fession. Notable among these are the decisions which were given some years ago by the Divisional Court on the right of holding public meetings in streets and public places, which were the result of the conflict of the Salvation Army with the local authorities at various places arising out of the attempt of the latter to repress street meetings of the Salvation Army in cases where they caused opposition from the public. Sociologists, rather than lawyers, are interested in the effect of the influence which the Salvation Army has exerted upon certain sections of the community, and in its evangelising work, but the student of constitutional law will find much food for reflection in a comparison of its origin and growth with that of similar or kindred organisations. The Church, then the sole example of a completely organised form of government, served as the model for almost all systems of government which were initiated during the period comprehending the early and late Middle Ages, and exerted an influence on the policy and legislation of almost every country which has proved a most important factor in its constitutional growth. The Salvation Army, with its wonderful and complex organisation throughout the world, is not, like the Church, the growth of ages, but has been brought to its present state within the memory of the present generation. It has not wielded political influence, as has the Church, but one might speculate with great interest as to the possibilities that would be opened up, if such an organisation were used as a model for constitutional development by any country. The Borstal Institutions. THE report of the year's work accomplished by these institutions shows clearly the advance that has been made in recent times with regard to the theory of punishment and the treatment of criminals. Punishment for crimes is not only to be used as a deterrent to others, but is to involve the creation of useful citizens from the raw material of youthful offenders. In the place of offenders hardened by the régime of ordinary prison life, the Borstal system aims at turning out youths who are able and willing, after their discharge, to look to an honest calling for their livelihood, instead of a resort to criminal methods, which was too often the only course open to them before the institution of this system. The success of the system adopted by the Borstal Commissioners receives eloquent testimony from the results hitherto achieved, as is shown by the large proportion of discharged offenders who are known to have conducted themselves permanently in a satisfactory manner since their discharge. In this connection the work of the Borstal Association is invaluable in keeping in touch with and finding employment for offenders after their discharge from the Borstal Institutions. NOTEWORTHY DECISIONS OF THE JUDICIAL was void. Mr. Justice Bray held that, even assuming the policy had become void, the premiums were forfeited since that date and could not be claimed back. The Court of Appeal in Marcovitch v. Liverpool Victoria Friendly Society (28 Times L. Rep. 188 had to deal with another condition which, put briefly, required that the assured, M., should only have one policy on her life unless with the consent of the company," which consent should be evidenced by an indorsement on the policy signed by the secretary of the society." Before this policy was taken out three further policies had been effected on the same life by different persons. All these policies had been treated as valid by the defendants and the amounts due on them had been met, but no indorsement on M.'s policy had been made. On M.'s death her executor claimed under the policy, and was met by the above-mentioned condition. The Court of Appeal held that there could be a consent to the other policies other than that by indorsement, and that under the circumstances the defendants had to sustain the burden of proof that they had not consented to more than one policy. They were held liable on the policy, having failed to show that they had not consented. 66 In connection with marine insurance Mr. Justice Scrutton had an interesting case before him in Cantiere Meccanico Brindisino v. Janson (106 L. T. Rep. 678; (1912) 2 K. B. 112), where the insurance was upon a floating dock. The owners insured it against loss on voyage under a policy containing the phrase "seaworthiness admitted." The owners honestly believed that the dock was sufficiently strong to withstand the contemplated voyage, but, though perfectly sound qua dock, the structure was not strong enough for the voyage risks. It was held that the underwriters were put on inquiry, and were quite aware of the special nature of their risks. The whole object of inserting words such as seaworthiness admitted" in policies concerning such docks and in the case of river steamers not ordinarily engaged in sea voyages is to avoid the doubts which arise as to whether sufficient temporary strengthening has been applied for an unusual service not designed as the service of its subject-matter, and no defence of concealment was permitted to succeed. At a later date the Court of Appeal has affirmed this decision (vide note ante, p. 308). In Law Guarantee, &c., Society v. Munich Reinsurance Company (105 L. T. Rep. 987; (1912) 1 Ch. 138) Mr. Justice Warrington was concerned with a guarantee of a debenture issue and a reinsurance of a proportion of the risk. The case shows that if the guarantors enter into a scheme of arrangement with creditors