ment respecting that island, could put us if it was not a measure of necessity, was in the same situation in which we stood it one of expediency? Were the disadbefore the war. As the treaty did not vantages of the war more than the advanspecify who the protecting power was to tages of the peace? He could not think be, it would be indecorous in him to say so; instead of security, we stood in more upon the subject; but he would add, greater danger than ever. He saw no that in contest with that power he would motives to submit to such a peace. He hold that important fortress as a pledge would not suppose the threat of invasion for our acquiescence in any demands which could influence it; if it did, that would be might be made. He begged to notice a repeated whenever the enemy had a point deviation from all accustomed practice in to carry. At the last peace it was necessigning the present preliminaries. It had sary to show that the united fleets of been usual to make the preliminaries as Spain, France, and Holland exceeded comprehensive as possible, and leave but our own-that was not the case at present, little to the definitive treaty. It was so nor could it become so. By the peace, in the treaties of 1763 and 1782; and the however, we had removed every security reason of the policy was obvious, because which we before possessed. Malta, Miit fell precisely under the situation of a norca, the Cape, Cochin, all surrendered, naval armistice, by which blockaded ports and our only security was upon the word were opened: they could furnish them of France. Much had been said of our with naval stores, and make new distribu- reliance upon France. Admitting, for tion of their forces. He confessed, there- the sake of argument, that the French fore, that though the ministers would government had an equal interest with resist any new demands, yet he was not our own in suppressing Jacobinism; adsanguine that they would obtain any mitting, that the republic was a kingdom, better terms at Amiens. This observation except in the name, and that there was applied to another article, which was left as much disposition there to support refor future discussion-he meant the New-gular government, as if the lawful heir of foundland fishery. England had nothing the house of Bourbon were on the throne to wish but that it should remain as it of France: still the ambition of France, stood at the last peace. What occasion as directed against this country, would, was there, then, to throw open this sub- under her enormous aggrandisement, be ject, especially as any new arrangement truly dismaying! Even under her momust be made in favour of France? One narchy, she at all times manifested a dispopoint more, as respecting Naples. If we sition to take advantage of our broils. treated Naples as our ally, we ought to Why, under the consulate, were we to to have stipulated effectually for her; at expect such a different line of conduct? present the terms were perfectly illusory: Reviewing the present state of Europe, France was to withdraw her troops, but no man could answer for a long continushe might go into the Cisalpine Republic, ance of peace. Ten years of peace were within sixty miles of Naples, and it might as much as the wisest man would venture happen, that all which she would get to calculate upon. And it was worth would be a precarious respite of three while to consider in what degree of imdays. Having thus gone through the improvement the two countries might be, as portant parts of the treaty, he asked, whether the situation of France justified her in these exorbitant demands? If we treated upon a footing of equality he saw no reciprocity-all the sacrifices were on our part, and none on theirs. The result, in his opinion, was, that we had given them the only thing they wanted-the means of creating a navy, and of rivalling us in our commerce, This treaty would extend their commerce as much as their territory, But why it was done, was not so satisfactorily explained. It was not from necessity, for all the noble lords had protested against that plea, and he rejoiced to hear it. There was one thing farther: to the means of warfare, at the expiration of that period, should any possession of ours, or more probably of our allies, tempt the cupidity or ambition of France. It was a serious thing to see the interests of the country signed away. He felt for the members of the present administration every kind of personal respect; but he differed from them most decidedly in this instance. Still he appeared not before their lordships as a professed oppositionist, He would strenuously and zealously support them, after this much-to-be-lamented business was disposed of, in every act of firmness and vigour which they might display in repelling those efforts and repress. ing those principles, which have produced | the present war and the sufferings of the European world.-There was one thing more to which he would advert. He agreed cheerfully in the necessity of a peace establishment far beyond what had been necessary at the termination of former contests. The very nature of this peace rendered it doubly necessary. Let ministers, in this respect, behave with wisdom, firmness, and vigour, and they should have his decided support. They were bound to guard against the consequences of their indiscretion. We were now in a new situation. We were enfeebled, but not broken down: we were lowered, but not debased. Some of our out-works had been demolished; many of them surrendered to the foe; but the citadel yet remained; and while it was defended by the noble courage of united Britons, it would bid defiance to attack. We should meet with mortifications and disappointments; but we should, he trusted, still preserve our honour, our constitution, and our religion. The Lord Chancellor entered into a defence of the peace. He was firmly persuaded, that the war had been carried on until