"A careful, sensitive and imaginative treatment of some of the main conceptual questions that condition any approach to the nature of mind."
-- Colin McGinn, "Nature" What is distinctive of the mental? In "Mental Reality," Galen Strawson argues that the answer is not intelligence, representational content, or intentionality broadly understood, but conscious experience. Strawson challenges neobehaviorist accounts of the mental. He argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind is still confused by positivism and its various offspring. It gives undue primacy of place to nonmental phenomena, publicly observable phenomena, and behavioral phenomena in its account of the nature of mind. Strawson describes an alternative position, naturalized Cartesianism, that couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with respect for the idea that the only distinctively mental phenomena are those of conscious experience.
A Bradford Book. Representation and Mind series
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ability act or behave action or behavior arguable argument beliefs blindsight brain causal chapter claim color experience concept conscious thought consider constituted count creatures Descartes desire disposed to act dispositions distinct E/C intentionality eliminativism episodes essential nature existence experienceless experiencing experiential phenomena experiential properties fact fundamental given Goldbach's Conjecture human idea idealism idealist immaterial instances of behavior Instant Louis intrinsically mentally contentful involve L-reality materialist mental goings-on mental phenomena mental properties mentalist mind-body problem neobehaviorism neutral monism nonexperiential phenomena nonexperiential processes nonmental phenomena notion objection occurrences one's ontically other-observable panpsychism phenomenology phenomenon philosophical philosophy of mind position possess possible propositional attitudes publicly observable pure process qualitative character question reality reason respect rience satisfactory account seems sensations sense sensory simply Sirians sort subject of experience suppose talk theoretical theory things thought experience true U-similarity understanding understanding-experience unpleasant Weather Watchers word pain