Had our lamented friend Romilly lived, you are aware that not even these considerations would have made me address any one but him, with whom I had oftentimes speculated upon this ground.—Dedication, p. iv.

Does not our noble writer spoil his compliment? As if, though in gracious mood, he could not help indulging in offensiveness? Another point in this "Discourse of Natural Theology," which strikes us as singular, is the studious and covert endeavour which it has of depreciating Paley, to whose immortal work on natural theology this illustrative essay of Lord Brougham professes to be a "Preliminary Discourse!" Paley is described, in these pages, as a man who had "little of scientific habits," and but " a moderate power of generalising." (P. 53.) "It may be doubted," we are told, "whether Paley was fully impressed with the evidence of mental existence; that he had "limited and unexercised powers of abstract discussion;" that he had not "any taste for metaphysical speculations." (P. 54.) In another passage, (p. 79,) we read that Dr. Paley "does not even advert to the argument upon which the inference of design must of necessity rest,that design which is the whole subject of his book. Nothing," it is added, "can more evince his distaste or incapacity for metaphysical researches. He assumes the very position which alone sceptics dispute." (P. 80.)

Surely these are "unkind thrusts" from the hand of one who essays to illustrate Paley's admirable work, which needs, in our judgment, no illustration, (for it is so felicitously perspicuous, as to assume the graphic impression of a picture,) and justifies no such bitter remarks as our noble author, in his contemptuous vein, has ventured to make! Whether Paley has omitted all mention of the argument on which his book rests, we stop not to inquire; but we content ourselves with suggesting to our author that there might possibly be other and better reasons for Paley's prudent abstinence from "metaphysical speculations," than his "distaste or incapacity" for such topics. It must, we submit, be imputed to his wisdom and sagacity, that he forbore to involve himself and his readers in that perplexing labyrinth of speculations which often "begin in vanity, are prosecuted amidst ignorance and error, and frequently terminate in impious presumption, or universal scepticism."*

We may well, we think, pass over our author's introductory matter without further comment: yet we crave the indulgence of our readers for one more notice of a singular statement in these pages, which is explanatory of the origin of the discourse before us. We quote Lord Brougham's words:

The composition of this Discourse was undertaken in consequence of an observation which I had often made, that scientific men were apt to regard the

* White's Bampton Lectures, Notes, p. 46.

study of Natural Religion as little connected with philosophical pursuits. The bulk of them relied little upon Natural Theology, which they seemed to regard as A SPECULATION BUILT RATHER ON FANCY THAN ON ARGUMENT!!!— Dedication, p. 1.

Natural theology built on fancy !!! This exceeds all the gross absurdities that we have ever heard of. Who could, these men of science be, in the name of wonder? Natural theology built on fancy !!! Again we refer to our motto, "nil admirari."

And now for an analysis of Lord Brougham's discourse, the object of which is

First, to explain the nature of the evidence upon which Natural Theology rests-to show that it is a science, the truths of which are discovered by induction like the truths of Natural and Moral Philosophy-that it is a branch of science partaking of the nature of each of those great divisions of human knowledge, and not merely closely allied to both. Secondly, the object of the Discourse is to explain the advantages attending this study.-Introduction, pp. 6, 7.

Our limits forbid us to dwell upon our author's philological distinctions, whereby he endeavours, with a proud parade of scholastic fore, to fix the meaning of his terms, and at length determines that natural theology consists, like all inductive science, of three compartments-natural, mental, and moral; or, in Greek phrase, physical, psychological, and ethical; nor do we lament our inability to follow him here, for mathematical exactness is unattainable in these inquiries; and where our author has himself failed to abide always by his own terms, confessing that all scientific language must necessarily "break down under us in an attempt to maintain a perfectly logical arrangement," we may well be relieved from the task of analyzing his technological classifications.

The first part of the work which treats of the kind of evidence upon which natural theology rests, is divided into seven sections. Our readers will best collect their contents from the prefatory titles of each, running thus :-Section I. Introductory View of the Method of Investigation pursued in the Physical and Psychological Sciences.-II. Comparison of the Physical Branch of Natural Theology with Physics.III. Comparison of the Psychological Branch of Natural Theology with Psychology.-IV. Of the Argument à Priori.-V. Moral or Ethical Branch of Natural Theology.-VI. Lord Bacon's Doctrine of Final Causes.-VII. Of Scientific Arrangement, and the Methods of Analysis and Synthesis.

