statement: "In the thirty-five years that have elapsed since then (1851) there has been twice as much bloodshed, and more than double the money spent in war by civilized powers, than during the preceding sixty-five years." But even judged by the light of recent events, there is no need to deal harshly with this Manchester peroration; that, too, was delivered on the assumption, unfortunately not yet realised, that a policy of free imports would lead to Free Trade, the free exchange of the fruits of his labours between man and his brother man. It may be worth while, too, to call attention to another of Cobden's minor predictions, which certainly exerted a very remarkable influence on the public mind. Free Trade or free imports were to give a cheap loaf. The big Free Trade loaf, and diminutive Protection loaf, are even now made use of with a view to catching the votes of the farm-labourers, newly enfranchised and new to such devices. The remark, perhaps imaginary, of some farm-labourer, was in the mouth of every anticorn-law-league agitator, "I be protected but I be starving," and was intended to convince the public not only that protection was bad in itself, but that Free Trade would make things better. Everywhere the argument of the cheap loaf was used in order to buy popularity for the advocates of free imports. Cobden and his colleagues honestly believed in it beyond all question, and many hoped, from feelings of philanthropy, that such a result would follow the abolition of the Corn Laws; but a far larger number of Free Traders were delighted with this prediction of Cobden's, because they fancied that cheap bread would enable them still further to grind down the labouring population of the towns, and compel them to work for lower wages. This latter class of Free Traders consequently welcomed with eagerness the burning eloquence and high motives of the Free Trade leaders as a cloak under which to conceal the base hopes of their greedy souls. Unfortunately for Cobden's reputation as a prophet, his hopes in the matter of the abolition of the Corn Laws cheapening the loaf have also been doomed to disappointment. The perusal of a table given in the Appendix to the Third Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the Depression of Trade and Industry, will show-that in Protectionist France wheat was on an average just 2s. 6d. a quarter cheaper than it was in England with her Corn Laws abolished, from 1846, the date of their abolition, down to 1870; that wheat has moreover been on an average cheaper in France than in England, during the whole period 1846-1883, the last year recorded in the Blue Book; and the same table will show that while the average price of wheat in England for the four years preceding the Abolition of the Corn Laws was only £2 12s. 4 d. per quarter, the average price of wheat from 1846 down to 1875 was £2 12s. 113d. per quarter!!! It would seem, in

fact, that not only was Cobden's prediction as to the effects of the abolition of the Corn Laws entirely and hopelessly wrong, but that ever since the introduction of a system of Free Trade in Corn wheat has been dearer in this country than in France with its protective tariffs, and that nearly for thirty years after the abolition of the Corn Laws wheat has been dearer in this country than it was while those laws remained on the Statute Book. Such have been the results of two of Cobden's minor predictions; but although he doubtless attached a considerable degree of importance to the lasting peace, international good-feeling, and cheap bread, which he believed a policy of free imports would bring in its train, he does not appear ever to have staked the truth of his principles, and, indeed, his character as a politician, on Free Trade producing these results. But he was not always so reticent. On the fulfilment of certain other of his predictions, he seems to have been ready to stake his all, predictions his implicit faith in which would appear to have been the key-note of his whole policy. It is about the fulfilment of these predictions, to which Cobden appears to have attached so much importance, that his admirers of the present day must be most anxious.

If the forty years which have elapsed since these predictions were made have proved them to be fallacious, then it will be seen that Cobden, according to his own showing, can no longer be considered as an apostle of free imports. His adherence to such a policy was, from the first, only conditional. If those conditions. have not been complied with, his admirers may well demand that justice shall be done him; that he shall be absolved from all connection with these latter-day Free Traders, and that the Cobden Club shall call itself after some other name, or be content to meet the charge of traducing the memory of its illustrious patron. The first of the two important predictions to which attention is called, was made in London in the autumn of 1843. It was asserted that a lower price of wheat would bring about a revival of trade; and it will be seen, from the solemn language in which Cobden indulged, how important he deemed the establishment of the truth of this principle to the success of his Free Trade policy. Wheat, it seems, had commanded an exceptionally high price during the three years 1839-40-41, but had fallen again in 1842 to 57s. 3d. per quarter. Speaking of these three years of high prices, Cobden said, "These three years were years of unparalleled suffering and distress. Last autumn Providence blessed us with an abundant harvest, and this, in connection with the importation of foreign corn to the extent of three millions, so reduced the price of wheat that the average price of that article for the first six months of the present year has only been 47s. 7d. Now, if there had been no revival of trade under such circumstances, I should not have dared to appear

before you; I should have deserved, indeed, the character of an imposter as to all I have said on this subject, had there been norevival of trade under such circumstances."

To those who speculate on what Cobden's attitude would have been at the present day, had he lived, nothing can exceed the importance of this very explicit declaration. So convinced does he seem to have been that a fall in the price of wheat, the precursor of his boasted cheap loaf, would necessarily result in an immediately increased prosperity of trade, that he is apparently content to allow the whole fabric of the Free Trade policy, which he had reared at such cost, to stand or fall by the truth of that simple principle. It is impossible to place any other interpretation on his language. Did not a fall in the price of wheat bring about increased prosperity of trade, he was willing that all he had said on the subject of Free Trade should be discredited, and he asserted that he himself would not dare to appear in public. Unfortunately for those who fondly believe that in supporting our present policy of free imports they are following out the principles which Cobden taught, this corner-stone argument of his, this. assertion on which he staked his very political morality, has, like each one of his other too confident predictions, now turned out to be altogether, and in every point, entirely fallacious.

