made Mr Ricardo's work "difficult to be understood by many people:" though, in fact, there is nothing at all unusual in his application of any term whatever, but only in the steadiness with which he keeps to the same application of it.

Phil. These distinctions of yours on the subject of obscurity I am disposed to think reasonable: and, unless the contrary should appear in the course of our conversations, I will concede them to be applicable to the case of Mr Ricardo: his obscurity may be venial, or it may be inevitable, or even none at all (if you will have it so). But I cannot allow of the cases of Kant and Leibnitz as at all relevant to that before us. For the obscurity complained of in metaphysics, &c., is inherent in the very objects contemplated, and is independent of the particular mind contemplating, and exists in defiance of the utmost talents for diffusing light: whereas the objects about which Political Economy is concerned, are acknowledged by all persons to be clear and simple enough, so that any obscurity which hangs over them must arise from imperfections in the art of arranging and conveying ideas on the part of him who undertakes to teach it.

X. This I admit: any obscurity which clouds Political Economy, unless where it arises from want of sufficient facts, must be subjective; whereas the main obscurity which besets metaphysics is objective; and such an obscurity is in the fullest sense inevitable. But this I did not overlook; for an objective obscurity it is in the power of any writer to aggravate by his own perplexities; and I alleged the cases of Kant and Leibnitz no further than as they were said to have done so; contending that, if Mr Ricardo were at all liable to the same charge, he was entitled to the same apology-viz., that he is never obscure from any confusion

of thought, but, on the contrary, from too keen a perception of the truth which may have seduced him at times into too elliptic a development of his opinions, and made him impatient of the tardy and continuous steps which are best adapted to the purposes of the teacher. For the fact is, that the labourers of the Mine (as I am accustomed to call them), or those who dig up the metal of truth, are seldom fitted to be also labourers of the Mint-i. e., to work up the metal for current use. Besides which, it must not be forgotten that Mr Ricardo did not propose to deliver an entire system of Political Economy, but only an investigation of such doctrines as had happened to be imperfectly or erroneously stated. On this account, much of his work is polemic; and presumes therefore in the reader an acquaintance with the writers whom he is opposing. Indeed, in every chapter there is an under reference, not to this or that author only, but to the whole current of modern opinions on the subject, which demands a learned reader who is already master of what is generally received for truth in Political Economy.

Phil. Upon this statement it appears at any rate that Mr Ricardo's must be a most improper book as an elementary one. But, after all, you will admit that even amongst Mr Ricardo's friends there is a prevailing opinion that he is too subtle (or, as it is usually expressed, too theoretic) a writer to be safely relied on for the practical uses of legislation.

X. Yes. And, indeed, we are all so deeply indebted to English wisdom on matters where theories really are dangerous, that we ought not to wonder or to complain if the jealousy of all which goes under that name be sometimes extended to cases in which it is idle to suppose any opposition possible between the true theory

and the practice. However, on the whole question which has been moved in regard to Mr Ricardo's obscurity or tendency to paradox or to over refinement and false subtlety, I am satisfied if I have won you to any provisional suspension of your prejudices; and will now press it no further-willingly leaving the matter to be settled by the result of our discussions.

Phad. Do so, X.; and especially because my watch in forms me that dinner-an event too awfully practical to allow of any violation from mere sublunary disputeswill be announced in six minutes; within which space of time I will trouble you to produce the utmost possible amount of truth with the least possible proportion of ohscurity, whether "subjective" or objective," that may be convenient.

X. As the time which you allow us is so short, I think that I cannot better employ it than in reading a short paper which I have drawn up on the most general distribution of Mr Ricardo's book; because this may serve to guide us in the course of our future discussions.

"Mr Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy consisted in the second edition of 31 chapters, to which, in the third edition, was added another, making 32. These 32 chapters fall into the following classification:-Fourteen are on the subject of Taxation; viz., the 8th to the 18th in

The 11th is on Tithes; and the 18th on Poor Rates; but these of course belong to the subject of Taxation properly defined. The present Lord Chancellor (late Earl of Eldon) said on some cause which came before him about a year ago, that Tithes were unjustly called a Tax; meaning only that Tithes were not any arbitrary imposition of the government, but claimed by as good a tenure as any other sort of property. In this doctrine no doubt the Chancellor was perfectly right; and only wrong in supposing that any denial of that

clusively, the 22d, 23d, and 29th; and these may be entirely omitted by the student, and ought at any rate to be omitted on his first examination of the work. For, though Mr Ricardo has really been not the chief so much as the * sole author of any important truths on the subject of Taxation, and though his 14 chapters on that head are so many inestimable corollaries from his general doctrines, and could never have been obtained without them, yet these general doctrines have no sort of reciprocal dependency upon what concerns Taxation. Consequently, it will greatly lighten the burden to a student, if these 14 chapters are sequestered from the rest of the work, and reserved for a separate and after investigation, which may furnish a commentary on the first. The chapters on Taxation deducted, there remain, therefore, 17 in the second edition, or 18 in the third. These contain the general principles, but also something more— -which may furnish matter for a second subtraction. For in most speculations of this nature it usually happens, that, over and above the direct positive communication of new truths, a writer finds it expedient (or perhaps necessary in some cases, in order to clear the ground for himself) to address part of his efforts to the task of meeting the existing errors: hence arises a division of his work into the doctrinal or affirmative part, and the polemic or negative part. In Mr Ri

doctrine is implied by the Political Economists in calling Tithes a Tax; which, on the true definition of a Tax (as I shall show hereafter), they certainly are.

*Polemic:-There is an occasional tendency in the use and practice of the English language capriciously to limit the use of certain words. Thus, for instance, the word condign is used only in connection with the word punishment; the word implicit is used only (unless by scholars, like Milton) in connection with faith, or confidence. So

cardo's writings, all parts (as I have already observed) have a latent polemic reference; but some, however, are more directly and formally polemic than the rest; and these may be the more readily detached from the main body of the work, because (like the chapters on Taxa- ' tion) they are all corollaries from the general laws, and in no case introductory to them. Divided on this principle, the 18 chapters fall into the following arrange

ment:

also putative is restricted most absurdly to the one sole word father, in a question of doubtful affiliation. These and other words, if unlocked from their absurd imprisonment, would become extensively useful. We should say, for instance, "condign honours," "condign rewards," "condign treatment" (treatment appropriate to the merits) -thus at once realising two rational purposes; viz., giving a useful function to a word, which at present has none; and also providing an intelligible expression for an idea which otherwise is left without means of uttering itself, except through a ponderous circumlocution. Precisely in the same circumstances of idle and absurd sequestration, stands the term polemic. At present, according to the popular usage, this word has some fantastic inalienable connection with controversial theology. There cannot be a more childish chimera. No doubt there is a polemic side or aspect of theology; but so there is of all knowledge; so there is of every science. The radical and characteristic idea concerned in this term polemic, is found in our own Parliamentary distinction of the good speaker, as contrasted with the good debater. The good speaker is he who unfolds the whole of a question in its affirmative aspects, who presents these aspects in their just proportions, and according to their orderly and symmetrical deductions from each other. But the good debater is he who faces the negative aspects of the question, who meets sudden objections, has an answer for any momentary summons of doubt or difficulty, dissipates seeming inconsistencies, and reconciles the geometrical smoothness of d priori abstractions with the coarse angularities of practical experience. The great work of Ricardo is of necessity, and almost in every page, polemic; whilst very often the particular objections or difficulties to which it replies, are not indicated at all-being spread through entire systems, and assumed as precognita that are familiar to the learned student.