served on the respondent, M. E. L. B., at Mallow, county Cork, where he was residing. No leave had been obtained for service out of the jurisdiction. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the service was good, notwithstanding Bateman v. Bateman (84 L. T. Rep. 331). Having heard evidence in support of the petition, which was undefended, Evans, P. pronounced a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights, to be obeyed, within fourteen days after service.

[Buckley v. Buckley. P. Div.: Sir S. T. Evans, P. Oct. 19. -Counsel: J. H. Murphy. Solicitors: Rutherfords.]

A second edition is to hand of Mr. Charles H. S Stephenson's Study of the Law of Mortgages (Effingham Wilson). The original scheme of the book has not been interfered with, but recent statutes and cases directly affecting the subject under consideration have been noticed in proportion with the scope of the book in its first edition The book has also been revised, the chapters relating to Registration, to Leaseholds and Copyholds, and to Valuations, respectively by Messrs. Chadwick, Margetts, and Brackett.

LAW LIBRARY.

The Cambridge University Press has published the first volume of a large work on the Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish, and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1720, by Mr. William Robert Scott. In this first volume Mr. Scott deals with the general development of the joint stock system to 1720. The subject holds an important place in the study of economic progress, more especially in relation to capital. The second and third volumes of the book have already appeared, the first having been delayed on account of the number of paged references to the other two.

NEW EDITIONS.

That excellent rade mecum for the Common Law practitioner, Chitty's King's Bench Forms (Sweet and Maxwell Limited and Stevens and Sons Limited), has reached its fourteenth edition, the present editors being Master Willes Chitty and Messrs. E. H. Chapman and Philip Clark. All the forms and notes have been carefully revised and brought up to date, several new forms having been added and some new subjects introduced. In all matters relating to proceedings in the King's Bench and on appeal therefrom, it is difficult to conceive any form that may be required which will not be found in its pages.

Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (Sweet and Maxwell Limited) now appears in its sixth edition, Mr. Wyatt Paine again being responsible for the present issue. Only three years have elapsed since the publication of the last edition, but the thorough and complete revision to which the work has been subjected, together with the additional matter which it has been necessary to include, has compelled Mr. Paine to increase the size of the volume. As we have stated before, we know of no better work on the law of torts. Messrs. Sweet and Maxwell Limited have also sent us the sixteenth edition of Chitty on Contracts, the editor also being Mr. Wyatt Paine. The whole treatise has been carefully revised, much extended (several thousands of additional cases being included), and it truly constitutes a compendious and thoroughly up-to-date disquisition upon the whole law of contractual obligations as regulated by statute and interpreted by judicial opinion. These two works form a complete statement of the various legal obligations arising ex contractu and ex delicto.

That well-known volume, Kerr on Receivers (Sweet and Maxwell Limited), has reached its sixth edition, Mr. Frank C. Watmough being responsible for this issue. The subject of "Managers" having been dealt with in several important cases, the chapter in question has been rewritten and considerably enlarged, while the portions of the book dealing with receivers in debenture-holders' actions have been carefully revised. Although concise, the book is eminently comprehensive.

Messrs. Sherratt and Hughes have brought out a sixth edition of Elliott's Workmen's Compensation Acts, this being rendered necessary owing to the large numbers of decisions in the appeal courts of the United Kingdom since it was last published in 1909. It gives a clear statement of the statute law as interpreted by judicial decisions, the old matter having been thoroughly revised, much of it rewritten, and the cases brought up to date. A new feature is the inclusion of precedents of costs in arbitration proceedings, the precedents having been compiled mainly from bills as actually taxed and allowed in one of the larger courts.

The Elements of Child Protection, by Dr. Eden Paul, translated by Sigmund Engel (George Allen and Co.). This book contains a lucid and well-planned presentation of all the problems of child protection-problems the importance of which gained such a wide recognition at the end of last century that it has sometimes been called "the century of the child." After an introduction on general lines, the author goes on to the department of civil law and individual rights, the department of local administrative activity, and, finally, the department of criminal law. Dr. Paul's dictuo that children with respect to whom medical science indicates that it is impossible for them ever to become useful members of society" should be quickly and painlessly destroyed" will hardly meet with widespread approval.

