am equally ready to confess, that I gave up my hopes with the greatest reluctance; and I shall, to my dying day, lament that there were not, on the part of the other powers of Europe, efforts corresponding to our own, for the accomplishment of that great work. There were periods, during the continuance of the war, in which I had hopes of our being able to put together the scattered fragments of that great and venerable edifice; to have restored the exiled nobility of France; to have restored a government, certainly not free from defects, but built upon sober and regular foundations, in the stead of that mad system of innovation which threatened, and had nearly accomplished, the destruction of Europe. Me si fata meis paterentur ducere vitam Auspiciis, et sponte meâ componere curas; UrbemTrojanam primùm dulcesque meorum Relliquias colerem, Priami tecta alta manerent, Et recidiva manu posuissem Pergama victis This, it was true, had been found unattainable; but we had the satisfaction of knowing, that we had survived the violence of the revolutionary fever, and we had seen the extent of its principles abated. We had seen Jacobinism deprived of its fascination; we had seen it stripped of the name and pretext of liberty; it had shown itself to be capable only of destroying, not of building, and that it must necessarily end in a military despotism. He trusted this important lesson would not be thrown away upon the world. Being disappointed in our hopes, of being able to drive France within her ancient limits, and even to make barriers against her farther incursions, it became then necessary, with the change of circumstances, to change our objects; for he did not know a more fatal error, than to look only at one object, and obstinately to pursue it, when the hope of accomplishing it no longer remained. If it became impossible for us to obtain the full object of our wishes, wisdom and policy both required that we should endeavour to obtain that which was next best. In saying this, he was not sensible of inconsisteney, either in his former language or conduct, in refusing to treat with the person who now holds the destinies of France; because, when he formerly declined treating with him, he then said, that if events should take the turn they had since done, he should have no objection to treat with him. He would now add but very little more to what he had said. He could not agree with those gentlemen who seemed to think that France had grown so much stronger in proportion to what we had. These gloomy apprehensions seemed to him to be almost wholly without foundation. This country always was, and he trusted always would be, able to check the ambitious projects of France, and to give that degree of assistance to the rest of Europe which they had done upon this occasion; and he wished it had been done with more effect. But when the immense acquisitions which France had made were taken into consideration on the one hand, it was but fair, on the other, to consider what she had lost in population, in commerce, in capital, and in habits of industry. The desolation produced by convulsions, such as France had undergone, could not be repaired even by large acquisitions of territory. Comparing, therefore, what France has gained with what she had lost, this enormous increase of power was not quite so apparent as some gentlemen on the other side seemed to apprehend. When he took into consideration the immense wealth of this country, and the natural and legitimate growth of that wealth, so much superior to the produce of rapacity and plunder, he could not but entertain the hope, founded in justice and in nature, of its solidity. This hope was strengthened by collateral considerations, when he looked to the great increase of our maritime power; when he contemplated the additional naval triumphs that we had obtained; when he looked to the brilliant victories of our armies, gained over the flower of the troops of Francetroops which, in the opinion of many, were invincible,-when he reflected upon these glorious achievements, though he could not but lament our disappointment in some objects, he had the satisfaction of thinking, that we had added strength to our security, and lustre to our national character. Since the treaty which had taken place at Lisle, we had increased in wealth and commerce. But there were some important events which had given the greatest consolidation to our strength, and, as such, should not be forgotten. The destruction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun in India, who had fallen a victim to his attachment to France, and his perfidy to us, would surely be thought an important achievement. It had frequently been observed, that great dangers fre ourselves. If, however, the views of France were correspondent with our own, we had every prospect ef enjoying a long peace. He saw some symptoms that they were, though upon this he had no certain knowledge; but he would never rely upon personal character for the security of his country. He was inclined to hope every thing that was good, but he was bound to act as if he feared otherwise. quently produced, in nations of a manly | We must depend for security only upon cast of mind, great and noble exertions; so when the most unparalleled danger threatened the sister kingdom, the feelings of a common cause between the people of both countries, had enabled them to overcome prejudices, some of them perhaps laudable, and all of them deep-rooted, and led to that happy union, which adds more to the power and strength of the British empire, than all the conquests of one and indivisible France do to that country. These were consolations which he wished to recall to thie recollection of those who entertained gloomy