ation; they are on a plan likely to prove more efficacious than the former, which rendered this force by no means adequate in service to the expense with which it bore upon the country. It has been thought expedient to abolish the name of "invalids," to which contemptuous ideas were attached, as if of a man walking on a crutch, and unable to manage a musket or a bayonet. It is intended that they shall be effective men, and they are to have a board of officers, by whom redress of all complaints is to be made. The difference of expense between these and the invalids is about 5,000/., the difference between them and troops of the line is between 35 and 40,000l. The clothing for these corps is this year to be issued out of the king's stores, and consequently there are to be no charges incurred this year for clothing them. These battalions are able to occupy garrisons, and to do service in several posts which would otherwise be maintained by regiments of the line, consequently these regiments will be at liberty for other services.-I am now to notice to the committee the mode by which this plan is more economical than keeping up a smaller proportion of officers. First, the battalions and squadrons are really capable of service, without waiting to recruit, and admit of increase, without breaking the hearts of officers in the beginning of a war, by raising new corps, and bringing men into the field who had seen no service. The addition of 1 lieutenant and 25 men to each company in the cavalry, gives an addition of 5,000 in the infantry; 1 lieutenant and 25 men for each company give an increase of 250 rank and file in each battalion, and a total addition of 25,000 rank and file, with 1080 lieutenants. The whole addition thus made is 30,000 men, with the expense of only a few additional officers. By the addition of one company to each regiment of cavalry, and two to each regiment of infantry, there is a farther increase of 20,000 men.-All the services in the army department will amount to 5,270,000%. and all those annexed expenses not in the paper, including the half-pay to reduced officers, and the out-pensioners of Chelsea and Kilmainham, will not exceed the similar expenses in 1801. The expense of the military college is 7,000!.; and it is for the pleasure of parliament to grant a sum for the support of the Military Asylum. The total of the military expense will be about 5,500,000l. This expense is certainly

great, but it is less than that of last year by 2,270,000l. and less than that of the last year of the war by 10,130,000l. A difficulty arose, from the army proposed to be kept up last year, but to which in fact, we could never arrive. There is an increase of 8,525 men this year, and an additional expense of 65,0004; there has been, at the same time, a saving in several items. The expense of barracks is less by 300,000l.; and in the half-pay and other items there has been a proportionate diminution. In mentioning the increase of force since last year, I must notice a charge made on his majesty's ministers of having hastily, improvidently, and unwisely reduced the armed force of the country, when, as those persons them selves admitted, the increase now demanded was not too considerable. I will now proceed to show that these charges were without foundation. On the 1st of October 1801, there were under arms 250,000 men of all descriptions; of these, 125,343 men of all descriptions have been reduced. 1st, The cavalry amounted at that time to 25,000 men; a force not thought necessary, and for that reason, as well as because it was the most expensive, the reduction commenced with it, and 10,493 men were reduced. The militia of Great Britain and Ireland were discharged to the amount of 71,000 men. It is understood that the militia is always to be called out at the commencement of a war, and discharged on the conclusion of peace, but the fencible regiments come more strictly under this description, and were therefore immediately disbanded, to the number of 20,679 men. The invalids, to the number of 5,172 were reduced, because it had been resolved to form the out-pensioners into a more effectual force. The foreign corps were reduced to the number of 8,945 men; a force which we were glad to spare, and which, when any reduction was necessary, we thought it most politic to reduce; for when British troops were disbanded, who would think of maintaining foreigners, unless they were in situations where we could not dismiss them? All other descriptions of men dismissed, amounted to 7,025 men, which number alone constitutes the strict and regular difference between the British infantry, then and now. And if it be considered, that of these 7,000, some had enlisted to serve for a limited time, and though they were not strictly entitled to their discharge, yet as the act is so drawn as to give them