it became hopeless to proceed any farther. It was undertaken to guard the country against the effect of principles and practices, which had been propagated and carried on by persons combined for the purpose of overturning the constitution. With this object in view, the war was at tended with success; because those principles no longer existed to any extent that could be attended with danger. In advising his majesty to make peace, he would perish sooner than he would sacrifice any of the essential interests of the country; but when he said that, he must not be understood to vapour in praise of the peace, as if it was a very honourable one. His principal object had been the attainment of a secure and lasting peace, and the former ministers had often declared they had no other object in view; but from what had that night fallen from the noble lord, this was very evident, that unless his argument could be displaced from their lordships' minds, this country was gone and ruined. If the representation was true, which the noble lord had given of the external and internal state of this country, he would ask him at what period could he ever hope to make a peace? What were the restorations he would refuse? It was true that this country had got several possessions belonging to the enemy; but had France gained none at all? Had she no dominion over Naples or Portugal? It was stated that, in 1797, all the possessions of France would be restored, had the negotiation at Lisle been successful. A colony restored was certainly the same thing as if it had never been conquered. It was a fact, that, in 1797, a peace had been sought for with the French Directory; but the noble lord should recollect that nothing had been done at Lisle, except proposing the basis on which the parties were about to treat; and there was a material difference between a proposition and an ultimatum. It was not, therefore, certain what conditions would have been agreed upon, had the negotiations gone on. The noble lord's observations with regard to Portugal, were not well-founded; and, whatever consequences might arise from the new arrangements with regard to her American territory, it was an evil which could bear no proportion to that of continuing the war. He would not continue the war with a view of getting rid of the war. There were many things which he might have thought necessary to be insisted upon, but which circumstances prevented him from doing. He thought the circumstances under which this country had entered into the war might have imposed upon him a necessity of requiring that a competent provision should be made for the illustrious house of Orange; but he did not in his conscience think he would have been justified in hazarding the success of the treaty by insisting on such a condition; and he had therefore thought it wiser to leave it for future arrangement. With regard to what had fallen from the noble lord, as to the importance of the Cape of Good Hope, he confessed he had himself heard seamen and statesmen say, that it was a place of the first consequence.. So far as it served for a harbour to our shipping on their voyage to India, it was of some consequence. This advantage was still to continue; but on what grounds could the cession of this port be a matter of regret? Was it because the place had been fed at a most enormous expense, from which this country was now happily relieved? He would not, then, say any thing about the value of this place as a free port, but if he had no other object in carrying on the war, than that of determining whether a certain point of land, at the extremity of peace? He knew there were some who thought it necessary to go on with the war until the ancient monarchy of France should be restored. He would not enter into the question how far that was a desirable object; but let it be ever so desirable, he would ask, how it could be done? If the present government of France was an evil, how was it to be removed? It could not be done without a great coalition of the European powers; and even when the combination did exist, it was able to effect nothing. If Great Britain was true to herself, she had nothing to fear from any principles that might still exist in France. She had already read France an awful lesson. The people of this country had reason, from the examples before them, to feel the value of their constitution. The greatest evil that was to be feared, was the effect which peace might have on a small band of people in this country, who might still wish to follow the practices of some disaffected persons in France; but to say that the present government of France was founded on principles destructive to civilized government was an absurdity in itself; and the people of England had too much sense to shed the blood of their countrymen in a civil war, for the sole prospect of gaining something which could never be called a system of liberty. He was confident that the vigour of the law would enable the government to prevent all internal mischief. As to the danger of the peace not being permanent, there was a greater chance of its being permanent now than in 1797, when the late ministers negociated with France. Although he did not attempt to represent this peace as a glorious one; yet it was a peace which, he believed, would be conducive to the security of the substantial interests of the country. Africa, was to belong to Great Britain or to Holland, and considering at the same time that since this place got into our possession, no less a sum than 125 millions had been spent, and that another year would take away thirty millions more, without this country being one whit nearer the object in view, he had no hesitation in declaring which course he should pursue. The noble lord had found fault with the cession of territory and a port that had been made in the Mediterranean; and had asked what was to become of our fleets that were