apprehensions about the strength and resources of Great Britain. Mr. Fox rose and said:-At no time, Sir, since I have had the honour of being a member of this House, did I ever give my vote with more heartfelt pleasure than I shall do on the present occasion, in support of the preliminaries of peace between this country and the French republic. And I own, Sir, that I think his majesty's ministers, and the mover of the address, did very wisely in taking that moderate line, and in refraining from all those topics which might have diminished the satisfaction which gentlemen must feel in assenting to the motion now before us. Yet, Sir, for my own part, I have no hesitation in saying, that had even the word "honourable" been intro declined assenting to it; for I will be bold to say, that unless the peace be honourable, it ought not to come before us. Whether the epithets safe and honourable be convertible, I will not now inquire; but of this I am sure, that among individuals, and much more among nations, honour is the most essential means of safety, as it is the first, and I had almost said the only legitimate ground of war. With regard to another term made use of by the noble lord, I cannot so readily agree with him. I cannot conceive how the term glorious peace could be applied. A glorious peace can only ensue from a glorious war, and such an epithet I never can apply to the late war. If any additional proofs were wanting, to prove her ability to protect her honour and maintain her interests, let gentlemen look to the last campaign, and they would see Great Britain contending against a powerful confederacy in the North; they would see her fighting for those objects at once in Egypt and in the Baltic, and they would see her successful in both. We had shown, that we were ready to meet the threatened invasion at home, and could send troops to triumph over the French induced into the vote, I should not have the barren sands of Egypt, before a man could escape from Toulon, to reinforce their blocked-up army; we had met the menaced invasion by attacking France on her own coasts, and we had seen those ships which were destined for the invasion of this country, moored and chained to their shores, and finding protection only in their batteries. These were not only sources of justifiable pride, but grounds of solid security. What might be the future object of the chief consul of France, he knew not; but if it were to exercise a military despotism, he would venture to predict, that he would not select this country for the first object of his attack; and if we were true to ourselves, we had little to fear from that attack, let it come when it would. But though he did not entertain apprehensions, yet he could not concur with those who thought we ought to lay aside all caution. If such policy were adopted, there would indeed be ground for most serious apprehensions. He hoped every measure would be adopted, which prudence could suggest, to do away animosity between the two countries, and to avoid every ground of irritation by sincerity on our part. This, how. ever, on the other hand, was not to be done by paying abject court to France. Those who have argued the subject before me have very fairly divided it into two heads: 1st. Whether this peace be preferable to a continuance of the war? this is certainly the most material point: and 2ndly, Whether a better peace could have been obtained? The last point cannot easily be ascertained. If we could have had a better peace without running the risk of continuing the war, his majesty's ministers would undoubtedly have been very blameable in not making a better. But I should like to have it proved to me, how ministers could have made a better. Sir, I was glad to hear the noble lord, whose speech I admired so much in all the main points of it, lay down that liberal system of policy, that what is gained does not of itself make peace so much the better; nor what is not gained, make it so much the worse. We have gained Ceylon and Trinidad; valuable acquisitions both. We have not gained the Cape, and I am not one of those who regret that we have not, for, from its destination, we shall have all the benefits of that possession without any of the expense of it. Perhaps, Sir, I do not agree with the hon. gentleman, who considers any acquisitions in the Mediterranean as secondary and subordinate points to Ceylon and Trinidad. The noble lord, considering the subject in a commercial point of view, says the Dutch did not possess Minorca, and yet they carried on the principal part of the Levant trade. But it is not in this point of view that I contemplate the question. Desiring peace most ardently, and thinking and hoping it may be a lasting one, I still cannot put entirely out of my consideration the possibility of future wars between the two countries. In any such event, surely Malta would be a more important possession than either Ceylon or Trinidad. ing in France? The only question then is, Whether by pressure of war we could prevail upon France to cede to us Malta or the Cape? Could we have prevailed upon her by pressure upon her colonies? No, for that had been already done. By pressure upon the European territory of France? That idea is absurd. By pressure upon her finances? Here, Sir, I cannot but admire the judicious conduct of his majesty's ministers. They have not sought to delude us by the jargon of of their predecessors, and by senseless assertions of the French being on the brink, and in the very gulf of bankruptcy. They had too much good seuse to do it. They adopted another mode of conduct. They well knew, that, by insisting upon Malta or the Cape, they must have made peace on less dignified terms, or they must have continued the war. That we might have gone on with the contest, I am not prepared to deny. I am not blind to the resources of the country. I see one resource while I am speaking. The income-tax is only mortgaged for fifty-five millions of debt. It might have been mortgaged for as much more; but these resources, says the noble lord, and justly, ought to be reserved for the defence of our honour and our independence. I come, then, to this conclusion, that there was little probability of our gaining better terms of peace. From this digression I return to the question, Why are we to suppose that better terms of peace could have been obtained? I wish to know, Sir, what I proceed next to the question, Whepressure could have been made upon ther we ought to have accepted these France that would have induced her to terms, or to have continued the war? 