riches, when they possess any, or skill in hunting, or valour in war; but as it is impossible that all should obtain distinction, each village is filled with distrust, jealousy, and secret ambushes. They are universally devoid of gratitude; their chief amusement is dancing, accompanied with drums and singing. But the passion whose gratifisation yields them the highest pleasure is that of revenge; on exposing their enemies to the most excruciating tortures, they feel a cool and premeditated delight; and it must be owned, that from the same stern, obdurate, and inflexible frame of mind, they bear the tor ments inflicted on them by their enemies with a ferocious, insulting firmness and patience, which some call fortitude. With the plea sures of sympathy they are totally unacquainted, and the pains of others, not even their enemies, are to them mere matter of sport.'

This appreciation of the restricted happiness of man in the savage state is followed by a particular reply to all the positions of Rousseau, in which the preference of the savage to the civilized state is maintained. The general answer to Rous seau's whimsical hypothesis is an appeal to the fact that the primeval savages have by degrees adopted a civilized state.

We need not follow Mr. K. through his chapter on what are termed the Barbarian Governments of America, and on what are called the Anomalous States, viz. the antient Germans and the Otaheiteans; we shall therefore hasten to his view of the condition of mankind in the civilized state, of which the following neat definition is given: The civilized state is that in which different families are associated for the protection of their natural rights, namely, life, liberty, property, and safety, together with such advantages, as may be gained by the united power of the society.' That high degree of civilization, which the greater part of Europe has already attained, Mr. K. justly attributes chiefly to the benign effect of Christianity, and in a subordinate degree to the influence of chivalry and philosophy; yet the triumphs of revelation and science are as yet far from being complete in this respect:

It must be confessed, however, that most European countries are, as yet, but imperfectly civilized; in most of them an absolute unlimited authority is at present, and has been for some ages, vested in a single person whose power is supported by a numerous disciplined army; hence it is frequently abused, and those rights for the preservation of which men originally associated, are frequently grossly violated, by arbitrary imprisonments, heavy, unequal, and unnecessary impositions, severe restraints on the communication of knowledge, and in many by punishment, even unto death, of those who adopt speculative religious opinions different from those autho rised by the state. Those guilty of this atrocity cannot surely reproach the Mexicans with their execrable human sacrifices.'

After this reflection on the imperfect civilization of European states, Mr. K. takes a home-view; and, with a compliment to

the

the government under which we live, as approaching most to perfect civilization, he introduces an examination of the degree of happiness enjoyed, or that may be enjoyed, under it.' Taking it as an assumed principle that the essential rights of men are so secured to them by the united powers of society at large, that they have leisure and opportunity of pursuing that course of life proportioned to their abilities which seems most productive of pleasure and least exposed to pain;' and having arranged the individuals of the civilized state under the four divisions of Opulent, Rich, Poor, and Indigent*, defining also what he means by necessaries, comforts, and luxuries; he proceeds to inquire into the degree of happiness which may be expected in each of the above-mentioned classes: but he no more believes that happiness is equally distributed through them all, than that vessels of different capacity will when full contain the same portion of fluid. He ably contests this point with Dr. Paley, who maintained that the pleasures of superiority and ambition are common to all conditions; and that the farrier who excels in his trade feels "the delight of distinction as truly and substantially, as the statesman, the soldier, and the scholar, who have filled all Europe with the reputation of their wisdom, their valour, or their knowlege." To this representation, the present essayist replies:

Here the Doctor confounds the pleasure of ambition, which consists in the desire of power, with that of distinction, which denotes the desire of attracting attention; and to this latter his examples apply. What he means by substantially, as distinct from truly, I do not understand; but is it possible that he should confound the simple pleasure of the farrier, arising from the trifling regard of his few neighbours, with the complex multifarious pleasure of the statesman who has promoted the prosperity of his country, of the soldier who has valiantly defended it, or of the philosopher who is honoured and respected by all Europe for his scientific discoveries and improvements? Can he compare the glory of Newton, of Lavoisier, of Franklin, of Adam Smith, with the puny satisfaction of an obscure farrier?'

If happiness consists in the multiplicity of agreeable consciousnesses, then the farrier and the philosopher cannot be considered as on a par respecting intellectual enjoyment. In connection with this subject, Mr. K. is induced, as a man of science speaking from experience, to advert to the pleasures resulting from philosophical pursuits to persons of competent fortunes; observing that pursuits of this kind are best calculated to produce happiness, and are least exposed to adventitious pains.' With these pleasures arising from the exercise

To which he afterward adds a fifth class, viz. the Philosophica. and the Literary.

or

of the understanding, he ranks those of the moral sense, and of the imagination, including the departments of poetry, painting, and music; and, in order to secure the continuance of these intellectual and mental pleasures, he kindly states the circumstances which must concur to produce them in any perfection:

Ist, Health, which is indeed the substratum of any sort of happiness, and consequently moderate exercise, as without it health cannot be long maintained. 2dly, Patience, and a placid temper, which is absolutely requisite in philosophic pursuits. 3dly, Society of persons engaged in the same pursuits, and a correspondence with the most eminent in our own or in foreign countries. 4thly, Relaxation from continued attention, either by pleasing conversation on other subjects or by theatrical amusements, or by entertaining books, during the perusal of which the mind is almost wholly passive, as accounts of voyages, travels, select novels, &c. Lastly, a prudent stated attention to the sources of competence.

A mind thus incessantly occupied bids fair for the enjoyment of as much happiness as can be found in the present state of our existence.'

