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What the learned judge meant by the concluding words it is not easy to say. A low price cannot in itself be evidence of fraud. To arrive at fraud you must let in other circumstances. A low price may equally be evidence of carelessness in the conduct of the sale, and whether the insufficiency is due to carelessness or fraud, it is impossible to tell without inquiring further. So that the dictum of Mr. Justice Kay, though it is frequently quoted, cannot be regarded as laying down any very intelligible principle.

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In Farrar v. Farrars Limited (sup.) Lord Justice Lindley reverted to the principle in Nash v. Eads (sup.), that the mortgagee must conduct the sale properly. "Every mortgage," he said, "confers upon the mortgagee the right to realise his security and to find a purchaser if he can, and if in the exercise of his power he acts bona fide, and takes reasonable precautions to obtain a proper price, the mortgagor has no redress, even although more might have been obtained for the property if the sale had been postponed." This admits that fraud is not the only ground for setting aside a sale. In Farrar v. Farrars Limited, fraud was not before the court. "Fraud in the present case," said Lord Justice Lindley, "is not now alleged; it was alleged in the court below, and was then clearly disproved." But there remained the question of the proper conduct of the sale, and on this the Court of Appeal decided in favour of the validity of the sale. "The sale here impeached, having been made honestly and at a fair value, ought, in our opinion, to be allowed to stand, and there is no hard-and-fast rule which compels us to hold the contrary."

Under Nash v. Eads and Farrar v. Farrars Limited, the tests are that the sale must be bona fide, must be conducted properly, and must be at a fair value, and on this basis it is possible to lay down a clear rule for the guidance of mortgagees; but a disturbing element was introduced by the decision of the House of Lords in Kennedy v. De Trafford (76 L. T. Rep. 427; (1897) A. C. 180), and since that case it has been posssible to contend that a mortgagee's sole duty is to act in good faith, and, if he does, that it matters not how disadvantageously he has effected the sale. "I am disposed to think," said Lord Herschell, "that if a mortgagee, in exercising his power of sale, exercises it in good faith without any intention of dealing unfairly by his mortgagor, it would be very difficult indeed, if not impossible, to establish that he had been guilty of any breach of duty towards the mortgagor." This places the matter solely on bona fides, but the case is not a distinct authority that that alone is sufficient, because, as Lord Herschell proceeded to point out, the mortgagee had also satisfied the test of taking reasonable precautions; and while it is a tenable proposition that a mortgagee does all that is required of him if he acts in good faith, it is safer to assume that he must also conduct the sale properlythat is, that he must take reasonable precaution in the matter of the sale. In this view, undervalue, although not in itself a ground for setting aside the sale, is important as evidence either of bad faith-that is, according to Warner v. Jacob (sup.), of fraud -or of want of care in the conduct of the sale.

The judgment of the Privy Council in Haddington Island Quarry Company v. Huson (sup.) is singularly bare of any discussion of principle, though in the above state of the authorities, the case seemed to invite such a discussion. A mortgage of a quarry was made in 1893 to secure 3500 dollars. The appellant company were the transferees of the mortgage, though the validity of the transfer was disputed. In 1908 the company sold the quarry in the exercise of their power of sale. The action was brought to set aside the sale, on the ground of the invalidity of the transfer of the mortgage, and also on the ground that, owing to the sale not being properly effected, an inadequate price had been obtained. On this point the judge at the trial upheld the sale, the Court of Appeal of British Columbia reversed him, and the Privy Council have now restored him.

It is a singular feature of the judgment, which was delivered by Lord De Villiers, that Warner v. Jacob (sup.) appears to have been accepted as the only relevant authority on the exercise of a mortgagee's power of sale. "The mortgagees," it says, "acted within their powers in selling the property, and the purchasers are entitled to the full benefit of their purchase, unless it be alleged and proved that they acted in collusion with the vendors or that the price was so low as in itself to be evidence of fraud or collusion ?" This, as shown above, was the test laid down in Warner v. Jacob, but it was not the test in Farrar v. Farrars Limited, and it cannot be said that Kennedy v. De Trafford has decisively preferred the former to the latter authority. No other case than Warner v. Jacob was referred to in the judgment, and the court missed an opportunity of contributing to the ascertainment of the law on a matter of much practical importance. Under a system of separate judgments this could hardly have happened; and while the Judicial Committee gives its decisions in this way it is not likely to advance as an authoritative tribunal.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE LAY ARBITRATOR. IT was the delay and costliness of litigation which induced the man of business to seek in the procedure of arbitration a speedy and inexpensive method of settling disputes. For a time the system appeared to give satisfaction, and the many instances of arbitration clauses to be found inserted in contracts testifies to the existence of a widespread belief in the efficacy of arbitration. It is only by experience that it has been discovered that a procedure which apparently offered so many attractions had in it unexpected drawbacks. Instead of there being no delays, it often happens that the hearing of arbitrations is postponed again and again, and that, when heard at last, the sittings are long and protracted. Arbitrators, so far from being expeditious, allow great latitude to the parties and their legal representatives, and, whether from inexperience or lack of personal force, they are unable to keep the proceedings within proper limits. This is produc tive, as often as not, of a good deal of heat, due to the absence of a restraining judicial influence. Lay arbitrators chosen for their particular skill as scientific experts are found unable to appreciate the legal questions which arise. They find great difficulty in deciding, first, what are the real issues which they have to try. and they are often unable to understand the laws of evidence and what value ought to be attached to such evidence as is called before them. Their decisions, so far from giving satisfaction, are often arrived at in the teeth of the evidence, and are so obviously based upon wrong principles that it is easy to upset them on appeal. This lack of finality about arbitrators' awards has become charac teristic, and when appeals result in reversals of their decisions, or, what is worse, directions for a new trial of the issues, the parties see that the evils attendant upon arbitrations far exceed those inherent in litigation. The actual costs are certainly as great as in ordinary litigation, and there is the additional expense very often involved of having to pay the fees not only of two arbitrators, but also of an umpire. The necessity of appointing an umpire owing to the arbitrators' failure to agree is specially characteristic of the spirit in which arbitrations are conducted, Each party has chosen his arbitrator, and the two of them, instead of realising the resulting duty to act judicially, remain under the impression that they are in some way identified with the interests of the parties to whom they respectively owe their appointments.