sailing in that sea? What would the noble lord have said on this subject, had he consented to make peace in 1797, when neither Malta nor Minorca were in our possession? If he conceived the occupation of them, on the part of Great Britain, as necessary to the security of this country, how could he have supposed it possible for England to make a secure peace when we did not possess those islands? As to Minorca, he did not think the occupation of it at all necessary to our security; and as to Malta, if we considered the facility with which it became an easy acquisition to France, it must appear that our security with regard to that port, must be increased with the difficulty of the French being able to take possession of it again, while under the guarantee of a third power. With respect, therefore, to Malta, we were evidently in a better situation than we should have been, had peace been concluded in 1797. As to our ships in the Mediterranean, if they had nothing else to do but to sail round that sea, he thought it by no means an useful employment. There was no use in keeping a naval station there, if we could not command the commerce of that sea; particularly so, if the French had taken possession of Naples and Portugal, as they might have done. As to the West India islands, he could assure their lordships, that if he could have got Martinique, he would have retained it for this country in preference to Trinidad. if it had not been in his power to obtain what he liked best, what alternative was there? Nothing but that of spending thirty millions more, in order that he might be able to ask himself, that day twelve months, how many more years were to pass away before peace could be made? If any noble lord maintained that peace ought to be rejected, when proposed on the terms of the treaty then before the House, on what terms would such noble lord consent to a The Earl of Moira said, that a noble lord near him (Grenville), among the various other objections that he had urged against the peace, had said that it was inadequate. It certainly was; but how inadequate? Inadequate to the expectations which that noble lord and his colleagues had so confidently held out at the commencement of the war-indemnity for the past, and security for the future. That the peace was a hollow and precarious peace, and inadequate to what we were entitled to expect, he could not admit. In order to decide upon this point, it was necessary to examine the relative situations of the French republic and Great Britain. France was an extensive continental power, and the maintenance of her greatness depended altogether on her army. Great Britain was an insular and a maritime state, and her security rested on her navy. Looking at the acquisitions and conquests of each country, Great Britain stood in a state of inferiority in point of strength and aggrandizement compared to the French republic. To ascertain, therefore, the value of the cessions that ministers had made for the purchase of peace, and to see whether they were necessary sacrifices or not, let noble lords weigh our acquisitions against the acquisitions of the republic. Were all the islands we had taken in the West Indies equally important with the acquisition of Savoy? Undoubtedly not; and yet Savoy was only a part of the immense territories which the army of France had conquered, and which the French government had united to its ancient possessions, and made part of its dominions. To negotiate a peace with any prospect of effecting it, ministers must necessarily accommodate the terms to the relative situations of the two countries, and a precise reciprocity of cession on a pertinacious contest for the uti possidates, was out of the question where a weaker power had to treat with a stronger. The reasoning of the noble lord would not only serve to make an early peace impracticable, but to render the attainment of peace hopeless at any period, however distant. He, for one, rejoiced sincerely that peace was effected, he gave ministers credit for having made the best peace they were able to obtain; and it should have his cordial support. There sequences we could expect from prolong. ing the contest. France, compared with this country, could be vulnerable only at sea; and so glorious had been our success upon the ocean, that there scarcely remained a point in which the republic of France was penetrable. No man surely would be mad enough to suppose that we could make any impression on France by land. The continental powers, with whose united co-operations alone we could hope to produce any effect, had, one after another, abandoned the confederacy. No noble lord had hinted a doubt, that the islands of Trinidad and Ceylon were possessions of infinite value to our commerce, and our power as a maritime state. remained only therefore to consider the cessions we had made. It could not be expected that we were to hold all our acquisitions in the West Indies when peace was to be negociated. With regard to Minorca, past experience showed, that though of no great intrinsic value, it would always be in the possession of the state most powerful at sea. In the war of 1754, the French conquered it, and took possession. In the war of 1778, we retook it, but ceded it at the peace of 1783, In the late war we had again taken it, but by the present preliminaries we had ceded it. Neither that however, nor the island of Malta, were of material consequence to us, but in time of war. With regard to Cochin, the holding of it was important or not, according to circumstances. While we were masters of the Mysore country, Cochin might be in the possession of any other power, without the least danger to us. The Mysore in other hands, Cochin would be of infinite importance to us. Much had been said by his noble friend about the Cape of Good Hope, who had laid great stress upon its value. Though he had never seen the Cape himself, yet