The Law Quarterly Review for October (Stevens and Sons Limited) contains (inter alia): Private International Law, by A. V. Dicey, K.C.; Merger of Charges, by A. E. Randall; A Historical Study of Mohammedan Law, II., by Syed H. R. Abdul Majid; Judicial Legislation in Egypt, by Norman Bentwich; The Exemption of the Crown from Charges in Respect of Land, by W. W. Lucas; Legal Procedure in Anglo-German Cases, by Julius Hirschfeld; The Rescission of Executory Contracts for Partial Failure in Performance, I., by C. B. Morison; and A Short History of English Law, by Courtney Kenny.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Pitman's Commercial Encyclopædia. Vol. 3. Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons Limited, 1, Amen-corner, E.C. Price (four vols.) 30s. net.

Jenks' Digest of English Civil Law. Book 3: Law of Property (continued). Butterworth and Co., Bell-yard, Temple Bar. Inns of Court and of Chancery. Macmillan and Co. Limited, St. Martin's-street. Price 1s.

Charles Knight

Copnall on Highways. Second Edition. and Co. Limited, 227-239, Tooley-street, S.E. National Conference of Free Workers Report. Hamilton Brothers Limited, 20, Victoria-street, S.W.

Ryde on Rating. Third Edition. Butterworth and Co., Bellyard, Temple Bar; Shaw and Sons, 7 and 8, Fetter-lane, E.C. Price 37s. 6d.

Buckland on Roman Private Law. Cambridge University Press, Fetter-lane, E.C. Price 10s. 6d. net.

Mews' Digest of English Case Law. October. Stevens and Sons Limited, 119 and 120, Chancery-lane; Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 3, Chancery-lane. Price 58.

Palmer's Company Precedents. Eleventh Edition. Part 2 Stevens and Sons Limited, 119 and 120, Chancery-lane. Price

34s.

Seton's Forms of Judgments and Orders. Seventh Edition. Three vols. Stevens and Sons Limited, 119 and 120, Chancerylane. Price £6.

SANITARY ASSURANCE.-Before renting or purchasing a house it is advisable to obtain an independent report on the condition of the Drains, Sanitary Fittings, and Water Supply. Moderate fees for Sanitary Inspections on application to the Sanitary Engineering Company, 115, Victoria-street, Westminster. 'Phone, 4316 Victoria Telegrams: "Sanitation," London.-[ADVT.]

Bolton, Wednesday, at 9.30

Bow, Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday Brackley, Monday, at 12

Bradford (Yorks), Tuesday, at 10; Thursday (J.S.). at 10.30; Friday, at 10

Braintree, Friday, at 11

Brentford, Friday, at 10

Bridlington, Monday

Brighton, Friday, at 10

Bristol, Monday, Tuesday, Wed

nesday, and Thursday, at 10;

Friday (By), at 11

Bury, Monday, at 9

Carmarthen, Friday

Cheltenham, Friday

Leigh, Friday

10

Northleach, Saturday

Nottingham, Wednesday, and Fri day (J.S.), at 10

Oldham, Thursday, at 9.30
Paignton, Monday, at 10
Petworth, Thursday

Portsmouth, Monday (R. By), at 11

Rochdale. Friday (J.S.), at 9.30 Rye, Tuesday

St. Helens, Wednesday

Salford, Wednesday and Thursday

Sheffield, Wednesday, Thursday (By at), and Friday, at 10 Shoreditch, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday

Sleaford, Thursday, at 10
Solihull, Tuesday
Southport, Tuesday, at 10
Southwark, Monday, Tuesday, and
Thursday, at 10.30

Sunderland, Thursday (R. By) Swindon, Wednesday (By at 11), at 10.30

Todmorden. Friday

Ulverston, Thursday, at 9.30
Wakefield, Tuesday, at 10
Wandsworth, Monday
Westbromwich, Friday

Westbury, Monday, at 11
Westminster, Monday,

Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday

Widnes, Friday

*

Wigan, Tuesday, at 9

Witney, Saturday, at 11

Wood Green, Monday, at 10.30. *Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary.

