To surrender at their respective District Courts. ATKINSON, HERBERT RAINE, Windlestone, confectioner. Ct. Durham. Aug. 29. ASH, JAMES HENRY, Devizes, builder. Ct. Bath. Aug. 30. BARFETT, RICHARD FREDERICK CECIL CHING, Falmouth, schoolmaster. Ct. Truro. Aug. 30. HINDS, SAMUEL JAMES BOYD, Macclesfield, confectioner. Ct. Macclesfield. Aug. 29. HOWES, EDWARD, Norwich, brick manufacturer. Ct. Norwich. Aug. 30. HICKSON, HERBERT GEORGE, Great Grimsby, grocer. Ct. Great Grimsby. Aug. 29. JEALOUS, NEWTON AUGUSTUS, Houghton-le-Spring, house painter. Ct. KAY, HARRY, Cheltenham, gentleman. Ct. Cheltenham. Aug. 29. Aug. 26. BAILEY, CAPTAIN F., Buckingham-gate. Ct. High Court BERRY, GRACE ISABELLA (spinster), late Bloomsbury-st, Bloomsbury. Ct. BOWEN, THOMAS, Ellesmere, draper. Ct. Wrexham and Llangollen. Aug. 28. BOWEN, ALBERT EDWARD VICTOR, Carlton, bootmaker. Ct. Nottingham. Aug. 27. BOSWELL, GREGOR, Enfield, tailor. Ct. Edmonton. Aug. 28. CRESWELL, ARTHUR WILFRED, Leigh-on-Sea, schoolmaster. Ct. Chelmsford. Aug. 28. CUTLACK. NORMAN ROBERT, Margate, wine merchant. Ct. Canterbury. Aug. 27. DAY, ALFRED EDWIN ADAMS, Margate, fishmonger. Ct. Canterbury. Aug. 27. DAVIES, EDMUND, Aberdare, colliery roadman. Ct. Aberdare and Mountain Ash. Aug. 28. DAVIES, FRANK WALTER (trading as Walter W. Davies and Sons), Bristol, advertising agent. Ct. Bristol. Aug. 27. ELLIS, EDWARD, St. George's, plumber. Ct. Shrewsbury. Aug 28. FATHERS, GEORGE EDWARD, and FATHERS, WALTER JOHN (trading as GINSBERG, MAURICE, St. John's-rd, Holloway, financial broker. Ct. High GROVE, ERNEST ALBERT, Birmingham, auctioneer. Ct. Birmingham. Aug. 28. HAWORTH, HAROLD, Blackpool, journalist. Ct. Preston. Aug. 28. HOPKINS, HENRY, Caerphilly, collier. Ct. Pontypridd, Ystradyfodwg, and Porth. Aug. 26. HOUNSELL, WALTER HENRY, Ilkeston, bootmaker. Ct. Derby and Long MARTIN, EDWIN MCGRATH, Hart-st, Bloomsbury, solicitor. Ct. High MILSOM, SAM, Bristol, dealer in horses. Ct. Bristol Aug. 26. PICKEN, WILLIAM, Codsall Wood, general blacksmith. hampton. Aug. 27. Ct. Wolver PROCTER, HARRY CASTLE, Scarborough, plasterer. Ct. Scarborough. Aug. 27. PHILLIPS, PERCY HERBERT (trading as Phillips and Co.), Downham Market, brewer. Ct. King's Lynn. Aug. 26. READ, WILLIAM, late Grays, tailor. Ct. Chelmsford. Aug. 28. RICHARDSON, GEORGE (trading as Richardson and Co.). Harrogate, painter. STONE, GEORGE, Bath, baker. Ct. Bath. Aug. 27. Aug. 28. Aug. 24. Amended notice substituted for that published in Gazette, July 30. CALLOW, ALEXANDER CRAWFORD, Tottenham, clerk. Ct. Edmonton. July 24. Amended notice substituted for that published in Gazette, Aug. 2. RUTTY, WILLIAM JAMES (trading as Frances Rutty), Stafford, ironmonger. Ct. Stafford. July 27. GAZETTE, SEPT. 3. ATKINSON, HERBERT RAINE, Windlestone, confectioner. Ct. Durham. Aug. 29. Truro. Aug. 30. BARFETT, RICHARD FREDERICK CECIL CHING, Falmouth, schoolmaster. Ct. DAVIES, RICHARD EDWARD, Bishop's Castle, tailor. Ct. Leominster. EVANS, WILLIAM GEORGE (late trading as W. G. Evans and Co.), late Blackwood, boot dealer. Ct. Tredegar. Aug. 31. EASTWOOD, WILLIAM HENRY, Manchester, East India merchant. Ct. Manchester Aug. 29. FLATHERS, JOHN (described in the receiving order and trading as J. Flathers and Co.), Broad-st-pl, merchant. Ct. High Court. Aug. 30. GOODSTEIN, ALEXANDER, Waterloo-rd, tobacco dealer Aug. 30. Ct. High Court. Ct. Macclesfield HINDS, SAMUEL JAMES BOYD, Macclesfield, confectioner. HOLMES, ABEL, Liscard, grocer. Ct. Birkenhead. Aug. 29. JONES, THOMAS, Chatsworth-rd, Clapton, late tailor. Ct. High Court. LEE, JOSIAH JOB (trading as F. J. Thomas and New Coventry Cycle Company), Coventry, cycle sidecar maker. Ct. Coventry. Aug. 30. LEGGOTT, EDWARD, Brothertoft, farmer. Ct. Boston. Aug. 31. MCCRAITH, PATRICK ALPHONSUS (described in the receiving order and trading as McCraith and Co.), Duke-st, London Bridge, Southwark, provision agent. Ct. High Court. Aug. 30. Moss, MOSES, late Southport, farmer. Ct. Liverpool. Aug. 30. VON GRUNDHERR ZU ALTENTHAN U WEYERHAUS, HUGO ERNST PETER HERMAN To Readers and Correspondents. All communications must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee of good faith. Anonymous communications are invariably rejected. All communications intended for the Editorial Department should, in order to prevent delay, be addressed to the EDITOR OF THE LAW TIMES." Any contributions that may be sent on approval will be carefully considered by the Editor; but no responsibility whatever can be accepted in respect thereof, although, if unsuitable, every effort will be made to return them, provided that a stamped addressed wrapper is inclosed for that purpose. The copyright of all contributions (including reports paid for) shall belong to the proprietors of the LAW TIMES, together with the right of republication in any form they may think desirable. 