Our author contends that there is no real foundation for the distinction which is taken between the different objects of scientific investigation; and that the evidence upon which our assent reposes is of the same kind, namely, inferences drawn by reasoning from sensations or ideas, originally presented by the external senses, or by inward consciousness. Hence he pursues his argument, and applies his conclusion to natural theology, shewing that this branch of divine knowledge is of 3 Q

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a similar kind with the physical and mental sciences, being supported by the same evidence, and resting upon the same process of induction, and based on similar foundations.

The position, (writes Lord Brougham,) which we reach by a strict process of induction, is common to Natural Philosophy and Natural Theology-namely, that a given organ performs a given function, or a given arrangement possesses a certain stability, by its adaptation to mechanical laws. We have said that the process of reasoning is short and easy, by which we arrive at the doctrine more peculiar to Natural Theology-namely, that some power acquainted with and acting upon the knowledge of those laws, fashioned the organ with the intention of having the function performed, or constructed the system so that it might endure. Is not this last process as much one of strict induction as the other? It is plainly only a generalization of many particular facts; a reasoning from things known to things unknown; an inference of a new or unknown relation from other relations formerly observed and known. . . The same reasoning, by the help of experience, from what we know to what we cannot know, is manifestly the foundation of the inference, that the members of the body were fashioned for certain uses by a maker acquainted with their operations, and willing that those uses should be served.-Sec. ii. pp. 42-45.

This argument is eloquently pursued by our author, through many pages of his discourse. The mechanism of the eye is taken as an illustration of his position, which is further sought to be established by natural history, and comparative anatomy, astronomy, osteology, and geology; but, for discussion of these various topics, we have no room in our miscellany, and beg leave, therefore, to refer our readers to the discourse under review, assuring them of an abundant harvest of gratification, if not of instruction, from this pleasing portion of Lord Brougham's volume, from which we have irrefragable evidence of the great variety of his acquirements, however we may desiderate, sometimes, satisfactory proof of the depth of his learning. We would confine ourselves to the peculiar argument which the noble writer inculcates from his statements, contending that natural theology rests upon induction, and is as much entitled to be called a science as those other investigations which exclusively arrogate that name to themselves. It is asked

What perceivable difference there is between the kind of investigations we have been just considering, and those of Natural Theology-except, indeed, that the latter are far more sublime in themselves, and incomparably more interesting to us? Where is the logical precision of the arrangement, which would draw a broad line of demarcation between the two speculations, giving to the one the name and the rank of a science, and refusing it to the other, and affirming that the one rested upon induction, but not the other?-Sec. ii. pp. 50, 51.

Once more we quote our author's words, where he is speaking of the discoveries of geology and comparative anatomy, with the view of demonstrating that the kind of evidence adduced to prove the existence of antediluvian animals, is identical with that on which natural theology

rests.

We have, it is true, no experience directly of that Great Being's existence in whom we believe as our Creator; nor have we the testimony of any man relating

such experience of his own. But so, neither we, nor any witnesses in any age, have ever seen those works of that Being, the lost animals that once peopled the earth; and yet the lights of inductive science have conducted us to a full knowledge of their nature, as well as a perfect belief in their existence. WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE FROM OUR SENSES, OR FROM THE TESTIMONY OF EYE-WITNESSES, we

believe in the existence and qualities of those animals, because we infer by the induction of facts that they once lived, and were endowed with a certain nature. This is called a doctrine of inductive philosophy. Is it less a doctrine of the same philosophy, that the eye could not have been made without a knowledge of optics, and as it could not make itself, and as no human artist, though possessed of the knowledge, has the skill and power to fashion it by his handy-work, that there must exist some being of knowledge, skill, and power, superior to our own, and sufficient to create it?-P. 51.