reason to think they were entitled to it, and many of them were induced to enlist, by having it so explained; it seemed inconsistent with that good faith which the government should always maintain with the people, to refuse to discharge them; but I can assure the gentleman who brought those charges, that no exertion was omitted to induce them to enlist regularly in other corps, and so many did enlist, that 19 or 20 battalions were filled up, while the reduction did not take away more than 6 or 7. Of these 7,000, many were discharged from the hospitals, and many were discharged for infirmities, on their return from long foreign service. This is the only foundation on which the charge of improvident reduction rests. But look at the force kept up, and the picture now afforded by the British army. This army was never more respectable, never in better subordination, never in better order than now, it was never composed of more able and efficient men, never actuated by a noble military spirit, with a number of able, experienced, and brave general officers, many of them in the flower of their age, uniting the vigour and enterprise of youth with the temper and wisdom of more advanced years; regulated by a prince possessed of an uncommon understanding in military affairs, indefatigable in his attention to business, and eminently just in discharging the duties of his office. For this respectable army, and the facility of augmenting its military force, the country is partly indebted to the hon. gentleman on the other side, who is entitled to the praise of having given us the command of such a force, with the facility of making an addition of 20,000 men; besides an easy resource in the militia of Ireland of 20,000 men more, exclusive of the yeomanry and volunteer corps, who have agreed to continue their services. Of these last, 8,000 rank and file have been already enrolled in Great Britain, chiefly cavalry. In Ireland the enrolment has been above double that number, amounting to 10,000 cavalry, and a still greater num. ber of infantry. Putting all together, we have a total force of 200,000 men, exclusive of the army in India; a force of such a magnitude, and of such a description, as to present no very alluring prospect to any foreign power that may be disposed to attack us. I conclude, Sir, with moving, "That 66,574 men be voted for guards and garrisons in Ireland, from the

25th of Dec. 1802, to the 24th of Dec. 1803."

Mr. Bankes said, that if he disapproved of a high peace establishment, it was not because he thought less highly than others of the formidable power of France, but because he thought more highly of the natural means and resources of this country; and he did not like to waste those resources in guarding against a danger which did not exist. In former times it had been found that small peace establishments were sufficient to keep the country secure at home, and preserve its respectability abroad; but if we were now to make the military establishment of France the measure of our own, that could not be done without ruining the resources of the country. If this country was quiet and contented at home, he did not think it need to be panic-struck on hearing of half a million of men drawn up upon the shores of France. Our insular situation was to be estimated as a powerful defence, but, above all, we were to rely on the resources of the nation, when satisfied with its government. It was by public credit and confidence, and not from our population, that Great Britain had carried on so many wars with advantage and glory. He relied also on the great number of men trained and disciplined to arms, who are now in the country; he wished, instead of increasing, to diminish as much as possible, the expenses of the army, by allowing the soldiers leave of absence for a considerable part of the year, as had always been done upon the continent.

Sir Eyre Coote approved of the proposed increase of the military establishment, which in times like the present was, he conceived, necessary, to support the honour and dignity of the empire.

Earl Temple said, that consistently with the principles he had ever acted upon in that House, he could by no means op pose the increase which was now proposed, nor should he by any vote of his, either damp the spirits of the country, or check that spark of spirit which had, however tardily, been exhibited by his majesty's government. He gave full credit to the able speech which had been made by the secretary at war; but in that statement there was nothing which could enable the House to judge whether this was an estimate for a peace establishment, or for a war establishment. There was no language of the noble secretary which

ppeared like telling France, as it was e duty of this country to do, "Thus ar shalt thou go, and no further." We ere voting a large establishment, with ut any information on the subject. lordship then condemned the general onduct of administration, and particurly their conduct with respect to the ffairs of Switzerland; and on the whole e considered, that his majesty's minisers were not persons fit to be entrusted ith the government of the country in nes like the present.

General Maitland highly approved of e speech of the secretary at war; and ought that there was no occasion for ny other argument to justify the vote, xcept the present situation of Europe. esides the enormous power of France, e ruling passion of that people is now tirely for military enterprise; and their overnment is in the hands of a general, ho if not the first and greatest now alive, certainly the most ambitious and enterrising. He never gave a vote in parliaent with greater pleasure than the prent. It was for an establishment which ould have all the effect of real economy, d a mode of securing to us peace, r better than could be effected by by seal that was ever put to the treaty. General Tarleton stated, that he had niformly voted against the late war, and ad done so most conscientiously: but he could vote with pleasure for the increase ow proposed, as he consided it absotely necessary for the honour and serity of the country-however great ere the horrors of war, yet the horrors seeing Buonaparte's flag on the Tower London, or his political principles rrent in this country, were still more rrifying to him.

Mr. Archdall hoped the vote of that ght, would be understood both at home d abroad as the cool decision of the presentatives of a great nation, who shed to act in the spirit of the answer ven to his majesty. It was not the rk manifesto of a perpetual dictator, at the voice of a great and free nation, equately represented. He had often ard the situation of the country oken of in the most desponding terms, those very gentlemen who were for the ost vigorous measures. They seemed wish to vote the country to vigor, but debate it to despair. He had heard at a general should not think lightly of s enemy, but that a common soldier

should; now he saw no policy in describ ing our situation to the enemy, so as that they should despise both general and soldier: if what was said in the House passed no further, there would be no harm perhaps, in gentlemen speaking one way, and voting another but as those things travelled far, it was very dangerous. The strength of France was also magnified; it was supposed by many, that her resources were founded on pillage, and its alliances on compulsion: if so, he saw no great reason for us to dread her power. If with our great resources, our loyalty firm, our honour untouched, our glorious navy,our army and people in a mass attached to our Constitution, we should yet be doomed to fall and be destroyed; he must say, there was something in it beyond human foresight, and therefore we must not be ashamed of our destruction.