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Four lines of 30 words or £ s. d. less than 30 words in body type One page Half page 3 6 One column 6 10 0 0 5 0 0 Each additional line Advertisements ordered for a series of three insertions are charged 10 per cent. under scale, and for six or more insertions 20 per cent. under. Paragraph Advertisements 1s, per line, minimum 5s. No series discount. Advertisers whose reference is under initials to this office, should remit 6d. additional to defray postage in transmitting replies to their Adver tisements. Advertisements must reach the office not later than five o'clock on Thurs day afternoon, and must be accompanied by a remittance. Post-Office Orders payable to HORACE COX. Vol. 133.-No. 3624. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. CHANCERY DIVISION. Re PORTER, AMPHLETT, AND JONES. -Solicitor and client Costs Taxation as between solicitor and client-Unnecessary costs inci rred by instruction of client YEATMAN v. L. HOMBERGER AND Co. -Passing off-Vintage port wineFancy trade name, "T.'s "-Inadvertence-Disclaimer-Continuing wrong-Injunction.... KING'S BENCH DIVISION. SCOTTISH SHIRE LINE LIMITED AND OTHERS v. LONDON AND PROVINCIAL MARINE AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED. Insurance (marine)-Policy on freight COKER v. BOLTON. Insurance (marine)-Constructive total loss Freight policy-Institute time LEADING ARTICLES, &c. TO READERS AND CORRESPONDENTS 435 AND LEADING Unexplained Dis Seamen during Voyage-Noteworthy Decisions of the Judicial Year 33 COMMENTS ON CASES.. LAW LIBRARY 36 435 438 439 THE CONVEYANCER.-Precedents...... 439 441 The Law and the Lawyers. Census Returns and Parliamentary Areas. IN the first two volumes of the detailed abstracts of the census returns the several administrative areas and registration areas were dealt with. Vol. 3 contains figures for the Parliamentary areas, and the statistics therein contained show the great divergence that exists in proportional representation. These extreme variations are no doubt due to the varying rates of increase in population, but none the less do they show the urgent necessity for a new redistribution. To take the two extremes, in eight constituencies the population per representative is less than 20,000, while there are no less than eighty-three constituencies in which the population is upwards of 100,000 per member. The total number of electors in 1911, exclusive of the universities, was 6,386,679-that is, on an average, one elector among 5.6 in the country; while persons among all the constituencies the City of London is unique in having more electors on the register than it had persons enumerated within its area on census night, there being 19,657 population as compared with 30,988 electors. There are, however, some 364,061 persons engaged during the day in that area. Conclusions from the Figures. 66 WE to a great extent agree with the conclusions of the Registrar-General and his assistant as to the chief points brought out by an examination of the figures. They state them to be: (1) The lack of identity between Parliamentary and any other areas in the kingdom, and (2) the degree to which the relation between population and representation established in principle by the Act of 1885 has been disturbed by the growth and movement of the population since that date. It is hardly to be anticipated that complete Second Sheet correspondence between Parliamentary and administrative areas could be permanently maintained, even if temoprarily secured by a new scheme of redistribution; since the needs for further alteration would be found, in the future as in the past, to vary widely in the two cases. It is to be hoped, however, that in any future rearrangements of Parliamentary areas it may be possible to base these areas upon, and build them up from, conveniently sized units in the shape of pre-existing administrative areas; the urban or rural district, the civil parish, or the ward, as the case may be." Redistribution is therefore clearly an immediate need. IN a recent issue (ante, p. 98), we discussed the change in the law relating to the compensation of seamen injured by "accident arising out of and in the course of" their employment that was effected by the passing of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58). Thus, for example, any