Originating volitions.

deserving praise or blame, reward or punishment? It is sometimes said that a man is not accountable for acts which he does not himself originate. Every man does originate all his volitions, in this sense, that they are his acts, and not the acts of another, that they begin with him, that they do not exist before he puts them forth. But does this imply, that nothing can have any influence to induce him to originate them?

Customary use.

121

SECTION VII.

COMMON SENSE.

Philosophical use.

Customary use of the phrase-Philosophical use-Intuitive truths-Application of common sense to philosophical speculations-Remarks of President Edwards-Decisions of common sense respecting volition, the influence of motives, and accountable agency.

AN appeal to common sense, in behalf of a selfdetermining power of the will, is not unfrequently made. This phrase, in customary use, has a meaning sufficiently well settled. It signifies the practical judgment exercised by the mass of the community, especially by men of plain education, on subjects with which they are familiar, in the common business and intercourse of life. It is the sense of common men, about common things. But in philosophical speculations, the phrase is not entirely free from ambiguity. Some writers appear to use it, as nearly or exactly synonymous with intuition; the power of

Intuitive truth.

Common sense applied to philosophy.

the mind to decide immediately respecting self-evident truths; a faculty which is common to all mankind, the learned and the unlearned. In public discussions, propositions ought not to be ranked with intuitive truths, unless, like mathematical axioms, they are universally admitted. That which is selfevident to one man, may not always be so to another. But for the purposes of controversial argument, some common ground must be agreed upon. Nothing should be taken for granted on one side, which is not admitted by the other. To assume a point as self-evident, is to come to a conclusion previous to discussion.

But it is presumed, that when an appeal is made to common sense, in behalf of self-determination, it is intended that the phrase should be understood according to its usual acceptation, as expressing the decision of the great body of plain, practical men. This is a tribunal very competent to judge, in cases with which it is familiar. But on points of intricate philosophical speculation, it is no easy matter to bring a statement before men not versed in metaphysical phraseology, in such a shape as to be effectually guarded against misapprehension. The common people know what liberty means, as they are accus

Edwards on common sense.

tomed to use the word. But they are not informed of all the strange significations which are given to the term, in metaphysical speculation. According to them, a man is in the enjoyment of liberty, when he does as he will. Now if you present a case for their decision, in which the term is intended to have a very different meaning, their verdict may be correct, according to their own understanding of its import; while it has, in truth, no application to the case actually proposed. "There is a grand illusion," says Edwards, "in the pretended demonstration of Arminians from common sense. The main strength of all these demonstrations, lies in that prejudice that arises, through the insensible change of the use and meaning of such terms as liberty, able, unable, necessary, impossible, unavoidable, invincible, action, &c. from their original and vulgar sense, to a metaphysical sense entirely diverse."*

Common sense decides, that a man is free, when he does as he will; that is, when his actions are obedient to his volitions. But has common sense taken up this question for adjudication, whether we will as we will; whether every volition is preceded by ano

* Freedom of the Will, Part IV. Sec. 4.