their fatigue, a corps was dispatched in pursuit of him, which after displaying the same intrepidity and skill which had distinguished them on the main attack, succeeded in coming up with and capturing him. Thus was this important island annexed to the British empire; and to use the words of lord Minto," by the successive reductions of the French islands and of Java, the British nation has neither an enemy nor a rival from the Cape of Good Hope to Cape Horn." CHAPTER XVI. Affairs of the Peninsula—Preliminary Remarks on the important and useful Inferences to be drawn from the Occurrences in Spain-Peculiarities in the Causes and Means which have hitherto pre.erved Spain from Suljugation by the French-Expectations formed, that the Reverses of the French in Spain would materially wakin the Power and Influ.nce of Bonaparte-Difference between Spain and Portugal, and the Spaniards and Portuguese, with respect to the War in the Pausala-Circumstances in favour of the Portuguese More generally detest the French, and are more cordill; attached to the English. ONE NE of the most plausible, and, indeed, one of the most weighty objections, that has been urged against the utility of the study of history, rests upon this ground, that, in the long series of the events which it embraces and narrates, nothing is taught but what might with infinitely more facility, and with equal certainty, be learnt from the transactions that are always passing around us: that men are naturally fond of power; and that, when possessed of it, they are prone and apt to abuse it: that sovereigns are too much disposed to trust to the representations of their ministers, and of those who flatter and court them, are, it is urged, among the most novel and important maxims with which the study of history, supplies us, so far as human character in general, and the character of sovereigns in particular, is concerned. It is further objected, that, even if we depend upon the study new ΟΥ of history supplying us with very very important political maxims, we shall be much disappointed. Whoever, after the perusal of the history of most states, whether ancient or modern, sits down to recollect and digest the political rules and maxims which he has been able to glean, will perceive that they are very common-place, and only such as he might have obtained from casting his eyes round on passing public events. There is a considerable share of truth and justice in these remarks; but if they are apphed, without exception, against the utility of the study of every. history, they cease to be just and true. Both in ancient and modern times, there arise every now and then a series of events so totally distinguished and apart from the common every-day transactions of states, that they must, in their origin, progress, and consequences, strongly fix the attention and and interest, and must to the politician and philosopher afford much in sight, not before possessed, into the causes of the rise and fall of states, and into the nature of the human character when acted upon, or sur rounded by, peculiar circumstances. Those who are but moderately conversant with ancient and modern history, will easily fix upon and recognise these remarkable epochs, so pregnant with interest and instruction: the latest which have occurred are the French and the Spanish revolutions. It may, however, justly be maintained, that the lesson taught by what has already occurred, and by what is yet transacting in Spain, is both more novel and more important than what was taught by the events of the French revolution. In each of our volumes, since the commencement of the war in the peninsula, we have prefixed to our narrative of that war, or intermixed with it, such observations and reflections as it naturally sug gested, or as appeared to us calculated to set the whole transaction in its fair ard proper light, and to draw from it its legitimate and most useful conclusions. The mere simple statement of the fact, with respect to the peninsula, will excite considerable surprise and interest, and naturally provoke inquiry and investigation. France, after having, with more rapidity and uniform success than was ever before known, conquered the most powerful armies, and destroyed the most wealthy and firmly established states of Europe; by which she had not only extended her territory and increased her armies and her resources, but, what perhaps was of more moment, infused into her own soldiers a belief of invincibility, and into those of other nations a degrading and weakening feeling of military inferiority, attacked a country, the inhabitants of which had long been declining both in patriotism and valour; the armies of which were either in a wretched state of preparation and discipline, or actually, at the moment of invasion, at a distance, surrounded by the troops or the allies of the invaders; and the sovereign of which had joined, either from treachery or fear, with those who were come to wrest the sceptre from his hand, and to overrun and conquer his kingdom. When we examine more minutely into the circumstances and particulars of this event, our wonder and admiration, instead of being diminished, will be considerably extended and increased. It may indeed be said, when we com pare what the inhabitants of the peninsula have done towards the preservation of their country from the power of France, and towards the resistance and destruction of the French armies, with what other nations have done when placed in a similar situation, that the former have greatly surpassed the achievements of former times. For, in all former similar cases, there existed at the main spring of action uncommon vigour, activity, and patriotism; and by these were naturally set and continued in motion and success all the energies of the country. To take the French revolution for an example: at first, there can be no doubt that the greatest mind,-the mind of the most enlightened and comprehensive views, and of the most determined and active character, directed the movements of France, as far as they respected the defence and protection of her territory from from the invasion and conquest of a foreign power: even afterwards, in the very midst of all that savage brutality which disgraced the revolution, and which brought to light and into action a set of men infinitely worse than the most degrading and misanthropical ideas of human nature had dared to form;in the midst of all this there was undoubted talent, and that talent was so directed as to call forth the energies of the country. Far otherwise has it been with Spain ever since the commencement of the war in that country: there has, in fact, been no head, no ruling or superintending power to arrange, methodize, and direct, the well-disposed and well-directed vigour of the nation. It has been even worse than that: for those into whose hands the ill fortune of the state has uniformly thrown the direction of public affairs, have not only been destitute of all positive qualities which could possibly have rendered them fit for their situation and office; but, in too many instances and respects, the activity and vigour which they have actually discovered and exercised have done manifest and extensive mischief to the cause they were bound to benefit and support. Circumstances will justify the