seaman who meets with an accident when returning to his ship is now, as appears from our article, rendered capable of seeking relief by way of compensation. In the event of death resulting from such an accident, his dependants may be justified in making a claim of that nature. This is shown by the numerous decisions that formed the subject of that article. Similarly, in the case of accidents that happen when seamen are actually on board. Should "personal injury by accident," answering all the statutory requirements, then befall them, they or their dependants, as the case may be, may claim to be compensated. Furthermore, their unexplained disappearance from their ships in the course of a voyage may likewise give rise to such a claim by their dependants. And that accidents of that description are of no uncommon occurrence is demonstrated by several cases that have come up for decision. To the ordinary landsman, indeed, it must be little short of a relevation that this kind of accident to seamen is one that is so apt to take place, even though not caused by anything in the nature of what are regarded as the usual perils of the sea. For the cases that have called for determination by the courts are doubtless merely occasional instances of a melancholy repetition, in multifarious shapes and guises, of an identical calamity. An examination of the circumstances detailed in the decisions that have been reported by us n which the unexplained disappearance has occurred indicates, in the clearest manner, the view that is taken by the courts in respect of that mystery. The natural and irresistible conclusion to be drawn from the fact that a seaman has disappeared from his ship in the course of a voyage, and while the ship is actually at sea, is either that he has fallen overboard accidentally and been drowned, or that he has done so intentionally-committed suicide, in short-or has been murdered by being thrown overboard. But allowing that the first alternative is what truly occurred, it is not at all a necessary consequence as is manifested by the decisions on the subjectthat the dependants of the seaman will be awarded compensation. A seaman's drowning in such circumstances does not raise a prima facie inference that he met with an "accident arising out of and in the course of" his employment. For although the statutory requirement that the seaman's death shall have resulted from an injury by "accident" may have been completely satisfied, and likewise that the accident arose "in the course of " his employment, it by no means follows that the same arose also "out of" that employment. And the cardinal principle that has again and again been enunciated in workmen's compensation cases is that the onus lies on the person who claims compensation to prove both those requisites. That principle was nowhere more distinctly and definitely expressed in cases in which the dependants of a deceased seaman were concerned than in McDonald v. Owners of Steamship Banana (99 L. T. Rep. 671; (1908) 2 K. B. 926). It was there laid down by the Court of Appeal that where a claim for compensation is made by the dependant of a deceased workman under the Act of 1906, it is for the applicant to prove affirmatively that the workman's death was due to "personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment" of the deceased. It is not enough to prove that the deceased was in the employment of the respondents, and that the accident happened during such employment. In other words, there is no presumption in favour of the applicant; and if the only evidence that is obtainable is equally consistent with either view the application fails. What was said by Lord Collins-then Sir Henn Collins, M.R.-in Pomfret v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company (89 L. T. Rep. 176; (1903) 2 K. B. 718) was thus applied. The whole burden of proving the conditions essential to the obtaining of an award of compensation rests upon the applicant and upon nobody else. That, as Lord Collins remarked, was precisely the position that was dealt with by the House of Lords in Wakelin v. London and South-Western Railway Company (55 L. T. Rep. 709; 12 App. Cas. 41). In the Irish case of Gatton v. Limerick Steamship Company (1910, 2 Ir. Rep. 561), the same principle was adopted. The burden of proving, said the court there, that an accident arose out of and in the course of the employment rests on the applicant, even when claiming as a dependant of a deceased workman. The first case that came before the Court of Appeal of a claim for compensation by a dependant under