Let us now consider the attitude of the courts towards agree. ments to arbitrate, and whether they have been able to mitigate any of the attendant evils of the system. The courts have, of course, always loyally acted upon the principle that where persons by agreement have deliberately chosen arbitration as a method of settling their disputes, unless for some special cause shown, proceedings on such disputes in the courts will be stayed. But the courts have never lost control of such proceedings, and properly hold their discretion to order a stay must be judicially exercised. In some respects in recent years a distinct change of attitude may be noted. Whereas before the Arbitration Act 1889, except where fraud was charged, it was in most cases useless to resist an application to stay, a tendency has certainly appeared since then to scrutinise all the circumstances more closely, and in one class of case especially we find that the courts have been able to assist parties to avoid expensive proceedings in arbitration where a more summary trial in open court was clearly to be preferred.

Instances of this have occurred in cases where the questions in dispute were primarily questions of law. First let us take an example of the older view held by the court. While it might have been thought that questions of law were more properly decided by a judge than by a layman, in the case of Randegger V. Holmes (L. Rep. 1 C. P. 679), although the only question in dispute was a point of law upon the construction of a charter. party, the court stayed the proceedings on the ground that the parties had agreed to refer all differences to arbitration. The Chancery judges have not adopted this view, and, when the ques tion has come before them, have insisted upon the duty of the court to exercise its discretion in all cases. Thus, in Lyon v. Johnson (60 L. T. Rep. 223; 40 Ch. Div. 579) Mr. Justice Kay declined to stay an action which raised a point of construction of certain articles of partnership. In Re Carlisle; Clegg v. Clegg (62 L. T. Rep. 821; 44 Ch. Div. 200), another partnership case, Mr. Justice North, being of opinion that the only question in dispute was one of law, thought the best course was to decide that question first in court and afterwards, if necessary, to refer any question of account to an arbitrator. He thought it would save time, as an arbitrator would in all probability invoke the opinion of the court under sect. 19 of the Arbitration Act on the point of law. In Vawdrey v. Simpson (1896, 1 Ch. 166), also a partnership dispute, Mr. Justice Chitty in the exercise of his dis cretion decided to refer the particular questions which had arisen to arbitration. They related to charges made by one partner against the other upon which a dissolution was claimed. Questions of law were not involved.

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In Barnes v. Youngs (1898) 1 Ch. 414) Mr. Justice Romer decided, in the exercise of his judicial discretion, not to stay proceedings. In his view there was a preliminary question to be decided as to whether a notice given by a partner was good or bad, which was much more fit for the court to decide than for an arbitrator, who would probably refer it to the court. The question was, he said, ripe for decision and in the interest of both parties ought to be decided forthwith. Accordingly, though it was then only the motion to stay which was before him, he dealt with the question at once, and held the notice was bad. The course he took was probably the means of saving the parties heavy expense. In Bonnin v. Neame (102 L. T. Rep. 708; (1910) I Ch. 732) Mr. Justice Swinfen Eady followed the other Chancery judges, and gave as one of the reasons for refusing a stay that the principal points in dispute were matters of law arising on the construction of the partnership articles.

Thus it was the Chancery judges who first determined to avoid the waste of time involved in referring to lay arbitrators questions of law upon which they would in all probability be compelled to state special cases for the opinion of the court, and the good sense of this view of the matter is obvious.

COMPANIES REPORT 1911.

REPORT BY THE SOLICITOR TO THE BOARD OF TRADE.
THE legal proceedings conducted by me on behalf of the Board of
Trade and official receivers during the year 1911 in connection
with the Companies Acts fall within the following classes, viz. :-
(1) General proceedings in connection with companies in
liquidation.

(2) Proceedings against defaulting liquidators.
(3) Cases relating to defaulting receivers.

(4) Proceedings relating to companies not in liquidation.

(1) General Proceedings.

Questions of some difficulty and of not a little importance arose in connection with two companies which, after having been registered in Guernsey, were ordered to be wound-up both by the proper court of that island and by the High Court in England. The winding-up orders in Guernsey having been. made before the liquidation proceedings in England were commenced, the companies books and papers were taken possession of by the liquidator in Guernsey, who declined to recognise that the official receiver had any right either to the custody of the books and papers or even to inspection thereof, and the questions which arose were as to the best course to be adopted to enforce the recognition of his rights.

In support of the petitions for winding-up orders in the English court, affidavits were filed containing various allegations as to the object of registering the companies and winding them up in Guernsey. The Board of Trade considered that whether or not these allegations should prove on further investigation to be well founded, it was of importance on general principles that as the companies had carried on business in England there should be a proper investigation of their affairs in this country; and being advised that the Guernsey court would probably render the official receiver assistance, the department authorised me to take the necessary steps to apply to the Guernsey court on his behalf for an order directing its liquidator to afford the official receiver reasonable access to the books.