or go into liquidation, the reinsurers are not released from their liabilities. Such a contingency is an element in the risk which the parties must be taken to consider within the possibilities. Allen v. London Guarantee and Accident Company (1912) W. N. 55) is useful as a decision on the construction of an accident policy. The defendants indemnified the plaintiff for twelve months against all sums which the plaintiff might be legally liable to pay as compensation in respect of accidental bodily injuries caused by any horse-drawn vehicle or horse belonging to the plaintiff and in charge of a driver in his employment. A van of the plaintiff's while in charge of a carman struck two men engaged in conversation and just stepping off the kerb. The plaintiff, on the defendants' instructions, repudiated liability, and the defendants defended the action without any request from the plaintiff. One of the persons injured obtained £200 damages, and his costs were taxed at £116; the other obtained £175 damages with costs taxed at £101. The defendants paid the damages, but refused to pay the costs, and an execution was levied upon the plaintiff's goods and the sheriff was paid out by him at a cost of £243. The action was for recovery of this sum, and the defence was that the claims of the two men were one accident or occurrence" within the meaning of a condition in the policy, and that another condition contemplated a maximum liability for damages and costs in the aggregate, and that the defendants had already paid more than the maximum. The defendants abandoned a counter-claim for the £75 alleged to be in excess of that maximum. Mr. Justice Phillimore held that the costs, charges, and expenses referred to only indicated such as were incurred at the insured's request, and that the limit of £300 only applied to the damages. Judgment for the plaintiff for the amount claimed. A totally different class of condition was concerned in Re Bradley and Essex and Suffolk Accident Indemnity Society (105 L. T. Rep. 919; (1912) 1 K. B. 415). The claim arose under an employer's liability policy in which there were set out certain conditions precedent, one of which called for the insured to keep a proper wages book. Only one person, his son, was employed by the insured. An accident supervened, and compensation was paid by the claimant, but the society refused to refund owing to the fact that no wages book was kept. The Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton dissenting) held that the claimant was entitled to indemnity as the object of the condition was to provide for the adjustment of premiums, and that compliance was not essential. Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton took the view that the policy plainly regarded it as a condition precedent, and that it should not be declared to be 66 otherwise. The Master of the Rolls thought that it would be unreasonable to go so far, for only one sentence in the middle of the whole condition, which condition the learned judge treated as one and entire, was a condition precedent, and the rest of it was not of this type. Policies of this nature, we now read, in cases of ambiguity are to be construed against the office and in favour of the policy-holder. On the subject of health insurance, even at this early date, some decisions are to be recorded. Thus, Mr. Justice Joyce has held in Re Employment of Ministers of the United Methodist Church (noted ante, p. 282) that the duties of Nonconformist ministers were not within the scope of the Act. That curates are not compulsorily insurable persons appears from Mr. Justice Parker's decision in Re Employment of Curates, &c., in the Church of England (noted ante, p. 331), whilst Mr. Justice Swinfen Eady in Re National Insurance Act 1911 (noted ante, p. 331) has held that dairymen's foremen and tailors' cutters were not within the Act. 66 LANDLORD AND TENANT cases have not been prolific either in the matter of their importance or actual numbers during the past twelve months. Plasycoed Collieries Company v. Partridge, Jones, and Co. (106 L. T. Rep. 426; (1912) 2 K. B. 345) turned on sect. 19 of the Distress for Rent Act 1737, which enacts that where there is an irregularity or unlawful act by the distrainor where any lawful distress is made, the distress itself is not to be unlawful, but the party aggrieved may recover satisfaction in an action of trespass or on the case at the election of the plaintiff. The defendants in this case let a seam of coal, and the lessees subsequently sold to the plaintiffs the right to get the coal under the lease. The royalties payable got into arrear, and the defendants distrained certain ponies and waggons and purported to buy them for themselves at an appraised price. The ponies were used for their own purposes, but the waggons were on demand delivered up to a company from whom they had been hired. The plaintiffs now sued for conversion, the sale to the defendants being invalid. The defendants urged that they were not liable for conversion, but only for the special damage sustained by the plaintiffs. The Divisional Court held that the defendants were liable for conversion, because the acts complained of were not done quâ distraining landlords nor in the course of the distress, but were done under the impression that they were entitled to purchase the goods and were owners by purchase. Re Searle; Brooke v. Searle (106 L. T. Rep. 458; (1912) 1 Ch. 610) was a case of construction of a demise for two years certain