the Act of 1906, because of the unexplained disappearance of a seaman during a voyage, was that of Bender v. Owners of Steamship Zent (100 L. T. Rep. 639; (1909) 2 K. B. 41). While the ship in which the seaman -who was its chief cook and baker-was employed was on the high seas he fell overboard and was drowned. The weather was perfectly calm at the time; it was daylight, and the ship was steady. There was no evidence to show how the deceased had fallen overboard. It was held by the Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of the County Court judge, that the dependant of the deceased seaman had failed to discharge the onus that was upon her, there being no justification for inferring that the accident arose "out of the employment, because it was admitted that it happened "in the course of " it. Of some importance is it to refer to the statement of the opinion of Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton-as he then was-in that case, in regard to the fact that there was nothing to account for the loss of the seaman-no storm or other peril of the sea. "If," said the learned judge (at p. 641 of 100 L. T. Rep.), " on a stormy night one of the watch of a ship was found to be missing, I should have very little difficulty in drawing the inference that the most natural cause of the accident was the increased danger to which the seamen were subjected by having to do the duty of a seaman on watch in such perilous circumstances." The accident apparently in a case of that sort would, according to his Lordship's opinion, be one that arose out of " the employment of the seaman as well as " in the course of" it. 66 The view that was expressed by the learned judges of the Court of Appeal in McDonald's case (ubi sup.) and Bender's case (ubi sup.) was given full effect to by the House of Lords in Marshall v. Owners of Ship Wild Rose (103 L. T. Rep. 114; (1910) A. C. 486). The facts of that case were as follows: Between ten and eleven on a hot night, while a ship was lying at a wharf in a tidal basin in Aberdeen Harbour, her first engineer rose from his berth and went on deck for the purpose, as he said, of obtaining a breath of fresh air. It was found that he had disappeared from the ship, and his dead body was discovered the next day in the water close to a part of the ship where the evidence showed that he was in the habit of sitting on the rail. There was, however, no evidence as to how he got into the water. The majority of the House of Lords (dissentiente Lord Loreburn, L.C. and Lord James of; Hereford) affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal that it was not a necessary inference from the facts that the deceased met with an accident arising "out of" his employment. It will be observed that in the foregoing cases of Bender v. Owners of Steamship Zent (ubi sup.) and Marshall v. Owners of Ship Wild Rose (ubi sup.), the accident which happened to each of the workmen" in question there occurred when he was not in any way engaged in the discharge of his duties in his capacity 66 ! of a seaman. In both those cases the deceased seaman was one whose duties were below deck. He had no duties which called him above. In proceeding to the deck before he fell overboard, he was consequently forsaking for the time being his customary duties. We come now to a case in which, by reason of the fact that the seaman was engaged in the performance of his duties on his ship at the time of his unexplained disappearance therefrom, the same was held to have been caused by an accident that arose "out of" as well as "in the course of" the employment of the deceased. On that ground, Bender's case (ubi sup.) and Marshall's case (ubi sup.) were considered to be distinguishable. We refer to Owners of Ship Swansea Vale v. Rice (102 L. T. Rep. 270; on appeal, 104 L. T. Rep. 658; (1912) A. C. 238). In that case, an officer of a ship, who was on deck in pursuance of his duty of keeping a look-out, disappeared from his proper post on the upper part of the deck in broad daylight in fine, calm weather, the sea being quite smooth. No one saw what happened to him, but there was evidence that, not long before he went on deck for the purpose of keeping his watch, he complained of feeling sick and giddy. It was decided by the Court of Appeal (dissentiente Lord Justice Buckley) that there was evidence which enabled the County Court judge to draw the inference that the seaman met with an " accident"; that the accident which caused his death was one arising "out of" as well as "in the course of" his employment; and that, therefore, the dependants of the deceased were entitled to compensation. The House of Lords affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal on the ground that there was evidence to justify the County Court judge in arriving at the conclusion at which he did arrive. 