Mr. Cartwright said, it was because he felt anxious for the preservation of peace that he should give his vote in favour of the estimate proposed; but he could not help thinking it extraordinary that his majesty's ministers should withhold all information as to the actual situation of this country with respect to France, and the stipulations of the treaty of peace.

Mr. Whitbread lamented that ministers had about them so much indecision; for at one time the minister told the House, that from the situation of affairs, he was convinced that 30,000 seamen would be sufficient; then, without any alteration in those affairs, 50,000 were proposed; and having given it as his opinion, that it would only be necessary to vote this force for a few months, then, without the least allegation of increased danger, the same minister, in a few hours afterwards, thought it proper to propose this force for the year. He condemned the language that had been so often repeated, of a determination to defend our honour, and not to bear insult: he thought that might be very well inferred, from what this country had formerly done; and that consequently such language was unnecessary, and not in the tone of true spirit. He did not seriously believe, that France meditated an attack upon this country, and thought the French government might as well pretend to be alarmed with the fears of an attack from this. Nations, as well as individuals, often retained ridiculous apprehensions of danger; we had once entertained strong apprehensions from

Dunkirk being fortified, and now we cared very little about its harbour. We were very much afraid of Jamaica too, when the French fleet sailed for St. Domingo; but those sort of fears cannot last a very long time: he did not see how the vote now proposed, could at all tend to diminish the power of France. He concluded by declaring, that it was with pleasure that he had seen the government of the country taken out of those hands, who had so misused it: and he dreaded the consequences of such men returning to power.

Mr. Ryder said, that if the proposed increase in our establishments did not take place, this country might bid a long adieu to all its greatness. But some gentlemen seemed inclined to think that navies were useless, armies something worse, and even all continental alliances absolutely detrimental. When we beheld the subjugation of the Swiss, and the progressive aggrandizement of France, were we to sit still, and suffer her to devour the rest of Europe, contented at her forbear ance in making us the last whom she was to snap at? According to the observations of an hon. gentleman, we should remain quiet, in hopes that the first consul would in time remit his anger against us, and be satisfied with the punishment we had already suffered; but the same hon. gentleman (Mr. Fox) in this afforded us but little consolation, for, in his opinion we deserved that punishment, and the war ought to have terminated gloriously to France, and ingloriously for this country. The pacific sentiments of some gentlemen argued no small degree of inconsistency. At the time when a commercial treaty was negotiating between the two countries, the same gentleman opposed it, not so much on account of the terms, as the fear that the benefit we might derive from it might, on any future occasion, render us unwiling to to go to war, even though we should have provocation: yet they assumed a different tone now, when the question was respecting a war for our own immediate defence, and at a time when we were every where surrounded by France or its auxiliaries. The demand was for a military establishment, ready for any emergency that might arise, and not perhaps so much called for by any subsisting differences, but such as would place us in a situation to assist others, and perhaps, in some not very far distant day, oppose a barrier to the encroachments of our aspir

ing neighbours. Into what situation things might yet subside, must be left to time and circumstances to develope, and no reliance could be placed upon pledges or previous dispositions exhibited by that House. In the reign of Queen Anne, parliament had passed a resolution, that no peace should be made with France while she retained an inch of the Spanish territory; yet that object was wholly abandoned at the peace of Utrecht. So also, in 1741, the parliament voted, that no peace should be made until the Spaniards renounced the right of search on the coast of America; but the treaty of Aixla-Chapelle was made without ever men. tioning the subject. It was true, that heretofore we had always peace establishments comparatively small; but at no former period were we ever totally destitute of all continental alliances and connexions. The House was not, however, now called upon for a pledge of any kind; but as our resources were but little impaired, he conceived it to be the duty of every man to bear his share in the expenses of an increased establishment, lest the burthen should afterwards fall with accumulated weight upon us.