An application was accordingly made on his behalf to the Royal Court of Guernsey for an order directing the liquidator to deliver up the books, &c., to the official receiver, or to give him inspection thereof, and after considerable opposition by the liquidator an order was made under which the official receiver obtained temporary possession of the books and papers with liberty to take copies.

In the case of a company which was being wound-up under an order of the High Court, certain persons who had been publicly examined upon the report of the official receiver, which stated that in his opinion they and others had committed frand in connection with the formation of the company and in the conduct of its business, applied for an order that their costs of the examination should be paid out of the company's assets, upon the ground that they were exculpated from the charges made against them in the official receiver's report.

The public examination had been followed by certain misfeasance proceedings brought against the applicants by the official receiver as liquidator, which were dismissed; and on the strength of this the applicants asked the court to order payment of their costs of the examination out of the company's assets without (as the court held) any evidence to prove that the charges of misfeasance covered the whole of these made by the official receiver in his report.

The learned judge declined to hold that it had been established that the parties were exonerated from all the charges made against them, and the application was accordingly dismissed.

It is, perhaps, worthy of observation here that it has recently been held by the Court of Appeal that the duties of the official receiver in connection with a public examination under the Act cease when the examination has taken place, and that he can only appear to contest an application such as that now under notice if he is prepared to accept the character of a litigant. Accordingly, counsel for the official receiver in the present case confined himself to seeing that all the material facts were before the court.

Application was made to the court to stay the proceedings under a winding-up order in the case of a company in which substantially the whole of the shares were held by the applicant (who was also a creditor) and members of his family. The nominal capital of the company was £30,000 and the position at the date of the winding-up order was that the whole of the company's assets had been realised by debenture holders, to whom a balance of over £9000 remained owing after giving credit for the proceeds of sale, and there were also liabilities amounting to £5600 to unsecured creditors.

The applicant's proposal was that he should pay to the official receiver by certain fixed instalments a sum sufficient to pay the debts of the unsecured creditors in full (certain family creditors being excluded) and that in addition he would satisfy the claims of the debenture-holders.

The proposal offered obvious advantages to the debentureholders and to the non-family creditors; and as the official receiver had made his preliminary report to the court under sect. 8 of the Companies (Winding-up) Act 1890, stating that he was unaware of any matters relating to the promotion of the company or the conduct of its business, as to which further inquiry was desirable, it was intimated to the court, on his behalf, that if the proposed arrangement for the payment of the company's liabilities were carried out there appeared to be no objection to the court acceding to the motion. Unfortunately, however, the applicant was unable to carry out the arrangement proposed; and after the case had been before the court a number of times the court had ultimately to dispose of the matter by making no order on the motion.

Another case in which an application was made for a stay of proceedings involved somewhat different considerations. As in the previous case, the official receiver saw no reason for making or suggesting any charge of fraud against the persons concerned in the promotion or formation of the company or the conduct of its business; but it was considered that the circumstances under which it was proposed that the company should resume business left room for criticism. At the date of the application the company was possessed of no assets by means of which the debts due to its creditors could be paid; but a person (who, it was stated, was fully aware of the winding-up order) came forward with an offer to subscribe for a number of shares sufficient to pay the claims of the creditors. On behalf of the official receiver it was pointed out that the effect of that transaction would be that, although the company would thus rid itself of its liabilities to the existing creditors, it would be left without any assets towards meeting any new liabilities which it might incur. The court has laid down the rule in previous cases, both with respect to the bankruptcy of individuals and to insolvent companies, that it will have regard to the position of future creditors before removing the restraint of an order of adjudication or winding-up order, and will require to be satisfied that the individual or company is in a reasonable position to carry on business before allowing him or it to do so.

The court, however, considered that the fact that there was no allegation of fraud in this case enabled it to distinguish the cases cited, and made an order staying the proceedings on the usual terms.

In the liquidation of a company, which, although primarily a building society, had also carried on a extensive business as a bank, application was made to the court by the official receiver as provisional liquidator of the company for leave to borrow upon the security of the company's assets a sufficient sum to enable an immediate payment of 10s. in the £ to be made to all persons whose claims arose out of its banking transactions, both upon current and deposit accounts. The application was granted, and relief was thus afforded to a number of persons of small means, who would otherwise have suffered heavily by their inability to draw upon the money which they had intrusted to the company. The court has frequently held in bankruptcy that dividends in respect of proofs which have been admitted can only be paid to the creditor who has proved, and that if any claim to the dividend is made by any other person it is necessary for him to file a proof in substitution for that of the original creditor before he is entitled to claim payment of the dividend. As has been pointed out in connection with bankruptcy matters, it is manifest that in the absence of such a rule, a trustee or liquidator would be

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saddled with the onerous duty of coming to a decision upon the merits of a large variety of claims, which might involve the estate in the expense of costly litigation.

A case arose in the High Court in which the official receiver was served with a summons at the instance of a judgment creditor of two persons who had been admitted to rank as creditors of a company in course of winding-up, for the appointment of a receiver of the dividends payable upon their proof. On behalf of the official receiver the attention of the court was called to the cases in which it had been held that such an application ought not to be entertained, and in the result the summons was dismissed.

The remaining cases related to applications for the transfer of proceedings under the respective winding-up orders, but as no elements of special interest were present it is considered unnecessary to refer to them in detail.'

In each case the application was granted.

(2) Proceedings against Defaulting Liquidators.

In 317 cases I was instructed to take proceedings against liquidators of companies in process of voluntary liquidation for the purpose of recovering penalties incurred by them in consequence of their failure to send to the Registrar of Companies the statutory statements as to the proceedings in and position of the liquidation. In most of these cases the liquidators were induced to file the documents required as a result of my correspondence with them. In eight cases, however, summonses were issued, in four of which fines were inflicted; the remaining cases being withdrawn owing to the difficulty of finding the liquidators.