RECENT DECISIONS.

MEAD v. COLEMAN.

Replevin-Impounding Heifer-Damage.

HIS HONOUR JUDGE MULLIGAN, K.C., delivered judgment in the Norwich County Court on the 8th Oct. in this case.

Edmund Reeve appeared for the plaintiff, and A. W. F. Bagge for the defendant.

The facts and arguments appear in the judgment.

His HONOUR.-This is an unusual claim. It is the first of its kind that has come before me for trial. On the 10th of last month some of the plaintiff's cattle, including a heifer which was in calf, broke in the defendant's garden and injured some plants and an apple tree. The defendant seized the heifer and shut her up in an outhouse. So far he was within his rights. The plaintiff went and asked the defendant to let him have the heifer, he undertaking to pay for the damage. The defendant refused. The plaintiff had the damage valued and tendered to the defendant £2 10s. and 6s. for the keep of the heifer. The defendant again refused. The plaintiff thereupon deposited £35 in court as security that he would commence and prosecute this action and return the heifer if so ordered. A warrant of replevin was then issued and the heifer was restored to the plaintiff, but in a depreciated condition owing to the prolonged detention. This plaint was afterwards issued by the owner claiming £9 3s. 6d. by way of damages. The defendant counter-claimed £6 17s. 6d. for the trespass. plaintiff paid the £2 10s. and the 6s. into court, and the dispute came on for decision. Now, it was very annoying for the defendant to see an inroad made into his garden by his neighbour's cattle, and he was entitled to compensation for the trespass. There are lawful means of ascertaining and recovering the proper amount. Means that are not lawful are sometimes used to extort more than is just for a slight trespass. That is what was attempted here. It seems that the plaintiff's cattle went upon the defendant's land on some former occasion, and, when the plaintiff's valuer was investigating the damage on the present occasion, the defendant said to him: "They kidded me to take £1 last time, but this time I'm going to have it right. I'm going to

The

have £7 10s. or sell the heifer." He had no right to sell the heifer. Therein he was wrong in his law. Upon the facts, £2 10s. was ample to satisfy all the defendant's just claims. The defendant must pay £3 10s. damages for injury to the heifer, the plaintiff's charges for loss of time and travelling, and the charges of his solicitor relating to the security and the warrant and the replevin fees (which are all damages in the nature of costs and will be adjusted by the registrar), and also the costs of action and counter-claim.

Solicitors for the plaintiff, Mills and Reeve. Solicitor for the defendant, Russell Steward.

GODFREY V. DIVETT.

Workman "-Work of casual Nature-Workmen's Compensation
Act 1906.

IN the Newton Abbot County Court, on the 18th inst., His Honour Judge Lush Wilson, K.C., delivered the following judgment:

His HONOUR.-This was a claim for compensation by reason of an accident resulting in the loss of an eye to the applicant whilst breaking stones on the property of the respondent. It was proved in evidence that the applicant was employed by the steward of the respondent to break certain stones at ls. 4d. per vard which were required for the purpose of repairing roads on the respondent's estate, which roads as between the respondent and her farm tenants she was under liability to keep in repair. There was a conflict of evidence between the applicant and the steward as to whether or not a conversation took place between them with regard to the respondent having insured against accidents to casual labourers employed by her. I am not satisfied that any such conversation as sworn to by the applicant did in fact take place between them. It was proved that the applicant brought a man named Pike to work with him. The steward swore that, having agreed to pay the applicant 1s. 4d. a yard, he was surprised, but did not object, when he found that the applicant brought another man with him, and he further stated that the respondent was paying other men daily wages to quarry the stone which was to be broken, and, further, that he agreed to pay the applicant so much a yard instead of daily wages because he thought they could get it done cheaper. It was proved that in the course of the work the steward desired the applicant to break the stones smaller and to put the heaps higher. No arrangement was made as to the hours of work. During the last two days of work the applicant worked alone. On the last day of working, a stone went through the applicant's goggles and injured an eye which had eventually to be and was removed. The applicant had no work for eight weeks after the accident, and he swore that he has since earned on the average about 7s. a week and finds that people will not employ him as before on account of the loss of his eye. It was proved that previously to the employment of the respondent the applicant's average earnings were about 25s. to 30s. a week as a breaker of stones for a road contractor. The question I have to decide is whether or not the applicant was a "workman within the definition of sect. 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906. Was the applicant a person whose employment was of a casual nature and who was employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's business? It is immaterial that the employment should have been of a casual nature provided the purposes were those of the employer's business. In this case I entertain no doubt that, inasmuch as the leases provided for the performance of a correlative duty or obligation on the part of the respondent towards the tenants to repair the farm roads and the applicant was employed in relation thereto, the employment was for the purposes of the respondent's business. Was the applicant an independent contractor, or was he working under a contract of service? The principal test for distinguishing between these two forms of contract is whether or not the applicant whilst performing his work was under the control of the respondent's steward. This case appears to me to be very near the line. I do not say that the interference of the steward with the applicant's work was inconsistent with the theory that the applicant was an independent contractor. But, having regard to the steward's admission that he did direct the applicant to break the stones smaller and that he paid by measurement instead of daily wages because he thought they could get it done cheaper, whilst the quarrymen were paid daily wages, I have arrived at the conclusion that the contract was one of service, and that therefore the applicant is within the Act and entitled to recover. The only remaining question is that of the amount of compensation to which he is entitled. He still possesses one eye and can work, although I have no doubt that employers of labour are disinclined to employ injured workmen, and that therefore, for this reason alone, the earning capacity of the applicant has been permanently diminished or affected. It is, however, within the power of the applicant to obtain a glass eye. I think, so far as I am able to

estimate it, the fair weekly compensation should be 7s. a week, and I award half wages, the amount having been agreed, from the date of the accident to the date of the hearing, and this amount afterwards to the applicant.

RUTHVEN (app.) v. EDITH GENT (a married woman, formerly Edith Cooper, spinster) (resp.).

Workmen's Compensation Act 1906.

The marriage of a parlourmaid does not of itself suspend or extinguish her right to weekly payments by way of compensation for injury by accident. There is not any dum sola limitation in the Act, and the court will not interpolate one. IN the Norwich County Court, on the 11th Oct., His Honour Judge Mulligan, K.C., delivered judgment in this case.

His HONOUR.-This is an application by the ex-employer to review. The respondent was parlourmaid in the employment of the applicant. On the 3rd of last February she slipped on the stairs and fell and injured one of her legs so badly that it is still painful and becomes greatly inflamed with ordinary exertion. At the time of the accident the respondent was engaged to be married. The marriage was delayed on account of the gravity of the injury, and an agreement was filed in May to pay her 8s. 3d. per week by way of compensation. The 8s. 3d. was paid until the 3rd July, when the marriage took place, the respondent being then able to walk short distances. She can now do some light intermittent work. But her labour, as the result of the accident and apart altogether from the effect of the marriage, would not fetch half what she sold it for prior and up to the 3rd Feb. 1912. To-day Mr. Dodson has for the applicant contended that upon the marriage Mrs. Gent ceased to belong to the wage-earning class and therefore ceased to be entitled to compensation, and cited a number of cases. Mr. Bagge, for the respondent, has contended that Mrs. Gent had not ceased to belong to the wage-earning class; that married women in her position do work and earn wages. I shall not refer to the cases cited. They are at most far-fetched illustrations. Each case depends on its own facts. The facts here are altogether novel. There can be no doubt that the status of employer and workman was ascertained and fixed, finally fixed, by the filed agreement. The payments under that agreement, whether they be made weekly or whether they be redeemed for a lump sum, are compensation for an ascertained injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment of Edith Gent by C. H. V. Ruthven-out of the status which existed at the time of the fall on the stairs. There is not any dum sola limitation in the Act or in the agreement, and I altogether decline to interpolate or to add any such limitation. I award compensation at the rate of 8s. 3d. per week until now and at the rate of 78. a week hereafter, and the respondent must be paid her costs on scale B.