66 It is clear, therefore, that in a case in which the sphere of duty of a seaman is the deck of a ship-a part of the vessel where an accident is most likely to occur—his employment brings him into a special position of danger. And if he falls overboard and is drowned, the more probable inference to be drawn is that the accident arose out of" his employment as well as "in the course of" it than that it arose by reason of "larking" or any other suggestion which can be made. That was how the Master of the Rolls (Cozens-Hardy) reasoned in coming to his decision in Rice's case (ubi sup.). His Lordship was of opinion that the case resembled that of Mackinnon v. Miller (1909, S. C. 373; 46 Sc. L. Rep. 299), which was decided by the Court of Session in Scotland. There it was held that the arbitrator was entitled to draw the inference that the death of the engineer of a ship who mysteriously disappeared from it was due to an accident arising "out of" his employment as well as "in the course of" it. Another case in which a decision on precisely the same lines was pronounced came very recently before the Court of Appealnamely, Lee v. Stag Line Limited (noted ante, p. 329). As appears from our note, the seaman's duty in that case was below deck, as in Bender's case (ubi sup.) and in Marshall's case (ubi sup.), inasmuch as he was a fireman. But he came on deck in order to better perform his duty as a fireman-for a drink and fresh air -while at work in the course of a voyage in tropical regions. Accordingly, the County Court judge considered that he was justified in drawing the same inference that was drawn in Rice's case (ubi sup.), a conclusion that was entirely approved of by the Court of Appeal. In a case, however, that came before the Court of Appeal on the same day-viz., the 17th July last-of Burwash v. Frederick Leyland and Co. Limited (noted ante, p. 306) it was held that, in the absence of any evidence to show how a seaman-a cook he was-got out of his galley and fell overboard, there was nothing to take the case out of the region of mere "surmise, conjecture, or guess." And that Lord Halsbury in Barnabas v. Bershore Colliery Company (103 L. T. Rep. 513) expressly stated as insufficient to satisfy the court. Nevertheless, the facts stated in our note will possibly lead numerous persons to ponder over the propriety of the course taken by the Court of Appeal in thus negativing the finding of the judge of the City of London Court that the accident arose "out of" the seaman's employment as well as "in the course of" it. Why the unfortunate cook, who had commenced his duties in the galley boiling potatoes and who lost his life in the way that he did, should not have been treated as being in precisely the same position as the fireman in Lee's case (ubi sup.), it may to many minds be far from easy to comprehend. But cases of this type all lie very close to the line. Indeed, they raise, as was remarked by the Master of the Rolls (CozensHardy) in Rice's case (102 L. T. Rep. 270, at p. 271), "one of the most difficult problems which have to be faced in considering the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906." Little wonder, therefore, if decisions thereon, whether of the Court of Appeal or of the House of Lords, occasionally fail to harmonise with everyone's notion of what is appropriate and correct. NOTEWORTHY DECISIONS OF THE JUDICIAL YEAR. (Continued from p. 422.) We now pass on to that wide section of judicial decision which is comprehended under the heading of VENDOR AND PURCHASER. Dotesio v. Biss (56 So. Jo. 612) was decided by the Court of Appeal, and was somewhat unusual in its facts. The purchaser had bought a boarding establishment on leasehold premises, and by arrangement took possession before the day for completion. The vendor was in arrears with the rent, and a distress was put in, whereupon the purchaser repudiated the contract and gave the guests notice to quit. The Court of Appeal held that the purchaser was wrong in both cases. The circumstance of the distress was not considered so destructive to the subject-matter as to justify repudiation, while Lord Justice Farwell held that, even if repudiation were possible, the purchaser had no right to dismiss the guests, but was called upon to take care of the subject-matter of the contract until the vendor