tives of the proscribed-the large class of men who had been ruined by the civil wars-all resting upon the basis of the great popular party, which only waited an opportunity to recover its lost share in the government, and especially the tribunitial power. But this opposition wanted leaders. Rome was not deficient in rising men of genius, whom ambition might prompt to take part in a new movement; but for the moment there were none distinguished enough to take the lead. Cicero had just returned from his two years' course of study at Athens to devote himself to the forensic labours by which alone he could hope to rise to the honours of the state; and Cæsar, in whom the prescient eye of Sulla had seen many another Marius, was too young to be more than the hope of the revolutionary party.

The actual leadership fell into the hands of M. Æmilius Lepidus, a man neither of character nor ability, who had deserted from the Optimates to the popular party to escape prosecution on the charge of misgovernment in Sicily. The plunder of that province, and the support of Pompey,* enabled Lepidus to secure his election as consul for B.C. 78, and we have seen the failure of his attempt to deprive Sulla of funeral honours. Even before the dictator's death, Lepidus had talked of repealing his acts. The murmurs of the populace in the Forum encouraged the attempt: some of the chiefs of the old Marian party, such as Perperna and the younger Cinna, appeared again at Rome; and a conspiracy was organized in Etruria, where the Sullan confiscation had been most severe. The most distinguished leaders of the high aristocratic party were Quintus Lutatius Catulus, son of the Catulus who had shared the victory of Marius at Vercellæ and fallen a chief victim to his revenge,-Q. Cæcilius Metellus Pius, who had gone into Spain as proconsul against Sertorius,-and the two brothers, Lucius and Marcus Lucullus, who had served with distinction under Sulla, the one in Asia, and the other in Italy. Catulus, who now held the consulship with Lepidus, was an honest Roman of the old school, but endowed neither with civil nor military talent. He would have met his colleague's movement with open force; but the Senate chose to temporize. Having made a concession to the demand for a distribution of corn, enough to encourage without satisfying the people, they sent both consuls into Etruria to levy soldiers for their

* This indication of Pompey's readiness to play a part independent of the aristocracy is said to have called forth from Sulla in his retirement the warning :—“ Young man, it is time for you not to slumber; for you have strengthened your rival against yourself."

protection; and their knowledge that Lepidus would only abuse the confidence which they affected to repose in him was betrayed by the silly precaution of making the consuls swear not to turn their arms against each other. Lepidus interpreted the oath as only binding for his year of office; and, upon its expiration, he forwarded from the head of his army demands worthy of a Marius, and marched upon Rome. While Pompey, who obeyed the call of the Senate to take up arms against his friend, overpowered and killed Marcus Brutus, the legate of Lepidus, at Mutina, Catulus defeated Lepidus himself at the Mulvian Bridge, close to the walls of Rome. Unable to hold his ground in Etruria, Lepidus withdrew to Sardinia, where he soon after died; and the remains of his army, with a well-filled military chest, were carried over by Perperna to Liguria, and thence to the aid of Sertorius in Spain (B.C. 77).

That peninsula had now been for three years, and was destined to be for five years more, the scene of a resistance, which not only left the victory of Sulla incomplete, but threatened to revive the great enterprise of the house of Barca. If Rome was to bow to a Sullan despot, the Marian refugees seemed likely to set up in Spain a Latin kingdom. QUINTUS SERTORIUS derived his obscure birth from the Sabine village of Nursia, and was distinguished for all the hardy virtues of the old Sabine stock. He began his military career under Marius in Gaul (B.c. 102), and ventured as a spy into the camp of the Teutones. His service as a military tribune under Didius in the Celtiberian War (B.c. 97) gave him a knowledge of the country and natives of Spain; and the loss of an eye added an accident to the points of resemblance between Sertorius and Hannibal. He was quæstor in B.c. 91. We have seen how, in the civil war, he was distinguished from the other Marian leaders as much by his moderation as by his military talent. He was prætor in B.C. 83, the year in which Sulla returned to Italy; and, before the decisive combat at the Colline Gate, he had departed for his province of Spain. The destined theatre of his exploits seemed at first to deny him even a refuge. The commander whom he left to guard the passes of the Pyrenees was killed by one of his own officers; and the lieutenants of Sulla took possession of the two provinces without resistance (B.c. 82). Embarking at New Carthage, Sertorius crossed over to Mauretania, and there he gained a victory over one of Sulla's generals. When the Marian cause was lost in Africa, he conceived the project of organizing a resistance in Spain by means of the native population. Invited by the Lusi

VOL. III.

