riod of peace, invaded the territory, and violated the independence of the Swiss nation, in defiance of the treaty of Luneville, which had stipulated the independence of their territory, and the right of the inhabitants to choose their own form of government. They have annexed to the dominions of France, Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia, and the island of Elba, without allotting any provision to the king of Sardinia, whom they have despoiled of the most valuable part of his territory, though they were bound, by a solemn engagement to the emperor of Russia, to attend to his interests and to provide for his establishment. It may, indeed, with truth be asserted, that the period which has elapsed since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, has been marked with one continued series of aggression, violence, and insult, on the part of the French government. In the month of October last, his majesty was induced, in consequence of the earnest solicitation of the Swiss nation, to make an effort, by a representation to the French government, to avert the evils which were then impending over that country. This representation was couched in the most temperate terms; and measures were taken by his majesty for ascertaining, under the circumstances which then existed, the real situation and wishes of the Swiss cantons, as well as the sentiments of the other cabinets of Europe. His majesty learned, however, with the utmost regret, that no disposition to counteract these repeated infractions of treaties and acts of violence, was manifested by any of the powers most immediately interested in preventing them; and his majesty therefore felt that, with respect to these objects, his single efforts could not be expected to produce any considerable advantage to those in whose favour they might be exerted.

It was about this time that the French government first distinctly advanced the principle, that his majesty had no right to complain of the conduct, or to interfere with the proceedings, of France, on any point which did not form a part of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens. That treaty was unquestionably founded upon the same principle as every other antecedent treaty or convention, on the assumption of the state of possession and of engagements subsisting at the time of its conclusion; and if that state of possession and of engagements is materially affected by the voluntary act of any of the parties, so as to prejudice the condition on which the other party has entered into the contract, the change, so made, may be considered as operating virtually as a breach of the treaty itself, and as giving the party aggrieved a right to demand satisfaction or compensation for any substantial difference which such acts may have effected in their relative situations; but whatever may be the principle on which the treaty is to be considered as founded, there is indisputably a general law of nations, which,

though liable to be limited, explained, or restrained by conventional law, is antecedent to it, and is that law or rule of conduct to which all sovereigns and states have been accustomed to appeal, where conventional law is admitted to have been silent. The treaty of Amiens, and every other treaty, in providing for the objects to which it is particularly directed, does not therefore assume or imply an indifference to all other objects which are not specified in its stipulations, much less does it adjudge them to be of a nature to be left to the will and caprice of the violent and the powerful. The justice of the cause is alone a sufficient ground to warrant the interposition of any of the powers of Europe in the differences which may arise between other states, and the application and extent of that just interposition is to be determined solely by considerations of prudence. These principles can admit of no dispute; but if the new and extraordinary pretension advanced by the French government, to exclude his majesty from any right to interfere with respect to the concernsof other powers, unless they made a specific part of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, was that which it was possible to maintain, those powers would have a right, at least, to claim the benefit of this principle, ia every case of difference between the two coun tries. The indignation of all Europe must surely then be excited by the declarations of the French government, that, in the event of hostilities, these very powers who were no parties to the treaty of Amiens, and who were not allowed to derive any advantage from the remonstrances of his majesty in their behalf, are nevertheless to be made the victims of a war which is alleged to arise out of the same treaty, and are to be sacrificed in a contest which they not only have not occasioned, but which they have had no means whatever of preventing.

His majesty judged it most expedient, under the circumstances which then affected Europe, to abstain from a recurrence to hostilities on account of the views of ambition and acts of aggression manifested by France on the continent; yet an experience of the character and dispositions of the French government could not fail to impress his majesty with a sense of the necessity of increased vigilance in guarding the rights and dignity of his crown, and in protecting the interests of his people.

Whilst his majesty was actuated by these sentiments, he was called upon by the French government to evacuate the island of Malta. His majesty had manifested, from the moment of the signature of the definitive treaty, an anxious disposition to carry into full effect the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens relative to that island. As soon as he was informed that an election of a grand master had taken place, under the auspices of the emperor of Russia, and that it had been agreed by the different priories assembled at St.

cessarily be supposed to have had considerable influence with his majesty in inducing him to make so important a concession was the acquiescence of the French government in an arrangement for the security of the Levant, by the eighth and ninth articles in the treaty, stipulating the integrity of the Turkish empire, and the independence of the Ionian islands. His majesty has, however, since learnt, that the French government have entertained views hostile to both these objects; and that they have even suggested the idea of a partition of the Turkish empire. These views must now be manifest to all the world, from the official publication of the report of colonial Sebastiani; from the conduct of that officer, and of the other French agents in Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian islands, and from the distinct admission of the first consul himself, in his communication with lord Whitworth. His majesty was, therefore, warranted in considering it to be the determination of the French government, to violate those articles of the treaty of peace, which stipu lated for the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire, and of the Ionian islands, and consequently he would not have been justified in evacuating the island of Malta, without receiving some other security, which might equally provide for these important objects. His majesty accordingly feels that he has an incontestible claim, in consequence of the conduct of France since the treaty of peace, and with reference to the objects which made part of the stipulations of that treaty, to refuse, under the present circumstances, to relinquish the possession of the island of Malta.

Yet notwithstanding this right so clear and so unquestionable, the alternative presented by the French government to his majesty, in language the most peremptory and menacing, was the coacuation of Malta, or the renewal of

war.

If the views of ambition and aggrandizement, which have thus been manifested by the French government since the conclusion of the treaty of peace, have in so very particular a manner attracted the attention of his majesty, it has been equally impossible for him not to feel, and not to notice, the repeated indignities which have been offered by that government to his crown, and to his people.