66

In the course of a judgment delivered in the Accrington County Court, His Honour Judge Hans Hamilton made the following trenchant observations: I hope the Legislature will at an early date make it illegal for insurance companies agents to canvass and worry people into taking out insurances on their lives and on the lives of their relations. The practice is that not only one but two servants of the company (the agent and the superintendent) come to the house of a person they in many instances never knew before, and they sit down, sometimes for hours, and worry and persuade until they succeed in "getting a life," as they call it, and secure their commission, which is their primary object. If a British subject wishes to insure his or her life or the life of a relation within the law, surely he or she might be permitted to go to the office of a company and not have his or her home besieged by agents. This practice has led and is leading honest people to gamble in human lives, and much harm is done."

The case upon which we were there commenting was tried last week in the King's Bench Division, the indictment having been removed there by certiorari. The trial has resulted in an interesting decision on several points-amongst others, the liability of a corporation to be indicted under sect. 47 (3) of the Public Health (London) Act 1891. The indictment was laid under that sub-section which provides that "where it is shown that any article liable to be seized under this section, and found in the possession of any person, was purchased by him from another person for the food of man, and when purchased was in such a condition as to be liable to be seized and condemned under this section, the person who so sold the same shall be liable to the fine and imprisonment mentioned above [£50 and six months' imprisonment], unless he proves that at the time he sold the said article he did not know and had no reason to believe it was in such condition." At the trial in the King's Bench Division, counsel for the defence moved to quash the indictment on the ground that a corporation could not be guilty of mens rea, and that that was an essential part of the offence charged. The learned judge ruled, however, that the offence was complete without proof of intent on the part of the sellers, and that proof of the proviso at the end of the sub section was a defence open to a person charged with the offence created in the first part of the sub-section. A further point was taken-namely, that as the statute prescribed imprisonment as a punishment for the offence, if proved, it could not apply to a corporate body, which could not be imprisoned. Under the Interpretation Act 1889, s. 2 (1), " in the construction of every enactment relating to an offence punishable on indictment or summary conviction the expression 'person' shall, unless a contrary intention appears, include a body corporate." In Hawke v. Hulton (100 L. T. Rep. 905), in a prosecution under the Vagrancy Act 1824, it was held that a corporation could not be convicted as rogues and vagabonds. In Chater v. Freeth and Pocock Limited (105 L. T. Rep. 238) a corporation was held to be rightly convicted of an offence under sect. 20 of the Food and Drugs Act 1899. The learned judge followed this decision and refused to quash the indictment on the ground that imprisonment under sect. 47 of the Public Health (London) Act 1891 was alternative to the fine therein provided, and that the defendant corporation could be fined.

WHAT IS A POLITICAL OFFENCE?

IN a case at the Oxfordshire Autumn Assizes on Saturday last, the prisoner was convicted of being found armed with intent to break and enter Nuneham House and set fire thereto. She was what is known as a militant suffragist, and her counsel, before sentence, advanced the view that, as apolitical offender, she should be treated as a first class misdemeanant. Mr. Justice Ridley stated that the offence could not be regarded as a political one, and passed sentence of nine months' imprisonment with hard labour. In default of a successful appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal against the sentence the learned judge's view holds the field. As, however, there is a widespread confusion of ideas on the subject of what are called political offences, it may be well to examine shortly the position of such offences in the eye of the law.

First of all, then, it may be stated broadly that the municipal law of England draws no hard-and-fast distinction between political offences and others as regards the measure of guilt and of consequent punishment. The one exception to the rule is the case of persons convicted of sedition or seditious libel, who by the Prison Act 1877 (s. 40) are to be treated as misdemeanants of the first division. Other offences against public order, such as high treason, treason-felony, unlawful assemblies, riots, and other unlawful acts directed to obtain a change in the law. are not placed by common law or statute in any privileged category of comparative immunity. A judge who has to fix the sentence has, of course, to consider all the surrounding circumstances of the crime, whether it has or has not a political com plexion, but the mere fact that the offence has been committed to attain some political object does not, and ought not to, give the offender any claim to exceptional lenity.

