and not of the word lead, it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead, by saying, it is a metal, which at once expresses several of its simple ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a body very heavy, fusible, and malleable.

§. 5. As part of the definition of the term defined.—A like trifling it is, to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined, or to affirm any one of the simple ideas of a complex one, of the name of the whole complex idea; as "All gold is fusible." For fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the sound gold stands for, what can it be but playing with sounds, to affirm that of the name gold, which is comprehended in its received signification? It would be thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely, as a truth of moment, that "gold is yellow ;" and I see not how it is any jot more material to say, "It is fusible," unless that quality be left out of the complex idea of which the sound gold is the mark in ordinary speech. What instruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed to know before? For I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me, or else he is to tell me. And if I know that the name gold stands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable, it will not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a proposition, and gravely say, "All gold is fusible." Such propositions can only serve to show the disingenuity of one, who will go from the definition of his own terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry no knowledge with them, but of the signification of words, however certain they be.

§. 6. Instance, man and palfry.—Every man is an animal, or living body, is as certain a proposition as can be; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things, than to say, “A palfry is an ambling horse," or a neighing ambling animal, both being only about the signification of words, and make me know but this that body, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving, are three of those ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word man; and where they are not to be found together, the name man belongs not to that thing; and so of the other, that body, sense, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I always comprehend and signify by the word palfry; and when they are not to be found together, the name palfry belongs not to that thing. It is just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any one or more of the simple ideas, that

altogether make up that complex idea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man; v. g. suppose a Roman signified by the word homo, all these distinct ideas united in one subject, corporietas, sensibilitas, potentia se movendi, rationalitas, risibilitas, he might, no doubt, with great certainty, universally affirm one, more, or all of these together of the word homo, but did no more than say, that the word homo, in his country, comprehended in its signification all these ideas. Much like a romance knight, who, by the word palfry, signified these ideas; body of a certain figure, four-legged, with sense, motion, ambling, neighing, white, used to have a woman on his back; might, with the same certainty, universally affirm also any or all of these of the word palfry; but did thereby teach no more, but that the word palfry, in his, or romance language, stood for all these, and was not to be applied to any thing, where any of these were wanting. But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing sense, motion, reason, and laughter were united, that thing had actually a notion of God, or would be cast into sleep by opium, made indeed an instructive proposition; because neither having the notion of God, nor being cast into sleep by opium, being contained in the idea signified by the word man, we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what the word man stands for; and, therefore, the knowledge contained in it, is more than verbal.

§. 7. For this teaches but the signification of words.-Before a man makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand the terms he uses in it, or else he talks like a parrot, only making a noise by imitation, and framing certain sounds which he has learnt of others; but not as a rational creature, using them for signs of ideas which he has in his mind. The hearer, also, is supposed to understand the terms as the speaker uses them, or else he talks jargon, and makes an unintelligible noise. And therefore he trifles with words, who makes such a proposition, which, when it is made, contains no more than one of the terms does, and which a man was supposed to know before, v. g. a triangle hath three sides, or saffron is yellow. And this is no farther tolerable than where a man goes to explain his terms, to one who is supposed, or declares himself, not to understand him; and then it teaches only the signification of that word, and the use of that sign.

§. 8. But no real knowledge.-We can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions, with perfect certainty; the one is, of those trifling propositions which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not instructive. And, Secondly,

we can know the truth, and so may be certain in propositions, which affirm something of another, which is, a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it. As that the external angle of all triangles, is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles; which relation of the outward angle, to either of the opposite internal angles, making no part of the complex idea signified by the name triangle; this is a real truth, and conveys with it instructive real knowledge.

