plicated, resting on undisputed facts, or involved in controverted principles. But it was of peculiar importance that this ground of preference should, in the negotiation of this treaty, have been secured to Great Britain.

Our interest in the whole subject, very far exceeded that of the power with whom we treated. Much of our security in peace, much of our energy and success in war, must hereafter depend on the accuracy and precision of the law, which is now laid down, by this convention, for the conduct of our navy, and for the gui dance of our courts of admiralty. It must also be remembered, that the whole subject is involved in difficult and technical distinctions, in matters of detail, and in points of law, often very imperfectly understood by the continental governments, who have so little occasion to study them in their practical application: whereas, in this country, they ought to be familiar to every man who undertakes the conduct of the public interests. And if the king's servants had the smallest reason to distrust their own abilities or knowledge in this respect, they might, for the purpose of framing such a project, have availed themselves of the assistance of some of the greatest men who have ever professed the science of public jurisprudence. But whether this mode of negotiating were more or less desirable, whether it were safer to have treated for the final arrangement of these great questions on the basis of a British or of a Russian project, I must say, without reserve, that no circumstances could require from the ministers of this country that course which has actually been pursued in the present instance; a course which should, in my opinion, have been decidedly rejected from the beginning, not only on the considerations which I have already stated, but perhaps still more on that of the national honour and the dignity of the British crown.

they cannot be renewed, but with difficulty and danger. Whatever shall then be left in ambiguity will be placed in the worst of all situations; in a state where we can neither abandon our right with dignity, nor maintain it with advantage. Where we shall neither obtain the credit which we might claim for its sacrifice, nor secure the benefits which we should derive from its assertion. To how large a proportion of these articles this remark applies, your lordships will judge by comparing them with the corresponding provisions in the hostile conventions of 1780 and 1800. Those conventions were framed with the avowed object of destroying our rights; this treaty is concluded for the purpose of securing them; and the difference of the stipulations, which are to produce these contrary effects on the same subjects, must, therefore, be looked for on the face of the instruments themselves, This comparison is rendered but too easy by a circumstance which I consider as having uniformly, and, in a very great degree, operated to our disadvantage throughout the whole conduct of this negotiation. I am far from supposing that the authors of this treaty can be ignorant of the advantage which a person employed in negotiation must always derive from treating on the basis of his own project, rather than on that of his adversary. They know, unquestionably, that concessions so introduced are often suffered to remain, in order to avoid the inconveniences of farther controversy or delay. That differences, even unintentional, and apparently inconsiderable, in the wording of an article, have often led in their result to the most important consequences; and that the party, who draws any such instrument, will naturally apply his principal attention to the perspicuity and accuracy of those stipulations which are most favourable to the interests he is employed to maintain. The skill and diligence of a public minister is, indeed, often best shown, in the security which In the form and wording of all these he has thus provided to his country, against articles, the two hostile conventions of those ambiguous interpretations, and armed neutrality have have been followed latent claims, to which the expressions with a scrupulous and servile exactness chosen by an adversary might too proba- wherever they could be made to apply. bly be liable. This advantage, however, We have, therefore, negotiated and conas it is known to both parties, cannot cluded this treaty, not on the basis of any always be obtained even by the ablest British, or even of any new Russian prostatesmen; nor is it always equally impor-ject, but on that of the very same hostile tant. Its value and effect are more or and inadmissible conventions, which we less considerable, as the nature of the actually went to war for the purpose of subject to be arranged is simple or com- annulling. And we now stand, in the [VOL. XXXVI.] [P]

occasional exceptions only, as have more strongly proved her general principle of exclusion. But in war she has always found it impossible to maintain these monopolies. Pressed on the one hand, by our naval superiority, which has rendered the navigation of their own ships unsafe; and unable, on the other hand, to forego the resources which depend entirely on these important branches of her commerce, she has frequently endeavoured, under these special circumstances, to open both her colonial and her coasting trade to the vessels of neutral nations. But this attempt has uniformly been resisted by Great Britain; nor have the other powers of Europe been very forward to embark in a commerce which they knew we should justly consider as an interference in the war, and as a manifest breach of all the obligations of neutrality.

any fair construction at all, preclude it; and if the principle essential to Great Britain be not (as I fear it is) expressly negatived, it is left, at the best, in a state so very doubtful, as to afford a handle for perpetual cavils, and a copious source of interminable differences. A free navigation to the ports, and upon the coasts of any country, must, I think, imply the liberty of navigating freely, both to and from all those ports, and upon every part of those coasts. If any limitation of this liberty was intended, it must naturally be looked for in the same instrument which asserts, and guarantees, the general right. Some such restraints and limitations are accordingly specified in this article; and these must, I think, in all fair reasoning, be taken to be the only remaining exceptions, to that otherwise unrestrained freedom of navigation and The right to carry on unmolested, dur-commerce with our enemies ports, which ing war, both these branches of the trade of France, although prohibited in time of peace, was, however, claimed in 1780, by the pretended neutral league, which was then formed for the purpose of destroying our naval power. And when, at the close of the last year, the same confederacy was renewed, with the same views, this unjust and inadmissible pretension was, with many others of the same description, once more openly advanced in hostile defiance to Great Britain. The claim which the confederates thus asserted, was, as far as relates directly to the coasting trade, expressed in the third article of the convention of 1800, under the following words, viz. "That neutral ships may navigate freely from port to port, and upon the coasts of the belligerent powers." The present convention has adopted very nearly the same expressions. By the first section of what there also stands as the third article, neutral ships are permitted to navigate freely to the ports, and upon the coasts of the belligerent powers." And in the next section of the same article, corresponding also (though with a variation respecting enemy's property, of which I shall hereafter speak) with a clause in the treaty of 1800, it is expressly declared, that "the effects embarked on board neutral ships shall be free, with the exception of contraband of war, and of enemy's property."