and thereafter from year to year until either party" gave a three months' notice to determine the tenancy. The question was whether there was a two years' tenancy certain and whether the tenant could then go out without notice. Mr. Justice Neville held that the tenancy was not determinable at the end of the second year, but is a tenancy for three years at the least, and is only determinable by a three months' notice expiring at the end of the third or any subsequent year. This case resolves doubts arising out of some early and conflicting authorities. Mr. Justice Phillimore in Cave and another v. Horsell (106 L. T. Rep. 147; (1912) W. N. 19) had to construe a covenant by a defendant lessor not to let during the continuance of the lease to the plaintiff "any of the adjoining shops belonging to him on the L. estate" for the purposes of the businesses carried on by the plaintiff, who covenanted not to use the premises except for the purposes of those businesses. The plaintiff's own description of his businesses was those of "upholsterers, cabinetmakers, furniture dealers, and french polishers." The defendant let a shop to another tenant, who covenanted to carry on there the business of "a cabinetmaker, restorer of antiques, and dealer in works of art." On an action being instituted for a breach of the defendant's covenants, it was held that the plaintiff must succeed, and he was awarded substantial damages. Quite recently (noted ante, p. 281) the Court of Appeal has by a majority affirmed this decision. Another question of construction arose in Simner v. Watney (28 Times L. Rep. 162), where a lease had been executed prior to the 23rd Dec. 1910 by the lessors, but was so dated. The rent was payable by equal quarterly payments to be made on the usual quarter days, "of which the first shall be made on the 25th day of December next." Affirming the decision of Mr. Justice Hamilton, the Court of Appeal held that the first quarterly payment had to be made on the 25th Dec. 1910. Turning now to the vexed subject of the law relating to the LICENSING Acts, we find some cases worthy of special note. Thus, in Cooke v. Cooper (Bolton Justices, Lancashire) (105 L. T. Rep. 818; (1912) 2 K. B. 248) there was an appeal from quarter sessions. The justices had refused renewal of a licence on the ground that the house had not been well conducted, and that the fitness of the licence-holder was unsatisfactory. Both the licenceholder and the owners appealed to quarter sessions against this refusal, but the former died before the hearing, and his widow was granted letters of administration. Quarter sessions upheld the objection raised by the respondents that by his death the licence was extinct and therefore no appeal lay, and that the owners had no right of appeal, as they were not persons aggrieved within sect. 29 of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act 1910 The Divisional Court, consisting of Lord Alverstone and Justices Hamilton and Bankes, held that the death of the licence-holder did not make the licence totally void, but that it remained in existence for the purposes of the representatives of a deceased licensee getting a renewal in his place, and being held liable if they contravened the Licensing Acts. The owners were also held entitled to maintain the appeal. Lees v. Lovie (1915) 2 K. B. 425) was a case where the appellant had been convicted and fined for supplying drink on the premises of an unregistered club. In April 1910 the club had been struck off the register, and an order was made that the club should not be used for purposes requiring registration for six, afterwards reduced by quarter sessions to three, months. In Jan. 1911 an application was made to register the club afresh. It was held that a club which has been struck off by a court of summary jurisdiction under sect. 95 of the Licensing Consolidation Act 1910 cannot be replaced on the register as a club. This seems a heavy penalty, but the Act is exceedingly ambiguous, and whatever decision is arrived at entails some curious results. An important decision on the law relating to compensation was reached in Knight v. City of London Brewery Company (106 L. T. Rep. 564; (1912) 1 K. B. 10). Mr. Justice A. T. Lawrence had to deal there with a lease of licensed premises for a term of forty years dated 1875. In 1888 these premises were redemised for a period of twenty-one years to commence on the expiration of the above-mentioned period of forty years. In 1897 a further extension of the lease was given for a period of fifteen years to commence on the expiration of the period of twenty-one years. These two extensions contained a clause purporting to effect a forfeiture of these extensions should there be a forfeiture of the original lease of 1875. In 1910 a compensation charge was imposed by quarter sessions when the tenant's licence was renewed, such charge being imposed under the Licensing Act 1904, and the learned judge held that, in order to determine the amount of the unexpired term, the original lease and extensions could not be treated as one, but that the deduction of the percentage contemplated from the rent would have to be regulated by the unexpired portion of the original lease only. An interesting LIGHT OBSTRUCTION case was heard by Mr. Justice Neville in Griffith v. Richard Clay and Sons Limited (106 L. T. Rep. 68; (1912) 1 Ch. 291). The main point was the measure of damages. The plaintiff owned two houses the windows of which on the street side were ancient