Among the objections which lie against the docrine maintained in this essay, the most prominent is that of Maupertuis; who asserts that the evils of every condition far surpass its pleasures,' and maintains, in proof of this declaration, that few would consent to renew precisely the same course of life through which they had already passed.' Mr. K. is of a different opinion. I believe,' says he, that many in the situations above mentioned, as most productive of happiness, and many in the middle classes of society would, with the exception of some immoralities, of which reason and religion forbid the repetition, gladly once more renew the same course of life. At least Virgil was of that opinion, for mentioning those whose sufferings induced them to terminate their lives, he says:

quam vellent athere in alto

Nunc et pauperiem et duros perferre labores !""

To represent the mass of evil in human life as greater than the mass of good is an error which the universal attachment to life refutes. Man is capable of much enjoyment, and he is placed here by his Creator for benevolent purposes: but the degree of happiness to which he attains must depend on his own efforts, assisted by favouring circumstances.

ANTIQUITIES.

Of the Origin of Polytheism, Idolatry, and Grecian Mythology. By Richard Kirwan, Esq., LL.D., P.R.I.A., F.R.S.-In inquiries of this nature, we can arrive at little more than probable con

jecture;

jecture; and so vague are the materials on which we speculate, that conjectures which are satisfactory to one writer are rejected with contempt by another. Mr. Kirwan amused himself, probably, by the composition of this essay: but few, perhaps, of his readers will concur with him in all his opinions. If he successfully combats Mr. Hume, in asserting, against the contrary position of that philosopher, that monotheism was the primeval religion of mankind, he will be opposed as maintaining an untenable hypothesis, when he suggests that the corruption of the primitive patriarchal religion arose from the cessation of the manifestation of the Divine Presence in a visible glory, luminous symbol, or Shechinah; and that, in consequence of this cessation, mortals directed their worship to the Sun (in which, according to the LXX version of the 19th Psalm, the Deity had placed his Shechinah,) and to the other heavenly bodies.

It is difficult to say at what period and on what occasion polytheism commenced: but, if the worship of the host of heaven, and afterward of deified mortals, resulted from the disappearance of a luminous symbol of the Divinity to which men had for ages directed their adoration, polytheism was more a venial error than a crime. Little benefit is obtained by endeavouring to reconcile Sanchoniatho with Moses, and mythology with true history. At this distance of time, and with the slender evidence which we possess, it is impossible for Mr. K. positively to pronounce that the Hellenistic Greeks were the last of all civilized nations which embraced polytheism and idolatry; and he has perhaps still less ground for asserting, at p. 36., that the introduction of polytheism into Greece must be attributed solely to the Phoenicians.' Egypt rather than Phoenicia was the country in which Grecian fable originated. We smiled when we read at p. 49. that the spot on which Paradise stood seems to have been destroyed by a volcano ;' and, if Mr. K. were alive, we should ask him whether the Cherubim with their flaming swords mean the eruption of volcanic matter?

A Dissertation upon the Chronology of the Judges of Israel. By Hugh B. Auchinleck, Schol. T.C.D. This elaborate paper occupies 183 pages, and manifests the learning and patient research of the author: but the point which he has undertaken to settle is of so very difficult a nature, and such various opinions have been entertained by chronologists concerning it, that Mr. A. must not suppose that he has put the question at rest. According to 1 Kings, vi. 1., Solomon began to build his celebrated temple in the year 480, after the Exodus of the children' of Israel out of Egypt, (the Septuagint reads 446,) in the fourth year of Solomon's reign. Now the controversy turns on the authenticity

authenticity of the numbers given in this passage; the consistency and agreement of the interval there stated with the several periods deducible from the history of the Judges; and the various fortunes of the Jewish nation, from the time of the departure from Egypt to the commencement of the regal state after their settlement in Canaan. The general opinion has been that the period, assigned in the above-quoted passage in the book of Kings, is too short for the transactions which croud into it, and is not to be reconciled to the chronology of history. Most learned men have, therefore, been induced to believe that some error has crept into the text; and, adopting an enlarged calculus, they have framed various hypotheses, which they have endeavoured to support by calculations. Instead of considering the interval, which elapsed from the Exodus to the commencement of the building of Solomon's temple, to be only 480 years, Petavius would read 520; Vossius and Perizonius, 580; Serrarius, 680; Codoman, 598; Vignols, 683; and Pezron, 873. Josephus and Clemens Alexandrinus state the period to be far greater than that which is given in 1 Kings, vi. 1.; the former at 592, the latter at 567. Notwithstanding, however, the general current of opinion against the authenticity of the passage in the book of Kings, as it stands in the Hebrew, Mr. Auchinleck contends for the correctness of the number of years (480) as there laid down; and for this purpose he not only offers, at great length, his reasons and calculations in defence of his own scheme, but endeavours to point out the defects of the several hypotheses or theories of those who have written in favour of an enlarged period. We cannot possibly follow him through this long and laboured discussion, but must content ourselves with reporting the principle on which he proceeds in analysing the chronology of the Judges of Israel, and presenting our readers with an abstract of the result. Some management is necessary in the conduct of his own theory; and the state of Israel during the period recorded in the book of Judges was in general so unsettled, and often so calamitous, that he is obliged to propose some preliminary rules of interpretation before he details its chronology. He tells us that the jurisdiction of the judges is not always to be understood as synonimous with the term of the repose,' (p. 101.): that repose signifies an interval between the epochs of warfare and hostility,' (p. 101.); and that the first servitudes are to be included in the periods of repose,' (p. 120.) Aware of an objection which will be made to this part of his system, he offers the following reply:

Is servitude, I am asked, synonimous with repose? Could the land enjoy rest, when it was enslaved? I answer yes it enjoyed rest from the evils of hostility and war, which is all my principles would

go