1

The rights and
duties of the

reciprocal.

to him and obey his commands. Hiftory tells us, that the whole navy of England were likely to remain ftaunch unto him; nor is there any reafon to imagine, that the army, which was commanded by lord Feverfham, would have deferted from him; and it is more than probable, that had king James the Second, even at this time, fhewn the fmallest degree of energy, fpirit, or rectitude in governing, he would have prevented the greateft part of the nation from joining with the prince of Orange.

No fort of comparison can be drawn beking and people tween the rights and duties of a fovereign in his political capacity, and those of a subject in the natural capacity of an individual; for, as I have before obferved, the rights of the sovereign are, in fact, the duties of the subject, and the duties of the fovereign are the rights and liberties of the fubject. Now no one can deny that the community have in themfelves an indefeasible right of preferving their own rights and liberties, and thefe in our community chiefly confift in the advantages of a limited and efficient monarchy; and if that be by any means done away or abolished, it neceffarily induces an actual diffolution of that government, by which the community had agreed to be governed.

Anarchy

Anarchy is allowed by all writers to be the greatest political misfortune, which can befal a state, and the first principle of felfpreservation supplies every community with the right and the means of preventing and avoiding it. Attention to this laft principle will at one glance develop the neceffity, and justify the adoption of the revolution; for at that time the nation was in a state of the moft dreadful fermentation, and there could not be a stronger neceffity for efficient energy in the executive power of government, in order to allay and counteract the ferment, which threatened the very fubverfion of the nation. In this critical pofture of affairs, every action of the fovereign will be perceived to draw with it the most important confequences; nor can we in paffing judgment upon them make any allowances for perfonal prejudice, or want of judgment, knowledge, refolution, or courage.

I fhall not refume the queftion, whether England or Scotland expreffed with more propriety the actual ceffation of king James's reign, when the former used the term abdication, and the latter forfeiture of the crown. The actual exercise of the executive powers of the fupreme magiftrate is abfolutely neceffary for the actual fubfiftence of the English diffolution of

monarchy;

The ceffation of

the exercife of

the executive

power an actual

government,

monarchy; if, therefore, king James the Second did, as far as he could, annihilate or even fufpend the operation of the fupreme executive powers, it must be allowed that he did all that he could to annihilate, for the time at least, the very exiftence of the Englifh monarchy. We need therefore only to confider in what ftate this nation would have been, had it been left but for the space of one month in the fituation, in which king James endeavoured to leave it; and we shall ́ from thence be able to form a fatisfactory' judgment of the rights, which the nation fo abandoned had in them to fecure their own préservation. He withdrew, in the person of the king, the whole executive power of vernment; he called in his writs, which were about to be iffued for convening a parliament; he difmiffed his judges; he threw the great feal of England. into the river; he difbanded the army without pay; and let loofe a lawless armed force upon the nation. The actions of Now if a fupreme executive magiftrate, upon whom all fubordinate magiftrates depend, if the administration of justice, if armed force on certain occafions be requifite for preserv ing our present conftitutional form of government, it is felf-evident, that a king who has by overt and unequivocal acts attempted to deprive

king James an abfolute abandonment of his fovereignty.

8

go

deprive the community of thefe neceffary means of support and preservation, must be allowed to have done whatever he could to diffolve the government, and involve the nation in anarchy and confufion. In this light the warmeft devotee to the house of Stuart cannot furely deny, that king James the Second by these acts ceased, while their effects could laft, to be that fupreme executive power, which our conftitution requires the king to be. The actual duration of thefe effects could not by poffibility be known to the nation; and therefore as a community, upon the common principle of self-preservation, they had the indefeafible right of adopting fuch measures, as they thought moft conducive to attain that end. For if a government be actually diffolved for one hour, by the act of the go

vernor, the primeval rights of the governed

to chufe, fquare, and model their own government, revive in the fame extent, as they enjoyed them before the formation of the governnient fo diffolved. And upon these principles we must at this day candidly allow, that our ancestors, in 1688, did actually poffefs the right to make a new limitation of the crown, and to annex a new condition to the tenure of it.

If

Right of the na model the go

tion to new

vernment

wholly at the

revolution.

If we take an impartial view of the whole tranfaction, we shall neceffarily conclude, that our ancestors were fatisfied with the general form and tenor of our constitution and government, by. their continuing and confirming the greatest part, when an opportunity offered itself of new modelling the whole; and confidering that their then actual state of anarchy, and the preceding ferment and difturbances in the nation were. by the majority of them attributed to their fovereigns profeffing a different religion from their own, it is not furprising, that for the prefervation and fecurity of their own, ast well as the peace and tranquility of their pofterity, they should have taken the most effectual means of preventing the occafion of any fuch difafters in future. It was in fact a duty incumbent upon them to do it, under the prepoffeffions of the majority of the community at that time.

If king James the Second, circumstanced as he was in the year 1688, had put himself at the head of his army and militia; had he convened a free parliament; had he paid attention to the advice of his bishops, and the remonftrances of feveral of his people; and had he fummoned all his liege fubjects to their allegiance; whatever rebellion might