he had heard from professional men, that it had been greatly The Earl of Warwick expressed his satisfaction that the country had been restored to peace, since it was highly necessary to put an end to the difficulty and distress that all ranks felt, but especially the labouring class of the people. At the same time, he must confess that the pre-over-rated in this country; that it was an liminaries appeared to him by no means adequate to the expectations that the glorious successes of the country entitled us to entertain. Lord Mulgrave said, it appeared to him that peace was necessary, and if he looked at the projet of 1797, and compared it with the present preliminaries, he could not but think that peace was cheaply purchased at the price which we had consented to pay for it. It would puzzle a plain man to find out what beneficial con expensive, unproductive settlement, and obliged to be maintained, ever since we obtained possession of it, at an enormous expense to this country. Let their lordships conjecture what his surprise must have been, when he heard that a right hon. friend of his (Mr. Dundas) had declared in another place, that if a minister should dare to propose the surrender of the Cape of Good Hope, he ought to lose his head. After having gone e through his observations on the conditions of the peace, his lordship proceeded to speak of the splendid display of valour and skill exhibited by our army and navy in the course of the war. He said, he felt peculiarly proud at seeing the distinguished object opposite to him (lord Nelson) a living monument of the prowess and intrepidity of our admirals. The conduct of our army in Egypt would entitle them to immortal fame, and those that have outlived the siege of Alexandria, might say with our Henry the 5th, speaking of the battle of Agincourt, "He that shall live this day, and comes safe home, Will stand a tip-toe when this day is nam'd, The Duke of Bedford said, that the preliminaries should have his support. With regard to the war, which ministers had just put an end to, the noble lord who had arraigned the preliminaries in terms of such severity, might recollect, that it was owing to the ill conduct of it, that an inadequate peace was now made. It could not be forgotten, that he and his colleagues had uniformly been humbled by every turn of ill fortune, and elevated beyond bounds by the return of success. In the one situation, they had condescended to hold the most abject language, and, in the other, they had assumed a tone of arrogance and insult. If it were not at the expense of the country, what a triumph might not he and his friends feel, at the fulfilment of their predictions, that a war so misconducted would surely end in an unequal and disgraceful peace. It was painful to him to allude to matters so often discussed; nor would he have done so, had he not been compelled to it by the speech of the noble lord, who appeared to consider his own projet, in 1797, so highly preferable to the present preliminaries, without at all taking into his consideration, the expense of the war for the last four years, and the victories the French Republic had obtained on the continent within that period, which, notwithstanding the extraordinary success of our arms, had placed the French Republic, if possible, in a higher situation than that in which it stood in 1797. He did no more than act consistently with the language he had held for years, in declaring his thorough approbation of the peace, unequal as it was, and disgraceful as it [VOL, XXXVI.] might be. He entertained a lively hope, from what he had heard from the noble secretary of state, that the king's present servants would conduct themselves on principles of more equanimity and less violence than their predecessors; that they would not be forward to show humiliation and abjectness to the strong, and pride and disdain to the weak. He returned them his thanks for having made the peace, and he trusted, that they would follow it up by a full restoration of the constitution to the people, and an immediate repeal of those statutes, which had originated in childish alarm, and unfounded apprehension of dangers that never existed, but in the minds of his majesty's late ministers. The Bishop of Rochester said :-My lords; after what I have heard in this House this night from the gravest authority-in perfect agreement with what I before had heard elsewhere from authority not less respectable-I ought perhaps to be diffident of my own judgment, when it stands in opposition to the sentiments of those whose opinions I have long been in the habit of looking up to with respect and deference; who may be supposed, from the situations which they have held in public life, to be more competent than I can be to form an accurate judgment upon questions like that which is now before us. Nevertheless, when a resolution has been moved, that this House should approach the throne with an address expressive of approbation of the preliminaries of peace with the French republic which have been laid upon the table, I cannot consistently with my parliamentary duty give my vote of assent to the motion, unless a conviction were wrought upon my mind by argument, that these preliminary articles are, at least in the leading points, such as any one who pays regard to the interest and honour of the country may conscientiously approve. My lords, I shall not attempt at this late hour to go into the detail into which I thought to go when I came down to the House this night. The attempt indeed is rendered unnecessary, by the great ability with which the subject has already been discussed, by the noble earl who first rose in opposition to the motion, and the noble lord who followed on the same side. I shall therefore compress my argument as much as possible, and state my reasons generally for dissenting from the motion. But I think myself obliged to declare my rea[N] |