could resume control. Von Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg v. Alexander (105 L. T. Rep. 434; (1912) 1 Ch. 284) was a case where the plaintiff sought specific performance of an agreement for the sale of a house. She alleged that the agreement was contained in the correspondence. The defendants denied this, and relied strongly on the alleged circumstance that the letters contemplated a formal contract. Mr. Justice Parker lays down the principle that in such a case it is a question of construction whether the execution of a contract is regarded as a condition of the bargain, or whether the parties are merely desiring to express the manner of carrying out their agreement. In this case there was a stipulation that the plaintiff's solicitors should approve the title and covenants, the title from the freeholder, and the form of contract. Under these circumstances the letters were not regarded by Mr. Justice Parker as marking a complete contract susceptible of enforcement by specific performance. Re Earl of Arran and Knowlesden and Creer's Contract (106 L. T. Rep. 759; (1912) 2 Ch. 141) was a case where the vendor had agreed to sell certain land in England, the commencement of title being 1874, and he was to sell as tenant for life under the Settled Land Acts. There was a compound settle; ment, some of its components being dated before the commencement of title, and there was a resettlement dated 1902. The vendor voluntarily abstracted all the earlier instruments with the exception of a certain will dated 1836 which was recited in an instrument dated 1860. There had originally been land in Ireland only, and the Irish courts in 1908 had appointed the present trustees to be trustees for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts. The English land, which was the subject of the disputed contract, was conveyed in 1910 to the trustees upon the trusts and subject to the powers, &c., upon which the lands comprised in the settlement were limited. The conveyance stated that the purchase was made by the direction of the tenant for life out of capital in the trustees' hands arising under the compound settlement. Mr. Justice Warrington held that the purchasers, by sect. 3 (3) of the Conveyancing Act 1881, were debarred from calling for the production of the probate of the will of 1836, or an abstract or copy thereof; that the trustees by the order of the Irish court were trustees for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts in reference to the English land without being reappointed by an English court; and that the purchasers could not go behind the statement or require evidence that the purchase money arose from the sale of Irish land subject to the compound settlement. Re Derby and Fergusson's Contract (105 L. T. Rep. 943; (1912) 1 Ch. 479) was a case where the purchaser bought certain agricultural land under conditions of sale that the leases or agreements under which existing tenancies were held could be inspected before the sale, and the purchaser was deemed to have notice of and take subject to all the terms of the existing tenancies. Before completion (the purchaser discovered that a tenant, to whom notice to quit had been given with the concurrence of the purchaser, had, with the late owner's consent, planted fruit bushes, and the question arose as to who was to pay for the improvements under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1908. The tenancy ended in October, but completion took place in the February prior thereto after debate as to who should pay, the matter being in the end left unsettled without prejudice. Mr. Justice Joyce held that a landlord's consent in writing under a lease, and, semble, one also under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1908, to a tenant's improvements during his tenancy, involving the tenant in a right to compensation, form a term of the tenancy within the meaning of a condition of sale affecting purchasers with notice of the terms of all existing tenancies. Where in these circumstances a claim for compensation arises in respect of such improvements after the date of completion, the purchaser must pay for it. Mr. Justice Swinfen Eady in Reading Industrial Co-operative Society Limited v. Palmer (106 L. T. Rep. 626; (1912) 2 Ch. 42) had a rather curious point before him. The vendor conveyed some property to the plaintiffs in fee. The plaintiffs covenanted not to erect any building otherwise than in accordance with the drawings and specifications to be approved by the vendor's surveyor. Certain plans were submitted to which