ever,

sented that no three-decker was available; that the only two-deckers available would require an expenditure of from 13,000l. to 14,000, and would probably only last 10 years; and, moreover, be "liable to be unroofed by a typhoon, and thus rendered useless when most needed; and suggested it was preferable to build a hospital. The result, howhas been that no ship has been sent out, and no hospital built. It should be stated that the decision of the Secretary of State not to replace the hospital ship was arrived at after consultation with the medical authorities at home. It must be borne in mind that the hospital ship could not, under any circumstances, have arrived in time to have been of use during the sickness which ensued in 1865.

Notwithstanding the report upon the state of the Hercules, the following passage appears in the journal of the Quartermaster-general's Department, 21st June, 1865:

"The general hospital being full, and sickness on the increase, it has been found necessary to re-occupy the hospital ship Hercules as a hospital. The detachment 2nd battalion 11th Regiment, 150 men and 6 officers, will be removed to her Majesty's ship Princess Charlotte, Captain Nolloth having kindly consented to this arrangement."

The Princess Charlotte was a three-decker (originally sent out as a floating barrack, but was at this time the receiving-ship for the squadron). It is stated that she would hold about 1,000 men; but the relief of the squadron was about to take place, and on their arrival the men would have to be drafted into the receiving ship. It does not appear that any application was made to the admiral for accommodation on board this ship until the 21st June, when 150 men were taken on board. No communication on the subject had passed between the War Department and the Admiralty on the subject.

Major General Guy reported, on the 18th September, 1865, that he had authorized the hire of two buildings to hold sixty patients, at a rent of 500 dollars per month, or about 1,300l. a year, and states that it was rendered necessary by the great amount of sickness; and further, that, "on the 26th August there were 304 sick, and of these 54 soldiers were

treated in quarters, and 48 sleeping in the verandahs of the existing hospital."

Removal of Indian Troops.-Indian troops were employed in China from 1850 to 1854, and from 1857 to 14th March, 1865.

From this return it appears that they have been eminently useful in relieving the Europeans from much duty and consequent exposure to heat and malaria, which are the fertile causes of death and invaliding.

Your committee have inquired into the reasons which induced the Government to withdraw altogether from the China command the Indian troops which had been employed there since the outbreak of the war of 1856.

To

Lord de Grey's evidence contains a statement of the various grounds upon which he considers it unadvisable to employ troops on the Indian establishment for imperial purposes, except in the pressing emergency of war. use his own words, these reasons are "financial, in the widest sense of the word: but not at all financial in the narrow sense of the word, as meaning whether that employment causes an expenditure of 20,000l., or 30,000l., or 40,000l., more or less; but the employment has this effect-that it removes the allowances of pay and the allowances of the officers and men of the Imperial troops employed with Native troops from the control of Parliament. I have always felt, and it is an opinion which, as far as I know, was shared by my predecessor, certainly by those of my predecessors under whom I personally served, by Sir George Lewis and Lord Herbert, that that is upon constitutional grounds an undesirable arrangement; and that it does not give the control to the Secretary of State and to Parliament through the Secretary of State's responsibility, which the Secretary of State and Parliament ought to exercise in regard to every portion of her Majesty's army."

It appears from this statement, and from other evidence, that the troops on the Indian establishment were originally sent to China on account of the war; and that at least from 1859, if not from the very commencement of their employment there, it was the intention of the War Office, under successive Secretaries of State, that these troops should be withdrawn as soon as the warlike necessities which had led to their employment had ceased to exist;

and in withdrawing these troops when the occupation of foreign territory in China had ceased, Lord de Grey adopted the course which had been contemplated by his predecessors, if the opportunity had occurred in their time. It appears, however, to your committee, that it is to be regretted that successive Secretaries of State, whilst contemplating the removal of these troops when the military reasons which had caused them to be sent there had ceased, did not advert to the very beneficial sanitary results accruing from their presence to the European troops stationed there, and to the desirableness of supplying their place by other Asiatic troops.

Your committee fully recognize the importance of the reasons adduced by Lord de Grey for the non-employment of troops on the Indian establishment in other countries; but as a financial question they are of opinion that the withdrawal of these troops, and the substitution of a purely European garrison, ultimately resulted in increased expense to the British Government. There was a saving on the Indian allowances, but a largely increased expenditure in the cost of transport of European troops, both of reliefs and invalids; and also increased expenditure, both from the costly nature of the barrack accommodation required for an increased European garrison, and the extra cost of rations and comforts required by such troops in that climate.

Sir Edward Lugard, the Under Secretary of State for War, states that it was considered at the War Department that the troops would be provided for in one or more of three ways, namely, by placing a portion of the troops on board a man-of-war; secondly, by quartering the greater part of the 2nd battalion 11th Regiment at Japan, in place of 500 marines ordered to embark; thirdly, by accommodating them in hired buildings at Hong Kong. These expectations were not altogether realized. No demand was made to the Admiralty to instruct the admiral in China to furnish accommodation on board the man-of-war; and with the exception of 150 men sent on board the "Princess Charlotte," by the kindness of Captain Nolloth, none was afforded; 150 men only were sent to Japan, for the reasons previously stated, and the head-quarters of the regiment, 250 strong, were sent to Kowloon to occupy

the mat huts. Colonel Jenner, 11th Regiment, gives a deplorable account of the state to which they were reduced by fever and ague at the end of one month in answers 1478, 1479, 1480, 1481, 1482, 1483, 1484, 1485, 1486. The insufficiency of the hired accommodation has been stated above.

In reference to paragraph 23 of General Guy's letter of 23rd May, 1866, he states that "the hired barracks were in a situation that is generally considered the healthiest in the place;" and that there was a "large and well lighted recreation room in McGregor's barracks."

It appears that the Secretary of State for War, after consultations with the Commanderin-Chief, acted upon the opinion that the experiences of the years 1854-5-6, showed that the duties of the garrison at Hong Kong could be temporarily entrusted with safety to the force employed at Hong Kong in those years, with the addition of about 180 rank and file to supply the posts, if any required, at Kowloon. This was not an unnatural conclusion, but your committee regret that further inquiry was not made as to the amount of duties at present required in the colony.

That it appears that General Guy authorised the hire of buildings to the amount of 18,6107. per annum, and that, nevertheless, the accommodation was defective in quality.

It appears from a review of the facts above stated, that during the summer of 1865 the troops were overcrowded, and that the hospital accommodation was insufficient. It also appears that the information in possession of the War Department led that department to believe that the troops ordered to be retained in the command between China and Japan might have been so distributed as to avoid overcrowding. reasons why General Guy was unable so to distribute them are stated in this report, and in his letter of 23rd May, 1866. Imperative instructions as to the distribution of the force were not given by the War Department; but, looking to the various contingencies which might arise at a station so distant as that of China, your committee are not of opinion that it would be desirable to limit the discretion which in this, as in similar instances, was left to the general. They are, however, of opinion,

that fuller instructions, explaining the views as to the various arrangements which were contemplated by the department at home, and the grounds which it was considered might

render their adoption desirable, far from limiting General Guy's discretion, would have enlightened and strengthened him in its exercise.