position, however harsh, and even strange and paradoxical it may appear, that without the government which have exercised power and rule over Spain si ce the commencement of the revolution, she would have achieved much more than she has actually done. In forming a just estimate, therefore, of the efforts of the Spaniards to drive the French beyond the Pyrenees, or to defend effectually their country from the invaders, we ought always carefully and candid ly to bear in mind (among many But Still there are other circumstances which ought to be noted and allowed their due weight, before we can sit in candid judgement upon upon the efforts of the Spaniards to protect their country against the power of Bonaparte. In the agitation and convulsion which a revolution occasions, or which are the natural and necessary consequence of a whole people being excited in defence of their independence, and being, in a great degree, thrown loose from regular government, the buoyancy of great and aspiring talents will unavoidably raise them to their proper and just level. The history of all states, under these circumstances, proves this: the history of France, perhaps more than that of any other state ancient or modern, may be cited in illustration of this position. But indeed the truth of it is so very readily and generally acknowledged, that men are much more disposed to wonder that great talents should not arise and display themselves during the convulsions of a state, than that they should become conspicuous and active. But what is the case with respect to Spain? Would it not be difficult to point out one in dividual, either in the civil or military line, of pre-eminent talents, whom the revolution has produced or called forth? However we may account for this circumstance, the existence of it is undoubted; and if it is so, if no commanding talents adequate to the direction and management of the affairs of Spain, during this momentous, arduous, and most difficult crisis, have arisen, ought we not to be the more surprised that she still has been enabled to resist the power of France? Let us also take into our consideration the character of those men who conduct the hostile councils, and lead on the hostile armies, in order that we may gain a still further insight into the merit of Spanish resistance. When France was attacked at the commencement of her revolution, although the generals who led the hostile armies were men of considerable talents, yet they were not pre-eminently so: and in a very short time, France, in respect of generals, was fully adequate to cope with her enemies. But the case with Spain was far different: she was attacked by men perfect masters in the art of war, who led against her feeble and undisciplined troops armies habituated to victory. a It was, however, expected and foretold by the sanguine friends of the Spanish cause, that, although at first her generals were inexperienced, and her troops raw and undisciplined, yet during the continuance of a protracted resistance these disadvantages would gradu. ally wear away, and the Spanish generals and armies would, from the unavoidable and natural operation of circumstances, become at least equal to those of her invader, These hopes, however, have hitherto been disappointed; and these prophecies still are without their accomplishment. Whenever French and Spanish army encounter each other, if the numerical force is nearly equal, the advantage is on the side of the French: little or nothing seems to have been gained by experience, on the part of the Spanish generals, of skill or military knowledge; and still less, on the part of the soldiers, of steadiness and discipline. Neither can be depended upon: under some circumstances, and in sorne instances, the generals will display and exert no contemptible share of military skill in the mode of attack or defence, and in the maneuvres during the battle; and their skill will be seconded by corresponding discipline and steadiness on the part of of the troops; while under other circumstances, and at other times, all the ignorance and inexperience of generals and soldiers totally unused to warfare will most fatally be exhibited. Here, then, is another cause for wonder; that under these circumstances Spain is not conquered. What is it that has prevented her conquest? We have already in our former volume adverted to some of the causes of her protracted resistance and still-preserved independence. The events of every fresh campaign either confirm the justice of those remarks, or open to our view and consideration other causes, which co-operate in enabling Spain to resist her invaders. As it is these causes which distin guish the Spanish war, they cannot be too fully explained, or too forcibly dwelt upon; we shall therefore again shortly revert to them, before we enter on our narrative of the affairs of the peninsula, interspersing such remarks as are supplied or suggested by closer and further attention to those affairs. We have already, in our former volume, adverted to the nature of the peninsula, as being particularly favourable to the cause and exertions of the Spaniards. This, of course, was equally favourable at the commencement of the revolution; but the Spaniards at that time, too much disposed to trust their defence to regular armies, neglected in a great degree the advantages which the nature of their territory supplied. Now, however, they have turned their attention more closely and effectually to them. There is only one unfavourable consequence which this mode of warfare was likely to produce, and against which they do not appear sufficiently to have guarded this 1811. desultory warfare, this occupation of the strong parts of their terri tory, ought never to have been regarded as the ultimate object of their efforts, nor as of itself adequate to the expulsion of the French. It should only have been deter mined to have recourse to it, until the regular armies could be increased and matured in skill and disci pline: it should have been regarded more as a temporary and mediate than as a lasting and ultimate measure. Had it been viewed solely and exclusively in this light, it could have produced much more beneficial effects than liave actually proceeded from it. But the nature of the Spanish territory has, from the nature of the warfare carried on in the peninsula, and from the protracted state of that warfare, produced another advantage to the Spanish cause, which was indeed partially foreseen by many of its advocates. In all the countries that have been over-run and conquered by France, her ar mies have been in a great measure both paid and supported by contributions and exactions on the inhabitants; and as the conquest was generally achieved in the short space of one campaign of but a very few months continuance, there occurred no difficulty in obtaining money and provisions amply sufficient from the occupied territory. In Spain, however, the case was different: the protracted state of the warfare of itself was sufficient to produce very great difficulties in the way of paying and supporting the French armies; and as the warfare was not only much protracted, but the French armies frequently compelled to remain long stationary, these difficulties were much increased. There were also other circumstances which operated the X same |