assent was, on one and the same day, given to the act under which the traverser was now indicted, and to the act for removing that great mass of disabilities under which the catholics had theretofore laboured; which latter act had been obtained through catholic deputation, first to the castle, and afterwards to his majesty and, what is still stronger, the legislature, instead of questioning the means by which it was attained as being illegal or sus picious, in the very preamble in which it recites that the concessions were made in consequence of the loyalty of the catholic body, removes all doubts of the legality and fairness of their proceedings. Mr. Burrowes then argued, that the attorney-general, feeling conscious that the object of the catholic was to petition, and to petition only, and that he could not show that petitioning was merely a pretext, was reduced to the necessity of contending, that pretext and purpose were synonymous terms; but Mr. B. insisted they were not, in common sense or in legal construction. Where the attorney-general caught up this interpretation Mr. B. could not conceive, unless he descended for it into Milton's Pandæmonium, where it is said by the fallen angels "Spirits, on our just pretences arm'd, fell with us." And he insisted, that the pretence, in its legal sense, must be either suggestio falsi aut suppressio veri." Mr. Burrowes then showed, that the object of the catholic body in the appointment of the traverser in any point of view, could not be an alteration of the constitution in church or state-they sought to disturb no part of either-they sought only to be admitted to a participation of it as it stood: and he con cluded by lamenting, that whilst the jury-box, on any question where civil property, to however great an amount, was involved, was crowded with enlightened catholics, upon the present occasion no member of that community appeared upon the pannel; and finally implored the God of all power and might so to enlighten the understandings, and to touch the hearts of the jurors, as that they might bring in a verdict, at once the result of a conscience without blemish, and a judgement without a cloud. The chief justice, after recapitulating the evidence, proceeded to define the law in a charge which lasted an hour and a half, of which the following is the substance: He commenced by reading at length the indictment, and then recapitulated the evidence of Sheppard, M'Donough, and Huddleston. He said, that, if they believed the witnesses Sheppard and M'Donough, they must believe that on the 31st of July a meeting had taken place in Liffey-street Chapel; that an election had there taken place, for delegating five persons to serve in a general assembly or committee of the catholics of Ireland, and to respresent that parish in that assembly. If they believed the witnesses, who both spoke to the same facts with little variation, they must believe that the traverser assisted at the election of those persons mentioned,—that he was in the chair, and put the question of their appointment. If, also, they believed Mr. Huddleston, they must believe that a meeting also took place at Fishamble-street on the 9th of July, at which certain resolutions were passed; and particularly, they would observe the nature and substance of the resolution, that five persons should be elected from each parish in Dublin, to serve in the committee: for, as the traverser did not appear to have interfered with the proceed ings at Fishamble-street, his responsibility for any thing done there would entirely depend upon the connexion, if any, which they should believe existed between those two meetings. If they thought that the meeting in Liffeystreet was held in pursuance of the resolutions entered into at Fishamble-street, they were identified; and the acts of both were evidence against the traverser. On that part of the case he should remark, there was certainly no evidence of their connexion, but the coincidence in point of number of the five persons elected in Liffey-street according with the number assigned by the resolution of the 9th, and that the election was for a parish in Dublin, and that it took place within the month. It was on this evidence for them to say, if they believed the one was in consequence of the other; and if so, the traverser was identified with both. In order to apply those facts to the law, he should give them what was the opinion of the court on the law, undertheconstruction of the statute. The act does not profess to say, that it was intended to suppress conventions meeting with a criminal intention; and to this day, an assembly might meet, and not be guilty of any criminal act, and be only illegal under the operation of the statute: but it was the meeting of an assembly, however fair and innocent their motive, that was considered by the legislature criminal and dangerous, from the very nature of the constitutions of such conventions. It was not because they were fair intended, but because, from their very formation, they possibly might be injurious; and the remedy which the legisla ture had taken, was to declare the existence of them unlawful, and to authorize the magistrates to disperse them: and this must be the only operative construction of the act; for the second section declares the publishing a notice to meet, to be a high misdemeanour, and makes it a substantive offence, attending and voting at any election of persons to serve in the same: and it would be impossible that this section of the act could ever apply, if it was