In three cases proceedings were taken to compel liquidators to pay undistributed funds in their hands into the Companies' Liquidation Account. In each case the money was obtained or accounted for to the satisfaction of the Board of Trade.

(3) Cases relating to Receivers who failed to file Abstracts of their Receipts and Payments.

The department referred 199 cases to me in which receivers had made default in filing with the registrar abstracts of their receipts and payments. It is satisfactory to report, however, that in only one case was it found necessary to issue a summons; in that case it was found impracticable to serve the summons and the matter had to be abandoned.

(4) Proceedings relating to companies not in liquidation for defaults in rendering returns, &c., under the Companies Acts 1862 to 1907 and the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908.

During the year ending the 31st Dec. 1911 I had referred to me 988 companies for action in respect of default in the year 1910, and in some of the cases the years 1908 and 1909 as well, in rendering the various returns and notices required by the Companies Acts; but in twenty cases only was it necessary to institute proceedings for penalties. In these twenty cases, however, seventy-six informations were laid and summonses issued. The following convictions were obtained :

:

(I.) Seven for offences against sect. 26 of the Companies Act 1862 (as amended by the Acts of 1900 and 1907) for failure to render the 1908 return (form E.), i.e., copy list of members with summary as to capital and shares, &c.;

(II.) Forty for similar offences against sect. 26 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 in respect of returns for the years 1909, 1910, and 1911. Before a conviction was obtained in one of these cases a special case had to be stated for the opinion of the Divisional Court on the dismissal of a summons by the stipendiary magistrate at Manchester, the point of law being whether the Registrar of Companies was right in contending that he could require companies (not being private companies) to state separately the value of their goodas a fixed asset in the balance-sheet which has to be included in their annual returns under sub-sect. 3 of the section. The Divisional Court decided in favour of the registrar's contention, and remitted the case to the magistrate, who convicted; (III.) Eight for offences against sect. 64 of the Consolidation Act, i.e., failure to hold the ordinary general meeting during the calendar year 1910; and

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(IV.) One for default under sect. 75 of the Consolidation Act, i.e., failure to notify the Registrar of Companies of change in the directorate of a company.

Of the twenty charges upon which no convictions were obtained, sixteen were withdrawn, fourteen upon convictions being obtained on other charges and two on payment of costs, and four were dismissed. The reasons for the four dismissals are as follows:(a) Two because the defendant's solicitor was able to satisfy the court that his client had been recorded as a director

without his knowledge and had never acted as such and was not aware of the defaults.

(b) Two because charges were preferred under sect. 26 of the Consolidation Act for default in rendering proper returns (form E.) for the calendar years 1909, 1910, against a company which had been registered as a private one within the meaning of sect. 121 of that Act and which had subsequently exceeded its membership of fifty, but had refused to include audited balance-sheets with those returns when requested so to do by the registrar, who contended that the company had thereby ceased to be a private one within the meaning of the Act and could no longer therefore claim the immunity or privilege extended to private companies under sub-sect. 3 of sect. 26. The decision was appealed against and a case was stated by the magistrate for the opinion of the High Court, who, however, agreed with the magistrate's ruling.

R. ELLIS CUNLIFFE, Solicitor to the Board of Trade. Board of Trade, August 1912.

RECLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months from the date given, unless other claimants sooner appear.]

WEDGE (Isabella), wife of William Edward Wedge, Wolverhampton, and FORDEN (Ellen Townsend), wife of Christopher Forden, Wold Newton, £109 7s. India £3 10s. per Cent. Stock. Claimant, Lucy Pollard, administratrix to the estate of E. T. Forden, who was the surviving stockholder. Sept. 13.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT STOCK
WINDING-UP ACTS.

NOTICES OF APPEARANCE AT HEARING MUST REACH THE SOLICITORS BY 6 P.M
ON THE DATE GIVEN, UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED.
ALDERLEY EDGE HIGH SCHOOL AND KINDERGARTEN COMPANY LIMITED.——
Creditors to send in, by Oct. 10, to P. Swanwick 64. Cross-st, Man-
chester. Cobbett, Wheeler, and Cobbett, Manchester, sols, for
liquidator.
ALFRED HIBBERT AND CO. LIMITED. Creditors to send in, by Oct. 10, to
A. N. Westoby, 28, John Dalton-st, Manchester. H. F. Simpson,
Manchester, sol. for liquidator.

A. MAFFUNIADES AND CO. LIMITED.-Order for continuation of voluntary winding-up subject to supervision of the court, made by His Honour Judge Tindal Atkinson (Edmonton County Court), dated Sept. 6. Goldberg, Barrett, and Newall, 2 and 3, West-st, Finsbury-cir, E.C., sols. for pet.

ANCHOR TUBE COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Oct. 5, to H. J. Peart, 120, Colmore-row, Birmingham.

BRUNSWICK WARD LIBERAL CLUB LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Oct. 1, to F. Holliday, 4, Greek-st, Leeds.

CALIFORNIAN GENERAL MINING COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Sept. 19, to H. Limebeer, 65, London-wall, E.C. Kekewich, Smith, and Kaye, sols. to liquidator. CARBONIC ACID GAS, ICE, AND COLD STORAGE COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Oct. 10, to J. B. Wandless, 13, Old Jewry-chmbrs, E.C. CO-OPERATIVE AND GENERAL VARIETIES LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Oct. 15, at Royal Courts of Justice. Amery, Parkes, and Co., 18, Fleet-st, E.C., sols. to pets. Notices of appearance by Oct. 14. COUNTIES AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Oct. 29, to S. Clark, Goldsmiths' Hall, Pilgrim-st, Newcastleupon-Tyne. Bain and Hanna, Sunderland, sols, to liquidator. ELECTRIC THEATRES BUREAU LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Oct. 25, to G. E. Corfield, 119, Finsbury-pave, E.C. GOSPEL OAK GALVANIZING AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY LIMITED.Creditors to send forthwith, or by Oct. 31, to J. Paterson, 1, Walbrook.

