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any corner of the country. His vaunted policy of "scrapping was simply a device to keep down the personnel of the Fleet, and to ingratiate himself with cheeseparing politicians, who, whatever Party is in power, are only too zealous in starving the Services, and too indifferent as to national security. With the same object he has deliberately curtailed our shipbuilding programmes during five critical years. His own Cawdor Programme was abandoned with his consent. He has enabled Germany to get ahead of us in the production of modern battleships, while he has beguiled an ignorant public by bounce and bluster. Now that the situation is so grave that even the man in the street can no longer be fooled, Sir John Fisher poses as a Big Navyite, and makes a show of clamouring for "Dreadnoughts" to the neglect of everything else. It is as though a general created an army exclusively of artillery. He is primarily responsible for the criminal neglect of Rosyth. He has fought desperately against the creation of a General Staff. Besides being the Navy's worst enemy, he is likewise the worst enemy of the Army, against which he has ceaselessly intrigued, with the object of reducing our Regular Forces. He inspired Mr. Balfour's lamentable speech in 1905 upon Invasion, which he has brought within the range of practical politics. There is, in fact, no end to the catalogue of his high crimes and misdemeanours. Can he possibly survive the Report of the Sub-Committee?

Mr. Middlemore's Revelation

WHEN We speak of "the Admiralty," we mean, of course, the present régime—i.e., Sir John Fisher. That the Admiralty, using the word in that limited sense, has betrayed the Navy and the nation has long been notorious. That it has likewise betrayed the Government has only come to light during the past month. In the debate on the Naval Estimates (July 26) Mr. Middlemore, one of the members for Birmingham, and one of our very few legislators who take any serious interest in national security, called attention to a statement of Mr. McKenna (First Lord of the Admiralty) that two years ago the possibility of Krupps undertaking to supply all the component parts of eight battleships in a single year would have been ridiculed. Mr. Middlemore was able to inform Mr. McKenna that so long ago as May 1906 the Admiralty received a letter containing this striking warning:

Are you aware of the enormous expenditure now going on at Krupps' for the purpose of manufacturing very large naval guns and mountings quickly? We find that Krupps' have filled up the output of all the big machine-tool makers for the next year or two. We estimate that at the present time Krupps' are expending at least a further £3,000,000. This is in addition to the immense works they already possess. Their whole scheme seems to be speed of production. For instance, they are making immensely powerful lathes which will bore and turn a 12-inch gun simultaneously, which they estimate will save at least one-third of the time. They seem to have ordered five machines for turning up the roller paths and turn-tables for very large mountings, each of these machines costing £5300; there is nothing nearly as good in this country. These extensions, &c., will give them a possibility of output far in excess of the whole capacity in Great Britain [our italics]. That information had been sent in vain to the Government by an expert in 1906. Mr. McKenna asked Mr. Middlemore from what he was reading, to which the latter replied that it was a letter first addressed to the War Office, then passed on to the Admiralty, and afterwards discussed by the Admiralty with several outsiders. Another document, presumably communicated to the Admiralty, stated: "To organise an output of guns and gun-mountings equal to the combined capacity of some fourteen slips would appear impossible, and yet that is exactly the arrangement that was then made with the firm of Krupp, obviously the ultimate scheme being the completion of fourteen battleships within such a time that it would be impossible for England to reply, and so to suddenly reverse the balance of power." Mr. McKenna: "What is the hon. Member reading from? I don't know this document." Mr. Middlemore replied that he would be happy to send it to the right hon. gentleman, another extract being as follows:

It is not suggested that a fleet could be completed without any one knowing anything about it, but any one who has had practical experience of endeavouring to ascertain what is going on in German shipyards and in Krupps' works would know that it is quite possible for construction to have advanced to such a stage that it would be childish, considering the preliminary steps which would have to be undertaken, to attempt to have ships ready in reply.

Again:

Few in England are aware of the steps taken in Germany to ensure privacy A detachment of soldiers with responsible officers is told off to watch the shops in Krupps' where heavy mountings are made, and intruders are rigorously excluded. The shipyards are even more carefully protected, and cases are known where for months it was kept secret whether a ship being constructed was a war or a mercantile vessel. To sum up, the position of Krupps' works to-day may be realised from the fact that the 62,000 men employed in 1905 have been

increased to over 100,000, forming an organisation far greater than that of Woolwich Arsenal and of all the ordnance and armament makers in England combined.