§. 9. General propositions concerning substances, are often trifling. We having little or no knowledge of what combinations there be of simple ideas existing together in substances, but by our senses, we cannot make any universal certain propositions. concerning them, any farther than our nominal essences lead us; which being to a very few and inconsiderable truths, in respect of those which depend on their real constitutions, the general propositions that are made about substances, if they are certain, are, for the most part, but trifling; and if they are instructive, are uncertain, and such as we can have no knowledge of their real truth, how much soever constant observation and analogy may assist our judgment in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses that amount yet to nothing. For it is plain, that names of substantial beings, as well as others, as far as they have relative significations affixed to them, may, with great truth, be joined' negatively and affirmatively in propositions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be so joined; and propositions consisting of such terms, may, with the same clearness, be deduced one from another, as those that convey the most real truths; and all this, without any knowledge of the nature or reality of things existing without us. By this method, one may make demonstrations and undoubted propositions in words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things; v. g. he that having learned these following words, with their ordinary mutual relative acceptations annexed to them, v. g. substance, man, animal, form, soul, vegetative, sensitive, rational, may make several undoubted propositions about the soul, without knowing at all what the soul really is; and of this sort, a man may find an infinite number of propositions, reasonings, and conclusions, in books of metaphysics, school divinity, and some sort of natural philosophy; and, after all, know as little of God, spirits, or bodies, as he did

before he set out.

§. 10. And why.-He that hath liberty to define, i. e. deter

every one does in effect, who makes them stand for his own ideas), and makes their significations at a venture, taking them from his own or other men's fancies, and not from an examination or enquiry into the nature of things themselves, may, with little trouble, demonstrate them one of another, according to those several respects, and mutual relations, he has given. them one to another; wherein, however things agree or disagree in their own nature, he needs mind nothing but his own notions, with the names he hath bestowed upon them; but thereby no more encreases his own knowledge, than he does his riches, who taking a bag of counters, calls one in a certain place a pound; another, in another place, a shilling; and a third, in a third place, a penny and so proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and cast up a great sum, according to his counters so placed, and standing for more or less, as he pleases, without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a pound, shilling, or penny is, but only that one is contained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve; which a man may also do in the signification of words, by making them in respect of one another more or less, or equally compre

hensive.

§. 11. Thirdly, using words variously, is trifling with them.Though yet concerning most words used in discourses, especially argumentative and controversial, there is this more to be complained of, which is the worst sort of trifling, and which sets us yet farther from the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them, viz., that most writers are so far from instructing us in the nature and knowledge of things, that they use their words loosely and uncertainly, and do not, by using them constantly and steadily in the same significations, make plain and clear deductions of words one from another, and make their discourses coherent and clear (how little soever they were instructive), which were not difficult to do, did they not find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy under the obscurity and perplexedness of their terms: to which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill custom-do in many men much contribute.

§. 12. Marks of verbal propositions.-To conclude: barely verbal propositions may be known by these following marks :

First, predication in abstract.—First, All propositions, wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the signification of sounds. For since no abstract idea can be the same with any other but itself, when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term, it can signify no more but this, that it may, or ought to, be called by that name; or that these two

names signify the same idea. Thus should any one say, that parsimony is frugality; that gratitude is justice; that this or that action is or is not temperate; however specious these and the like propositions may at first sight seem, yet when we come to press them, and examine nicely what they contain, we shall find, that it all amounts to nothing but the signification of those terms.

§. 13. Secondly, a part of the definition predicated of any term.-Secondly, All propositions, wherein a part of the complex idea which any term stands for, is predicated of that term, are only verbal, v. g. to say that gold is a metal, or heavy. And thus all propositions, wherein more comprehensive words, called genera, are affirmed of subordinate, or less comprehensive, called species or individuals, are barely verbal.

When, by these two rules, we have examined the propositions that make up the discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books, we shall perhaps find, that a greater part of them, than is usually suspected, are purely about the signification of words, and contain nothing in them, but the use and application of these signs.

This, I think, I may lay down for an infallible rule, that whereever the distinct idea any word stands for, is not known and considered, and something not contained in the idea, is not affirmed, or denied of it, there our thoughts stick wholly in sounds, and are able to attain no real truth or falsehood. This perhaps, if well heeded, might save us a great deal of useless amusement and dispute; and very much shorten our trouble and wandering in the search of real and true knowledge.

CHAPTER IX.

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.

§. 1. General certain propositions, concern not existence.Hitherto we have only considered the essences of things, which being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence (that being the proper operation of the mind, in abstraction, to consider an idea under no other existence but what it has in the understanding), gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice that universal propositions, of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge, concern not existence; and farther, that all particular affirmations or negations that