HILLS GAS PLANTS LIMITED-Creditors to send in, by Sept 30, to M. W. Jenkinson, of Franklin, Wild, and Co., Broad-st-av, E C. Pakeman, Son, and Read, 11, Ironmonger-la, E.C., sols. for liquidator. ISTHMIAN OIL COMPANY LIMITED. Creditors to send in, by Oct. 18, to F. T. Carter, 68, Palmerston House, E.C.

J F. PHILLIPS AND SON LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Oct. 15, at Royal Courts of Justice. Williamson, Hill, and Co.. 13, Sherborne-la, E.C., agents for Land and Foster, Halifax, sols. for pets. Notices of appearance by Oct. 14, to Williamson, Hill, and Co. JOHN LEES AND SONS LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Sept. 28, to P. G. Redfearn, 2, Oldfield-la, Heckmond wile. Iveson and Macaulay, Heckmondwike, sols. for liquidator. NORTHERN INDUSTRIAL SYNDICATE LIMITED-Creditors to send in. by Sept. 30. to M. W. Jenkinson, of Franklin, Wild, and Co., Broad-stav, E.C. Pakeman, Son, and Read, 11, Ironmonger-la, E.C., sols. for liquidator.

PALACE THEATRE OF VARITIES (TONYPANDY) LIMITED.-Petition for winding. up to be heard Oct. 15, at Royal Courts of Justice. Smith, Rundell, and Dods, 9, John-st, Bedford-row, W.C., gols. for pets. Notices of appearance by Oct. 14.

PARKER GAMES COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Sept. 30, to A. C. Roberts, 9 and 10, Pancras-la, E.C.

TARPAULIN, BRATTICE CLOTH AND LINOLEUM COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Oct. 14, to H. S. Squance, 26, John-st, Sunderland.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. LAST DAY OF PROOFS THORP (George Barlow), Heaton Chapel. Oct. 12; P. S. Minor, sol, Manchester. Oct. 22; Registrar of Manchester District of Chancery of Lancaster, at 11.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. LAST DAY OF CLAIM AND TO WHOM PARTICULARS TO BE SENT. A'BECKETT (Susannah Frances), Kensington. Oct. 12; Chester, Broome, and Griffithes, 36, Bedford-row.

ADAMS (Charles), Hanley. Oct. 28; Paddock and Sons, Hanley. ALLOTT (Charles William), Long Preston.

Barnsley.

Nov. 1; Raley and Sons, ASHMOLE (Mary Jane), Leamington. Oct. 31: Lee, Musgrove, and Co., Birmingham.

ATHORPE (Rev. George Middleton), Dinnington. Oct. 21; Hodgkinson and Beevor, Newark-on-Trent.

BAUR (Rudolphus), City-rd, and Sugar Loaf-ct, Leadenhall-st. Sept. 30; Hatchett-Jones, Bisgood, and Marshall, 48, Mark-la. E.C.

BAYLEY (Capt. Robert Edward Ward), Windsor Castle. Oct. 12; Frere,
Cholmeley, and Co., 28, Lincoln's-inn-fids, W.C.

BENNETT (Robert Gray), Worcester and Malvern. Oct. 12; Beauchamp
and Gallaher, Worcester.
BENTALL (Jay), Southend-on-Sea. Oct. 14; S. G Warner and Todd, 1.
Arundel-st. Strand, W.C.

BICKMORE (Charlotte Mary Anne), Adderbury East. Oct. 14, Pomeroy and Son, Wymondham.

BIENVENUE (Frédéric Cajetan Louis, otherwise Frédéric Louis, otherwise Frédéric), Paris, France. Oct. 10; G. Gavan Duffy, 22, Basinghallst, E.C.

BOOSEY (Jane Ann), Bickley. Nov. 1; Hores, Pattisson, and Bathurst, 48, Lincoln's-inn-filds, W.C.

BOTTO (Sarah), Jarrow. Oct. 30; Newlands and Newlands, Jarrow-onTyne.

BOURCHIER (Rev. Walter), Bishops Park. Nov. 10; Irvine, Borrowman, and Browne, 25, Crutched-friars, Mark-la, E.C.

BUTLER (Thomas William), Hampton Manor. Nov. 1; Byrch, Cox, and Sons, Evesham.

CHADWICK (Alfred), St. Leonards-on-Sea. Oct. 31; Finch and Turner, 84, Cannon-st, E.C.

CHAPMAN (Harriet Ann), Disley. Oct. 19; Lynde and Branthwaite, Manchester.

CLARE (Elizabeth Ellen), Liverpool. Oct. 17; R. W. H. Thomas, St.
Helens, Lancs.

CURTIS (John), Hurstpierpoint. Oct. 31; H. J. Hillman, Lewes.
DARLEY (James Jacob), John-st, Bedford-row; Belsize Park; and Brading,
Oct. 26; the executors, at the offices of Darley, Cumberland, and
Co., 36, John-st, Bedford-row.

DAVY (Laura Ann), Brighton. Nov. 4; Stuckey, Son, and Pope, Brighton.
DAWSON (James), Gipsy Hill. Oct. 5; C. W. Dommett and Son, 46,
Gresham-st, E.C.