'consent to better terms. And here I can- I know a noble earl who sits on the same not help repeating, that though I admired side of the House with myself, has called much of the noble lord's speech, the part the peace a complete surrender, a capituI most admired was that in which he ap-lation of our safety; but yet, in the proplied the epithet "unsatisfactory;" angress of that noble earl's speech, I disepithet chosen with singular felicity to the state of the continent, fairly confessing at the same time, that nothing gave him any reasonable hope of much mending it. But it has been urged, that France could not hurt this country. Not hurt it! That nothing can be more chimerical than the project of invading this country, I am as firmly convinced as any man can be. But are there not many other points which, at this late hour of the night, I will not discuss? Is there any man so blindly fond of the union with Ireland, so widely satisfied with the measures that have been adopted with respect to that country, as to say that the danger of a French force being in Ireland is not at least greater than the danger of an English force land covered that he begged to be understood Yet last years? What have we seen through-and lament that the peace is a glorious out the country, in every town and parish? one for France. If the peace be glorious We have seen the poor depending upon for France, without being inglorious to alms. We have seen the mass of the peo- England, it will not give me any concern ple living upon charity, all levelled by that it is so. Upon this point, the feelthe most dangerous equality, an equality ings and opinions of men must depend in of claims to be fed; claims destroying a great measure upon their conceptions of true charity.-Charity do I call it? Sir, the causes of the war. If one of the one of the worst features of the present objects of the war was the restoration of times is, that charity loses almost its na- the ancient despotism of France, than ture. The claims were irresistible. The which I defy any man to produce in the miser felt it his indispensable interest to history of the world a more accursed one; give, as well as the humane. The indus- if, I say, that was one of the objects of trious and the idle, the honest and the dis- the war, why then, I say, it is to me an solute, were all to be fed alike; for, how- additional recommendation of the peace, ever you might prefer relieving the former, that it has been obtained without the you could not suffer the latter to perish. accomplishment of such an object. My I think I shall not at this time of day be undisguised opinion is, that if the coalitold, that this evil was unconnected with tion for the restoration of the Bourbons the war. Have not the events of the last had succeeded, the consequences would three months established that connection. have been amongst all the kings of Europe We have had a most abundant harvest, as a perpetual guarantee against all people well got in as it was plentiful in its produce. who might be oppressed by any of them I know it did reduce the price of grain, in any part of the world. All countries, and, in some degree, the prices of other therefore, must be benefited by the failure kinds of provision. But we saw that the of such a project, but none more so than prices began afterwards to rise again, great Britain. To the people of this probably because the fall had been more country the consequences would have rapid than was natural. But what was the been fatal. Refer to the page of history. effect as soon as peace came? The fall Had the coalition in the reign of Charles from that time was much more rapid and 1st established such a guarantee, would considerable than it had been from the the liberties of the people have been preperiod of the harvest to the peace. Let served against the house of Stuart, or gentlemen contemplate this picture. Let would Hampden have gained the imthem say whether the outlines of it be not mortal victory he did? To come lower correct, and then let me ask them, can down: had such a guarantee existed in any man doubt, under such circumstances, later times, would the Revolution of 1688 whether it be not better for the people to have been able to maintain itself? I say, eat, than that we should possess the Cape, therefore, that there could not have been or even Malta, could we have gained them any greater misfortune to the world than at such a price? Another question I would the success of that coalition for restoring ask is, whether gentlemen ever remember the Bourbons to the crown of France. any event that was received with so much joy as the peace with France? But I may be told, that that joy was much greater among the lower classes of the people. Be it so, for the sake of argument. Why, then, I say, that this is only an additional proof of their having connected in their minds the idea of plenty with the prospect of