Considering what a parade of philological precision,-what an ostentatious claim of philosophical exactness,-what a pedantic display of logic characterise the pages under review, we are indeed astonished at the looseness and enormous exaggeration exhibited in this passage; nor have we ever seen an argument so overstrained. But let us examine Lord Brougham's statement a little. He tells us that the lights of inductive science have led us to a full knowledge of the nature of antediluvian animals, so that we have "an accurate notion of their forms and habits," and are able to represent the one, and describe the other, with unerring accuracy, picturing to, ourselves how they looked, what they fed on, and how they continued their kinds.”

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Is it quite consistent with philosophical exactness, and logical precision, to make "full knowledge" synonymous with an accurate notion?" Let this pass, however: we ask, again, whether it be correct to say that our knowledge, or our notion, of antediluvian animals, does not rest upon a single particle of evidence from sense or from testimony? On what, then, does it rest? Is it baseless as the fabric of a dream? Surely not; all the knowledge of the comparative anatomist, is gathered by the senses from ocular demonstrations, and perfected by experience and accumulation of testimony! That some certain teeth indicate herbivorous, whilst teeth of a different shape characterise beasts of prey, is a knowledge gained by what we see; and without the testimony of such palpable proof, the discoveries of the geologist would be inapplicable to the purpose of his inferences! is by an accurate examination of fossil remains, by close inspection of the texture of their surface, and by cautious admeasurement of their proportions, their shapes, their extremities, that the comparative anatomist proceeds to discover the general form of the animal to which they belonged, the economy of its viscera, and its general habits. Observing a cloven hoof, we infer that the animal ruminated; seeing that he wanted certain teeth, we gather that he possessed horns; or from his possession of cloven hoofs, we deduce that he wanted the collar-bone. And yet we are gravely told by our author, that these are things respecting which we have not, and cannot have, a single

particle of evidence, either by sense or testimony!!! What will Cuvier and Buckland say to these rash assertions of our ex-chancellor, and "Member of the National Institute of France?"

They will class them, we doubt not, in the same predicament with our author's boastful claim of originality in his speculations upon the constitution of the human mind as manifesting, equally with the material world, the existence and wisdom of an intelligent cause.

Hitherto, (he says,) our argument has rested upon a comparison of the truths of Natural Theology with those of Physical Science. But the evidences of design presented by the universe are not merely those which the material world affords; the intellectual system is equally fruitful in proofs of an intelligent cause, although these have occupied little of the philosopher's attention, and may, indeed, be said NEVER to have found a place among the speculations of the Natural Theologian. Nothing is more remarkable than the care with which ALL the writers upon this subject, at least among the moderns, have confined themselves to the proofs afforded by the visible and sensible works of nature, while the evidence furnished by the mind and its operations has been WHOLLY neglected!

-P. 52.

Philosophers have paid but little attention to this psychological branch of science, it seems, and natural theologians have totally excluded it from their inquiries. It was left for Lord Brougham to supply their deficiencies; for whilst they "pass over in silence, unaccountably enough, by far the most singular work of divine wisdom. and power, the mind itself," he first essays to teach us how "the phenomena of the mind are more peculiarly adapted" to demonstrate a divine mechanist!

But, how stands the fact? We write in an obscure village, remote from books, and having but few authorities to consult, and yet these are sufficient to invalidate the arrogant pretensions of our author to originality on this point.

And, in the first place, let us examine what philosophers have said, and consult Dr. Reid. The very opening sentences of his learned "Inquiry into the Human Mind," run thus:

"The fabric of the human mind is curious and wonderful, as well as that of the human body. The faculties of the one are with no less wisdom adapted to their several ends, than the organs of the other. Nay, it is reasonable to think, that as the mind is a nobler work, and of a higher order than the body, even more of the wisdom and skill of the Divine Architect hath been employed in its structure. It is, therefore, a subject highly worthy of inquiry on its own account, but still more worthy on account of the extensive influence which the knowledge of it hath over every other branch of science."-Dr. Reid's Inquiry, &c. c. 1. § 1. p. 17.

Turn we, in the second place, to Natural Theologians, of whom it is said that they have, all of them, neglected this psychological research. We content ourselves with referring to Dr. Crombie's well-known work