lights, and he owned also the land adjoining the rear of these houses. The defendants built so extensive a building on the opposite side of the street that the light was affected. The neighbourhood was such that the houses would soon have to be demolished, the same being, moreover, in a grave state of disrepair. If business premises were erected on the site, their value would be seriously diminished by the obstruction. The learned judge was faced with the difficulty of settling whether he should solely consider the plaintiff as the owner of the houses and no more when determining the measure of damages for the diminution of light, or whether he must take into reckoning his ownership of the whole site. He held that he must consider what the difference would be between the value of the plaintiff's premises as a whole if sold to-morrow to a purchaser and what it would have been had the defendants' building never been carried beyond an imaginary line representing the angle of 45°. This new point was decided in the sense that the plaintiff's damages were not limited to the depreciation in the value of the houses, but extended to the diminution in the value of the site available for the purpose of erecting buildings of the character suitable for the neighbourhood. Two or three MONEYLENDING cases are worthy of notice. One of these has also been touched upon under the heading of Infancy (quod vide), and we now draw attention to two decisions upon the more special point of registration. In Re Robinson's Settlement; Gant v. Hobbs (106 L. T. Rep. 443; (1912) 2 Ch. 717), R. had by marriage settlement assigned certain funds, taking himself a protected life interest, the trustees being empowered to pay his debts and to raise money for the purpose if requested by him in writing. He was adjudicated bankrupt in 1907. Between this date and the preceding act of bankruptcy he requested the trustees to raise £800 for the purpose of paying off liabilities. The money was borrowed from G. by a mortgage in which the trustees covenanted to repay at 5 per cent. "as such trustees, but not otherwise." The present action was to enforce the security, and Mr. Justice Warrington held originally that the trustees were personally liable, although G. was not registered as a moneylender, on the ground that the mortgage was not taken by him quâ moneylender, but as an investor. The Court of Appeal held that it was taken by G. as moneylender, and was a void transaction as G. was unregistered. The debt was therefore gone, and G. could not succeed on any claim for money had and received. Lord Justice Buckley held also that the trustees would not be bound personally by such a covenant as that set out above. Yet another registration case is worth remark in that of Peizer v. Lefkowitz (106 L. T. Rep. 776; (1912) 2 Ch. 235), a decision of the Court of Appeal. The "Wentworth Loan and Discount Office" was the registered title of the plaintiff Peizer, a moneylender, and she was described in a promissory note given to her as security as Peizer of the "Wentworth Loan and Discount Company." The Divisional Court held that this did not amount to carrying on business in a name other than registered. The Court of Appeal affirmed this, holding that there can be a variance in degree, but the difference in the variance is a question of law and not of fact. Lord Justice Vaughan Williams thought that the plaintiff's identity was not in any way concealed. This case, however, must not be taken as suggesting that words importing a different constitution of a firm from that indicated by the words in the registered name might not in some cases vitiate the transaction when used in a promissory note or other security taken by the moneylender. (To be continued.) COMMENTS ON CASES. "Perils of the Sea." sea. As to what is and what is not a "peril of the sea there has ever been a wide divergence of judicial opinion. But in Wilson and Co. v. Owners of the Cargo of the Xantho (57 L. T. Rep. 701; 12 App. Cas. 503) and Hamilton v. Pandorf (57 L. T. Rep. 726; 12 App. Cas. 518) much was done by the House of Lords to settle this moot point. The considered opinions which the learned Lords delivered on the same day-namely, the 14th July 1887-in those two cases dealt exhaustively with the question. In the latter case, Lord Bramwell stated (at p. 729 of 57 L. T. Rep.) that he thought the definition of "perils of the sea," given by Lord Justice Lopes in the court of first instance, very good"a sea damage, occurring at sea, and nobody's fault." Lord Bramwell went on to say: "What is the 'peril'? It is that the ship or goods will be lost or damaged, but it must be of the Lord Herschell, in pronouncing his decision in the other casee-which overruled Woodley and Co. v. Michell and Co. (48 L. T. Rep. 599; 11 Q. B. Div. 47)-dwelt on the significance of the preposition "of" in this connection. "It must be a peril ' of ' the sea, said his Lordship: (at p. 703 of 57 L. T. Rep.). Thus, every accident or casualty which may happen to the subjectmatter of a marine insurance on the sea is not covered. Nor is every loss or damage of which the sea is the immediate cause. With these clear expressions of opinion as a guide, the Privy Council had to consider, on an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of China in the recent case of Sassoon and Co. v. Western Assurance Company (106 L. T. Rep. 929), whether goods belonging to the appellants had been damaged by the perils insured against, which included "perils of