peace. But it is added, that this popular joy was indiscriminating, and that the people never stopped to inquire about the terms. Most correctly true, I believe, is this assertion. But what does it prove? It only proves that the people were so goaded by the war, that they preferred peace almost upon any terms. Sir, there are many persons who think Sir, the noble lord, to whom I have had such frequent occasion to allude, does not, I am sure, expect me to agree with him in opinion upon the earlier periods of the war. Upon those periods, and upon the situation of France at that time, I differ with him directly. I have always conceived that we carried on a war against the freedom and independence of France. Sir, I know I shall be told that France was the first to declare war ; but this I contend is no proof of her having been the aggressor. We refused to hear an authorized negociator who was sent to us; we took no steps to procure reparation or disavowal of the acts complained of; and all writers that I have ever read upon the law of nations, agree have enforced it? I admit the justice of his conclusion; but surely I had no right to expect this from the "Deliverer of Europe." I had no right to expect that that the country which refuses to hear what another has to propose, is to be considered the aggressor. The right hon. gentleman who has just sat down, has urged it as a maxim, and I am not pre-he, of all men living, would have argued pared to deny it, that whenever the executive government places us at peace with another country, we are bound to speak with decency of the government of that country. If this be true with respect to the conduct we ought to adopt after peace is made, is it not equally our duty to abstain from harsh and insulting language before war is declared? Let gentlemen recollect the language of that right hon. gentleman in December 1792. Let them remember what inflammatory topics he urged, what invectives he made use of at the very time he was proposing that we should abide by our system of neutrality. Sir, the pretended grounds of the war were the navigation of the Scheldt, the decree of the 19th of November, and other acts of the French government. With respect to Holland, it was no casus foederis, for she did not desire your assistance. And here, Sir, let me remind the House, that one of the indemnities we have obtained for that war, is from that very ally whom we pretended we entered into the war to defend. But, for my own part, I must confess that I always understood the object of the war to be the restoration of the house of Bourbon. Not that I mean to say that it was the sine quâ non; but I contend that they avowed it with confidence, prosecuted it with perseverance, adhered to it with pertinacity, and relinquished it with difficulty. But they now affirm, that, not being able to obtain what they wished, they contented themselves with securing what they could; that they had a second best object, a succedaneum to put up in case of necessity. Yet who amongst us ever thought that that succedaneum, that second best object, was Ceylon and Trinidad? Who ever imagined that they who had held forth such mighty objects, would ever have admitted the acquisition of an island in the East and in the West to be that indemnity for the past, and security for the future," for which they had so obstinately and loudly insisted? I come now, Sir, to the third division of the question:-the subject of guarantees. Suppose you had got, says the right hon. gentleman, a guarantee for Naples or for Piedmont, how would you against our interfering in favour of Naples or of Piedmont, because we had not the means of doing it successfully.-I have now, I hope, sufficiently convinced the House, that in the terms and tone of the treaty I perfectly coincide with the noble lord. I approve of the terms. I think the noble secretary has very wisely tempered firmness of conduct with moderation of tone. But farther than this I cannot go with him. I cannot agree with him upon the time in which the treaty was made. It comes, in my opinion, many, many years too late. I would put it to the House, whether, at the period when we were most railed at and reviled for advising pacific measures, any man supposes for a moment that peace would not have been made upon terms equally advantageous with these? Does any man doubt that France, upon the breaking out of the war, would have acceded to much better terms? Does any man doubt that she would then have relinquished Holland, and perhaps abandoned even her designs upon the Netherlands? Would she not have given us better terms, both in the East Indies and the West? I urge this, Sir, with the more earnestness, in order to repel the idea of our being forced into the war. I know there were some gentlemen who admitted that she did not wish to commence hostilities with us at that time, and who told us, that she meant only to give us the privilege of being devoured the last. But might we not, I repeat, at every period since, have obtained better terms of peace than we have done? Could we not have negociated with more effect after the surrender of Valenciennes ? At length a new government was established, and a negotiation was entered into at Paris. That negotiation failed, from the extravagant pretensions of his majesty's ministers. A second negotiation was afterwards begun at Lisle. Whatever may have been said of that negotiation, I would ask, how could we hope for success from it, when it now appears that the sentiments of the members of the cabinet were so various and so opposite? when we find that one of those ministers now thinks that peace to be a good one which gives up the Cape; a possession which, another minister contended, could not be aban |