Now, my lords, if these words do not actually establish the hostile claim of the northern league on this subject of the coasting trade, they certainly do not, on

neutrals are henceforward to enjoy. Among the exceptions thus specified, not even the most distant reference is to be found to that principle respecting the coasting trade, which we have hitherto thought, as this address declares it, a right essential to our interests. The liberty of sailing freely to any port of the hostile country, is plainly conceded and guaranteed: but it is not even intimated, much less declared, by any article of this treaty, that this permission is not to extend to ships laden with commodities purchased at any other port of the same country. No man, from reading this convention, could conjecture that we had ever asserted such a rule of public law. The very principle itself is consigned to utter oblivion, and any attempt on our part to renew its practical exercise, will henceforth be regarded as a breach of that solemn compact by which we have recognized the innocence, and guaranteed the freedom, of all neutral trade, not consisting in enemies property, or in contraband of war.

Nor indeed would it be easy to explain, in any other sense than that of a deliberate and intentional concession of the coasting trade, the admission of those words which guarantee to neutrals the free navigation, not only to the ports, but "upon the coasts of the powers at war." If a direct trade only from the neutral country to the ports of the belligerents had been intended, the first words of this section had amply secured it. If it was meant to permit a partial and successive discharge of the

the concessions which really were intended; or why we should have forborne to require in return, that our remaining rights, whatever they might be, should be recog nized with the same precision, and guaranteed to us with the same certainty.

different articles of the cargo, at different ports, this also is secured by the general and unqualified permission to sail freely to those ports. And the addition of the words upon the coasts," cannot possibly have been made with this view; because the words themselves have no reference to this purpose, nor do they even convey the idea to the mind of any man, whether he be accustomed to hear the subject spoken of in loose and popular language, or be expressed with the precision of statesmen and civilians. These words were first introduced into the treaty of armed neutrality in 1780. They were there employed for the express purpose of asserting the right of neutrals to carry on the coasting trade of the belligerents. From that treaty they have since been carefully transcribed, first into the hostile convention of 1800, and now again into this conciliatory arrangement, to which we are hereafter to look for the rule of maritime law. It will not be a very uncandid argument, on the part those who shall maintain that Russia having, in all these three cases, adopted these same words of sailing freely upon the coasts of the belligerents, meant to express by them in each of the cases the same claim: and on the other hand, that if Great Britain had now intended to stipulate for the renunciation of the right which Russia had before asserted, our negotiators would not have selected the very same expressions which were originally used for that assertion, and which even now are capable of no other interpretation, and must be either so construed, or regarded as wholly superfluous.

It would however be difficult for any man, at all acquainted with the nature of the subject, and with the situation and interests of the contracting parties, to believe that this point was in fact intended to be conceded by us, or was purposely involved in doubtful and equivocal expressions. Russia could have no object in contesting it with us: Russian ships will never carry on the coasting trade of the belligerents, nor will that country derive either commercial or political advantage, from obtaining this benefit for the vessels of Denmark or of Sweden, to whom alone

it is likely that this stipulation will practically apply. But if this surrender of right was not in our contemplation, I am utterly at a loss to conceive why we should have been afraid to state with openness, and to define with accuracy, the extent of

I must however acknowledge, that to the next point of which I have to speak, the charge of ambiguity does not apply. On this head the treaty is unfortunately but too explicit. It is clear that we have admitted neutrals to carry on the whole colonial trade of France. That claim is indisputably and unequivocally conceded by Great Britain. I have already stated to your lordships on what grounds of policy and justice we have always hitherto refused to neutrals, during war, the privilege of trading with the French colonies. If this prohibition were once withdrawn, or if it did not attach upon the commerce of those colonies with the neutral ports of Europe, as well as on their direct trade with France, our maritime superiority would, at least in that quarter of the world, be completely eluded: the valour and energy of our navy would be deprived of the just reward which it now derives from its most profitable captures; and the enemy would enjoy, undiminished in war, as in peace, all those resources which are most applicable to increased exertions against the vital interests of Great Britain.

The instructions issued by his majesty at the commencement of the late war,* for the conduct of his navy, were therefore founded on this long-established principle; and the only relaxation of it which had taken place until the signature of this treaty, was by an indulgence granted to the united states of America, on account of the peculiarity of their local situation. That government complained that these instructions had driven the Americans to the necessity of purchasing in Europe, by a circuitous voyage, the articles of colonial produce necessary for their own consumption. If the other European colonies had at that time been open to the trade of America, while those of France were closed by us, the ground of this complaint would have been considerably weaker than

and detain all ships laden with goods the *Nov. 6, 1793. "That they shall stop produce of any colony belonging to France, or carrying provisions or other supplies for the use of such colony, and shall bring the same with their cargoes to legal adjudication in our Courts of Admiralty."