Passing from municipal to international law, the definition of political offences becomes of importance in the interpretation of extradition treaties. Most of these treaties except from extraditable offences political offences or offences of a political character. By the Extradition Act 1870, s. 3 (1), a fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offence in respect of which his surrender is demanded is one of a political character.

Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in his History of the Criminal Law of England (vol. ii., pp. 70-71) discusses the meaning of the words "an offence of a political character," and deduces that the expression ought to be interpreted to mean that fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for extradition crimes, if these crimes are incidental to and form a part of political disturbances. This view obtained judicial sanction in Re Castioni (64 L. T. Rep. 344; (1891) 1 Q. B. 149). In that case, the Divisional Court, consisting of Justices Denman, Hawkins, and Stephen, refused the extradition for murder of a prisoner who had shot and killed a member of the Government of a Swiss Canton, on the ground that the offence was incidental to and formed a part of political disturbances.

The question received further consideration in the later case of Re Meunier (71 L. T. Rep. 403; (1894) 2 Q. B. 415). Mr. Justice Cave said "It appears to me that, in order to constitute an offence of a political character, there must be two or more parties in the State, each seeking to impose the Government of their own choice on the other, and that, if that offence is committed by one side or the other in pursuance of that object, it is a political offence; otherwise not." There the prisoner, who was charged with anarchist outrages, was held liable to extradition.

Sir J. F. Stephen seems to have anticipated the present attempt to extend the definition of a political offence so as to include any offence committed in order to obtain any political object. "The exception," he writes, "thus interpreted would cover all crimes committed under the orders of any secret political society-such, for instance, as assassination, arson, robbery, or forgery. It is monstrous to suppose that this interpretation can be the true one. To take an illustration which can hardly give offence at the present day [1883], it would have protected the wretch Fieschi, whose offence consisted in shooting down many persons in the streets of Paris in an attempt to murder Louis Philippe."

The later developments of militant suffragism really amount to anarchy. They are mainly directed against the general body of private citizens, and the persons who perpetrate them cannot be rightly regarded as, in any real sense of the words, political offenders.

COSTS OF SPECIAL CASE STATED IN LICENSING APPEAL.

A QUESTION which, as Lord Alverstone, C.J., who was sitting with Pickford and Avory, JJ. in the Divisional Court, remarked, had never arisen before, was decided in the recent case of Rex v. Justices of the Salford Hundred Division of the County of Lancaster; Ex parte Bolton Justices (107 L. T. Rep. 174): Whether the costs of a special case stated for the opinion of the High Court by quarter sessions on an appeal to them by a licensee, and ordered to be paid by the licensing justices, come within the provisions of sect. 32 of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act 1910 (10 Edw. 7 & 1 Geo. 5, c. 24)—a re-enactment with amplifications of sect. 29 of the Alehouse Act 1828 (9 Geo. 4, c. 61).

This question-which was answered by the court in the affirmative-involved consideration of whether such costs are in any sense costs incurred on an appeal to quarter sessions, as constituting an incident of such appeal, and therefore covered by the wide language of the section, "all costs and charges whatsoever" to which the licensing justices may have been put in consequence of the appeal. In these circumstances, it is the express duty of the treasurer of the borough to indemnify the licensing justices. The alternative view, which was presented to the court with no little dexterity, is that while an appeal by a licensee to quarter sessions is one thing, a case stated by them is in the nature of an appeal to the High Court. In support of that view, Req. v. Chantrell (33 L. T. Rep. 305; L. Rep. 10 Q. B.

587) was cited. There the subject of cases stated by quarter sessions was discussed by Mr. Justice Field.