DUCKWORTH (Joseph Battersby), Eastham

Oct. 17; Laces, Wilson,

Todd, Stone, Fletcher, and Hull, Liverpool.
DUTTON (Robert), Edgeley. Oct. 12; J. Brooks, Stockport.

DYSON (James), Linthwaite. Nov. 1; Ramsden, Sykes, and Ramsden,
Huddersfield.

ELDER (William), Castlegate. Oct. 19; the executors, at the offices of Sanderson and J. K. Weatherhead, Berwick-upon-Tweed.

FLATAU (Barnett), Hilldrop-rd, Camden-rd. Oct. 14; G. W. Cook, 3, Broad-st-bldgs, Liverpool-st, E.C.

FULLER (George), Heaton Moor. Oct. 13; Makinson, Rainer, Son, and Wolstenholme, Manchester.

GODSON (Rev. John), Bourne. Nov. 10; Bullock, Worthington, and
Jackson, Manchester.

GOODWIN (Thomas), Longton. Oct. 28; Paddock and Sons, Hanley.
HALLIWELL (Mary Ann), Chorley. Sept. 28; D. M. Aspden, Chorley.
HORNE (Jane), Felton. Oct. 20; R. Middlemas, Alnwick.

HORNE (Jemima), Alnwick. Oct. 20; R. Middlemas, Alnwick.
HORTON (John), Little Leigh. Oct. 30; Hatt-Cook and Son, Northwich.
INGRAM (Anne Webb George), Chelsea.

Oct. 19; Routh, Stacey, and

Castle, 14, Southampton-st, Bloomsbury, W.C.

LAPAGE (William Perfect), Ealing.

Dallas, 12, Old Jewry-chmbrs, E.C. Oct. 25; Gresham, Davies, and MANSFIELD (William John), Bristol. Oct. 3; Jefferies and Son, Bristol. MARCH (Henry), Chapel-Allerton. Oct. 26; the executors, at the offices of North and Sons, Leeds.

MARTIN (Brooke), Weston-super-Mare. Oct. 12; A. R. Ford, Westonsuper-Mare.

MATTHEWS (Thomas Bright), Thorp Arch. Oct. 31; Broomhead, Wightman, and Moore, Sheffield.

MIDDLEMAS (Robert), Alnwick. Oct. 20; R. Middlemas, Alnwick. MITCHELL (Esther), Rawmarsh. Nov. 1; Harrop and Harrop, Rotherham. MORRIS (Thomas), Droylsden and Beswick. Nov. 2. M. E. and J. H. Morris, at the offices of Farrar and Co., Manchester.

OLDHAM (Mark Anthony), Ashton-under-Lyne. Sept. 29; J. B. Pownall and Co., Ashton-under-Lyne. Oct. 4; J Ayrton, jun.,

ORMEROD (Reginald), Boothroyd, Rastrick

Brighouse.

PATTERSON (Esther), Thames Ditton. Basinghall-st, E.C.

Oct. 10; G. Gavan Duffy, 22,

PEARS (Thomas), Isleworth. Oct. 15; S. L. Hunt, 6, Lancaster-pl, Strand.
PERKINS Richard), York. Nov. 9; Perkins and Perkins, York.
POOLE (Cuthbert Stuart Pugin). Leytonstone. Oct 11; Robinson and
Blaber, 12, Great Castle-st, Regent-st, W.

PREES (Catherine), Bridgend. Oct. 31; Lewis and Llewellyn, Bridgend. RICHARDS (Eliza Jane Windsor), Boscombe. Nov 4; Meade-King. Cooke, and Co., Bristol.

ROBINSON (James William), Raistrick, Brighouse. Claims against his estate or against the Brighouse Stone Cutting and General Contracting Company Limited. Oct. 21; W. Dunn, Bradford.

RODMAN (William Hook). Croydon. Oct. 31; Gardner and Hovenden, 16, Finsbury-cir, E.C.

SAUNDERS (William Stephen Tudor), Shirley.

Croydon.

SCOFIELD (Harold Charles Lingham), Herne Hill.

Norman and Co., 65, London-wall, E.C.

Oct. 30; Drummonds,

Oct. 11; Douglas

SEWELL (Edward George), Clitheroe. Oct. 12; J. J. Briggs, Padiham.
SIMPSON (Martha), Boscombe. Oct. 1; A. E. Withy, Swindon.
SMART (Henry Wells), Highgate. Oct. 31; Henry Mossop and Syms,
11, Lincoln's-inn-fids, W.C.

SMIRKE (Sydney), Richmond. Oct. 25; Monier Williams, Robinson, and
Milroy, 6 and 7, Great Tower-st, E.C.

SMITH (Henry), Kenley. Oct. 26; G. Brown, Son, and Vardy, 56, Finsbury-pave.

SMITH (Thomas), Nelson, at the time of his death temporarily residing
at Bare, Morecambe. Oct. 12; J. H. S. Aitken, Nelson.
STEBBING (Sarah), Exning. Oct. 21; D'Albani and Ellis, Newmarket.
STONE (Alfred Hyatt), Walworth-rd. Oct. 14; Osborn and Osborn. 2,
Coleman-st, E.C.

TEAGUE (Sarah), Blaengarw. Oct. 13; D. L. Powell, Bridgend
VERRALL (George Henry), Newmarket. Oct. 31; D'Albani and Ellis, New-
market, Cambs.

WARREN (Beatrice), Birmingham. Sept. 28; W. Shakespeare and Co., Birmingham.

WATSON (Col. Francis Gordon Degge), Chelsea. Oct. 18; H. C. Bryant, 6, John-st, Bedford-row, W.C.