the sea." The goods were stored in a hulk moored in a tidal river, in smooth water. But in consequence of natural decay, which could not be detected by ordinary examination and was unknown to the appellants, the hulk became leaky, and the goods were injured by water which percolated through the decayed woodwork of the bottom of the hulk. Mere mention of damage caused to goods by the incursion of sea water is suggestive of what occurred in Hamilton v. Pandorf (ubi sup.). There sea water entered through a pipe which had been gnawed by rats. The damage so caused to he cargo of the ship by the sea water-not by the rats themselves as in Laveroni v. Drury (8 Ex. 166)-was held to be within the exception "dangers and accidents of the seas of whatever nature and kind." Similarly, in the case of damage to cargo by sea water getting into the hold through an iron rivet being loosened by stress of weather: (The Cressington, 64 L. T. Rep. 329; (1891) P. 152). Another case to the same effect was Blackburn v. Liverpool, Brazil, and River Plate Steam Navigation Company Limited (85 L. T. Rep. 783; (1902) 1 K. B. 290). It was rightly said, therefore, by the appellants' counsel in the present case that an incursion of sea water is primâ facie a "peril of the sea." But although the causa proxima of the damage to the appellants' goods was undeniably the sea water, it was not, in the opinion of the Privy Council, due to a "peril of the sea. It was due to the defective condition of the hulk in which the goods were stored. There was no weather, nor any other fortuitous circumstance contributing to the incursion of the water, as Lord Mersey, by whom the judgment of their Lord ships was delivered, plainly pointed out. The risk of goods being at sea in a vessel which is unseaworthy-not, however, to the knowledge of the assured-and consequently allowing an incursion of sea water, is not, therefore, like that where rats gnaw a pipe and produce the identical result. This decision of the Privy Council would have been more convincing, perhaps, if Lord Mersey had vouchsafed the reasons for it in rather fuller terms. Some may, indeed, feel inclined to assert, and not entirely without justification, that in the conclusion arrived at there are signs of a lack of that minute consideration which is so noticeable a feature of the opinions expressed in the earlier cases on the subject. Anticipating Disputes that may never Arise. THE decision of questions that have not actually arisen, and, indeed, that may never arise-entirely hypothetical, therefore, they may be-is what the courts have always steadfastly set their faces against. The reluctance even that was formerly evinced to making declarations "in the air," to use the popular and expressive phrase that is to say, binding declarations as to future rights which would arise in events that had not happened -has been illustrated by numerous cases. Among them, Bright v. Tyndall (4 Ch. Div. 189) may, perhaps, be cited as an example that is as striking as any. The provision of rule 5 of Order XXV., in regard to declaratory judgments, based as it is on sect. 50 of the Chancery Procedure Act 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 86), has removed the objection that previously existed. But that merely extends to declaring the rights of parties, although no substantive relief is at the time able to be granted. Questions not really before the court are still tabooed. And that wholesome principle applies no less to arbitrations under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58) than to other proceedings. This appears from the decision of the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Payne v. N. Fortescue and Sons Limited (noted ante, p. 306). The employers there, admitting liability, agreed to pay and did pay full compensation to one of their workmen who had been injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The workman applied to have a memorandum of that agreement recorded, pursuant to sect. 9 of the second schedule to the Act. The employers objected that the memorandum omitted to state that the compensation agreed to be paid was only to continue so long as their doctor certified that the workman was unable to follow his occupation-during the period of his incapacity, in other words: (see sched. 1, sect. 1, sub-sect. 3). In consequence of the workman being yet in receipt of his full compensation, the employers denied that any question had arisen as to the extent of their liability to pay the same or as to the duration thereof. Therefore, said they, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction in the matter: (Field v. Longden and Sons, 85 L. T. Rep. 571; (1902) 1 K. B. 47; see also Jones v. Great Central Railway Company, 18 Times L. Rep. 65). To that view of the position of affairs the County Court judge acceded, and his decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The decision in Phillips v. Vickers, Son, and Maxim (105 L. T. Rep. 564; (1912) 1 K. B. 16) dealt with an agreement to pay so long as the workman produced a certificate from the medical man attached to his employers' works; and the decision there was exactly in point in the present case. Sect. 1, sub-sect. 3, of the Act of 1906 directs that any question arising in any proceedings under the Act, if not settled by agreement, shall be settled by arbitration. But it is not, as the Master of the Rolls (Cozens-Hardy) remarked, every kind of "question," present or future, possible or contingent, that can