International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State CooperationToday's international war crimes tribunals lack police powers, and therefore must prod and persuade defiant states to co-operate in the arrest and prosecution of their own political and military leaders. Victor Peskin's comparative study traces the development of the capacity to build the political authority necessary to exact compliance from states implicated in war crimes and genocide in the cases of the International War Crimes Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Drawing on 300 in-depth interviews with tribunal officials, Balkan and Rwandan politicians, and Western diplomats, Peskin uncovers the politicized, protracted, and largely behind-the-scenes tribunal-state struggle over co-operation. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 32
Page 32
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
Page 34
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
Page 40
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
Page 47
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
Page 48
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
Contents
3 | |
Slobodan Miloˇsevic and the Politics of State Cooperation | 29 |
International Justice and Serbias Troubled Democratic | 61 |
Franjo Tudman and the Politics of International Justice | 92 |
The Politics of State Cooperation in Croatias Democratic Era | 119 |
The Struggle to Create the International Criminal Tribunal | 151 |
Trials of Cooperation and the Battles for Karamira | 170 |
Investigating Rwandan Patriotic Front Atrocities and | 186 |
The Prosecutor v Kagame | 207 |
The Present and Future of International Criminal Justice | 235 |
Bibliography 259 | 263 |
Other editions - View all
International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the ... Victor Peskin No preview available - 2008 |
International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the ... Victor Peskin No preview available - 2009 |
Common terms and phrases
Agence France-Presse Appeals Chamber Arbour arrest Arusha Balkan Barayagwiza Belgrade Bobetko Bosnian Croat Bosnian Croat suspects Bosnian Serb Bosnian war bunal Carla Del Ponte chief prosecutor conflict counter-shaming country’s crimes suspects crimes tribunals crisis criticism Croatia Croatian government Dayton December decision democratic Din−di´c domestic ethnic Fieldwork interview Former Yugoslavia genocide suspects Goldstone Gotovina Hague hand handover human rights Hutu Ibid ICTR ICTR’s ICTY ICTY and ICTR ICTY’s international community International Criminal Court International Criminal Tribunal international justice international pressure international tribunal issue Jallow June Kagame Karadˇzi´c Karamira Kigali Koˇstunica Kosovo leaders Miloˇsevi´c Mladi´c nationalist negotiations non-compliance Norac November ofthe peace political Ponte’s prosecution Raˇcan role RPF atrocities Rwandan government Security Council Serb suspects Serbia shaming Sierra Leone soft power state’s survivor groups targeted trials of cooperation tribunal investigations tribunal officials tribunal’s Tu−dman Tutsi Tutsi-led undermine victim Vukovar West’s Western diplomats witnesses Zagreb
Popular passages
Page 26 - The evidence tendered by the prosecutor describes scenes of unimaginable savagery: thousands of men executed and buried in mass graves, hundreds of men buried alive, men and women mutilated and slaughtered, children killed before their mothers' eyes, a grandfather forced to eat the liver of his own grandson.
Page 231 - All differences between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be settled by negotiation between them without recourse to any outside jurisdiction. Except where express provision is made to the contrary in this Agreement, differences which cannot be settled by direct negotiation shall be referred to the North Atlantic Council.
Page 14 - The fact of the matter is that we know that crimes against humanity have occurred, and we know when and where they occurred. We know, moreover, which forces committed those crimes, and under whose command they operated. And we know, finally, who the political leaders are to whom those military commanders were — and still are — responsible...
Page 252 - He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley.
Page ii - Bob, Clifford (2005) The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Page 52 - that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is ... cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia including access for investigators, the provision of documents, and the surrender and transfer of indictees or assistance in their apprehension.
Page 23 - ... United States and its European allies in a "new" Europe be like? And what role would Russia assume after the Cold War?65 By now, Tony Lake felt, the administration's constant shifting response on Bosnia was hurting Clinton's foreign policy as a whole. In a memo Lake recalled, "The administration's weak, muddle-through strategy in Bosnia was becoming a cancer on Clinton's entire foreign policy — spreading and eating away at its credibility.
Page 79 - Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged In War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); and Laura Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, 1995).
Page 162 - Tribunal - an institution whose primary purpose is to ensure that justice is done - must not place its imprimatur on such violations. To allow the Appellant to be tried on the charges for which he was belatedly indicted would be a travesty of justice. Nothing less than the integrity of the Tribunal is at stake in this case. Loss of public confidence in the Tribunal, as a court valuing human rights of all...
Page 33 - ... November, the Bosnian Serbs began to resist on almost every nonmilitary issue, while remaining careful to avoid provoking IFOR. It was almost as if they had an implicit understanding with the IFOR command: we will not attack your forces if you leave us alone to pursue an ethnically divided country. Of all the things necessary to achieve our goals in Bosnia, the most important was still the arrest of Radovan Karadzic.