. Fabii [dictatoris] imperio. -T. Liv. lib. xxii. cap. 25.

arisen between the dictator and senate, in the case of young Fabius.*

The great deference, which Cicero paid to the judgment of the Roman people, appears by those inimitable orations, of which they were the sole judges and auditors. That great orator had a just opinion of their understanding. Nothing gave him a more sensible pleasure than their approbation. But the Roman populace were more learned than ours, more virtuous perhaps; but their sense of discernment was not better than ours. However, the judgment of a whole people, especially of a free people, is looked upon to be infallible; so that it has become a common proverb, that the voice of God is the voice of the people, Vox Dei est populi vox. And this is universally true, while they remain in their proper sphere, unbiased by faction, undeluded by the tricks of designing men.

Thank God! we are in the full enjoyment of all these privileges. But can we be taught to prize them too much? or how can we prize them equal to their value, if we do not know their intrinsic worth, and that they are not a gift bestowed upon us by other men, but a right that belongs to us by the laws of God and nature?

Since they are our right, let us be vigilant to preserve them uninfringed, and free from encroachments. If animosities arise, and we should be obliged to resort to party, let each of us range himself on the side which unfurls the ensigns of public good. Faction will then vanish, which, if not timely suppressed, may overturn the balance, the palladium of liberty, and crush us under its ruins.

* Tribunos plebis appello, (says an illustrious senator to the dictator,) et provoco ad populum, eumque tibi, fugienti senatus judicium, judicem fero. T. LIV. lib. viii. cap. 33.

VOL. II.

36

X*

The design of this paper is to assert the common rights of mankind, by endeavouring to illustrate eternal truths, that cannot be shaken even with the foundations of the world.

I may take another opportunity to show, how a government, founded on these principles, rises into the most beautiful structure, with all the graces of symmetry and proportion, as much different from that raised on arbitrary power, as Roman architecture from a Gothic building.

ON GOVERNMENT.- No. II.

FROM THE PENNSYLVANIA GAZette, april 8, 1736.

The politeness of the

AN ancient sage of the law* says, "The King can do no wrong; for, if he doeth wrong, he is not the King." And in another place, "When the King doth justice, he is God's vicar; but when he doth unjustly, he is the agent of the Devil." later times has given a softer turn to the expression. It is now said, The King can do no wrong, but his ministers may. In allusion to this, the Parliament of 1741 declared they made war against the King for the King's service. But his Majesty affirmed, that such a distinction was absurd; though, by the way, his own creed contained a greater absurdity, for he believed he had an authority from God to oppress the subjects, whom by the same authority he was obliged to cherish and defend. Aristotle calls all princes tyrants, from the

Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliæ; an author of great weight, contemporary with Henry the Third.

Rex non facit injuriam, quia, si facit injuriam, non est rex.

Dum facit justitiam, vicarius est Regis æterni; minister autem Diaboli, dum declinet ad injuriam.

It

moment they set up an interest different from that of their subjects; and this is the only definition he gives us of tyranny. Our own countryman, before cited, and the sagacious Greek, both agree on this point, that a governor, who acts contrary to the ends of government, loses the title bestowed on him at his institution. would be highly improper to give the same name to things of different qualities, or that produce different effects. Matter, while it communicates heat, is generally called fire, but when the flames are extinguished, the appellation is changed. Sometimes indeed the same sound serves to express things of a contrary nature; but that only denotes a defect, or poverty, in the language.

A wicked prince imagines, that the crown receives a new lustre from absolute power, whereas every step he takes to obtain it is a forfeiture of the crown.

His conduct is as foolish as it is detestable; he aims at glory and power, and treads the path that leads to dishonor and contempt; he is a plague to his country,

and deceives himself.

During the inglorious reigns of the Stuarts (except a part of Queen Anne's), it was a perpetual struggle between them and the people; those endeavouring to subvert, and these bravely opposing the subverters of liberty. What were the consequences? One lost his life on the scaffold, another was banished. The memory of all of them stinks in the nostrils of every true lover of his country; and their history stains with indelible blots the English annals.

The reign of Queen Elizabeth furnishes a beautiful contrast. All her views centred in one object, which was the public good. She made it her study to gain the love of her subjects, not by flattery or little soothing arts, but by rendering them substantial favors. It

was far from her policy to encroach on their privileges; she augmented and secured them.

And it is remarked to her eternal honor, that the acts presented to her for her royal approbation (forty or fifty of a session of Parliament) were signed without examining any farther than the titles. This wise and good Queen only reigned for her people, and knew that it was absurd to imagine they would promote any thing contrary to their own interests, which she so studiously endeavoured to advance.* On the other hand, when this Queen asked money of the Parliament, they frequently gave her more than she demanded, and never inquired how it was disposed of, except for form's sake, being fully convinced she would not employ it but for the general welfare. Happy princess, happy people! What harmony, what mutual confidence! Seconded by the hearts and purses of her subjects, she crushed the exorbitant power of Spain, which threatened destruction to England, and chains to all Europe. That monarchy has ever since pined under the stroke, so that now, when we send a man-of-war or two to the West Indies, it puts her into such a panic fright, that, if the galleons can steal home, she sings Te Deum as for a victory.

This is a true picture of government; its reverse is tyranny.

* This notion of the infallible perception by the people of their true interest, and their unerring pursuit of it, was very prevalent in the provinces, and, for a time, in the States after the establishment of American independence. A striking instance of it is mentioned by Mr. Justice Story, in his Eulogy on Chief Justice Marshall, who, during the earlier part of his life, did not dream that the voice of the people could be other than the voice of God. W. PHILLIPS.