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speed, and to-day two of her "Dreadnoughts" are actually at sea, while eleven more have been launched or are being rapidly advanced on the stocks. There may be others, in addition to these thirteen, for Mr. McKenna and Mr. Asquith admitted in March that they had no means of knowing what was being done in the German yards.

The peril from Germany is one that the Liberal Party has brought upon this country by its negligence and weakness. Like Frankenstein, it has created a monster which it cannot control. For though the German Navy Act of 1900 laid down as its principle that a German fleet must be provided, "of such strength that war with Germany would involve, even for the mightiest naval power, such risks as to imperil its own supremacy," little progress was made by Germany towards the desired goal, so long as the Unionists remained in office. Whatever their faults, and we have never ceased to blame them for cutting down the Navy Estimates in 1904 and 1905, Unionist Ministers never failed to lay down two British armoured ships for each German one, and the British ships were always individually of superior force. But on the eve of the fall of the Unionist Ministry, the Liberal Press began a campaign against a strong British Navy, unchecked by its leaders. The Daily News insisted that the expansion of the British Navy had been "insane," that it was "a real menace to the world"; that the naval strength of Britain was "grossly disproportionate to any force it may be called upon to meet, and that "the time is ripe and over-ripe for a great and significant diminution of naval expenditure." When Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman followed this up by preaching the necessity of a reduction in the fleet, the German Admiralty realised that the time had come to make a great and determined bid for seapower.

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In the autumn of 1905, when the Liberals obtained office, the German Government saw its opportunity and took its first steps. A bill was prepared providing for the construction by Germany of monster battleships in place of small ones, for the addition of six enormous armoured cruisers to the German programme voted in 1900, for the annual building of twelve instead of six destroyers, and for the commencement of a number of immense docks to accommodate the new warships. This measure, known

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as the Novelle, was not submitted to the Reichstag until the spring of 1906, but it was framed by the Marine Amt in the autumn of 1905. At the same time the German shipbuilders and Krupp's were warned that unprecedented demands would be made on their resources. Financial assistance was offered them to increase their plant in every way, so that they might equip themselves with machinery to turn out "Dreadnoughts" and arm them with a rapidity never approached by any naval power.

The plan adopted by the German Government and Admiralty was this: (1) to strengthen the German fleet in actual existence to the utmost degree possible, without causing panic in England, and for that purpose to keep the Liberal Party and the Liberal Press quiet with assurances; and (2) simultaneously to develop German resources and plant for ship and gun construction to such a point that, when England did take alarm, Germany, throwing off the mask, could rapidly outbuild the British yards, and place a superior force at sea. The German authorities could calculate on about six years of Liberal administration, and by the close of 1912, when the return of the Unionists to power seemed probable, they meant to be strong enough to prevent Tariff Reform by threats of war or to use it as a casus belli and make an end of the British Empire. In the interval they calculated that the British Navy would be gradually weakened and reduced. Herr von Rath has told us that the Big Navy party in the Fatherland acted as they did because they were certain that the Liberals would so impair the strength of the British Fleet that, by the time the Unionists returned to office, the damage done would be irreparable. Germany would then be in a position to gain the command of the sea.

A factor of the utmost importance in the German calculations was the presence of Sir John Fisher at the Admiralty. His openly avowed intention to effect "ruthless, relentless, remorseless retrenchment" was exactly what the Marine Amt would have desired, for it would render him slow to take counterprecautions, and anxious only to keep office by saving money, at whatever ultimate cost to his country. It is one of the characteristics of the German Staff that it makes the closest possible study of the personality of its possible opponents, and it had not studied the character of Sir John to no purpose or failed to mark

his boastful insistence on the "gigantic superiority" of "the invincible British Fleet."