the surveyors demurred, and they proposed to charge the purchasers with a fee of 100 guineas. The plaintiff's refused to pay, and the surveyors waived their rights on that occasion. On a future occasion the question of liability for fees of surveyors rose again. The learned judge pointed out that the covenant was for the vendor's benefit, that the surveyor was instructed by the vendor and authorised to approve plans on his behalf, and he held that nothing in the conveyance threw the expense on the plaintiffs, the purchasers. An attempt to import custom failed. The evidence given by surveyors was extremely feeble, and no general usage could be found for Berkshire, and the court was not even satisfied that there was a custom existing in London. Mr. Justice Phillimore in Re Martin; Ex parte Dixon (106 L. T. Rep. 381) had to deal with a contract for the sale of a lease. The assignor had failed to comply with a dilapidation notice served on him by his landlord, and the lease had become liable to forfeiture. Mr. Justice Phillimore held that a good title under an open contract could not be made, although the landlord had accepted rent tendered to him by the assignee subsequently to the date of the contract, but before completion. There have been several cases of some considerable importance on the subject of WATER SUPPLY during the past year to which the notice of every practitioner should be drawn. At the very commencement of the judicial year the House of Lords determined Colley's Patents Limited v. Metropolitan Water Board (105 L. T. Rep. 674; (1912) A. C. 24), which touches upon the question of what constitutes "domestic purposes." The appellants possessed a factory, and water was supplied to it by meter for cleansing the premises, for lavatories, water-closets, and sinks provided for the convenience of the employees. It was also used for drinking purposes, and to supply water for a gas engine. No one slept on the premises, and no inhabited house duty was paid. The respondents claimed to be paid on the basis of a domestic supply, and based their charges at 5 per cent. on the rateable value. The appellants argued that the charge should be based on the footing that the supply was other than domestic, and therefore the sum would be much less than half that claimed by the respondents. The House of Lords decided in the respondents' favour, holding that the water was supplied for "domestic purposes," but the charge was subject to the rebate provided for the case of purely business premises. Lord Mersey puts the matter into a nutshell by observing that the whole question resolves itself into this: Whether water used for the personal convenience of men employed in a factory can be said to be water used for the purposes of the trade carried on in the factory. Lord Loreburn observed truly that these cases can be overlaid with a good deal of subtlety. Bristol Guardians v. Bristol Waterworks Company (106 L. T. Rep. 615; (1912) 1 Ch. 846) is not altogether different. The company's private Act required them to furnish "to every occupier of a private dwelling-house a sufficient supply for domestic use at certain rents. The plaintiffs applied for a supply at a rental, instead of that furnished for many previous years by measure. The question whether a workhouse was a 'private dwellinghouse was answered in the negative by Mr. Justice Eve, and his view was concurred in by the Court of Appeal. 66 Cases on WILLS have been exceedingly numerous, as is the almost invariable fact each year. It is unnecessary to remind any reader of the great caution which has to be exercised in applying past decisions to the varying circumstances of cases sent for opinion. In our selection of recent authorities we therefore choose those which seem to be specially suitable for review. Thus, Re Hall; Watson v. Hall (noted ante, p. 177; 28 Times L. Rep. 480) shows the extreme desirability of a careful consideration of the applicability of general forms of bequest where motor-cars are possessed by the testator. A gift of "carriages, horses, harness, and stable furniture and effects" will not pass a motorcar, although its purchase synchronised with the disposal of several horses and carriages. Again, the phrase "moneys at the Post Office Savings Bank" occasioned difficulty in Re Mann; Ford v. Ward (106 L. T. Rep. 64; (1912) 1 Ch. 388), where Mr. Justice Neville had to construe a bequest which, having referred to money in the Post Office Savings Bank, bequeathed "the residue of such moneys." The testatrix had both a cash balance in the Post Office and also certain