An appeal, strictly so called, is one, according to what was said by Lord Davey when delivering the judgment of the House of Lords in Ponnamma v. Arumogam (92 L. T. Rep. 740, at p. 742; (1905) A. C. 383, at p. 390), " in which the question is whether the order of the court from which the appeal is brought was right on the materials which that court had before it." A special case would seem, without much stretch of the terms of that definition, to be susceptible of being included therein. But the obvious improbability of its ever having been intended by the Legislature that licensing justices should not be completely indemnified from all costs incurred by them in the course of any proceedings, simply because a portion of the same were incurred in respect of a special case, renders that aspect of the matter utterly unfeasible. The licensing justices were put to the costs under an order of the High Court which they were bound to obey. At the most, the existence of a casus omissus is all that could be suggested. And the words of the section are far too comprehensive for that to be possible. Moreover, some assistance is derivable from the decision in Reg. v. Justices of Staffordshire and Longhurst (79 L. T. Rep. 142, at pp. 145, 146; (1898) 2 Q. B. 231), where the costs of certiorari and mandamus were directed to be included in an indemnity order.

The assertion that the costs of a special case are much nearer the costs of an appeal than the costs of certiorari and mandamus is not open to denial. The present case, in the words of Mr. Justice Avory, was, indeed, an à fortiori one, assuming that the decision in the other was right. To say that a special case forms no part of an appeal, whether by the licensing justices or the licensee, to quarter sessions—which apparently is alone what has to be dealt with under the section-deprives the statutory enactment to a considerable extent of its utility. Sect. 2 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Procedure) Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 16) was referred to. For that, at first sight, certainly does not favour the conclusion arrived at by the Divisional Court in regard to the costs of the special case. But the court found no difficulty in rejecting that section as inapplicable.

Serious Offences.

Minor Offences.

There are certain offences created by the Act or the Local Government Board Regulations which, as pointed out above, may be serious or trivial according to the circumstances of the case, and it is in dealing with such infractions of the law that there is the greatest call for the exercise of discrimination by the justices. A heavy penalty should not be imposed as a matter of routine merely because the maximum fine allowed is a large one. For instance, driving without a licence or with the rear lamp extinguished may, in certain circumstances, be serious and deliberate offences requiring severe punishment. But to inflict a heavy penalty of fine and costs on a person who, though possibly known to the police as being the holder of a licence, has accidentally omitted to carry it with him, or on the driver who can produce credible evidence that his lamp had been lighted but was accidentally blown or jolted out without his knowing it, is calculated to create a sense of injustice in the individual without any corresponding advantage to the community. Trivial offences of this class not due to any grave negligence may properly be met by a warning and payment of costs, or by a light sentence. And, when the justices on consideration of the circumstances of a case do not think it proper to take a lenient course, it is most important that in the infliction of penalties regard should be had to the means of the offender. A fine which may properly be imposed on a well-to-do owner of a motor-car will often be an excessive penalty for a person of less

means.

Dangerous Driving (Motor Car Act 1903, s. 1 (1).

The Secretary of State is informed that an idea prevails that a conviction of dangerous driving cannot be obtained unless it is proved that some person was actually endangered by the act forming the subject of the charge. Mr. McKenna is advised that the wording of the sub-section is so plain in the contrary sense that this view is quite untenable. He alludes to the point only because it has been given as a reason why some police authorities discountenance prosecutions for dangerous driving and restrict themselves to proceeding under sect. 9 (speed limit). The Act lays it down clearly that whether the driving is or is not dangerous is to be decided "having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition, and use of the highway, and to the amount of traffic which actually is at the time, or which might reasonably be expected to be, on the highway"; and there can be no doubt that a person who drives, for instance, at a furious rate through a narrow village street, may properly be proceeded against under the sub-section, in a case where no proof can be produced that there was any person present in the street whom his driving actually endangered.

LEGISLATION.

Site Enfranchisement.

EDWARD TROUP.