WHITE (William), Pitchcott. Oct. 14; Wilkins and Son, Aylesbury. WIGHT (Mary Anne), Guildford and Hove. Oct. 14; C. S. Weekes, at the offices of R. B. Sparkes, Guildford.

WILLIAMS (Henry), Porthcawl. Oct. 17; Lewis and Llewellyn, Bridgend. WILSHERE (Louisa), Chesterton. Oct. 14; J. F. Symonds, Cambridge. WILSON (Thomas), Barry. Oct. 18; A. F. Bland, Cardiff

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The Development of Railway Law. Hugh M. Ingledew, Cardiff.

The Registration of Writs relating to Heritable or Real Rights in Scotland. W. Boyd Anderson, Glasgow.

Trade Marks: Rights by Priority of User. M. J. Riley, Manchester.

The Admiralty Court and Division of Loss. Frank S. Pritchard, London.

The Future of Family Trusts. Hugh Rendell, London. Legal Profession (Admission of Women). Edward A. Bell, London.

The proceedings will be resumed on Wednesday, at 11 a.m., when the following papers will be read :

The Insurance Act. H. Kingsley Wood, London.

The Land Transfer Problem: Registration of Deeds or Regis tration of Titles. J. S. Rubinstein, London.

A Proposal for the Creation of an Inner Circle in the Profession. Francis Nunn, Colwyn Bay.

Legislation affecting Inebriates. Jas. W. Reid, London.
Safety at Sea. Sanford D. Cole, Bristol and Cardiff.

The Effect of the Insurance Act on Accident and Compensation Claims. J. Scott Duckers, London.

The Office and Jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral. J. A. Howard Watson, Liverpool.

The president may make such alteration in the order of the papers as he may think convenient.

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

TO SECRETARIES.-Reports of meetings should reach the office not later than first post Thursday morning to ensure insertion in the current number.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

THE following public lectures will be delivered in connection with the Faculty of Laws: Mr. J. H. Morgan on "The Relations between Political Science and Law," at the London School of Economics, on Monday, the 7th Oct., at 5.15 p.m., Sir F. Pollock, Bart., presiding; Professor A. F. Murison on "Beginnings of the Roman Law," at King's College, on Thursday, the 10th Oct., at p.m.; and Professor Sir John Macdonell on Modern Social Movements as shown by Comparative Law," at University College, on Wednesday, the 16th Oct., at 5.30 p.m.

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JOINT BOARD OF LEGAL EDUCATION FOR

WALES.

THE second annual meeting of this board, which consists of representatives of the Law Societies of Wales and of the Welsh University, was held at Llandrindod Wells on Saturday, the 14th inst.

The president (Mr. R. S. Cleaver, of Liverpool) was in the chair, and there were also present Sir T. Marchant Williams and Mr. D. Lleufer Thomas, stipendiary magistrates for Merthyr Tydfil and Pontypridd respectively; Principal Roberts and Professor Levi, of Aberystwyth; Messrs. Colbourne (Newport), Dauncey (Newport), Lloyd John (Corwen), E. W. Jones (Swansea), Lewis Morgan (Cardiff), Stanley Owen (Swansea), Francis Nunn (Colwyn Bay), J. Hopley Pierce (Wrexham), and H. W. Spowart (Llanelly). Mr. Lleufer Thomas, who has acted as hon. secretary from the commencement, expressed a wish to retire, but was induced to continue in office for at least another year, Mr. A. C.

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Macintosh, of Cardiff, being asked to act as assistant hon. secretary. The treasurer's financial statement for the year ending the 30th June 1912 showed receipts amounting to £430 14s. 6d., made up of £79 grants from local law societies, £31 10s. private subscriptions, £120 4s. 6d. students' fees, and £200 grant from the Law Society, originally made to the Swansea Board of Legal Studies, but transferred to the joint board.

The first annual report of this board concerning the period extending from its first meeting in Feb. 1911 to the end of June 1912 was adopted. It opens with an interesting history of the movement for legal education in Wales. As to the year 1911-12, there were courses of law lectures provided at Swansea, Aberystwyth, and Card ff respectively. The instruction provided at Swansea and Aberystwyth was given, as in previous years, by members of the staff of the Law Department of the University College, Aberystwyth-viz., Professor T. A. Levi, M.A., B.C.L., Professor of English Law at the college since the opening of the department in Oct. 1901; and Mr. F. Raleigh Batt, solicitor (first class honours and Law Society's prizeman in conveyancing and equity). The instruction at Cardiff was given by Mr. F. Bertram Jacobs, LL.B., who was appointed Lecturer in Law at the University College, Cardiff, in June 1911, for the special purpose of these lectures.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS. Information intended for publication under the above heading should reach us not later than Thursday morning in each week, as publication is otherwise delayed.

Mr. DONALD KINGDON, LL.B., Legal Assistant and Inspector of Schools, Gambia, has been appointed Attorney-General of Uganda. Mr. Kingdon was called by the Inner Temple in 1905.

LEGAL OBITUARY.

Mr. HENRY JOHN SMITH, solicitor, retiring town clerk of Lambeth, died on the 14th inst., at Tulse Hill, aged eighty. Mr. Smith was appointed clerk to the Lambeth Vestry in 1880, and when the district was constituted a borough he was appointed town clerk. His thirty-two years of continuous service had rendered him an authority on all questions of municipal affairs. Mr. Smith was admitted in 1854. He was a member of the Law Society and of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association.