The Neglected
Warning

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MR. H. H. MULLINER, a managing director of the Coventry Ordnance Works, dotted the "i's" and crossed the "t's" in Mr. Middlemore's speech, in a couple of letters to the Times (August 2 and August 6). In explaining why, during 1906, 1907, and 1908, the Cawdor Programme had been abandoned, Mr. Asquith had informed the House of Commons that between March 1908 and November and December of that year "there was a sudden change" in Germany's capacity for construction, viz., "the expansion which went on in Krupps' works, and which took place last year, 1908.' Mr. Mulliner declared that Mr. Asquith had been misinformed, as the expansion in question was the result of an arrangement made at the end of 1905, and throughout 1906 and 1907 'machinery from nearly every maker in Germany was pouring into Krupps' works, and vast buildings were being erected to accommodate such plant." Mr. Asquith had also stated: "This great expansion. . . certainly did not come to our knowledge until the autumn of that year, 1908 " [our italics], and in answering a suggestion by Mr. Ashley that the Government may not have known, but that the Admiralty did, Mr. Asquith had added: "The Admiralty have never been in the habit of withholding any information from the Cabinet." Mr. Mulliner interpreted this as meaning that, according to Mr. Asquith, the Admiralty shared the Government's ignorance of Krupps' expansion prior to 1908, though, as a matter of fact, "the Admiralty did know, but, for reasons which I need not now discuss, did not impart the information to the Government" [our italics]. [our italics]. Mr. Mulliner tells us: "Owing to accidental circumstances (for which I claim no credit), I became aware, in my then capacity as managing director of the Coventry Ordnance Works, in May 1906, of the whole of the vast German scheme, and I naturally at once communicated with our Admiralty.' Mr. Mulliner was the writer of the letter read in the House of Commons by Mr. Middlemore, "from which it will be seen that it accurately conveyed full information as to what are now admitted to be accomplished facts." As we have seen, Mr. McKenna informed Mr. Middle

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more that "he did not know the document." adds:

Mr. Mulliner

During 1906, 1907, and the earlier part of 1908 I had many interviews with the principal Admiralty officials respecting the information which had come to my knowledge, and I was able to submit proofs of my assertions. As I knew no steps whatever were or had been taken to provide a corresponding increase of armament plant in this country, I decided last summer to take other means to make the Government acquainted with the position, which I regarded as of the gravest national importance. In other quarters the information which the Admiralty had ignored was taken seriously, inquiries were at once made, and it was found to be correct, with the result, as Mr. Asquith stated on Monday, the Cabinet first knew last autumn.

Cornering
the Admiralty

ON June 17, 1909, Mr. McKenna in reply to an inquiry as to when the Government first became aware of the extension of Krupps' works, said, "It was known early in 1906. . . . This extension has been going on continuously since then," upon which Mr. Mulliner observes, "We now have the definite assurance of the Prime Minister that-if Mr. McKenna meant the Government-his reply was not accurate, and that the Cabinet did not know until last autumn. Although of course the Government must take the responsibility, it is to the reticence of the Admiralty that we owe the present situation." Mr. McKenna elicited another annihilating letter from Mr. Mulliner (Times, August 6) by his audacious assertion that there was no discrepancy between his own statement and that of the Prime Minister, in which the writer reiterated that "in 1906 I explained to the Admiralty the immense extensions which were then actually taking place, all of which statements have since admittedly proved correct." To Mr. McKenna's pitiful suggestion that "nobody can forecast from year to year what the capacity of a particular firm may be in the future," Mr. Mulliner replied that he had supplied full particulars to the Admiralty in 1906, writing thus to them in May of that year: "At the present time Krupps' are expending at least a further £3,000,000, this in addition to the immense works they already possess"; while the same letter stated: "These extensions, &c., will give them a possibility of output far in excess of the whole capacity in Great Britain. As I was also able to point out, when further machinery which they had ordered would be completed, it was quite obvious what their capacity would be at various

dates." Mr. Mulliner likewise exposed Mr. McKenna's misleading employment of the word "particular," which suggested that there were several firms in Germany (as in England) supplying German naval requirements. "This is not the case. The whole of the heavy mountings and guns used in Germany are manufactured at Krupps. This firm, although nominally a private one, is certainly controlled, if not actually owned, by the Government or the Emperor. It must be further realised that Krupps' is the largest manufacturing concern in the world, far greater than all the ordnance firms in this country and Woolwich Arsenal combined.”

The Present
Position

THE facts are painfully clear. Three years ago the British Admiralty received a most serious and specific warning from a patriotic Englishman of unimpeachable testimony that Germany was embarking on a huge extension of her productive plant, with the obvious object of getting ahead of us in the construction of modern battleships. This information coincided with a furious agitation by the German Navy League, which is for all practical purposes a branch of the German Government, and under the direct inspiration of the Emperor, as a result of which two additional Navy Bills were hurried through the Reichstag, designed to secure the naval predominance of the Mailed Fist. What did our Admiralty do? Mr. Asquith has unwittingly let the cat out of the bag by admitting that it was only last autumn that the Government first heard of the Krupp development, whereas, as we know from Mr. Mulliner and Mr. McKenna, the Admiralty had been apprised in 1906; so this vital information appears to have been deliberately withheld from the Cabinet for two years. But the Admiralty, alias Sir John Fisher, did worse than nothing. With full knowledge of Germany's gigantic preparation, it not only acquiesced in the fatuous disarmament propaganda of his Majesty's Ministers which culminated in the home-made fiasco of the Hague Conference, but the Sea Lords actually promoted that campaign by assenting to the abandonment of their own Cawdor Programme, prescribing a minimum of four big armoured ships per annum, drawn up, be it remembered, before anything was known of the new German plans. All criticism was silenced by swagger about the overwhelming might of the British Navy, and the public were informed that their sole duty was "to sleep quietly in their

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