to depend on the question, whether the assembly met on a true or false pretence? which would be a transaction long subsequentso that, unless the legislature meant it to extend to all representative assemblies, save those particularly excepted, these enactments of the second section would be absurd and nonsense; and what would show that absurdity greater, if the pretence was to be a false pretence, that the act empowered the peace oflicer to force his way into any such assembly, and disperse it. Is the peace-officer to be a judge of the truth or falsehood of the pretence of the meeting, or is he to wait until the pretence, the false pretence, of the meeting is disclos ed, and then disperse them, while they were dispersing themselves, and the object of the meeting has been obtained? So that, if the acts of the assembly were only to bring it within the operation of the statute, the remedy would seem to me to be strangely inoperative. The act has done nothing, unless it has prevented the meeting of all dele gated assemblies, whether meeting for the purpose of petitioning or otherwise. It remains, then, if you do be lieve that the traverser Mr. Sheri dan dan did act in the election of Mr. Kirwan nominated to the general committee,and that such committee was for the purpose of altering any matter, by petition or otherwise, in the church or state, you will find him guilty; for it is our opinion, that the fact of his assisting at that election, whether it was for the purpose of petitioning or not, would n't put him out of the operation of the statute. The other three judges expressed their unanimous concurrence in the opinion of the chief justice. It is impossible, indeed language sinks under the effort to describe the anxiety manifested while the jury were in their room. Although it was nine o'clock at night, yet the hall of the four courts, the court of king's bench, all the avenues leading to the courts, the very attic windows at the top of the courts, were crowded with people. When it was announced that the jury had agreed to their verdict, after an hour and a half's deliberation, there was a deep silence for a minute. Mr. Byrne, the clerk of the crown, then called over the names of the jury: they having answered, Mr. Geale, the foreman, handed down the issue-Not guilty. The word was scarcely pronounced, when a peal of huzzaing and shouting rung through the court and galleries, and shook the very judicial bench. It was caught by the anxious auditors in the hall. The judges attempted to speakthe officers attempted to act-the enthusiasm deafened and destroyed every attempt. The judges waited for some minutes, and the chief justice attempted to address the court, but he could not be heard nothing could be heard but the lond, the overwhelming torrents of popular enthusiasm. As the jurors passed through the hall, they were greeted with waving of hats and clapping of hands. Sheriff Robert Harty was received with the most unbounded tumults of approbation and applause. In order that the bearings and merits of this most interesting and important cause may be brought fully and clearly before our readers, we have thought it necessary and proper to subjoin a copy of the convention act. Thus they may go along with us easily and regu larly in the observations we shall think it right to offer, and detect our arguments wherever they may seem to go contrary to the evident meaning and scope of the statute. "Whereas the election or appointment of assemblies, purporting to represent the people or any description or number of the people of this realm, under pretence of preparing or presenting petitions, complaints, remonstrances, and declarations, and other addresses to the king, or to both or either houses of parliament, for alteration of matters established by law, or redress of alleged grievances in church and state, may be made use of to serve the ends of factious and seditious persons, to the violation of the public peace, and the great and manifest encouragement of riot, tumult, and disorder,-be it declared and enacted, by the king's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that all assemblies, committees, or other bodies of persons elected, or in any other manner constituted or appointed, to represent, or assuming or exercising a right or authority to represent, the people of this realm, or any number or descripS4 tion tion of the people of the same, or the people of any province, county, city, town, or other district within the same, under pretence of petitioning for, or in any other manner procuring, an alteration of matters established by law in church or state, save and except the knights, citizens, and burgesses elected to serve in the parliament thereof; and save and except the houses of convocation duly summoned by the king's writ,-are unlawful as semblies; and it shall and may be lawful for any mayor, sheriff, justice of the peace, or any other peace-officer, and they are hereby respectively authorized and required, within his and their respective jurisdictions, to disperse all such unlawful assemblies, and, if resisted, to enter into the same, and to apprehend all persons offending in that behalf. 