thus be referred to arbitration. Although at some future time there may be a question as to the amount or duration of the compensation which is payable by an employer to his workman, that does not give either party a right to resort to arbitration before the time arrives. When a dispute as to amount or duration arises is the time for that procedure. The court declines, in the words of the Master of the Rolls, "to determine academic questions by way of prophecy." The judgment of the Court of Session in the Scotch case of Sweeney v. Gourlay Brothers and Co. (Dundee) Limited (8 Fraser, 597, 965; 43 Sc. L. Rep. 690) supports this eminently reasonable conclusion as to the intent and meaning of the statute. THE CONVEYANCER. A Lessee's Liability under a Covenant to Repair. THE instructive lecture delivered by Mr. R. W. Turner to the Solicitors' Managing Clerks' Association on the 16th Feb. 1912 calls attention to the important effect which the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Lurcott v. Wakeley (104 L. T. Rep. 290; (1911) 1 K. B. 905) has upon preconceived notions with regard to the liability of the tenant of a house under a covenant to repair. Previously to that case there appears to have been an impression that under a covenant to repair an old building the tenant was not liable to renew or rebuild anything worn out or decayed through the action of the elements, but that is no longer the law. In Lurcott v. Wakeley the lease was of a house in Hatton-garden for twenty-eight years, and the covenant by the lessee was to "well and substantially repair, paint, glaze, cleanse, and keep in thorough repair and good condition" the premises, and, "the said premises being so repaired and kept," to yield up at the end of the term. The house was at least 200 years old, and the London County Council served a notice on the owner and occupiers requiring them to take down the front external wall of the house as being a dangerous structure. The condition of the wall was caused by old age, and the wall could not have been repaired without rebuilding it, and it was held by the Court of Appeal, affirming the Divisional Court, that the assignees of the lease were liable under the covenant to pull down and rebuild the wall. The point appears to be that, although the lessee under such a covenant cannot be called upon, if the whole house has decayed by lapse of time, to build a new house in the place of an old one-that is, to give the landlord something which he had not at the date of the lease-it does oblige the lessee to maintain the house as a habitable house, whether the means to that end consist of repair or renewal, but the nature and amount of the obligation will be in accordance with the age and character of the house. As pointed out by Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton in the case under notice, a man who covenants to keep the Mauretania in good condition must, of course, keep her in the perfection of condition by reason of the fact that she is a vessel of her class and new. Suppose a man covenants for a year to keep in good condition a tramp that has been at sea for fifteen years, he must perform the covenant just as much as a man who covenanted to keep the Mauretania in good condition. But the keeping in good condition in the second case will mean something very different from that which is meant in the former case; it will mean in good condition for a vessel of that age and nature. Lord Justice Buckley in the course of his judgment observed that "repair" and "renewal" are not words expressive of a clear contract. Repair always involves renewal; renewal of a part-of a subordinate part. He agreed that, if repair of the whole subject-matter had become impossible, a covenant to repair did not carry an obligation to renew or replace. He thought that all the cases came only to this: that the question was one of degree. Those who wish to pursue the matter further will find Lurcott v. Wakeley thoroughly gone into, and compared with the previous decisions, in the sixth edition of Mr. J. H. Redman's excellent work on the Law of Landlord and Tenant. Parol Evidence of the Circumstances surrounding a Testator when he makes his Will. ALTHOUGH parol evidence of a testator's intentions is inadmissible, it has become almost an axiom that in construing a will you may place yourself in the testator's armchair and consider the circumstances by which he was surrounded when he made his will, to assist you in arriving at his intention: (see the judgment of Lord Justice James in Boyes v. Cook (42 L. T. Rep. 556 14 Ch. Div. 53). Again, in Charter v. Charter (L. Rep. 7 H. of L. 377) (which was a case of a mistake in the name of a devisee) Lord Cairns said: "There is a class of evidence which in this case, as in all cases of testamentary dispositions, is clearly receivable. The court has a right to ascertain all the facts which were known to the testator at the time he made his will, and thus to place itself in the testator's position in order to ascertain the bearing and application of the language which he uses, and in order to ascertain whether there exists any person or thing to which the whole description given in the will can be reasonably and with sufficient certainty applied." Without impugning either of those dicta in the connection in which they were used, they must, as suggested by Mr. Theobald, K.C., in his well-known work on Wills, be accepted with reservation. What has to be done is first to construe the will; if the