In 1906 the German Novelle was published. At a stroke it raised the armoured tonnage annually laid down by Germany from 38,000 tons to 53,000 tons. It was passed by the Reichstag almost without protest, and Germany entered upon her new policy of naval expansion. About the same date the British Navy Estimates were introduced into the House of Commons, showing a reduction of two millions on the Estimates for 1905 and the abandonment of the new naval base which was to have been constructed at Rosyth. The British Admiralty and the British Government thus made it clear that they meant to pursue a policy of disarmament in face of the increase in the German programme. This was a prodigious encouragement to the German Government and nation. Had England, immediately after the passage of the Novelle through the Reichstag, adopted a naval programme providing two British ships of each class for every one that Germany began, it is safe to say that little more would have been heard of German naval expansion. The German people would have been taught by deeds that their rival was not prepared to abandon the command of the sea, and tens of millions would have been saved the British taxpayer. But instead of this England continued to disarm. On March 12, 1906, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman stated in the House of Commons that he had "openly expressed his opinion in favour of a general reduction of armaments, and no favourable opportunity would be lost for facilitating that result." The moment this was published Germany allowed it to be known that, "in no conceivable circumstance would she abandon the construction of a single torpedo boat or reduce her armed strength by a single battalion." Yet on May 12 a Liberal moved a resolution calling on the Government to take drastic steps to reduce the drain on national income caused by armaments. The effect of this motion, accompanied as it was by a memorial signed by one hundred and twenty-five Radical Members of Parliament, urging an immediate reduction in the British Navy, was to convince every German that England was at the end of her financial tether, and that Germany's opportunity had indeed arrived.

The action of these unpatriotic M.P.s was followed by intima

tions that the British naval programme would be heavily reduced, and on July 27, 1906, an official statement was made in the House of Commons as to the manner in which the British programme would be cut down. Four "Dreadnoughts" had originally figured in the programme. One was abandoned. Five ocean-going destroyers were whittled down to two, though in 1906 the German Navy was laying down twelve: and the twelve submarines were reduced to eight. The most astonishing fact was that the country was told in the words of the Government spokesman, that "the Sea Lords were unanimously of opinion that the balance of sea-power would not be imperilled by the reductions which they had recommended to their colleagues."

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Thus, at the very date when the German programme was increased, the British programme was cut down. Yet it is known from Mr. Mulliner's letters in the Times, that in the summer of 1906 the Admiralty were aware of the great increase then being made in the German gun and shipbuilding plant. They knew of the special and extraordinary efforts in progress, of the orders that had been given for machinery, of the work that was proceeding on the new slips. Some time before May 1906, they had received information that "Krupps have filled up the output of all the big machine-tool makers for the next year or two. Their whole scheme seems to be speed of production. . extensions will give them a possibility of output far in excess of the whole capacity in Great Britain.' Another letter to the Admiralty stated that Germany was obviously aiming at the completion of fourteen battleships "within such a time that it would be impossible for England to reply." What shall be said of an Admiralty which, with such a document in its possession, and thus forewarned of Germany's intentions, recommended a reduction in the British programme and did not communicate its information to the country? There were means by which it could have done this without showing its hand, for scarcely a week passed without some article, inspired by Sir John Fisher, appearing in the British "service" press, advocating the reduction of the Navy, ridiculing the German programme, and asserting that England could give the Germans a year's start, and then easily catch them up.

Nor was this all. Not only the programme of 1906 was to

be cut down, but also that of 1907 was to be reduced in the wild hope that at the Hague Conference some scheme of naval disarmament might be arranged. Ministers announced that the British programme of 1907 would consist only of two "Dreadnoughts," with a third if the Hague Conference proved a failure. This was another intimation to Germany that she might safely go ahead and redouble her efforts without awakening Sir John Fisher or the British Ministry from their slumber. No steps whatever were taken in England to increase the plant. Yet if fresh proof of the fatuity of imagining that Germany would cut down her fleet to oblige the Liberal Party in England had been required, it was given at the close of 1906, when the Reichstag was dissolved and a furious campaign carried out by the German Navy League in favour of a forward naval policy. In January 1907 the elections gave the German Government an overwhelming majority, pledged to support a boundless navy. By way of rendering the work of international disarmament easier, Prince Buelow, in a speech to an election crowd, declared that "the whole world will recognise that Germany sits firmly in the saddle and will ride down every obstacle in the way of her wellbeing and greatness."

But the incorrigible British Government and the incorrigible British Admiralty would learn nothing. Both still persisted in the pathetically silly idea that a new Hague Conference would remove all their difficulties. The Navy Estimates of 1907 showed large further reductions, though greatly increased estimates had just been brought forward in Germany and passed without a murmur. The demobilisation of the British Navy continued, and the forces in active commission were reduced and so distributed that it was impossible to give them thorough training, and the risk of defeat in detail was taken.

While a violent campaign in favour of a progressive enormous increase in the German naval programme was in progress in Germany, the Hague Conference met. The British project of disarmament was laughed out of court, yet in order to curry favour with Germany, and to satisfy the British pacificists and anti-patriots, concessions were made on England's part which will seriously hamper the British fleet in any future war, and expose neutrals to terrible danger. One would have supposed

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