THE Bill introduced by Lord Beauchamp in the House of Lords in order to authorise the enfranchisement of the sites of places of worship held under lease, having undergone all its stages, is now before the Commons. During its passage through the Upper House sundry changes have been made in it with a view to making it more acceptable and practical. The Bill as now drawn enables trustees of premises, held under a lease or trust for the purposes of a place of worship, to have the right as an incident to their leasehold interest to enlarge that interest into a fee simple and to acquire the freehold and all intermediate reversions. It does not stand in the way if the trusts for the purposes of a place of worship are or are not in conjunction with other purposes. The premises have not only to be held on those trusts, but must also be in a condition of being used in accordance with the terms of the trust. The right of the trustees to enlarge will exist, notwithstanding agreement to the contrary, unless the agreement is one against the enlargement of the leasehold interest into a freehold contained in a lease granted or made before the Bill becomes an Act.

Limitations of the Right.

THE generality of these provisions is subjected to certain restrictions set out in a series of provisos in regard to which the original Bill has been amended. By virtue of these limitations trustees are not empowered, where the premises exceed two acres in extent, to exercise their rights in respect of the excess beyond the two acres. Again, the Bill is expressly designed so that it will have no application where the premises are used or proposed

to be used as a place of worship in contravention of any covenant contained in the lease under which the premises are held, or in any lease superior thereto, and a further important proviso is made in regard to premises forming part of land acquired for certain purposes of a very different character. The Bill does not affect premises forming a portion of land acquired by or vested in its owners for railway, dock, canal, or navigation purposes under an Act, provisional order, or order having the force of an Act of Parliament and the freehold reversion is held or retained by the owners for these purposes. This provision was inserted at a late date by an amendment moved on report by Lord Ritchie of Dundee. The Bill applies to leases, including underleases, and agreements for leases or underleases, whether granted or made before or after the passage of the Bill into law, for lives or a life or for a term of years. The term, however, as originally created must be one of not less than twenty-one years, whether determinable on a life or lives or not.

Covenants after Enfranchisement.

THE result will be that the trustees will acquire a fee simple, but it will be affected by the same trusts, so far as they are trusts for the use of the premises for places of worship or for purposes connected therewith, but they will be discharged from trusts providing for the use of the premises for other purposes. They will be subject to all the same covenants and provisions as to user and enjoyment and to all the old obligations of every kind, except, naturally, the payment of rent. All these covenants, provisions, and obligations will be enforceable against the trustees and their successors in title by the persons who would have been entitled to enforce them but for the enlargement of the leasehold interest into one of a freehold character. There is an important point, however, to notice in regard to covenants to insure against fire. Any covenants of this nature, whether applicable to any particular office or not, and any covenants as to reinstatement or as as to doing any act which would be beneficial to the demised premises alone, are to continue in force only where the consideration is payable in the form of a rentcharge, and only for so long as that rentcharge is payable. Trustees who make an improper use of the premises in which by virtue of this legislation they have obtained an enlarged interest are subjected to certain proposals designed to prevent an unfair employment being made of their acquisition. If a County Court judge is satisfied by any person who appears to him to be interested that any premises or any part of them acquired under this measure are let or are habitually used for any purpose other than that of a place of worship or purposes connected therewith, he can order them to be sold in whole or part unless it is shown to him that the use complained of was due to inadvertence and will be discontinued. Premises must not be deemed to be habitually used for any purpose other than that of a place of worship or purposes connected therewith by reason only of their being used for such other purpose not more than twice in any year.

Procedure.

THE machinery to be used for setting these provisions in action is that, in general, of the Lands Clauses Acts, the trustees being treated as though they had been authorised to acquire the premises by a special Act incorporating those Acts and sects. 77-85 of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. These applications of well-known enactments are, however, subjected to a series of modications which are set out in a schedule. The first reads somewhat quaintly, for it requires that the use of the premises as a place of worship and for purposes connected therewith " shall be deemed to be "the undertaking or the railway," while the trustees of the place of worship are to "be deemed to be the promoters of the undertaking or the railway company." Questions of disputed compensation are to be settled by a single arbitrator appointed, in default of agreement, by the County Court judge. The consideration can be payable in respect of any intermediate reversion, at the option of the person entitled to it, by way of rentcharge for a term corresponding to the unexpired residue of the term of the reversion. The sum of the compensation is not to include the value of buildings erected or improvements made by the trustees nor is any allowance to be made for compulsory acquisition. A