Never was a prediction more completely falsified. Guided by the experience of the past forty years, it would be difficult to conceive any prediction which could have been made on any subject that could be proved by events not merely so incorrect, but so completely the reverse of the truth. So generally is this understood that it is now almost universally admitted that we can look for no revival of our depressed industries until agriculture shows some signs of returning life, a consummation which cannot by any possibility be accomplished, unless it is by a rise in the price of agricultural products, especially of wheat. This feeling is well expressed in a note especially added to their replies to the question of the Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade, by the Liverpool General Brokers' Association, a society that cannot be suspected of any undue regard for the interests of agriculture. "Short crops," they say, "and low prices have made profitable farming an impossibility; thus, our best customers fail us when most wanted, and the result is felt not only in our own market, but in every manufacturing town and village in the land." The Blue Books containing the evidence given before the Royal Commission teem with such expressions of opinion. Mr. J. H. Brown, a witness representing the South of Scotland Chamber of Commerce, and interested in the tweed trade, speaks most emphatically of the ruinous effect on trade which is caused by any depression in agriculture; so also, among many others, do Mr. Stuttard, a Man

chester cotton-spinner, Mr. Ellis, of the South Yorkshire Coal Association, Mr. Belk, the master cutler, and Mr. J. Dixon, President of the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce. This latter gentleman, when questioned as to the causes that might be assigned for the depression of trade in general, replied: "Speaking generally,. of course, when the agricultural interest of this country is depressed, the Sheffield trade is depressed in proportion, and I believe that the agricultural interest is very greatly depressed owing, in a great measure, to the low price of cereals." And yet Cobden anticipated that as the price of cereals fell, the prosperity of commerce would increase! But the facts and figures of the past twenty years afford overwhelming evidence of the fallacy of this prediction of Cobden's. When, during the eight years 1866–74, our trade was progressing by "leaps and bounds," wheat was as high as 56s. 5d. a quarter; but during the past few years, when extraordinary depression or total ruin has overtaken each one of our national industries, wheat has scarcely averaged 32s. a quarter. If Cobden's principle had been correct, these results would have been reversed, and with wheat at 56s. 5d. a quarter, our trade would have progressed but slowly; while now, with wheat at least a guinea a quarter cheaper, our trade, which is apparently almost on its last legs, should be advancing by "leaps and bounds." But if further evidence were wanting to crush the last spark of probability from Cobden's theory, it is tolerably clear that no prosperity of trade, but the depression from which we have suffered so long, has occurred concurrently with, or subsequent to, the fall in the price of the wheat. One of the questions sent round to the Chambers of Commerce of the country by the Royal Commission on Trade Depression, was as to when the depression in trade may be said to have been first felt. Upwards of one hundred Chambers of Commerce, or branches of Chambers, replied to this question, and there are barely half a dozen replies in which the depression of trade is said to have begun earlier than 1874, towards the end of which year the great fall in the price of wheat began. But even the replies which trace back the beginning of the depression to an earlier date than 1874, can scarcely be called upon in support of Cobden's prediction; for they have to do with exceptional industries, and could scarcely be expected to have felt the fall in the price of wheat. Two replies from representatives of the sugar industries, trace back their bad times to the increase of foreign sugar bounties; whilst another of the exceptional replies comes from Luton, the seat of the straw-plaiting industry, and the depression in that industry dates back a number of years to the importation of Canton plaits into this country. In fact, it may be said that the Chambers of Commerce unanimously date back the trade depression to some date subsequent to 1874, the year in

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which the price of wheat first showed so terrible a decline, and the great majority of their replies would seem to show that depression has increased as the price of wheat has almost continuously decreased.

The second of Cobden's more important predictions, is his assertion that, would this country but set the example, and adopt a policy of free imports, other nations would be certain to follow suit. Mr. Villiers, the Parliamentary leader of the Free Trade party, declared on one occasion, in moving his annual motion for the repeal of the Corn Laws, that not only would foreign countries follow our example and open their ports, but that they were eagerly awaiting our action in the matter, and were with much difficulty being restrained by their leading statesmen from being beforehand with us. "Both Germany and America," said Mr. Villiers, "where our rivals are now most prosperous, say, Take our corn and we will take your manufactures,' and this has been the basis on which they have always desired to negotiate." On this point Cobden was most emphatic and determined, so completely does he appear to have been misled by the splendid glamour of his dream of "Free Trade, Peace, and Good-will among Nations." Speaking at Manchester, he said: "I believe that if you abolish the Corn Laws honestly, and adopt Free Trade in its simplicity, there will not be a tariff in Europe that will not be changed in five years to follow your example." Again, a few months later at the same place, at a time when the Free Trade party had won its crowning victory in Parliament, he says, referring to Free Trade: "But we have established a principle now, which is eternal in its strength and universal in its application, and must be applied in all nations and throughout all times, not simply to commerce, but to every item of the tariffs of the world; and if we are not mistaken in thinking our principles are true, be assured that these results will follow at no very distant period."

Here, again, Cobden stakes the truth of his principles on the advent of certain events; and there can be but little doubt that it was the decided opinion he so often and in so pronounced a manner expressed on this particular branch of the subject, that rendered the abolition of our import duties, and the entire upheaval of a fiscal system under which the commerce of this country had enormously progressed, a possible, and, as the event showed, even an easy task. But there has been a rude awakening here as elsewhere. If foreign nations were, in reality, so anxious, as Mr. Villiers would have had us believe, to follow our example and open their ports, they were also prudently anxious to await the results which might attend our adoption of a system of free imports. We have waited not five years, as Cobden suggested, but more than forty years. We have, with a