Mr. RICHARD BAYLY MURPHY, barrister-at-law, died on the 9th inst., at the early age of thirty-six. Mr. Murphy was the third son of the late Mr. Justice Murphy, and his maternal grandfather was another Irish judge, the Right Hon. Mr. Justice Keogh. He was educated at Charterhouse and Trinity College, Dublin, where he won a classical scholarship, and subsequently came over to try his fortune at the English Bar. He was called by the Inner Temple in 1900, and joined the Western Circuit. He was a prize-winner at the Inns of Court, and read in the chambers of Mr. R. B. D. Acland, K.C., now Judge Advocate of the Fleet, afterwards going as devil" to Mr. R. D. Muir, the Senior Treasury Counsel at the Old Bailey. Later he worked for the present Solicitor-General, whose chambers he shared to the end.

Mr. A. T. SIMPSON, of the firm of Messrs. Hancock, Simpson, and Hancock, died on the 10th inst. as the result of a cycle accident near Rugby. Mr. Simpson, who was clerk to the Commissioners of Taxes for the Blockley division, was admitted in 1877 and was a member of the Law Society.

Mr. CHARLES WALTER, solicitor, of the firm of Walter and Son, died at Lyndon House, Surbiton Hill, on Wednesday, aged eighty-three. This firm for more than a century had a large practice at Kingston.

CORRESPONDENCE.

This department being open to free discussion on all Professional topics, the Editor does not hold himself responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.

RECEIPTS STAMP DUTY.-The inclosed copy letters dealing with the chargeability of documents as receipts may be of interest to your readers. PRESTON AND FRANCIS.

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Bournemouth, Sept. 4, 1912.-Gentlemen,- We should be much obliged if you would kindly inform us whether it is the view of the commissioners that a person who retains money due to him out of a sum in his hands and pays over the balance is under an obligation to place a receipt stamp upon the account satisfied out of the money he has retained when he hands it over marked "settled," or "settled in account," or discharged," with a cheque for the balance. We frequently receive purchase money from clients and deduct from it our costs, and occasionally costs due to us in other matters. The bill of costs is then sent with our cheque and marked: "Settled in account -Preston and Francis," with the date added. It seems to be the universal practice not to use a receipt stamp, but we should like to be sure that in such cases we are giving a client the acknowledgment that he is entitled to. The view usually taken is that such a transaction is merely an account stated" between the parties, and that an "account stated is not chargeable with stamp duty either as a receipt or as an agreement. Yours truly, (Signed) PRESTON AND FRANCIS.-The Commissioners of Inland Revenue.

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Inland Revenue, Somerset House, London, W.C., Sept. 11, 1912. -Gentlemen,-In reply to your letter of the 4th inst., I am directed by the Board of Inland Revenue to state that in their opinion receipt stamp duty is chargeable in both the instances cited by you, where the sum in question amounts to £2 or upwards. I remind you of the definition of "receipt" contained in sect. 101 (1) of the Stamp Act 1891, viz. "For the purpose of this Act the expression receipt' includes any notes, memorandum, or writing whereby any money amounting to £2 or upwards, or any bill of exchange or promissory note for money amounting to £2 or upwards, is acknowledged to have been settled, satisfied, or discharged, or which signifies or imports any such acknowledgment, and whether the same is or is not signed with the name of any person."-I am, Gentlemen, your obedient Servant, (Signed) W. BARRETT, Assistant Secretary.-Preston and Francis.

Cox's CRIMINAL LAW CASES: In the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Superior Courts, the Central Criminal Court, at the Assizes, and in Ireland. Edited by W. DE BRACY HERBERT, M.A., LL.M., Barrister-at-Law. Published Quarterly. Price 5s. 6d. HORACE Cox, "Law Times" Office, Windsor House, Bream's-buildings, E.C. [ADVT.]

THE COURTS AND COURT PAPERS.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-LONG VACATION NOTICE.

DURING the remainder of the Vacation, all applications "which may require to be immediately or promptly heard," are to be made to the Hon. Mr. Justice Avory.

every

COURT BUSINESS.-The Hon. Mr. Justice Avory will, until further notice, sit in the Lord Chief Justice's Court, Royal Courts of Justice, at 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday in week, commencing on Wednesday, the 11th Sept., for the purpose of hearing such applications of the above nature as, according to the practice in the Chancery Division, are usually heard in court. No case will be placed in the judge's paper unless leave has been previously obtained, or a certificate of counsel that the case requires to be immediately or promptly heard, and stating oncisely the reasons, is left with the papers. The necessary papers, relating to every application made to the Vacation judges (see notice below as to judges' papers), are to be left with the cause clerk in attendance, Chancery Registrars' Office, Room 136, Royal Courts of Justice, before one o'clock two days previous to the day on which the application is intended to be made. When the cause clerk is not in attendance they may be left at Room 136, under cover, addressed to him, and marked outside Chancery Vacation papers, or they may be sent by post, but in either case so as to be received by the time aforesaid.

URGENT MATTERS WHEN JUDGE NOT PRESENT IN COURT OR CHAMBERS.-Application may be made in any case of urgency to the judge, personally (if necessary), or by post or rail, prepaid, accompanied by the brief of counsel, office copies of the affidavits in support of the application, and also by a minute, on a separate sheet of paper, signed by counsel, of the order he may consider the applicant entitled to, and also an envelope, sufficiently stamped capable of receiving the papers, addressed as follows: "Chancery Official Letter: To the Registrar in Vacation, Chancery Registrars' Office, Royal Courts of Justice, London, W.C." On appli cations for injunctions, in addition to the above, a copy of the writ and a certificate of writ issued must also be sent. The papers sent to the judge will be returned to the registrar. The address of the judge for the time being acting as Vacation judge can be obtained on application at Room 136, Royal Courts of

Justice.

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