The report of colonel Sebastiani contains the most unwarrantable insinuations and charges against his majesty's government, against the officer who commanded his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter. This paper cannot be considered as the publication of a private individual; it has been avowed, and indeed bears evidence upon the face of it, that it is the official report of an acredited agent, published by the authority of the government to which it was addressed, who thereby have given it their express sanction.

This report had been published a very short time, when another indignity was offered to this country in the communication of the first consul of France to the legislative body. In this communication he presumes to affirm, in the character of chief magistrate of that country, "That Great Britain cannot singly contend against the power of France;" an assertion as unfounded as it is indecent, disproved by the events of many wars, and by none more than by those of the war which has been recently concluded. Such an assertion, advanced in the most solemn official act of a government, and thereby meant to be avowed to all the powers of Europe, can be considered in no other light than as a de fiance publicly offered to his majesty, and to a brave and powerful people, who are both willing and able to defend his just rights, and those of their country, against every insult and aggression.

The conduct of the first consul to his majesty's ambassador at his audience, in presence of the ministers of most of the sove reigns and states of Europe, furnishes another instance of provocation on the part of the French government which it would be improper not to notice on the present occasion, and the subsequent explanation of this transaction may be considered as having the effect of aggravating instead of palliating the affront.

At the very time when his majesty was demanding satisfaction and explanation on some of the points above mentioned, the French minister at Hamburgh endeavoured to obtain the insertion in a Hamburgh paper of a most gross and opprobrious libel against his majesty, and when difficulties were made respecting the insertion of it, he availed himself of his official character of minister of the French republic to require the publication of it by order of his government in the gazette of the senate of that town. With this requisition so made, the senate of Hamburgh were induced to comply; and thus has the independence of that town been violated, and a free state made the instrument, by the menace of the French government, of propagating throughout Europe, upon their authority, the most offensive and unfounded calumnies against his majesty and his government. His majesty might add to this list of indignities, the requisition which the French government have repeatedly urged, that the laws and constitution of his country should be changed relative to the liberty of the press. His majesty might likewise add the calls which the French government have on several occasions made upon him to violate the laws of hospitality with respect to persons who had found an asylum within his dominions, and against whose conduct no charge whatever has at any time been substantiated. It is impossible to reflect on these different proceedings, and the course which the French government have thought proper to adopt

faith, and with the essential interests of the British empire; and that for these indignities and provocations, his majesty has in vain demanded satisfaction and redress:-That, actuated by these sentiments, we feel that the trust reposed in us by a brave and loyal people, requires, on our part, a firm determination to cooperate with his majesty in calling forth the resources of the United Kingdom for the vigorous support of a cause in which are involved the dignity of his majesty's crown, the rights and liberties of his people, and all that is dear and valuable to ❘ us as a free and independent nation."

Mr. Erskine warmly expressed his sense of the hostile disposition and proceedings of France. To some parts of the conduct of ministers in the negotiation, and of the Address, he urged objections; but he assured them of his readiness to contribute, at all times, and by every method in his power, toward an effectual resistance of all aggression, either upon the dominion, the interests, or the honour of the country. Mr. Pitt began by observing upon some passages of Mr. Erskine's speech, the tendency of which he professed not entirely to understand, but from which he was led to hope that the learned gentle tleman, and those with whom he usually acted, were not likely materially to object to the proposed address. He flattered himself that this was likely to be the case, because, whatever difference of sentiment might arise, and much was certainly to be expected, on many points included in the great mass of information contained in the papers on the table, yet upon the great and important question at issue between this country and France, and upon the justice and necessity of the grounds on which we were compelled to enter into the war, he thought it almost impossible that the House should not be unanimous. In those transactions which had most immediately produced our present situation, the learned gentleman himself appeared, notwithstanding some doubts which he had thrown out on particular points, to admit, upon the whole, that there was such clear evidence of views of aggression and hostility on the part of France, as justified this country in retaining Malta for its own security. This he maintained to be the first great point on which the question turned; and he contended, that the whole of Sebastiani's report, and the circumstances of his mission to Egypt, the express and deliberate

avowal by Buonaparté himself of his views and intentions, in a formal conference with lord Whitworth, and the information of the same intentions through the official channel of the minister for foreign affairs, afforded the most indisputable evidence, that the first consul had formed the determination, even while Malta was yet in our hands, of resuming his hostile project against Egypt; that the pursuit of such a project was an undeniable act of hostility against this country, and aimed at some of its most important interests; that it was, besides, a direct violation both of the letter and spirit of the treaty of Amiens itself, under pretence of which treaty alone our evacuation of that island was demanded, though under circumstances which, in other respects, according to the letter of that treaty, did not authorize such a demand; that the disclosure of this hostile project clearly justified this country in requiring fresh security against it, and if such security was refused, in having recourse to arms for that purpose, at the moment which appeared to be most for our advantage.

He then more particularly commented on each of these several circumstances with respect to the report of Sebastiani. He stated, that that was evidently an official paper addressed to the govern ment, by a persen regularly commissioned and employed by the consul himself; that its contents could never have been published in France but by his consent, and that they were published in fact in the official paper, under the direct authority of the government; that the whole tenor of that paper, and the account thus given by Sebastiani himself of his couduct in Egypt, made it impossible to doubt that he was sent there to prepare for the execution of a fresh attempt to put that country under the dominion of France; but that it was not necessary to dwell on the particular contents of the report; the mere circumstance of a military man having been sent at that time with such a commission to Egypt, was a sufficient evidence of the object of his mission. The time, he remarked, was very material, because it at once destroyed the chief pretext under which the French government had attempted, in the course of the official correspondence, to justify or extenuate the publication, or to deny the conclusion to be drawn from it. This pretext was, that the honour of the chief consul had been wounded by a narrative