meaning is clear, surrounding circumstances cannot be looked at to throw a doubt on that meaning, or to give the will a different meaning. The case of Higgins v. Dawson (85 L. T. Rep. 763; (1902) A C. 1) is a remarkable illustration of this. In that case a testator at the date of his will was the owner of some real estate, plate, and china, and of two mortgage debts amounting to £13,187, and of nothing else, except the accruing interest on the mortgage debts. By his will he specifically devised and bequeathed the real estate, plate, and china. He then gave a number of legacies, amounting to about £10,000. These were followed by a gift of the residue of the mortgage debts, after the payment of his debts, to a charity. The question was whether the residue of the mortgage debts meant what remained of them after paying thereout first the legacies, and secondly the debts, or whether it meant what remained after paying debts only. Subsequently to the date of his will the testator became possessed of further personal estate. If the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time when he made his will could have been considered, the presumption is very strong that the legacies were meant to be paid out of the mortgage debts, but it was held by the House of Lords that evidence of those circumstances was not admissible for the purpose of contradicting the plain meaning of the language used in the will. It is admitted, however, that where you are finding out persons or things-who are the persons designated by the will, what are the things left by the will-you may find either the person or the thing by proper external evidence of what is referred to: (see the judgment of the Earl of Halsbury in Higgins v. Dawson). Generalisations are dangerous, particularly in law. There are, no doubt, a few things which are settled, but they are not too numerous. annum. and 1911 BETWEEN (hereinafter called "the in the county of in MISCELLANEOUS PRECEDENTS (continued). Conveyance of Freeholds excepting Minerals and with Indemnity against Rentcharges. THIS INDENTURE made the day of A. B. of in the county of vendor") of the one part and C. D. of (hereinafter called " 'the purchaser") of the other part. WHEREAS under the deeds and documents mentioned in the third schedule hereunder written or some of them the vendor is seised of the hereditaments hereby assured in fee simple in possession free from incumbrances except (1) an annual rentcharge of £y charged also on other hereditaments in the parish of the counties of of much larger value in favour of C. B. under and by virtue of a deed dated the day of 18 mentioned in part 1 of the second schedule to the deed numbered 1 in the third schedule hereunder written (2) an annual rentcharge of £z payable to the vicar of in the county of and (3) to a Devon rate of about 10s. per AND WHEREAS by an agreement dated the day of 18 and made between the vendor of the one part and E. F. of the other part the greater part of the hereditaments hereby assured (together with other hereditaments) was agreed to be let to the said E. F. on a yearly tenancy as from the day of determinable by six months' notice expiring on any day of at the yearly rent of £a per annum. AND WHEREAS by another agreement dated the day of 189 and made between the vendor of the one part and G. H. of the other part the remaining part of the hereditaments hereby assured was (together with other hereditaments) agreed to be let to the said G. H. on a yearly tenancy as from the day of determinable by six months' notice expiring on any day of at the yearly rent of £b per annum. AND WHEREAS the vendor has agreed with the purchaser for the sale to him for the sum of £x of the hereditaments hereby assured in fee simple in possession free from incumbrances but subject to the exceptions and reservations hereinafter contained. AND WHEREAS upon the treaty for the sale it was agreed that the said annual rentcharge of £y should be charged exclusively upon a messuage farm lands and hereditaments known as situate at aforesaid and more particularly described in the second schedule hereto in exoneration of the hereditaments hereby assured and that the vendor should enter into such covenant in relation thereto as is hereinafter contained AND WHEREAS upon the treaty for the said sale it was agreed that the other hereditaments charged with the said annual rentcharge of £y should be primarily charged therewith in exoneration of the hereditaments hereby assured and that the vendor should enter into the covenant of indemnity hereinafter contained. AND WHEREAS it was a condition of the said sale that the yearly sum of £e should be apportioned as the part of the said yearly rent of £a payable in respect of the greater part of the hereditaments hereby assured and that the yearly sum of £d should be apportioned as the part of the said yearly rent of £b payable in respect of the remaining part of the hereditaments hereby assured (making together the apportioned rent of £e in respect of the hereditaments hereby assured). NOW THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH that in pursuance of the said recited agreement in this behalf and in consideration of the sum of £x now paid by the purchaser to the vendor (the receipt whereof the vendor doth hereby acknowledge) the vendor as BENEFICIAL OWNER doth hereby grant and convey unto the purchaser and his heirs ALL that &c. which premises are more particularly described in the first schedule hereunder written and are delineated