K

tanians to become their leader against the Romans, Sertorius commenced that marvellous career of ascendancy over the natives, which has made him one of the heroes of history and a favourite of romance (B.c. 80). All have heard of the hold which he gained over the superstition of the Iberians by the aid of the milk-white fawn that was always at his side, as if she were his familiar spirit. The powerful army supplied by the Spanish tribes was officered by the Marian refugees, whose number and dignity made the camp of Sertorius appear like a rival to the capital. At a later period, he nominated a Senate of 300 Romans, and founded a school at Osca (Huesca) for the education of the children of the chief Spanish families,-a security at once for their fidelity, as well as for their civilization. It is needless to follow the complicated details of the campaigns in which Sertorius baffled the Roman armies for eight years, chiefly by that guerilla warfare in which the Spaniards have always excelled. In B.C. 79, Q. Metellus Pius, who had been consul with Sulla the year before, was sent as proconsul into Spain; but he failed to bring Sertorius to a decisive engagement. The arrival of Perperna with fifty-three cohorts raised the insurgent general to the acmé of his power; and the Senate were reluctantly compelled to yield to the desire, which Pompey expressed at the head of his victorious army, to have an equal share in the command of Metellus, with the title of proconsul (B.C. 77). Crossing the Alps in the summer, Pompey spent some time in opening the new pass over Mont Genèvre, and in subduing some of the Gallic tribes; and it was late in the autumn before he passed the Pyrenees. He wintered in the corner of Catalonia, which was the only part of the nearer province held by the Romans, except the maritime towns commanded by their fleets; while Metellus maintained himself in the neighbourhood of Seville. To prevent the junction of the Roman armies, Sertorius watched the Upper Ebro, while Perperna was stationed on the lower course of the river. Pompey opened the campaign of B.C. 76 by throwing himself upon the latter, and not only forced the passage of the river, but took the important city of Valentia (Valencia). Sertorius himself soon arrived, and laid siege to Lauro, a town south of Valencia, which had declared for the Romans. A contest of generalship ensued, in which Pompey was completely outmanoeuvred, and the fall of Lauro, followed by the removal of its inhabitants to Lusitania, put a stop to further defection. Pompey's check, was the more mortifying from its contrast with the success of Metellus, who defeated Hirtuleius, the best general of Sertorius, near Italica,

and in the next campaign utterly overthrew and killed the same commander, who had occupied Segovia to oppose the march of Metellus to join Pompey. The latter, eager to retrieve his honour before the arrival of Metellus, hazarded a battle on the Sucro, which had nearly closed his career. His right wing, where he was opposed in person to Sertorius, was defeated, and he himself was severely wounded; but on the left, Afranius,-who afterwards fought in Spain against Cæsar-penetrated to the enemy's camp, and was plundering it when Sertorius came up and rallied his defeated wing. The renewal of the battle on the next day might have sealed Pompey's fate, but for the opportune arrival of Metellus, who overthrew Perperna and took his camp (B.c. 75). Even after this union of the two armies, the energy and resources of Sertorius prolonged the conflict for three years, and Pompey had no opportunity for boasting either over his antagonist or his colleague. The new supplies of men and money that he kept demanding seemed thrown into a bottomless gulf, while Rome needed all her resources for the new war with Mithridates; and there were those who fancied that that union of the West and East, which Hannibal and Antiochus had failed to accomplish, was about to crush Rome in its embrace. But time was also working against Sertorius. The Spaniards began to weary of the war; and their disgust was increased by the insolence of the Roman officers. Sertorius, like Hannibal, knew the hopelessness of the final issue; but all his overtures of reconciliation were rejected. Dissension broke out among his officers, and plots were made for his assassination. At length Perperna, who had always submitted unwillingly to his command, and who hoped to succeed to his power, headed a conspiracy of his chief officers, by whom Sertorius was killed amidst the festivities of a banquet at Osca (Huesca). Thus perished, by the hands of a band of worthless emigrants, whom it was his fate to lead against his country, a man worthy to rank with the ancient heroes of the Republic, a man whose wisdom, probity, and courage, thrown into the scale of parties at Rome, might perhaps have saved her from the aristocracy and Pompey, without delivering her as a victim to Cæsar (B.c. 72).

Perperna soon found that he had cut down the only protection for his own worthless life. The soldiers submitted to him from the necessity of their position in presence of the enemy, but they were as reluctant to obey as he was incompetent to command. The first collision with Pompey dispersed them to the winds, and Perperna himself was among the prisoners. His attempt to save

tanians to become their leader against the Romans, Sertorius commenced that marvellous career of ascendancy over the natives, which has made him one of the heroes of history and a favourite of romance (B.c. 80). All have heard of the hold which he gained over the superstition of the Iberians by the aid of the milk-white fawn that was always at his side, as if she were his familiar spirit.

The powerful army supplied by the Spanish tribes was officered by the Marian refugees, whose number and dignity made the camp of Sertorius appear like a rival to the capital. At a later period, he nominated a Senate of 300 Romans, and founded a school at Osca (Huesca) for the education of the children of the chief Spanish families,-a security at once for their fidelity, as well as for their civilization. It is needless to follow the complicated details of the campaigns in which Sertorius baffled the Roman armies for eight years, chiefly by that guerilla warfare in which the Spaniards have always excelled. In B.C. 79, Q. Metellus Pius, who had been consul with Sulla the year before, was sent as proconsul into Spain; but he failed to bring Sertorius to a decisive engagement. The arrival of Perperna with fifty-three cohorts raised the insurgent general to the acmé of his power; and the Senate were reluctantly compelled to yield to the desire, which Pompey expressed at the head of his victorious army, to have an equal share in the command of Metellus, with the title of proconsul (B.C. 77). Crossing the Alps in the summer, Pompey spent some time in opening the new pass over Mont Genèvre, and in subduing some of the Gallic tribes; and it was late in the autumn before he passed the Pyrenees. He wintered in the corner of Catalonia, which was the only part of the nearer province held by the Romans, except the maritime towns commanded by their fleets; while Metellus maintained himself in the neighbourhood of Seville. To prevent the junction of the Roman armies, Sertorius watched the Upper Ebro, while Perperna was stationed on the lower course of the river. Pompey opened the campaign of B.C. 76 by throwing himself upon the latter, and not only forced the passage of the river, but took the important city of Valentia (Valencia). Sertorius himself soon arrived, and laid siege to Lauro, a town south of Valencia, which had declared for the Romans. A contest of generalship ensued, in which Pompey was completely outmanoeuvred, and the fall of Lauro, followed by the removal of its inhabitants to Lusitania, put a stop to further defection. Pompey's check, was the more mortifying from its contrast with the success of Metellus, who defeated Hirtuleius, the best general of Sertorius, near Italica,