Mr. Sheridan rose and said :-Sir, being in the situation alluded to by the right hon. gentleman who has just sat down, of not being able to agree precisely with any of those who have preceded me, yet of being, at the same time, unwilling to give a silent vote on the present occasion, I rise with some sentiments of reluctance. There is one thing, however, in which we all coincide; it is, that the crisis in which we are are placed, is so big with tremendous importance, so pregnant with mighty difficulties, so full of apprehensions and dangers, that the House and the country have a right to know what are the inten tions and the views of those by whose exertions we may expect to be extricated from the complication of embarrassments, and snatched from the very brink of destruction. Sir, one of the circumstances I most regret in this debate is, the references that have been made to the characters and abilities of persons supposed to be fit to fill particular offices. I feel this as a subject of regret, and feeling so, I am sorry that my hon. friend near me made any allusion even to one man, whom of all men upon earth, I most love and respect, because I do view the crisis to be one of such moment and peril, and because, if ever there was a time in which

we should prove to the people of England that we are above all party feelings, that we are above all party distinctions, that we are superior to any petty scramble for places and power, that time is the present. Sir, in speaking upon these topics, I do find a disposition in some gentlemen to rebuke any man who shall deliver any opinion with respect to the first consul of France. One hon. gentleman, who rebuked an hon. general that spoke before him, declared that he would not give his opinion with respect to the conduct of France to Switzerland; and what does his rebuke amount to? He confesses that upon that subject there can be but one opinion. Why then, Sir, he either adopts the opinion of the hon. general or not. If he does adopt it, he gives as strong an opinion against the conduct of France as can possibly be given. If he does not adopt it, why then all we can say is, that there are two opinions. But what, he asks, has Switzerland to do with the question? It has this to do with it. The hon. general introduced the subject in this way; he contends that a power which is capable of such unprovoked aggression, and such perfidy, is the power that ought to be watched. But the hon. gentleman goes on to assert, that we have nothing to do with the case of Switzerland, nothing to do with France, nothing but with her power:-nothing but her power!-as if that were little. He asks too where is the great difference between France under the Bourbons and under her present ruler? Why, Sir, the hon. general inferred, from the conduct of France, that with her growing power she had a growing disposition to mischief. But is that power, demands the hon. gentleman, greater now than it was last June? Perhaps it is not, Sir. But her mischievous disposition is greater; and if I am asked to bring a proof of the truth of my assertion, I must bring the case of Switzerland. Sir, if I see a purposed contempt of the independence of a nation; if I see a perfidious disregard of the faith of treaties; if I see a power withdraw her assistance, only to return and entrap a country of freemen with greater certainty, why then I say there has been a change, and a great change too, and that such a power we have a right to watch. But, says the hon. gentlemen, we have no right to make use of invectives against the first consul of France. I will abstain if I can; I say if I can, because I feel that even a [VOL. XXXVI.]

simple narrative may be construed into invective. With regard to the general question of a disposition to peace or war, I, for one, declare, that I am as strongly and as sincerely for thepreservation of peace as any man, and that I do not consider war as any remedy for the evils complained of. If a war spirit be springing up in this country, if a chivalrous disposition be observable, if a sentiment of indignation be rising upon the subject of the treatment of Switzerland, I, for one, shall contend that the treatment of Switzerland is no cause of war. I would therefore say, preserve peace if possible: peace if possible, because the effects of war, always calamitous, may be calamitous indeed, buckling, as we should be forced to do, all our sinews and strength to that power in a contest with her upon such grounds. I repeat, therefore, peace if possible; but I add, resistance, prompt, resolute, determined resistance to the first aggression, be the consequences what they may. Influenced by these sentiments, I shall vote cordially and cheerfully for this large peace establishment; and it is because I shall vote for it, that I think myself bound to state my reasons. Sir, some gentlemen seem to consider what they advance as so many axioms too clear to need explanation or to require defence. But when I vote so large an establishment, I think myself not at liberty to bind such a burthen upon my constituents, without stating the grounds upon which I act, and the principles by which I am prompted. Sir, I have listened with all the attention I am master of to the different arguments that have been advanced in the present debate. One hon. gentleman who spoke second, appears to be a decided enemy to a great establishment, and the reasons he gave for his opposition, I confess, perfectly astonished me. Luckily he has no rapid flippancy in his manner; his sentiments are delivered too soberly and sedately to be mistaken. I am sure I mean nothing disrespectful to that gentleman, who amply repays the attention that is paid to him. But he says, if ministers had only said to him that danger existed, he would, for one, have voted for the force proposed. Does he doubt the danger? He complains that his majesty's ministers do not state it precisely. But does he pretend that he does not see and feel it? Can any one look at the map of Europe and be blind to it? Can any one have a [3 Y]