on the plan drawn on these presents and therein coloured and EXCEPTING out of this conveyance and reserving unto the vendor his heirs and assigns all the mines and seams of coal cannel and all other the mines and minerals and mineral substances water and strata whatsoever and of whatsoever nature or description lying under the hereditaments hereby assured with full liberty and power at all times hereafter to search win work get mine and carry away the same and any mines beds and seams of coal and other minerals and mineral substances water and strata lying within and under any adjacent and other lands without any obligation in the exercise of such powers of working to leave any vertical or lateral support for the surface of the land hereby assured or any buildings or works for the time being thereon provided that and it is hereby agreed that the person or persons actually working under or by virtue of any of the powers aforesaid shall pay to the purchaser his heirs and assigns adequate compensation for all surface damage which he or they may sustain by reason of the working of the said mines and minerals or the exercise in connection therewith of the said liberties and privileges hereby excepted and reserved the amount of such compensation in case of dispute to be settled by two arbitrators one to be appointed by each party under and subject to the Arbitration Act 1889 or any statutory modification thereof TO HOLD all the said hereditaments and premises hereby assured unto and to the use of the purchaser his heirs and assigns subject to the herein before mentioned agreements of tenancy of the day of 189 and so that the purchaser his heirs and assigns shall henceforth be entitled to receive take and [The first schedule above referred to.] · LAW LIBRARY. Medico-Legal Examinations and the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906. By Sir JOHN COLLIE. Baillière, Tindall, and Cox. SIR JOHN COLLIE has produced a book of equal interest to the legislator, the sociologist, and the lawyer. In a year he has made 844 examinations of injuries in medico-legal cases, many of which have been under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906, and therefore his observations are worthy of perusal. He deals first with the psychological and moral effects of legislation, in the course of which he quotes many interesting cases. This is followed by a summary of the compensation laws. There is then a chapter on the intention and result of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906, after which Sir John suggests a remedy for "the unfortunate state of affairs thus disclosed." Ancient, Curious, and Famous Wills. By VIRGIL M. HARRIS. Stanley Paul and Co. MR. HARRIS, Lecturer on Wills in the St. Louis University Institute of Law, naturally considers the subject of wills "not so prosaic as might be supposed," and has produced a book that contains some interesting and amusing reading. He begins with a chapter containing general suggestions as to the preparation of wills which may prove useful to readers, and the next chapter on ancient wills commences with a Mohammedan legend as to a will made by Adam. The subject-matter of the book has been collected from all over the world by research in libraries and reference to magazine and newspaper files. The Law of Evidence. By W. NEMBHARD HIBBERT. Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons Limited. MR. HIBBERT, having had many years' experience in preparing students for legal examinations, is well qualified to write such a book as this, which is intended primarily for students. In five concise chapters he gives the elementary knowledge necessary, at the same time referring his readers to the important works on the subject. The Green Bag for August contains: A notice of Knox Livingston, by W. H. Muller; the Lawyers of Dickens-Land, by Denis Æ. Behen; and the Mistake (?) of our Forefathers in Adopting the Common Law of England. The Law Magazine and Review for August contains: Individual and Communal Land Tenure in Russia, by L. P. Rastorgoueff; The Rights-and Wrongs-of Parents under the Education Acts, by W. P. W. Phillimore, M.A., B.C.L.; General Warrants, by J. A. Lovat-Fraser; Individual Liberty under the Commonwealth, by Arthur Cleveland; Civil Judicial Statistics 1910; and Circumstantial Evidence, by N. W. Sibley, B.A., LL.M. In The Rating of Gas and Water Undertakings, published by Walter King, Mr. Arthur Valon has endeavoured to show the practical application of the principles laid down in the Acts of Parliament and by legal decisions to the making of a valuation of a gas or water undertaking for the purpose of assessment to poor rate. He has included an outline of the procedure to be followed on making a rate, or when appealing, for the benefit of those who only deal with such matters occasionally. BOOKS RECEIVED. Stone on National Insurance, with Questions and Answers. Butterworth and Co., Bell-yard, Temple Bar; Shaw and Sons, Fetter-lane, E.C. Price 1s. net. Spicer and Pegler on_Practical Book-keeping and Commercial Knowledge. H. Foulks Lynch and Co., 9, Fenchurch-street, E.C. Price 5s. net. Calendar 1912-13 of the London School of Economics_and Political Science. The School, Clare Market, W.C. Price 1s. net. POOLING INSURANCE.-The Licenses Insurance Corporation and Guarantee Fund Limited has established an entirely new scheme of Insurance for Fire, Burglary, Workmen's Compensation, &c., by which the profits accrue to the insured. (See p. 400).-[ADVT.] |