Consols purchased by her through the intermediary of the Post Office, and it was held that Consols could not be regarded as "moneys." Re Clifford; Mallam v. McFie (106 L. T. Rep. 14; (1912) 1 Ch. 29) turned on a bequest of "twentythree of the shares belonging to me" in a company. Between the date of the will and the death these shares were subdivided into four, the company entering into an amalgamation scheme with another undertaking. Mr. Justice Swinfen Eady held that, in the absence of a contrary intention, the bequest passed the ninety-two subdivided shares where there was evidence to identify such divided shares with the original shares with no differences except those of name and form. Re Leeming; Turner v. Leeming (106 L. T. Rep. 793; (1912) 1 Ch. 828) was a case where there was a specific bequest of a certain number of shares. After the date of the will the company was wound-up, reconstructed, and incorporated under the same name, and under these circumstances there was a doubt whether the shares in question had been adeemed, more especially as the original shares were represented now by a larger number of shares in the reconstructed company. Mr. Justice Neville held that there was no ademption. Yet another of these important cases dealing with amalgamations of companies as affecting specific legacies of shares may be mentioned in Re Atlay; Atlay v. Atlay (1912) W. N. 112; 56 So. Jo. 444). There Mr. Justice Eve had before him a will in which there was a gift to A. of all the shares belonging to her in the W. Company at the time of her death. At that time there was no such company, nor had there been at the date of the will, for the W. Company had been absorbed by the X. Company. The testatrix held shares in the X. Company_in exchange for those in the W. Company. Mr. Justice Eve in this case held that the shares in the X. Company did not pass to the legatee, but fell into residue. Mr. Justice Parker in Re Speak; Speak v. Speak (56 So. Jo. 273) had to construe a will in which the vague expression "remaining children contained. Its meaning, unless the context otherwise compels, must be taken to be " other children," or 'the rest of the children" not otherwise dealt with, and must not be construed to mean "surviving children," unless there are other features in the will which point to such an interpretation. was The above cases set out in brief form the chief fruits of the year's judicial labours. They cover a wide area, and enter into many departments of activity. Already some recent statutes have commenced to undergo that severe examination of which, to their great detriment, the exigencies of modern legislation deprive them. It will be very surprising if it is not possible to point to some difficulties awaiting the final arbitrament of the House of Lords in connection with the important social experi ments which Parliament has been conducting of late. It is entirely satisfactory to find year by year with what success, amid many disadvantages, judicial decision is able by exposition and mandate to cut some sort of path through the tangled jungles of modern legislation. That finality will ever be reached seems doubtful as we note the new ambiguities in old statutes which are even now brought to light in the course of the conduct of business matters. There is therefore no indication that in the immediate future there will be any shrinkage in the volume of decisions requiring the quiet consideration of those engaged in the daily practice of the Legal Profession. COMMENTS ON CASES. Money Paid under Compulsion of Legal Frocess. MONEY paid in performance of some contract under the compulsion of legal process, but subsequently discovered not to have been due, is nevertheless irrecoverable. That was the decision in the leading case of Marriott v. Hampton (7 T. R. 269; 2 Sm. L. Cas., 9th edit., p. 441), its object being to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It was an extension of the principle of res judicata to a case where money had been paid in the course of proceedings. The defendant to an action being unable to find a receipt for money claimed from him by the plaintiff, and having no other proof of payment, was obliged to submit and pay the money again. Afterwards, however, he found the receipt, and thereupon sought to recover the money back in an action for money had and received. But the court, giving effect to the well-settled maxim Interest reipublicæ ut sit finis litium, held that the action was not maintainable. For, as was said by Lord Kenyon, C.J., "after a recovery by process of law, there must |