2. And be it further enacted, that if any person shall give or publish, or cause or procure to be given or published, any written or other notice of election to be holden, or of any manner of appointment of any person or persons to be the representative or representatives, delegate or delegates, or to act by any other name or description whatever, as representative or representatives, delegate or delegates, of the inhabitants, or of any description of the inhabitants, of any province, county, city, town, or other district within this kingdom, at any such assembly; or if any person shall attend and vote at such election or appointment, or by any other means vote or act in the choice or appointment, of such representatives or delegates, or other persons to act as such, every person who shall be guilty of any of the said offences respectively, being thereof convicted by due course of law shall be guilty of a high misdemeanour. 3. Provided always, that no. thing herein contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to affect elections to be made by bodies corporate, according to the charters and usage of such bodies corporate respectively. 4. Provided, also, that nothing herein contained shall be construed in any manner to prevent or impede the undoubted right of his majesty's subjects of this realm to petition his majesty, or both houses or either house of parliament, for redress of any public or private grievance." The On an attentive and impartial consideration of this statute, it is clear, that unless proof were adduced that some other object, be sides petitioning parliament, was in the contemplation of those who assembled, it could not apply to them. The great difficulty arises in find ing proof that there existed any other object; but this proof, of course, lay with the crown. fourth provision of the act, "that nothing herein contained shall be construed in any manner to prevent or impede the undoubted right of his majesty's subjects of this realm to petition his majesty, or both houses, or either house of par liament, for redress of any public or private grievance," puts it beyond a doubt, that the act was not intended to apply to the case of a convention assembled for the sole and real purpose of petitioning par liament. It may, indeed, be urged, that the fourth provision of the act merely guards the right of petition ing when exercised by assemblies of men acting for themseives, and not delegated: but as the whole of the act refers to conventions, as it was brought forward and incorporated with the law of the land, for the ex press press purpose of putting down conventions of those who met under the pretence of petitioning parlia ment, it would seem but just and natural to infer, that the fourth provision of the act guards conventional meetings, and not aggregate meetings, (which are never once mentioned or hinted at, either in the preamble or the body of the act,) from being interrupted or considered as illegal. It is quite a foreign and independent question, how far it was prudent in the catholics to have recourse to conventional meetings; how far it was consistent with their professions of regard for the tranquillity and peace of the country; and how far this proceeding, on their part, could be reconciled with the object which they professed solely to have in view. It is also a distinct and separate question, whether the convention act ought not to have had the meaning fully and unequivocally given to it, which the attorney-general and the chief justice of the king's bench contended it really possessed. On the former point we have no hesitation in affirming, that the catholics neither consulted the interest nor success of their cause, nor displayed the wisest and plainest proofs of regard to the well-being of their country, when they had recourse to delegated meetings. This step had too much the aspect of a wish and intention to force from the government by terror, what they could not obtain by simple request aud petition. At any rate, it esta blished a body of men in the metropolis of a disturbed country, who might have been led to make a bad and improper use of the character and power with which they were invested. With respect to the second point, we are of opi nion, for the reasons we have just mentioned, that the laws of all well regulated governments should be expressed against all delegated meetings, unless where the object is undoubtedly and manifestly such, that no public evil can arise from them. There is only one argument that can be urged in favour of delegated meetings assembled for the redress of public grievances; and that argument, if weighed well and examined in all its bearings, will be found to tell strongly against them. It is contended that the subjects of a country have an undoubted right to meet in delegated assemblies, whenever aggregate meetings fail in attaining their object; that individuals, scattered through the whole extent of a country, would have no chance of making their petitions for the redress of grievances heard, unless they delegated persons to act for them. But why, it may be asked, are delegates more likely to gain the object in view than aggregate meetings? Does not this argument imply, nay, does it not rest on this, that government will be threatened into submission by delegated meetings in cases where they would refuse the request of aggregate meetings? And even allowing the object of the petition to be of the highest possible importance, are not the safety and the very existence of the country objects of much greater importance? And how long would that safety continue? how long would the country exist after government had been terrified into compliance, and those who had so terrified them had felt their power? While, therefore, the right of petitioning by aggregate meetings is not put down, or called in question, there can be little danger,-while in every case |